

USCIB: 9.3/30

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4 March 1955

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: USCIB Master Requirements List.

Reference: USCIB 9.3/23 of 10 January 1955.

1. Further to the plan outlined in the reference, the USCIB Executive Committee has received, and on 25 February considered a report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by the reference.

2. USCIBEC was unable to recommend the report in its entirety. It did, however, agree to several basic aspects of it and is continuing consideration of the remainder. In addition, the State Department member expressed the view that the general plan now being pursued by USCIBEC may not be the best one. The State Department member criticized the type of COMINT Requirements List proposed in the report and the steps recommended for its preparation, but agreed generally with the other proposals. He stressed the need to proceed as quickly as possible to the development of NSA's Implementation Plan and the actual allocation of resources, and said that basic COMINT requirements could be delineated in a much less complicated and more precise manner for this purpose. He offered to submit an example of how this might be done for diplomatic communications. He stated that he must abstain from endorsing or participating in those proposals of the report which dealt with the preparation of the COMINT Requirements List. He also stated that meanwhile he did not desire to block a majority of the Committee from proceeding with this preparation, if it so desired.

3. This notice, therefore, constitutes a progress report to USCIB by USCIBEC setting forth what has been agreed to date and what remains to be done.

4. Turning to the enclosure herewith, the memorandum for the Chairman, USCIB and TAB A thereto are agreed by USCIBEC. TAB B is not agreed. The majority of the Committee favor instead the following change to TAB B proposed by the NSA member:

"Para 1: No change.

Para 2: Delete all after subpara 'd'.

Para 3: Delete entire paragraph and substitute the following:

'3. The Committee is of the opinion that it would be impracticable to set forth details of the mechanics or the mechanisms by which supplemental guidance is provided until

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after the procedures for providing suitable basic guidance have been implemented and been found to be satisfactory. It therefore recommends that the Director, NSA, submit his recommendations in this respect, as soon as possible, but not later than sixty days, after he receives the initial basic guidance as provided in TAB A.'"

The Navy and Air Force members stated that they cannot accept the above quoted NSA proposal as they feel that the mechanism for providing supplemental guidance must be stipulated as part of the whole plan. They would accept TAB B with a few modifications (not included in this report). The Department of Defense member does not share either of the above two views on TAB B and has submitted a third proposal which has not yet been formally considered by USCIBEC but which is included herewith as an annexure to TAB B for the information and convenience of the members of USCIB.

5. TAB C to the enclosed report is still in draft form and has not been fully considered. For that reason TAB C is not included with the enclosure although it is mentioned therein. It consists of a list of priority national intelligence requirements based on the Priority National Intelligence Objectives set forth in DCID 4/4. USCIBEC's intention is that when this priority national intelligence requirements list has been completed it will be sent to USCIB for approval together with the recommendation that, as approved by USCIB, the list be forwarded to the IAC for approval as indeed representing priority national intelligence requirements. It is recognized that approval of the list by the IAC may be a time consuming process. It is for this reason that Recommendation 3b. of TAB A suggests that USCIB use the list (as approved by itself) as a basis for indicating which requirements USCIB believes should be assigned as COMINT tasks thus avoiding a long hiatus in implementing the plan set forth in TAB A.

6. It should be pointed out that the above described requirements list is a key factor in implementing the plan owing to the fact that the additional recommendations for the assignment of COMINT tasks and the development of an implementing plan for allocation of facilities are based on the assumption that an agreed national intelligence requirements list will be achieved.

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
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7. USCIBEC therefore recommends that the Board consider the plan set forth in the enclosure in the light of the explanation set forth above and indicate (a) that it considers the progress made thus far by USCIBEC to be acceptable, (b) that USCIBEC should continue its consideration of this problem and (c) such additional guidance as it may desire.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
a/s

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25 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USCIB

SUBJECT: Requirements of U. S. Intelligence Agencies for Information from COMINT Sources

1. The Executive Committee has considered the subject matter in its various facets, as directed in the 10 December meeting of the Board, and recommends that the problem be resolved as outlined in the succeeding paragraphs of this document, and the tabs thereto.

2. Underlying the entire problem is the basic question of how to use most efficiently and effectively a "common-user" collection facility with a broad, but still not unlimited, potential for obtaining information of relatively high intelligence value.

