

~~SECRET~~

124

USCIB: 12./16

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

3 June 1955

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Cryptographic Assistance to

Reference: USCIB 12./15, dated 24 May 1955.

EO 3.3(h) (2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the reference the enclosure is forwarded for consideration in connection with Item 1 of the Agenda for the 116th Meeting of USCIB.



H. D. JONES

Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure

NSA Serial 3809 dtd 3 June 1955.

USCIB: 12./16

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Serial: 3809

3 JUN 1955

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

SUBJECT: Cryptographic Assistance to

1. USCIB 12./15 with inclosures was forwarded to the members of USCIB with the information that this matter would be placed on the Agenda for discussion at the next regular meeting of USCIB. In order to assist the Board in arriving at a decision, comments by the Department of State and NSA members of USCIB have been requested.

2. The following comments are submitted:

a. NSA has no information to indicate that immediate COMSEC assistance, as recommended by the Army member, is in the best interests of the U.S. Therefore it is preferred to delay provision of such assistance until military operations plans are available. NSA emergency and war plans, of course, are in part based on the assumption that U.S. military allies will be furnished adequate COMSEC assistance.

EO 3.3(h) (2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

the past. However, the mere supply of cryptographic materials to these countries in the absence of secure practices surrounding the use of such materials would probably not effectively improve the level of COMSEC. Nevertheless, the supply by the U.S. of such materials could ultimately have an effect on the international communications of these countries

c. It is assumed that State Department comments will point out the difference between the NATO and SEATO structures and any corresponding differences in the type and amount of classified information circulated which might affect U.S. security. Except for timing, the comments of the Army member concerning SEATO communications do not conflict with the proposals set forth in paragraph 7 of NSA Memorandum Serial 2965-A (USCIB 12./15). In the case of SEATO, as well as it is considered advisable to await establishment of a SEATO command structure or determination of definite requirements for the COMSEC assistance required to support a military organization.

Enclosure with USCIB 12./16 dtd 3 June 1955.

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~Serial: 3809
3 JUN 1955

d. UK/US collaboration in SEATO COMSEC matters is considered essential. Some discussion at the working level has been held concerning the possible requirement for a common cryptosystem for high level planning. However, this matter has not yet been referred to NSA by higher authority in the U.S. The necessity for a Combined Working Group is not fully appreciated in view of the existing close technical liaison between the UK and U.S. and the fact that Australia (as well as New Zealand and Pakistan) receives most of its COMSEC guidance and material from the U.K.

3. It is recommended, therefore, that the immediate requirement be considered on its own merits and that the proposed actions of the Director, NSA, as set forth in the inclosure to USCIB 12./15, be approved.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

(Signed)
J. S. HOLTWICK, Jr.
Captain, US Navy
Deputy Chief of Staff
Operations

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~~~SECRET~~