

USCIB: 13.7/42

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

19 May 1955

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Implementation of Categorization.

1. A cursory review of the reports of indoctrination totals as of 1 April 1955 indicates that further consideration of implementing procedures for categorization of COMINT may be in order. In brief, the reports of indoctrination totals submitted to this office contain no record of a Category II clearance, either in the case of consumer or producer personnel. In this connection, however, it should be noted that the report submitted by CIA indicates that an over-all re-examination of its cleared personnel is now in progress. A not inconsiderable difficulty arising from this situation is that it does not permit a satisfactory report "by category or sub-category, where applicable" to be made to U.K. and Canadian authorities pursuant to paragraph 26 of Appendix "B" to the UKUSA and CANUSA Agreements.

2. It is to be expected at this time that there would be few Category II clearances amongst the consumers. This office did, however, anticipate that the producers might have an appreciable number of Category II clearances owing to the number of personnel engaged in low grade intercept and processing tasks. It was also thought that the consumers might be able to follow the producers in limiting access to at least some of the material available.

3. It may be that the fact that the personnel security clearance requirements are identical for Category III and Category II indoctrination has led to the assumption that there is no practical difference between Category III and Category II access. If so, it should be remembered that one of the objectives of the Categorization scheme was to assist in restricting access to that high grade COMINT for which source protection is an overriding consideration. We have made the initial steps to single out such material. If we make no effort to build an access barrier between that material with which we can take no risk and that for which some risk is acceptable, we jeopardize the former (from the access viewpoint) to the extent that there is jeopardy to the latter.

4. We have now approximately forty-two thousand persons cleared for Category III COMINT. Approximately five thousand of these are consumers. It seems almost incredible that all of these persons have even a potential need for access to our highest grade COMINT. No doubt they all don't. Yet it is difficult to understand how the "need-to-know"

USCIB: 13.7/42

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~~~SECRET~~

USCIB: 13.7/42

~~SECRET~~Subject: Implementation of Categorization.

for that many persons can be administered effectively unless such administration is decentralized on the basis of a well understood standard. Nor can this office tell the Board what the real situation is under present circumstances.

5. It may also be that sufficiently rigid discrimination has not been exercised in circumscribing the material to be placed in Category III and that, in fact, much of what we have in Category III should be in Category II. If this is so, it is not difficult to account for the need for so extensive Category III access.

6. It is therefore recommended that the USCIB Security Committee examine the problem of administering clearances on the basis of the Category of access, reporting its findings and recommendations to USCIB through the Executive Committee.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

USCIB: 13.7/42

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~