MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject: USCIB Master Requirements List.


1. Further to the understanding reached at the 26th Meeting of USCIBEC on 25 February 1955, the CIA Member has prepared a draft list of priority national intelligence requirements for consideration as TAB C to the report forwarded with the reference. The CIA draft is enclosed herewith.

2. It will be noted that the requirements stated in enclosed list and the Priority National Intelligence Objectives on which it is based are not listed in priority order as is the case in the existing USCIB Master Requirements List (dated 3 July 1953). In this connection, attention is invited to the FOREWORD of the enclosed list and to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of DCID #4. Comparisons between the enclosed list and the existing MRL will undoubtedly be made and many similarities in substance noted. This is to be expected since our intelligence problem has not changed so radically between 1953 and now as to create an entirely new set of interests. The difference in form of presentation of requirements is, however, as stated above, a distinct change.

3. It is requested that the members of USCIBEC examine the enclosure with a view to determining whether they find it suitable for forwarding to the Board as a basis for the COMINT Requirements List described in TAB A of the enclosure with the reference, and, if not considered suitable, what changes they would recommend in order to make it suitable.

4. It is therefore requested that the attached vote sheet be executed and returned to this office prior to the close of business Friday, 18 March 1955.

Enclosure

RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 08-20-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526
FOREWORD

1. DCID 4/4, Priority National Intelligence Objectives, approved 14 December 1954, have been established pursuant to NSCID No. 4, paragraph 2, "as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy."

2. In implementation of this directive, CIA has prepared a draft list of requirements (attached) as an initial step in the formulation of coordinated national intelligence requirements. These requirements are intended (a) to identify the critical elements of intelligence that must be produced by intelligence research to meet the priority objectives, and (b) to provide a basis for the coordinated allocation of overall collection responsibilities and resources, and the development of detailed information requirements by each agency for specific source material.

3. The National Intelligence Objectives in DCID 4/4 are listed in three levels of priority, and each objective within a given category bears the same priority as the other objectives in that priority category. Requirements will bear the same priority as the objectives to which they relate.

4. In accordance with DCID 4/4, the Priority National Intelligence Objectives will be reviewed for revision at least semi-annually by the Board of National Estimates. Immediately after such review, it is proposed that the requirements will be reviewed and appropriate revisions incorporated.
REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - I b

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NIO - I c

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

-7-

SECRET
National Intelligence Objective - I d

Requirements

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EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II a

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II d

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II e

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II h

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EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II k

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II q

The political, economic, and military strengths and weaknesses of non-Communist regime in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

REQUIREMENTS

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II s

The stability and orientation of the effect thereon of economic difficulties, events in Southeast Asia, the increasing power of nuclear weapons, and progress in rearmament.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II

The reactions of governments and peoples in Western Europe, particularly in the
____________, to the increasing power of nuclear weapons and to increasing Soviet nuclear warfare capabilities; the effect of such reactions on the coherence and effectiveness of the NATO alliance.

REQUIREMENTS

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1. Attitudes, activities of government, degree of popular support thereto, in relation to:

2. Strength and activities of parties, factions, and key individuals in relation to their support or opposition to rearmament, sovereignty, reunification, the settlement and WEU, particularly as indicated by:

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
national intelligence objective - ii v

__ tendencies toward the revival of ultranationalism and militarism.

requirements

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1. government attitude and activities, and popular reaction thereto, with reference to: (a) rearmament; (b) acceptance of soviet proposals; (c) nato; (d) relationships as a sovereignty with foreign (particularly communist) countries; (e) economic expansion; (f) interzonal trade.

3. activities and following of individuals and groups favoring militarism, ultranationalism, their relationship to larger parties or factions, the effects of their activities upon the government and the popular reaction.

eo 3.3(h)(2)
pl 86-36/50 usc 3605
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II w

The strength, composition, interrelationships, capabilities (political, subversive, and clandestine), and vulnerabilities of major Communist parties outside the Soviet Bloc and of international Communist front organizations, particularly the political and paramilitary capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Communist parties in trends in global and local Communist party tactics.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

1. Strength and composition as indicated by: (a) discipline, ideological maturity and class composition of membership; (b) identity, policy orientation and calibre of leadership; (c) organizational efficiency, communications channels, methods of financing and structure; (d) size and ratio of hard-core membership to sympathizers.

