

USCIB: 9.6/1

24

12 October 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Planning for Counter-Clandestine COMINT Coverage in Time of Emergency.


1. The enclosure is circulated for consideration at a suitable time. Present intention is to place it on the Agenda of USCIBEC for recommendations at a future meeting.

2. The Director, NSA has offered the following comments in connection with a discussion of an advance draft of the enclosure:

"In the (enclosure), the matter of planning for counter-clandestine COMINT coverage in time of emergency is emphasized. It should be noted that the Director would expect the USCIB study to have greater utility if its scope were enlarged to include consideration of the responsibilities and arrangements which have been established, or may be required, for collection, production, and use of (a) counter-clandestine COMINT and (b) collateral materials. Within this broader scope, USCIB probably should concentrate on plans and operations which must be developed as coordinated inter-organizational efforts (as distinct from plans and operations which might be developed by a single organization pursuant to its unique responsibilities).

"If, at an early stage of the USCIB study, it could be ascertained that the members share a common interpretation of existing and required responsibilities pertaining to this subject, the subsequent stages of the study probably would be simplified. It would seem advantageous for USCIB to form an ad hoc group to consider this matter of responsibilities, and any related matters which USCIB may refer to the group."

3. THIS DOCUMENT AND ITS ENCLOSURE CONTAIN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.

  
RUFUS L. TAYLOR  
Captain, U. S. Navy  
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure  
Proposal for Counter-  
Clandestine COMINT Planning

USCIB: 9.6/1

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-23-2015 pursuant to E.O. 13526

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- Subject: Planning for Counter-Clandestine COMINT Coverage in Time of Emergency.
- References: (a) USCIB 8/2 of 28 January 1948 (Item 1, SECT III, 49th USCICC).  
(b) USCIB 8/5 of 25 February 1948 (Item 1, SECT III, 50th USCICC).  
(c) USCIB 8/9 of 28 April 1948 (Item 1, SECT III, 52nd USCICC).  
(d) USCIB 8/14 of 8 October 1948 (Item 2, SECT III, 34th USCIB).  
(e) USCIB 8/16 of 16 November 1948 (Item 6, SECT II, 35th USCIB).  
(f) USCIB 8/17 of 30 November 1948.  
(g) USCIB 8/18 of 10 December 1948 (Item 4, SECT II, 36th USCIB).  
(h) USCIB 8/28 of 7 February 1951.  
(i) USCIB 8/29 of 9 February 1951.  
(j) USCIB 8/31 of 21 February 1951.  
(k) USCIB 8/34 of 9 March 1951 (Item 4, 61st USCIB).  
(l) USCIB 3/99 of 8 April 1953, item (d) (TRI 53/4 Final of 25 March 1953).

1. Reference (a) records a decision as follows:

"DECISION:

USCICC agreed that:

- 1) USCIB clearly has the responsibility for the exploitation of domestic telecommunications and related activities in the collection of foreign communication intelligence. This responsibility is not confined to the exploitation of clandestine telecommunications and related activities.
- 2) Since the responsibility for the surveillance of domestic telecommunications and related activities in the protection of U.S. internal security is already assigned to the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, no further action on the part of USCIB appears necessary respecting this field of monitoring activity, and this aspect of the field will not be considered further."

Enclosure with USCIB 9.6/1 dtd 12 Oct 1954.

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2. The above recorded decision did not fully dispose of this matter as can be readily seen by a glance through the reference. A brief resume of subsequent action follows in the succeeding paragraphs.

3. On 25 February 1948 (see reference (b) for details) the Coordinator reported that the FBI (not then a member of the Board) could not assume the responsibilities implicit in acceptance of the above quoted decision. The Coordinator indicated that the Navy was going ahead with plans for its own Reserve Listening Service. Subsequent discussion of the problem indicated that participation by the Army's Military Amateur Radio Service (MARS) might require legislation. It was agreed that the problem should be kept under consideration.

4. The next record of interest in connection with this problem appears in reference (c) wherein the questions of Air Force participation and the extent to which civilians might be used in the

The decision reached did not go beyond an arrangement to exchange and evaluate information.

