

USCIB: 12./18

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

24

21 June 1955

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Issue of a Class A Cryptosystem to the [redacted]
[redacted] Army.

References: (a) USCIB 12./6 (COMSEC 2-8) dated 17 September 1954.
(b) USCIB 12./9 (COMSEC 2-15/1) dated 26 October 1954.

1. The Director, NSA has requested that the enclosure herewith be circulated to the members of USCIB for their concurrence in accordance with reference (a). It is noted that this matter has been previously circulated to the members of both USCIB and USCSB for general information by reference (b).

EO 3.3(h)(2)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

2. With reference to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the enclosure, attention is invited to the fact that this proposal was prepared prior to USCIB discussion of, and decision on, the Thai problem. Accordingly, it is requested that the attached vote sheet be completed to reflect your views upon the Director NSA's "intention to recommend to USCSB that the United States not undertake to provide a Class A cryptographic system for intra- [redacted] Army use".

3. It is further requested that vote sheet replies be returned to this office by the close of business, Thursday, 30 June 1955.



H. B. JONES
Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure

NSA Memo dtd 8 June 1955.

USCIB: 12./18

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

8 JUN 1955

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB

SUBJECT: Issue of a Class A Cryptosystem to the [redacted]
[redacted] Army

References: (a) USCIB 12./6, dated 17 September 1954

(b) USCIB 12./9, dated 26 October 1954

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

1. I have received a request from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U. S. Army, for the provision of a Class A Cryptosystem to the [redacted] Army for [redacted] Army use. As a result of the exchange of correspondence stemming from this request, I have been furnished with previous correspondence in the premises which was originated by the Eighth U. S. Army and successively indorsed by Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces, Far East; Headquarters, Far East Command; and Headquarters, Army Security Agency, Far East. It is to be noted that this is the correspondence referred to in ASAFE Message No. A 3267 which was attached as an inclosure to reference (b).

2. On the basis of the request from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U. S. Army, and the supplementary correspondence noted above, it has been ascertained that the most salient factors involved in the provision of a Class A cryptosystem to [redacted] Army units are as follows:

a. The inadequacy of one-time pads (DIANA), currently furnished by this Agency, to meet operational requirements.

b. The withdrawal on 31 December 1954 of all [redacted] cryptographic personnel below [redacted] Field Army level.

c. The expansion of [redacted] Army responsibilities and activities which necessitates rapid and secure internal communications.

d. The desirability of establishing secure teletypewriter communications throughout the [redacted] Army.

3. In this connection, I believe that it is pertinent to note that I recently submitted to USCIB my recommendation for the principles to be followed in considering a request for the provision of cryptographic assistance to the [redacted]. This recommendation was

Incl

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

designed to establish a specific policy under which the United States would not provide cryptographic assistance for the security of intra-
[redacted] communications. This was approved by the Members of USCSB and, although its application was restricted to the [redacted]

[redacted] question, its basis is sufficiently comprehensive for USCSB to make use of it in considering similar cases in the future. Essentially, this policy reflects the need to protect [redacted] and the difficulty of attempting to satisfy the cryptographic requirements of foreign governments from limited U.S. resources.

4. I have also recently submitted to USCSB my recommendations regarding a request for the provision of cryptographic assistance to [redacted], viz., that the USCSB apply the same policy to [redacted] as to [redacted], and authorize no assistance to improve the security of [redacted] communications. The Army member of USCSB has requested further discussion at a USCSB meeting and has suggested that the views of USCIB also be obtained. Accordingly, USCIB opinion on the matter has been requested by USCIB 12./15, dated 24 May 1955.

EO 3.3(h) (2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

5. In view of the above, and in the probability that the present request is sufficiently similar in principle so that action taken on the [redacted] request would provide ample guidance for dealing with that of the [redacted], I believe that, before I approach USCSB on the matter, prior coordination with you is desirable and reflects the intent of the procedures established by reference (a). It is my intention to recommend to USCSB that the United States not undertake to provide a Class A cryptographic system for intra-[redacted] Army use.

6. I recommend that USCIB support the foregoing views.


RALPH J. CANINE
Lieutenant General, US Army
Director

~~SECRET~~