

USCIB: 9.6/7

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8 July 1955

~~TOP SECRET U.S. EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject: Counter Clandestine COMINT.

References: (a) USCIB 9.6/3 dated 18 April 1955.  
(b) USCIB 9.6/5 dated 10 May 1955.

1. USCIB approval of the conclusions and recommendations set forth in reference (a) established a concept of planning for Counter Clandestine COMINT operations.

2. In addition, USCIB empowered USCIBEC to approve for the Board and forward directly to the Director, NSA, the resultant INTCOM papers and recommendations concerning establishment of procedures and designation of action agencies in connection with this problem.

3. Resultant INTCOM papers and recommendations primarily concerned with the domestic portion of the problem are accordingly enclosed for USCIBEC consideration.

4. Members are requested to execute the attached vote sheet and return it to this office by close of business 19 July 1955.



H. D. JONES

Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure  
INT #0005 dtd 8 July 1955.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB:

Subject: Counter Clandestine COMINT.

Reference: USCIB 9.6/3 dated 18 April 1955.

1. Pursuant to the reference, subsequently approved by USCIB 9.6/5 of 10 May 1955, INTCOM recommends approval of the following enclosures:

a. Enclosure #1, with the understanding that the FBI member, as executive agent for USCIB in this matter, shall attempt, without bringing the FCC into the COMINT business, to obtain all pertinent information, including, if possible, the frequencies routinely monitored by that Commission. This information is needed to help avoid duplication of facilities.

b. Enclosure #2, setting forth a procedure that will insure appropriate notification of all members before any action is taken to either shut off or continue a source of Counter Clandestine COMINT information.

c. Enclosure #3, containing guidance requested by the Director, NSA relative to the priority of the Counter Clandestine COMINT effort in relation to other tasks. It is noted that appropriate consideration with respect to a priority change for this subject is being taken in connection with revision of the present Master COMINT Requirements List (MRL).

2. INTCOM further recommends approval of the following procedures:

a. That the Department of the Navy make provisions for prompt passing to NSA of information relevant to COMINT production acquired as a result of wartime civil censorship. The Navy member of INTCOM reported Departmental approval of such a procedure. As the NSA member concurred with the Navy member's proposed method of providing such information, INTCOM recommends that the detailed arrangements be left in the hands of the Department of the Navy and National Security Agency and that a copy of this final agreement be forwarded to the Executive Secretary, USCIB for file and reference purposes.

b. That the FBI and NSA members jointly determine the extent to



EO 3.3(h)(2)  
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3. Recommendations with respect to the phase 2 portion (all areas other than the North American or domestic area) of the matter are being prepared by the CIA and NSA members of INTCOM with a view to circulation and study in connection with the next meeting of the Intelligence Committee.



H. C. SIMMONS  
Lt. Colonel, USAF  
Chairman, INTCOM

Enclosures  
a/s

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COUNTER CLANDESTINE COMINT ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE FBI AND FCC

Pursuant to the informal arrangement already existing between the FCC and the FBI whereby the FCC furnishes all information it encounters regarding unidentified or unlicensed transmissions to the FBI, the FBI will act as the Executive Agent of USCIB by furnishing such information promptly to the NSA.

Enclosure 1 with INT # 0005 dtd 8 July 1955.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

DOMESTIC CLANDESTINE TRANSMISSIONS

In the event that a domestic clandestine transmission is uncovered, the FBI and the NSA will be immediately notified by the USCIB member who first becomes aware of such a transmission. The other USCIB members will also be promptly advised. If the transmitter is operated outside [redacted] USCIB will keep the FBI continuously informed of the value of the material transmitted. If the transmitter [redacted] [redacted] USCIB will similarly be advised and will keep the Department of State and the FBI continuously informed of the value of the material.

Enclosure 2 with INT # 0005 dtd 8 July 1955.

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PRIORITY OF THE COUNTER CLANDESTINE COMINT EFFORT

[REDACTED]

information that an "Illegal Directorate" was created in Moscow in 1947 for the purpose of establishing illegal intelligence operations throughout the world. [REDACTED] there are many advantages to illegal intelligence operations in peacetime as well as in war, and that the primary method of communication is through the use of clandestine radio.

OGA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] officials of the Illegal Operations branch of the \*Komitet Gosudarstvennaya Bezopastnosti (KGB) have travelled extensively during 1954-1955 in the United States, Canada and Mexico for the purported purpose of establishing illegal transmitters.

Further reliable information available to the FBI indicates that Soviet intelligence operations are to be increased in the United States, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

\*Committee of State Security.

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Enclosure 3 with INT # 0005 dtd 8 July 1955.

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