3. The Executive Committee feels that this problem can best be solved by establishing a means whereby USCIB provides the Director, NSA, with authoritative guidance in carrying out his function as a collector of intelligence information from COMINT sources. It feels that this guidance should be in two forms: basic guidance in the form of a USCIB approved list of the information required by the national intelligence community for which COMINT has been assigned the responsibility of producing (hereinafter referred to as the COMINT REQUIREMENTS LIST); and supplemental guidance whereby interpretation or amplification of the basic guidance, and periodic shifts of emphasis or interest therein, can be provided in a manner which will insure accurate communication of consumer desires to the producers of COMINT.

4. The COMINT Requirements List must meet certain criteria. These are outlined in TAB A, as are the successive steps which this committee feels are the logical ones in order that a list meeting these criteria can be developed.

5. It is recommended that the Board approve the recommendations listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of TAB A, and request or direct, as appropriate, the organizations designated therein to implement them.

6. After USCIB has approved and delivered to the Director, NSA, its guidance in the form of the before-mentioned list, it is necessary that an implementing plan be developed. The Executive Committee feels that preparation of this plan is properly the responsibility of the Director, NSA. We therefore recommend that after preparation of the COMINT Requirements List, USCIB forward it to the Director, NSA, together with a request that he (1) prepare an Implementing Plan (2) forward it to the USCIB for review and approval.

Enclosure with USCIB 9.3/30 dtd 4 Mar 1955.

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
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7. It is apparent that any increase of emphasis on any requirement or imposition of any new requirement, will normally require a corresponding decrease in the effort committed against some other requirement since it would be obviously impractical, inefficient, and wasteful for the Director, NSA, to hold in reserve any of his COMINT resources for such contingencies. It would likewise be improper to require, except under emergency conditions, that the Director, NSA, divert any of the resources which he is employing to maintain technical continuity. This Committee has therefore provided, in TAB A, for such changes in USCIB's basic guidance. TAB B describes two alternatives for a mechanism to provide the Supplemental Guidance mentioned in paragraph 3 above. USCIBEC is still considering the several proposals in TAB B and includes it in this report only to illustrate the nature of the problem and the solutions of it that are under consideration.

8. As a final step in the cycle of relations between consumer and producer, NSA should prepare, after a suitable period has elapsed since approval of its Implementing Plan, a clear and understandable progress report to USCIB concerning conformity with, and fulfillment of, the guidance received: the adequacy, in form and substance, of his basic guidance; an appraisal of the practical working of the procedures established for supplemental guidance; the basic allocation of COMINT resources; and an estimate of any additional resources required to improve the amount and quality of information produced. After study of this report, USCIB should advise the National Executive Agent as to the extent of the estimated additional resources it considers should be made available for COMINT production in the coming year.

9. Subsequently, the USCIB should revise, as necessary, its basic guidance, thus initiating the recurrence of the cycle.

10. The Committee recommends that the USCIB approve the concept advanced in paragraphs 8 and 9 above, and so advise the Director, NSA.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Chairman, USCIBEC

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TAB A

1. The Executive Committee is of the opinion that the COMINT Requirements List should meet the five criteria listed below in order to be satisfactory as basic guidance from the Board to the Director, NSA:

a. It should be based on, and be in consonance with, the most recent expression of National Intelligence Objectives.

b. It should not include requirements for information which are beyond, or inappropriate to, COMINT's potential capability to produce.

c. It should not include requirements for information for which Intelligence needs can be satisfied by other sources.

d. It should include requirements for information which could be obtained from COMINT which is needed to complement, supplement, or corroborate that from other sources.

e. It should indicate the relative importance attached to the COMINT-produced information pertinent to each requirement, by division of the List into categories of COMINT priority.

f. It must be quickly and flexibly responsive to changes in National Intelligence Requirements.

2. To produce a COMINT Requirements List which would meet the criteria listed, several operations must be performed. Starting with an authoritative list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives, these successive steps are involved.

a. Producing a list of National Intelligence Requirements.

b. Integrating into this all Departmental Intelligence requirements.

c. Eliminating from this list those requirements which can be fulfilled to the satisfaction of the Intelligence Agencies by other than COMINT sources of information.

d. Evaluating the potential of COMINT as a source of information in satisfying each remaining item, and eliminating those which are beyond the capability of or inappropriate for COMINT to satisfy or which do not serve to complement, supplement, or corroborate other sources of information.

e. Dividing the resultant list into categories of relative importance in order to indicate the priority which the Director, NSA should accord to each.