5. Action on the problem of what to do about clandestine transmissions remained virtually suspended for several months when a proposal for a joint FCC-FBI intercept activity to monitor and exploit clandestine transmissions in the U.S. was considered by the Board (see reference (d)). The Board was somewhat concerned over certain implications of such a proposal and agreed to have its Department of State Member (Mr. Armstrong) explore the problem with the Chairman, FCC. This was done and Mr. Armstrong reported to USCIB at its 35th Meeting (see reference (e)) that FCC seemed to have the best of intentions and was quite willing to cooperate with USCIB. It was brought out that the operation was to be confined to work for the FBI on transmissions originating within the U.S. After considerable discussion USCIB agreed to have its Chairman consult the Director, FBI regarding the Bureau's needs. This was done and the report circulated under reference (f) was considered by the Board on 10 December 1948 (see reference (g)). The report, in effect, stated that the FBI's purpose was to explore the possibilities of having its needs in this field met by some Government agency already equipped to do the job with little or no increase in funds. USCIB's decision was to the effect that the COMINT activities under the cognizance of USCIB should

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make an effort to meet the Bureau's needs and that in the event such an effort proved to be unsuccessful the Director, FBI should arrange with USCIB for the coordination of any outside activity established to meet his needs. A letter to this effect was sent to the Director, FBI who indicated in his response a desire to cooperate with USCIB.

6. The next time subject question came up it was in the form of questions from the Department of State Member with regard to the policy to be followed in a forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics wherein it was anticipated that the question of measures to eliminate clandestine telecommunications stations might come up. The specific questions asked were (see reference (h)):

"1. Whether the US Government should take initiative at the forthcoming meeting toward the adoption of a resolution which would serve as a basis for establishment of a program similar to that undertaken during World War II?

"2. Whether such a resolution should be (a) directed specifically toward the identification and control of clandestine transmissions or (b) framed so as to cover the general field of subversive and clandestine activity in such manner as to permit the eventual development of a mutual monitoring program, if desired, without committing this Government to any immediate undertaking of this sort?

"3. Whether the US Government should avoid multilateral action in this matter, but should approach selected Latin American Governments on a unilateral basis?

"4. Whether the requirements and facilities of this Government are now such that cooperation with Latin American Governments in this matter should be avoided?"

7. In commenting on the above questions the Coordinator submitted the long report enclosed with reference (i). This is worth reading in full. It reviewed the background of the problem and, in effect, recommended against making any commitment at the forthcoming conference. It was suggested, however, that an ad hoc committee be appointed to make a thorough study of the entire problem. The report of this committee (reference (j)) recommended against any U.S. initiative in raising the question of a cooperative anti-clandestine monitoring program in Latin America and against any immediate commitment by the U.S. if the question should be otherwise raised. This view was approved by USCIB on 9 March 1951 (see reference (k)) and the matter was dropped from the Agenda.

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8. USCIB again gave this problem serious consideration at the [redacted] At that time USCIB undertook to "ensure that adequate counter-clandestine COMINT resources are devoted to the counter-clandestine COMINT effort (in wartime), including in particular, resources for General Search" (see reference (1)). From the records available to this office it appears that reference (1) constitutes the last occasion of consideration by USCIB of specific problems involving coverage of clandestine transmissions.

9. Since all of the above transpired, USCIB has been reorganized and strengthened and the National Security Agency has been firmly established. Many of the factors that have seriously complicated previous consideration of subject problem have been eliminated. It appears, therefore, that it might now be appropriate for USCIB to again consider the status of planning in this important field.

10. In order to provide adequate coverage of the transmissions of clandestine telecommunication stations an extensive, highly developed and highly specialized intercept organization is required. It should be possible to develop and train such an organization (and perhaps even put it to good use) in peacetime. If this is possible it should be done. Such an organization would require at a minimum the following elements:


- a. Numerous widely scattered intercept positions and reliable people to man them.
- b. An intercept control group to coordinate and direct the effort of intercept stations.
- c. An analysis group to identify and process intercepted traffic.
- d. An extensive long-range D/F net to locate the general area of transmissions.
- e. A well dispersed short-range mobile D/F organization with equipment of high accuracy and mobility to narrow the area of location.
- f. RFP equipment and files.
- g. Arrangements for guidance from, and for getting the end-product rapidly into, the hands of those who have the responsibility for translating counter-clandestine information into action.

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11. It is recommended, therefore, that the Director, NSA in collaboration with the other members of USCIB as necessary undertake to prepare a general plan to insure that adequate COMINT resources will be available in time of war to cover the counter-clandestine COMINT field.

  
RUFUS L. TAYLOR  
Captain, U. S. Navy  
Executive Secretary, USCIB