

USCIB: 9.3/42

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~~~APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS  
CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

25 April 1955

~~TOP SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: USCIB COMINT Requirements List (CRL).

References: (a) USCIB 9.3/37 of 24 March 1955.  
(b) USCIB 9.3/39 of 1 April 1955.

1. Enclosed herewith are two target papers for use in developing a final COMINT Requirements List which USCIBEC can recommend to USCIB for approval. Enclosure 1 is the Department of State member's contribution. It includes a draft memorandum for the Chairman, USCIB to use as a vehicle for forwarding to the Secretary of Defense whatever list is ultimately approved. Enclosure 2 is the Air Force member's suggestion for a COMINT Requirements List.

2. In accordance with the decision reached on item 3 of the 27th meeting of USCIBEC the enclosures herewith together with reference (a) need now to be consolidated into a single CRL. In this connection the CIA member advises that he will offer several changes to reference (a).

3. Accordingly a special meeting of USCIBEC will be held Thursday, 28 April 1955, at 1400, in room 2054, Temporary "Q" Building to discuss this question and to see what can be done to arrange the marriage mentioned in paragraph 4 of reference (b).

*H. Taylor*  
for RUFUS L. TAYLOR  
Captain, U. S. Navy  
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosures  
a/s~~APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS  
CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

USCIB: 9.3/42

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20 April 1955

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USCIBEC

SUBJECT: Long-Range COMINT Requirements

Recent USCIBEC discussions indicate a tendency to accept as a resolution of the long-range requirements problem either a brief list of general topics or a lengthy amalgamation of subject matter lists compiled by the member departments and agencies. The Department of State member believes that neither of these schemes is feasible since the Director, NSA has already stated that the existing MRL, which is a list of general topics, and its appendices, which are lengthy subject matter lists, do not provide him with the requisite guidance.

On the assumption that something other than a re-writing of previous approaches to the problem is necessary but accepting the need for fitting COMINT requirements into a general USCIB-approved framework the following documents are submitted for the consideration of USCIBEC:

- (1) A draft transmittal memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from the Chairman, USCIB.
- (2) A basic COMINT Requirements List.
- (3) An annex to the basic list.

These are target papers offered in the hope that the new approach presented therein can provide a means of solving this very difficult problem.



T. Achilles Polyzoides  
Department of State Member

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20 April 1955

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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Guidance for COMINT Activities

USCIB has considered the requirements of its member departments and agencies for information which may be derived from COMINT activities and has prepared a consolidated statement of the objectives to which these activities should be directed. The statement is contained in the attached "List of COMINT Objectives" and its Annex. It is designed to serve as the long-term guidance for the conduct of DIRNSA's COMINT production activities to meet the needs of the departments and agencies authorized to receive COMINT.

The List of COMINT Objectives contains (1) the broad COMINT tasks which should constitute the mission of NSA, (2) the Priority National Intelligence Objectives to which these tasks relate and (3) the COMINT targets considered relevant to the COMINT tasks. The COMINT targets are the communications which, by their content or the technical information available from them, are considered to contain the information needed from this source. The Annex to this list presents details which should be considered in allocating resources to these targets.

The COMINT tasks and targets are presented in order of their importance based upon (1) the national objectives set forth in DCID 4/4, (2) the unique character of COMINT as a source of information and (3) the usefulness of this information in relation to intelligence from other sources. Insofar as possible and reasonable and subject to the procedures for adjustment outlined below, COMINT production resources should be directed to the accomplishment of these tasks in the order listed. However, all the tasks are important and it should not be considered that every target listed under a given task is more important than all the targets listed under tasks falling lower in the list.

USCIB recognizes that COMINT production resources are insufficient to accomplish fully all the tasks listed, that the order of tasks and targets may not constitute the most efficient basis for allocating existing COMINT resources and that successful exploitation of COMINT targets can rarely be achieved in direct proportion to the resources applied to them or in order of their

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relative importance. Also, USCIB has not attempted to cover basic requirements for technical development and continuity. For these reasons it is, therefore, the intention of USCIB that the Director, NSA examine the attached list and, considering the technical factors which he alone can evaluate properly, present to USCIB a proposed plan for the allocation of COMINT production resources, together with comments on the adequacy and utility of the List of COMINT Objectives. It is anticipated that on the basis of these comments and the allocation plan USCIB may desire to adjust the targets to achieve greater flexibility and to obtain optimum benefit from the actual capabilities of COMINT activities.