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3. The Executive Committee has considered the several ways in which the above-listed steps could be accomplished, and makes the recommendations indicated after the discussion in the following sub-paragraphs.

a. To produce a list of National Intelligence Requirements from the current list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives (DCID 4/4 of 14 Dec 54) requires that some provision be made for requirements in support of non-priority National Intelligence Objectives, which are defined implicitly in DCID 4/4 as those which do not "warrant priority in relation to normal coverage." If this can be done without expending the time-consuming effort involved in spelling out a list of the non-priority objectives themselves, it would appear profitable to adopt such a course.

Recommendation: USCIB stipulate, in the carrying out of the succeeding steps in this process, that any requirement for National or Departmental Intelligence which does not clearly and directly relate to one of the Priority National Intelligence Objectives be considered to relate to a non-priority objective.

b. The Committee feels that ideally an authoritative translation of DCID 4/4 into Priority National Intelligence Requirements should be made by a suitable body at the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence in collaboration with the IAC agencies. However, this has not yet been done, and, since there are other means of accomplishing the desired end result, the Committee questions the need for delaying implementation of this plan until an authoritative list is available. The CIA member of USCIBEC is preparing a document from which it is hoped such a translation can be made.

Recommendation: USCIB note that USCIBEC is preparing a draft of a National Intelligence Requirements List to be attached as TAB C to this report. This draft, when completed, will be forwarded to USCIB for approval as a base from which a COMINT Requirements List will be derived. Concurrently, it would be anticipated that USCIB would seek IAC approval of the USCIB approved draft National Intelligence Requirements List, when completed, but not of the COMINT Requirements List based thereon.

c. As the next steps in the process, it is necessary that National Intelligence Requirements in support of non-priority National Intelligence Objectives be added to the list adopted as a result of the preceding recommendation, and that any requirements for information needed for the production of Departmental Intelligence (NSCID #3 paragraph d 1) be integrated with them.

Recommendation: USCIB request each IAC agency, through its USCIB member, to submit a list of its requirements which fall within these categories; and

Recommendation: USCIB direct the USCIBINTCOM to combine these lists into one list to be added to the Priority National Intelligence Requirements List in order to obtain an overall all-source Intelligence Requirements List.

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d. In order to tailor this list to fit the potential capabilities of COMINT as a source, a body competent to assess the potentialities of all sources of information is needed. The individuals comprising this body must have in aggregate not only a thorough knowledge of the peculiarities of any particular source of information, but also a thorough knowledge of the degree to which each source may be expected to fulfill a given requirement. The Committee does not feel that it is necessary that this body be empowered to assign collection tasks to other sources than COMINT, or even to recommend which specific Non-COMINT source(s) be utilized in fulfillment of any requirement. Their task is primarily to compare COMINT versus all Non-COMINT, and determine those requirements for which COMINT is properly the primary, a complementary, a supplementary, or an inappropriate, source.

Recommendation: USCIB designate a committee of individuals having the specified competence, to review the all-source Intelligence Requirements List and (1) eliminate therefrom all requirements which COMINT has not a potential capability to satisfy or for which COMINT is not an appropriate information source; (2) eliminate therefrom all requirements which potentially are wholly within the capability of a Non-COMINT source to satisfy; (3) indicate those requirements for which COMINT is not the primary information source, but rather is used to complement, supplement, or corroborate information from other sources; and for each the degree to which COMINT information is needed for this purpose.

e. The end product of the operation discussed in the preceding subparagraphs will be a list of Intelligence Requirements properly assignable to COMINT as a source of information. They will be grouped into four categories of intelligence importance, in accordance with the categories of priority of the objectives to which they relate. Those for which COMINT is not the primary source of information will be identified, and for each of these the degree to which fulfillment is dependent upon COMINT-produced information will be indicated. In order to meet the specified criteria, those requirements for which COMINT is not the primary information source should be evaluated and compared with the others, in order that each can be weighed in terms of the relative amount of COMINT effort which is warranted on it, and that it can be then assigned if necessary a new category. At this point it may be desirable, or even necessary, to establish sub-categories of COMINT importance within one or more of the four categories of intelligence importance.

Recommendation: USCIB designate USCIBEC to carry out this operation.

f. The final list should be authoritatively reviewed and approved before delivery to the Director, NSA, as basic guidance.

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Recommendation: USCIB review, and approve the completed COMINT Requirements List.

