MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Reports by the Director, National Security Agency re Fulfillment of COMINT Objectives.


The enclosed suggestions by the CIA member are circulated for information and consideration in connection with the reference and the entire matter of fulfillment of COMINT objectives.

Enclosure
CIA Memo dtd 10 Dec 1954.

RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB
MEMORANDUM TO THE MEMBERS OF USCIB

SUBJECT: Periodic Reporting by Director, NSA to USCIB

REFERENCES: (a) USCIB: 9.3/7  
(b) Enclosure to USCIB: 9.3/16, paragraph 9

1. The Director of NSA has reported on his operations under the Master Requirements List (ref. a). The Secretary of Defense has suggested, in this connection, that the Director of NSA report annually, (ref. b, para. 9).

2. The Director of Central Intelligence welcomes the suggestion that the Director of NSA report periodically to USCIB on his operations. The DCI anticipates, however, that an annual report may have to be supplemented by ad hoc reports on points which may arise from the discussion of an annual report.

3. In order to assist the Board in its discussion of the question of what material might be contained in a report of this nature, the DCI submits his views herewith.

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4. The principal purpose of the report would be to secure for the Board clear and concrete information on the current and anticipated ability of NSA to supply information bearing on the principal National Intelligence Objectives, and the Master Intelligence Requirements which stem therefrom. The Board should also be provided with the views of the Director, NSA, on what help he will need from the other members.

5. It is accordingly suggested that the report be responsive to the following questions:

I SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE PAST YEAR

A. What have been the principal accomplishments of NSA? What new systems have become readable? What significant new sources of raw material have been brought into production?
B. What have been the principal set-backs of the past year? What systems formerly readable, have become unreadable? What are the reasons therefor?

C. What significant trends have developed over the past year? What were the important developments in the communications procedures and techniques of important target countries?

II CURRENT STATUS OF EFFORT AT NSA

A. What percentage of the total effort (intercept, cryptanalysis, traffic analysis, translating) is presently being allocated to the traffic of the following areas:

1. USSR
2. Communist China
3. Other Orbit Countries
4. All other areas

B. What percentage of the "end product" in each of these areas is made up of:

1. Decrypts,
2. Plain Text,
3. Traffic Intelligence other than P/T?

C. What are the most important technical COMINT problems now being faced by NSA?

D. What are the current technical developments in NSA? What new equipment is under development?

E. What are the principal personnel problems and developments?

F. What help is NSA now receiving? - From other members? - From the UK? - Other?

III PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

A. What new systems does NSA hope to read in the course of the next year?

B. What presently readable systems does NSA fear to lose during the next year? Why?

C. What provision is NSA making for maintenance of flexibility to meet critical changes which may be expected to occur over the next year?
D. What help does NSA expect to need from the other members over the next year?

IV CONCLUSIONS

In the light of the above, what is NSA's opinion as to its ability to provide significant information in response to each intelligence requirement?

1. On which is it now providing a significant amount of information?

2. On which is it not now providing a significant amount of information? Why?

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6. In the light of the very highly sensitive nature of the above information, it is realized that a report along the above lines will present a difficult security problem. On the other hand, it is believed that the information should be provided if USCIB is to carry out its responsibility of giving policy guidance to the National COMINT effort.

Accordingly, it is proposed that only one copy of this report be furnished to each member, and that it be discussed only in Executive Session of the Board.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON
CIA Member, USCIB