USCIB recommends that the enclosed List of COMINT Objectives and its Annex be promulgated as the basis for the conduct of COMINT production activities subject to the adjustment procedure described immediately above.

Allen W. Dulles  
Chairman, USCIB

Attachments

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DRAFT

BASIC COMINT REQUIREMENTS LIST

20 April 1955

Priority National  
Intelligence Objectives  
(DCID 4/4)

COMINT Tasks

COMINT Targets

1. Support for military operations during hostilities and prior to hostilities maintenance of COMINT resources in an adequate state of readiness.

None

(A brief statement of Orbit communications on which minimum continuity must be maintained.) Details are contained in the Annex

2. Early warning of an attack or specific preparations for an attack upon the US, its forces or Allies to whom the US has a defense commitment.

Ia and b

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



3.



Ic and d

(A brief statement of the relevant types of Orbit communications.) Details are contained in the Annex

4.

Ia and b  
IIa,b,c,g,h,i,j,m,o,q,  
r,s,t,u,v and w  
IIIa,b,c,d,e,f,h,i and j



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- 2 -

COMINT Tasks

5. Support for the clandestine and counter-clandestine activities of the US.

6.

7.

9.

Priority National  
Intelligence Objectives  
(DCID 4/4)

IIc, i, m, o, q, w  
IIIb, d, e, h, and j

IIId, f, l, n and p

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

IIb, c, d, e, i, k, m and o

IIq, r, s, t, u, v and w  
IIIa, b, d, e, f, g, h, i, j and k

IIq, s and v  
IIIc and h

COMINT Targets

(A brief statement of the relevant types of clandestine communications.)  
Details are contained in the Annex.

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20 April 1955

ANNEX TO THE BASIC COMINT REQUIREMENTS LIST

DETAILED TARGET INFORMATION

Task 1

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605


Support for military operations

(State the Orbit communications on which minimum continuity must be maintained prior to hostilities and other details necessary for an adequate state of readiness. This might also be followed by a statement of the communications which will be needed for support during hostilities.)

Task 2

Early warning of attack or preparations for an attack

(Details of relevant Orbit communications)



- d. Of the targets listed in a and b, the communications of the USSR, Communist China, Poland and Czechoslovakia are considered most important and justify a substantial expenditure of US COMINT resources, as do the communications of [redacted]. However, research within these targets on systems that are considered unreadable



The communications of the other countries listed justify considerable emphasis in the COMINT program but from an intelligence point of view allocation of effort to these countries should be based to a large extent on the principle of applying resources where they are fairly certain to assist in the current reading of major systems.


EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605


Task 3

Information on Orbit weapons of mass destruction

(Details of relevant Orbit communications)

Task 4





The communications of Group II are also of high priority interest. The actual or potential intelligence available from these problems justifies considerable emphasis in the COMINT program although the individual targets do not warrant as much expenditure as the countries noted above. From an intelligence point of view allocation of effort to these countries should be based to a large extent on the principle of applying resources where they are fairly certain to assist in the current reading of major systems.

In the case of Group III countries the primary intelligence need is for timely exploitation of high and medium level communications which can be read with a relatively inexpensive effort; that is, less effort than would be justified in the case of Group II.

The above priorities considerations would be subject to revision in the case of major changes in the international situation or major changes in US COMINT capabilities.

d.



10.

11.



Task 5


Support for U.S. clandestine and counter-clandestine activities  
(Details of relevant types of clandestine communications)

Task 6

To provide basic Orbit military information  
(Details of relevant Orbit service and internal communications)

Task 7

Information on internal Orbit developments



(Details of other relevant communications)

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Task 8

Information on internal developments in non-Orbit countries

 Communications

a. The targets listed under Task 4  
(Details of other relevant communications)

Task 9

Military information on non-Orbit countries  
(Details of relevant service communications)

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214

SS 12514

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COMINT REQUIREMENTS

Related To

Priority National Intelligence Objectives  
(DCID 4/4)

~~Handle Via COMINT Channels Only~~

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**TOP SECRET**FOREWORD

21 APR 1955

1. This working paper is intended as the Air Force contribution to the proposed new USCIB COMINT Requirements List. It is anticipated that its contents will be consolidated with similar statements from other consumer members of USCIB to provide the Director, National Security Agency with basic guidance in carrying out his function as a collector of intelligence information from COMINT sources.