4. Provision must be made for changes in the COMINT Requirements List which are necessitated by changes in the fundamentals from which this basic guidance is derived, and which will probably not occur at the same time as the recommended periodic revision. Such changes will be of the following types:

a. Changes in the IAC list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives, either in substance, such as addition of a new objective or deletion of an objective, or both; or in priority.

b. Similar changes in National Intelligence Requirements.

c. "Crash" requirements - usually of an interim or temporary nature, which do not result from or in changes in Priority National Intelligence Objectives or in National Intelligence Requirements.

Recommendation: USCIB approve all changes in the COMINT Requirements List necessitated by revision of the Priority National Intelligence Objectives or of National Intelligence Requirements, of the nature described in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above.

Recommendation: Each USCIB member (or his alternate) be required to approve any "crash" requirement, of the nature described in sub-paragraph (c) above, which his agency imposes upon NSA, and concurrently submit this requirement to other USCIB members for approval. In stating such a requirement its priority in relation to the COMINT Requirements List must be indicated, and, if possible, its probable duration.

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TAB B

1. The Committee recognizes that basic guidance, in the form of a COMINT Requirement List, whether it be that described in TAB A or any other which it is feasible to produce, will necessarily state requirements more broadly and in more general terms than are used in the conduct of COMINT operations. The basic guidance must, and will, be of such a nature as will permit using it as a base upon which to prepare an Implementing Plan upon which Implementing Programs can be based. Some means must, however, be provided to supplement it.

2. The Executive Committee feels that the nature and scope of such supplemental guidance must be determined in light of the following factors:

a. Supplemental guidance must be consistent with the basic guidance provided by the COMINT Requirements List.

b. Supplemental guidance, in the main, will be in the form of supplemental or amplifying requirements which are originated by the USCIB intelligence agencies individually or collectively, or which are prepared at the request of the National Security Agency.

c. The mechanism designed to provide supplemental guidance must be responsive to the daily needs of the USCIB intelligence agency(s) and to the requests of the National Security Agency for advice, interpretation, and clarification.

d. Coordination of supplemental requirements among the USCIB intelligence agencies is essential in those cases where two or more agencies have a common interest in the information requested, and provision must be made to facilitate such coordination.

e. USCIB intelligence agencies should establish a joint intelligence agency facility (hereinafter called The Panel) empowered to act authoritatively on matters of supplemental guidance.

f. The National Security Agency should establish a centralized facility (hereinafter referred to as "The NSA Group"), empowered to determine authoritatively NSA's action in response to the supplemental guidance furnished by, or requested from, the USCIB intelligence agencies.

g. Any extensive amplification of a Requirement(s) which necessitates reallocation of intercept or processing facilities must be approved by all USCIB intelligence agencies before NSA initiates implementing action.

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3. In light of the factors outlined above, it is the opinion of the Executive Committee that supplemental guidance can be provided most effectively by:

a. Establishing a panel composed of USCIB intelligence agency representatives, empowered to deal authoritatively with NSA on matters of supplemental guidance.

- (1) Requiring that each supplemental requirement be prepared in writing and directly related to a requirement(s) on the COMINT Requirements List.
- (2) Requiring that the panel approve each supplemental requirement which, though in conformity with the COMINT Requirements List, is an extensive amplification of a requirement(s) on the COMINT Requirements List, and authorizing the NSA Group routinely to bring such requirements to the attention of the panel for action.

b. Establishing a central facility composed of NSA representatives knowledgeable in terms of established consumer requirements and NSA capabilities, which can deal authoritatively with the panel on matters of supplemental guidance.

- (1) Establishing a central file at NSA of all supplemental requirements originated by the consumer agency(s) and accepted by the NSA Group.

c. Requiring that the panel meet with the NSA Group as frequently as necessary, and at least once each month, to solve, and to exchange information on, mutual problems, and to review the supplemental requirement file monthly to ensure that both consumer agencies and NSA agree on matters of supplemental guidance as reflected by the current file of supplemental requirements.

- (1) Empowering the NSA Group to remand to the panel any supplemental requirement which, in the opinion of NSA, requires coordination, or additional coordination, among the consumer agencies.

d. Ensuring that USCIB make decisions on all matters of supplemental guidance which are irreconcilable between the panel and the NSA Group.

