

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~ADDRESS DELIVERED BY COLONEL J. J. DAVIS (P/P) TO NSASAB, 21 APRIL 1954ELINT

1. As you may be aware, the field of ELINT is undergoing considerable study in the office of the Secretary of Defense and elsewhere. In the next few minutes, I intend to cover briefly recent developments in organizing ELINT for more effective control.

2. Last Fall, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advising with the Director of NSA, to study and make recommendations for the improvement of ELINT. The Director presented orally to the Operational Deputies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff his concept of the basic principles essential to the effective establishment of a National ELINT effort. The principles are summarized as follows:

a. First: The artificial distinction between ELINT and COMINT must be removed and the two fields joined in a close relationship for the control, direction and coordination of ELINT and COMINT. The two fields thus joined would be regarded as SIGINT (Signal Intelligence).

b. Second: An authoritative SIGINT body at the National level is necessary to insure proper policy direction and coordination of the National effort in the fields of SIGINT and other electronics countermeasures. This SIGINT body should provide for coordination with the SIGINT policy authorities of foreign nations.

c. Third: Unified operational and technical control of SIGINT collection and processing is necessary to insure the most effective and economical conduct of operations, the optimum utilization of resources, and the elimination of unnecessary duplication. Upon establishment of authority for such unified control, that authority should be responsible for technical collaboration with foreign SIGINT agencies.

d. Fourth: The military commander in the field must be provided with SIGINT close support for effective use of all weapons available to him to include active electronics countermeasures.

e. Fifth: Active electronics countermeasures must be coordinated with SIGINT activities for maximum effective utilization of SIGINT, and to resolve possible conflicts between active countermeasures and SIGINT operations.

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f. Sixth, and finally, I want to stress this point; in the initial phases of implementation of integrated SIGINT operations, the over-all control exercised at the policy level must be loose and understanding, providing the essential flexibility to permit SIGINT procedures and relationships to be developed at the operating level by the authority made responsible therefor to insure that both operational and intelligence requirements of authorized consumers are adequately met.

3. In January, the JCS, informed the Secretary of Defense that a Joint Electronics Analysis Group (JEAG) had been formed under the cognizance of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and would be composed of personnel contributed by the three military services. This action now placed the control of processing of non-communications intercept material under an intelligence committee, and established a three Service effort. Before, there had been, an Army-Navy effort set up by the Chief Signal Officer and the Director of Naval Communications. Within the Air Force a separate effort existed. The JCS asked the Secretary of Defense to note the action taken and stated as their views that ELINT was now well organized for an effective ELINT effort. CIA and NSA were also invited by the JCS to collaborate with JEAG and in turn stated that JEAG would cooperate fully with agencies concerned.

4. At the same time, the JCS instructed unified overseas commanders to take appropriate steps within their commands for maximum possible effectiveness of ELINT including arrangements for close coordination among Service ELINT organizations in the Command, and, if desirable to co-locate theater processing units.

5. The formation of JEAG has begun, with the Air Force providing the first Director. The JIC has requested for JEAG, interested agencies such as CIA, NSA, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development) to submit ELINT requirements which can be used for planning purposes in the initial phase of organizing JEAG. The Director of NSA has stated he has the following general requirements:

a. Information regarding the characteristics of non-communication signals for use by the COMINT authorities in identifying signals encountered in the course of COMINT intercept.

b. Information regarding the locations and functions of non-communication signals transmitters for use by the COMINT authorities in processing foreign communications related to those transmitters.

c. Communications signals (including unidentified signals which might be communications) and other COMINT materials inadvertently obtained in the course of non-communication electronic intercept/analysis.

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d. Information on non-communication electronic intercept/analysis equipment and techniques when it is considered that such information might be applied to COMINT interception and processing problems.

e. Information and proposals regarding those operational or research efforts in the non-communication electronic intercept/analysis field which may unnecessarily duplicate COMINT functions.

f. The sharing with COMINT authorities certain facilities which originally were procured for non-communication electronic intercept/analysis purposes.

6. Although the Secretary of Defense has not as yet informed the JCS of the acceptance of their action on ELINT, there is reason to believe that the General Counsel of the Department of Defense will oppose the action as being contrary to Reorganization Plan No. 6. Under Reorganization Plan No. 6, it is not envisaged that the JCS would conduct operations such as the kind assigned to JEAG.

7. At its last meeting, USCIB was asked by the Department of Defense member to consider extending its authority to include the field of ELINT. USCIB agreed in principle that it recommend to the National Security Council that USCIB authority be extended to the ELINT field in the same manner as it now extends to the COMINT field except insofar as this applies to the COMINT operations of the Director, National Security Agency. At the moment, an ad hoc committee under the cognizance of the Department of Defense member is drafting specific proposals for the extension of USCIB cognizance to the ELINT field.

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