2. Policies and objectives as indicated by: (a) programs, internal publications and propaganda; (b) readmissions and purges of "deviationists," and changes in leadership; (c) emphasis accorded to various types of activity; (d) significant additions or deletions in Soviet/Communist propaganda output.

3. Interrelationships between major Communist parties and policy direction of these parties and of international Communist groups as indicated by: (a) major Soviet or Cominform ideological pronouncements relating to national, regional or international Communism; (b) contacts with and indications of instructions from high level Orbit or non-Orbit party personalities; (c) indications of the extent and timing of Orbit financial support; (d) similarities or divergencies in tactics, propaganda and objectives of major Communist parties and international front organizations; (e) financial support rendered to Communist parties by front organizations.

4. Capabilities as indicated by: (a) appropriateness of policies and tactics and general receptiveness thereto; (b) degree of infiltration and strength in labor movement, professional associations, government institutions, armed forces; (c) size and training
of organized sabotage and paramilitary units; (d) size and financial health of national and local press and clandestine publication facilities.

5. Vulnerabilities as indicated by: (a) degree and effectiveness of anti-Communist control measures; (b) effectiveness of Western counterpropaganda, policies and aid; (c) potential or actual internal doctrinal conflicts or personal rivalries; (d) internal organizational weaknesses, such as inadequate communications channels between center and provinces, inadequate covert organization; (e) public awareness of control from Moscow; (f) increasing strength of anti-Communist unions.

The following list of "major Communist parties" has been compiled on the basis of: (a) the strategic importance of the country to the USSR; (b) the party's size and capabilities, and (c) the party's position within the international Communist movement:

The following international organizations, and those national organizations operating under their auspices, are considered major:

- The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) (Including Trade Departments or Trade Union Internationals)
- The International Union of Students (IUS)
- The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)
- The Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)
- The World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)
- The International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)
- The World Federation of Teachers' Unions (FISE)
- The International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)
- The International Broadcasting Organization (OIR)
The International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR)
The World Peace Council (WPC)
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III a

The policy of the government, with particular reference to its position in the global balance of power, its relations with Communist China and the USSR, and its attitude toward developments in Southeast Asia.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

1. Official and popular reactions to: (a) Asian policies and activities of the United Nations, Western powers, USSR, and Communist and non-Communist Asian countries; (b) official visits and meetings with high level Communist personalities; (c) expansion of Communist control in South and Southeast Asia; (d) SEATO and Communist efforts to develop an organization of Asian nations.

2. Plans and activities of government: (a) gain Asian or Western Europe support for a Third Force (non-Communist, non-Western Bloc); (b) expansion of trade with Communist countries; (c) expand its own military capabilities; (d) acceptance of economic, military or technical aid from and exchange of scientific and technical information with Communist countries; (e) improve internal economic conditions to preclude necessity of seeking aid from Western or Communist Blocs; (f) development of internal political and economic programs to build popular support of the government; (g) strengthen effectiveness of border troops; (h) degree to which liberal-conservative factionalism within the ruling party affects the government capabilities for preparing and implementing above activities.

3. Indications of official recognition of dangers of Communism (a) tightening of controls over Communist Party; (b) tightening of controls over activities of official representatives of Communist countries.
REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III c

Arab-Israel relations, with particular reference to the possibility of an outbreak of open warfare.

REQUIREMENTS

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE – III d

The stability and policy of the [government, with particular reference to developments relating to Middle East defense plans, the Suez base, and the Sudan.

REQUIREMENTS

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE – III e

Nationalist unrest and Communist connections therewith.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

1. Strength and activities of nationalist groups: (a) reactions to programs and policies; (b) degree of control maintained by leaders; (c) participation in governments; (d) coordination of plans and activities of various groups; (e) evidence of Communist connections or control; (f) intentions toward future cooperation and collaboration; (g) identification of leaders; (h) attitude toward local French population; (i) support by foreign nations, particularly Egypt.

2. Strength and activities of Communist, terrorist and other subversive organizations: (a) composition and leadership; (b) source of finances and arms; (c) plans and coordination of activities; (d) relationship with and degree of control by nationalist or foreign elements; (e) interference with operation of US bases.