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ANNEXURE TO TAB B (Proposal by Department of Defense Member)

1. The Committee recognizes that basic guidance, in the form of a COMINT Requirement List, whether it be that described in TAB A or any other which it is feasible to produce, will necessarily state requirements more broadly and in more general terms than are used in the conduct of COMINT operations. The basic guidance must, and will, be of such a nature as will permit using it as a base upon which to prepare an Implementing Plan involving the allocation to tasks of available COMINT production resources. Some means must, however, be provided to supplement it.

2. The Executive Committee feels that the nature and scope of such supplemental guidance must be determined in light of the following factors:

a. Supplemental guidance must be consistent with the basic guidance provided by the COMINT Requirements List.

b. The purpose of supplemental guidance shall be to affect the production of COMINT information within the approved allocation of resources.

c. Supplemental guidance, in the main, will be in the form of supplemental or amplifying requirements which are originated by the non-producer members of USCIB, individually or collectively, or which are prepared at the request of the National Security Agency.

d. The mechanism designed to provide supplemental guidance must be responsive to the needs of the USCIB agency(s) and to the requests of the National Security Agency for advice, interpretation, and clarification.

e. Coordination of supplemental requirements among the USCIB agencies is essential in those cases where two or more agencies have a common interest in the information requested, and provision must be made to facilitate such coordination.

f. USCIB should empower USCIBEC, or a standing group created by USCIBEC, to act authoritatively on matters of supplemental guidance.

g. Any amplification of a Requirement(s) which would require a reallocation of COMINT production facilities for its fulfillment must be approved by USCIB and forwarded to NSA as a change to the basic guidance.

h. In those cases where USCIBEC agrees unanimously to an amplification whose fulfillment would require a reallocation of COMINT production facilities and designates it as being of an emergency nature, it may be forwarded to NSA in advance of USCIB consideration, and NSA may act on it in advance of its inclusion in the basic guidance.

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i. Any NSA reallocation of COMINT production facilities reflecting a change to the approved Implementing Plan shall be reported to USCIB by NSA, whether the change results from a modification in the basic guidance or results from technical COMINT considerations. Changes in allocation not reflecting a change in the Implementing Plan need not be reported to USCIB by NSA, except in summary in its annual report. Any individual member may, of course, raise such changes for consideration in USCIB as it sees fit.

j. The Director, NSA, may carry out changes in the NSA Implementing Plan in advance of their consideration by USCIB when, in his opinion, time does not permit prior consideration by USCIB.

3. In the light of the factors outlined above, it is the opinion of the Executive Committee that supplemental guidance can be provided most effectively by:

a. Empowering USCIBEC to formulate authoritative supplemental guidance for NSA.

(1) Requiring that each supplemental requirement be prepared in writing and directly related to a requirement(s) on the COMINT Requirements List.

(2) Requiring that USCIBEC approve each supplemental requirement which, though in conformity with the COMINT Requirements List, would adversely affect production by NSA of some existing or planned line of COMINT end-product, and requiring NSA routinely to bring such requirements to the attention of USCIBEC for action.

b. Requiring that USCIBEC meet as frequently as necessary, and at least once each month, to solve, and to exchange information on, mutual problems, and to review the supplemental requirement file monthly to ensure agreement on matters of supplemental guidance as reflected by the NSA current file of supplemental requirements.

(1) Requiring NSA to remand to USCIBEC any supplemental requirement which, in the opinion of NSA, requires coordination, or additional coordination, among the USCIB agencies.

c. Ensuring that USCIB makes decisions on all changes to basic guidance and all matters of supplemental guidance which cannot be unanimously agreed in USCIBEC.

4. The Committee is of the opinion that it would be improper to specify the mechanics or mechanism by which the Director, NSA, implements the basic and supplemental guidance which he receives from USCIB. It considers, however, that a description of such mechanics should be requested from the Director, NSA, to be based on the assumption that useful COMINT guidance will be formulated and provided to NSA as described in TAB A.

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5. USCIBEC recognizes that decisions on the most desirable interworking of USCIB members, individually and collectively, with NSA should not be made until an NSA implementing mechanism has been decided. It considers imperative to mutual understanding and cooperation, however, that adequate provision be made to inform NSA in detail of the intelligence considerations underlying USCIB guidance and requirements, and to inform USCIBEC authoritatively of the details of implementing action taken by NSA. It therefore recommends that the Director, NSA, provide, together with an outline of his implementing mechanism, his recommendations as to the most desirable working relationship to prevail between the requirements structures of USCIB and the individual members thereof, on the one hand, and the Director, NSA, and his implementing functions on the other.