MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject: USCIB Master Requirements List.


1. Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of the reference. A special meeting of USCIBEC to discuss this problem will be held at 1330, Friday, 7 January 1955, in Room 2E687, the Pentagon.

2. It is considered that discussion of the problem would be simplified and a solution more readily achieved if the members would be willing and prepared to attack this question along the lines indicated below.

3. For our purposes the question is one simply of how to use most efficiently and effectively a "common-user" collection facility with a broad, but still not unlimited, potential for obtaining high-grade (relatively speaking) intelligence.

4. The problem should be attacked in two stages, firstly, the establishment of a mechanism for the fulfillment of national intelligence requirements and, secondly, the establishment of a mechanism for the fulfillment of departmental intelligence requirements. As we go about solving the problem in these two stages we should consider whether the mechanisms for which we are searching do not already exist and need only be directed along the right path.

5. With regard to national intelligence objectives, it seems clear that these should be established without regard to the existence of sources. Clearly the IAC is the body to do this and, it is understood, has done so. Next, a statement of the requirements for intelligence necessary to meet these objectives must be prepared. This also should be done without regard to the existence of sources. Again, this would appear to be the function of the IAC.

6. Now comes the first big hurdle in achieving a mechanism for the fulfillment of national intelligence requirements. Having at hand a statement of objectives and the requirements for their fulfillment all in order of relative importance, it becomes necessary to assign the tasks of collection. At this point the extent of sources available must be considered and assignments made in accordance with the capabilities of those sources bearing in mind the reliability and accuracy factor for each source and the necessity for corroborative...
intelligence without creating undesirable duplication. The individuals who perform this task must in aggregate have not only a thorough knowledge of the peculiarities of any particular collection source, but also a thorough knowledge of the degree to which that collection source may be expected to fulfill a given requirement. This knowledge must then be pooled and assignment of collection tasks made in the light thereof. Such a mechanism does not appear to exist. It could be brought into existence within either the USCIB structure (by additional representation on the USCIB Intelligence Committee) or by creation of such a panel within the IAC structure and, for COMINT purposes (which is our concern here), including NSA representation on such a panel.

7. If we assume that we can solve successfully the problem of establishing a mechanism for the assignment of broad national collection tasks to the National Security Agency, the rest of the problem begins to fall apart automatically along the lines indicated below.

8. Having achieved an assignment of national collection tasks in the COMINT field, departmental COMINT requirements require consideration before a satisfactory implementing plan for employing the "common-user" source can be achieved. At this point, then, each member department and agency of USCIB should examine the national collection tasks which have been assigned to the National Security Agency and determine what if any of his departmental or agency requirements would not be likely to be included therein. A list in the form of additional COMINT collection tasks (if any) should then be prepared by each member department and agency of USCIB and a mechanism found for adjusting these requirements with the national tasks already established. USCIB would appear to be the mechanism for this purpose using its Intelligence Committee and Executive Committee for the necessary staff work.

9. Having now established in order of relative priority a list including both the national and the departmental tasks to be performed by the COMINT source, it becomes necessary to formulate an implementing plan and a means of assessing the effectiveness of such a plan. A mechanism for this must now be found. Since it is this aspect of the problem that has thus far not been solved to the satisfaction of our collector, the National Security Agency, it would appear that the NSA is the mechanism which should prepare the Implementing Collection Plan and submit it to USCIB for review and approval. With the National Security Agency now in possession of an approved collection plan we
need only find a way to see how well the plan works. A yearly report by the collector (the NSA) setting forth a quantitative and qualitative analysis of his efforts in response to specific questions posed by USCIB at the time of approval of the collection plan would appear to serve this purpose. Review of this report by USCIB and the IAC would provide a basis for determining the extent to which the allocation of tasks and the collection plan for the succeeding year need be altered. The cycle would then be established.

10. The above leaves several problems still unsolved, namely:

a. Ques. How are "crash" national requirements met?

   Ans. By decision of the IAC as to the degree of importance and urgency of the "crash" requirement and immediate, temporary alteration of the national collection assignment.

b. Ques. How are "crash" departmental requirements met?

   Ans. By direct, unilateral imposition on NSA of the collection task in writing with copies to the other members of USCIB. If the NSA cannot meet the requirement without serious detriment to national tasks or other departmental tasks the Director, NSA immediately so informs the USCIB member concerned who then refers it to USCIB for immediate resolution. The committee structure of USCIB can be made immediately responsive to such a circumstance.

c. Ques. How are adjustments of emphasis within an established departmental task achieved?

   Ans. By direct, unilateral, authoritative approach to the NSA at levels satisfactory to the Director thereof.

11. From the above it will be seen (if any substantial agreement to this is achieved) that most of the machinery we need is in existence and need only be bent to our will. If the Executive Committee can approve this philosophy of attack on subject problem it is suggested that USCIB be so advised and asked to let us proceed along the lines indicated above.

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