3. Strength of control: (a) strength and loyalty of armed forces and police; (b) degree of responsibility afforded local individuals or groups; (c) effectiveness of economic and political reforms; (d) effectiveness of control over popular morale and over nationalist groups and leaders; (e) control over foreign propaganda.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III f

The stability and policy of the Governments of [blank], the general trend of popular opinion in those countries, and the trend in parliamentary politics.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

1. Composition, strength, plans and activities of political parties and factions and pressure groups with particular reference to: (a) degree of popular support; (b) strength and following of individual leaders; (c) efforts to combat effectiveness of government measures; (d) ability to influence government measures; (e) placing of members in strategic government and military positions; (f) attitudes on government foreign policies (particularly on East-West trade, NATO, SEATO), economic issues, and European defense; (g) general attitude toward Communism; (h) attitude in the East-West struggle.

2. Policies and strength of government: (a) ability to control internal opposition; (b) popular support; (c) control of armed forces including police; (d) effectiveness of economic controls and reforms; (e) foreign policies, particularly on East-West trade, NATO, SEATO; (f) ability to develop support of minority parties; (g) effective control of Communists and Communist propaganda; (h) ability to increase national prestige and influence; (i) increased relationships with Communist countries; (j) control of labor organizations.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III g

Scientific and technological developments in

REQUIREMENTS

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1. Planning and control of scientific and technical research and development in (a) organization, locations, functions, and key personalities of controlling or supervising agencies; (b) allocation of funds and materials; (c) foreign affiliations or influence in each principal field of science; (d) availability or shortage of scientific manpower and facilities in each field of basic science; (e) objectives, achievements and potential of higher education in each principal field of science.

2. Research and development activities (including tests, successes, failures), installations and facilities, and key personalities related to: (a) nuclear BW and CW weapons; (b) guided missiles and rockets; (c) aircraft armored vehicles; artillery, combat weapons, naval vessels; (d) transportation equipment; (e) electronic equipment; (f) optical photogrammetric and aerial photographic equipment; (g) meteorological, hydrographic instruments and methods; (h) industrial, agricultural and mineralogical machinery and methods; (i) basic sciences in which important but as yet unknown technological "break throughs" are most likely to occur; (j) research and development on known concepts of potential significance.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III h

The stability and orientation of the Yugoslav Government, its strategic intentions in the event of war, and the strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of its armed forces.

REQUIREMENTS

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NIO - III h

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III i

The development of militant nationalism in Latin America and Communist exploitation of this trend.

REQUIREMENTS

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1. Reactions and activities of government, political parties, and organizations with reference to: (a) U. S. economic policies which conflict with national interests; (b) policies and practices of foreign owned firms located in country; (c) real or potential foreign exploitation of natural resources; (d) efforts to increase political and economic independence of U. S. through domestic developments, increasing ties with other foreign nations, and policy on control of offshore waters.

2. Exploitation of nationalistic issues by Communist front organizations by: (a) use of radio, newspapers and other propaganda media; (b) attempts to form popular front movements.

3. Effectiveness of Communist exploitation of nationalism as indicated by degree of influence on government and party policies and on organized business and labor groups.
Economic conditions and trends in backward countries, particularly as they affect vulnerabilities to Communist propaganda on the one hand and attitudes toward the United States and the West on the other.

REQUIREMENTS

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1. Attitudes, capabilities and activities of government in regard to: (a) economic developments, modernization and mechanization; (b) increasing business and commercial relations and securing aid from US or Western nations; Communist nations; (c) securing aid through UN or other international organizations; (d) developing undeveloped areas; (e) control and development of natural resources; (f) effectual control of labor; (g) control or counteractions to Communist or Western propaganda; (h) detrimental effect of natural phenomena.

2. Popular reaction to: (a) government policy on economic issues; (b) aid from Western or Communist nations; (c) Communist efforts to create and exploit economic difficulties; (d) modernization of methods and machinery; (e) exploitation of natural resources by foreign nations.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III k

Non-Soviet nuclear energy research and development; the production of fissionable materials and the use of such materials for weapons or other purposes.

REQUIREMENTS

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1. Research, developments, production, in any non-Soviet country related to nuclear energy: (a) locations, sizes and capabilities of installations and facilities; (b) type of fissionable materials produced, amounts and distribution; (c) type of foreign aid received and identification of country supplying same; (d) degree of government control; (e) type of aid received from the UN and local reactions thereto.