2. The requirements set forth herein have been prepared and reviewed by personnel of the Directorate of Intelligence, Headquarters USAF, who are familiar with the capabilities and limitations of both COMINT and collateral material. Requirements which can be adequately fulfilled by means other than COMINT have been excluded.

3. The compilers have concentrated their attention upon writing requirements for information critically needed for timely USAF planning, decision, and action in support of national policy. As there are a number of other subjects in which the Air Force has an important, though sometimes secondary, interest, the requirements drafted by the Central Intelligence Agency and circulated as an inclosure to USCIB 9.3/37 have been examined in detail. In all cases where a CIA requirement appears to cover air intelligence needs, this has been indicated in the present paper by the phrase "Same as CIA draft".

4. Air Force requirements have been listed on the following pages under the Priority National Intelligence Objectives to which they relate. DCID 4/4 divides these objectives into

- I. Highest Priority
- II. High Priority
- III. Priority

but states that within each category the order of listing of objectives "is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items". This lack of differentiation among objectives within a category gives rise to certain curious situations. For example, "the political, economic, and military strengths and weaknesses of non-Communist regimes in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia", apparently rate as equal in importance to "the strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite armed forces." In the opinion of the Air Force compilers, it will be necessary for USCIB to establish the relative priority of all the intelligence objectives within each of the three categories in terms of COMINT goals and resources before a truly meaningful, useable guide can be drawn up for the Director, NSA. Pending such determination by USCIB, it has not been considered practical to attempt to list the Air Force requirements in priority order under the various intelligence objectives.

5. This paper is submitted with the understanding that the Air Force will have an opportunity to participate fully in the preparation of the final USCIB List.

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~~TOP SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - I a


Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans particularly Soviet intentions and plans to initiate hostilities using Soviet or Satellite armed forces.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS


1. Intelligence concerning the standing operational plans to be put into effect at start of war and any code designations for such plans.

2. Indications that the Soviet Bloc may initiate hostilities within 30 days:




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


3. Indications that the Soviets may initiate hostilities within a 60 to 90 day period:

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4. Indications that the Soviets may initiate hostilities more than 90 days hence:



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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - 1 b



REQUIREMENTS


EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

- 1. Same as CIA draft.



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
5. Same as Requirement 3 in CIA draft.
6. Same as Requirement 4 in CIA draft.
7. Same as Requirement 5 in CIA draft.
8. Same as Requirement 6 in CIA draft.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - I e




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EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605




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
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EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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


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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - I d



REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.
- 3. Same as CIA draft.
- 4. Same as CIA draft.
- 5. Same as CIA draft.
- 6. Same as CIA draft.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II a

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

[Redacted]

- 2. Same as CIA draft.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II b

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.
- 3. Same as CIA draft.

\*\*\*\*\*

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II c

[Redacted]

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(NOTE: Although COMINT is not the sole source of the information listed below, it is a valuable supplementary source.)

REQUIREMENTS

[Redacted]

2. Same as CIA draft.

3. Same as CIA draft.

[Redacted]

5. Same as CIA draft.

\*\*\*\*\*

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II d

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

1. Same as CIA draft.

[Redacted]

3. Same as CIA draft.

4. Same as CIA draft.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II e

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

[Redacted]

- 2. Same as CIA draft.
- 3. Same as CIA draft.
- 4. Same as CIA draft.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

\*\*\*\*\*

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II f

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. CIA draft seems generally satisfactory, except in the following respects:

[Redacted]

- 2. Same as CIA draft.
- 3. Same as CIA draft.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II g

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.

\*\*\*\*\*

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II h

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft, plus  
(h) policies or agreements which give privileges to USAF.

\*\*\*\*\*

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II i

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.
- 3. Same as CIA draft.

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- 4. Same as CIA draft.
- 5. Same as CIA draft.

\*\*\*\*\*

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II j

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.
- 3. Same as CIA draft.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II k

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.
- 3. Same as CIA draft, plus [Redacted] at end of sentence.
- 4. Same as CIA draft.
- 5. Same as CIA draft.
- 6. (a) through (e) same as CIA draft. Delete (f).

7. [Redacted]

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II l

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

1. NOTE: CIA draft is generally satisfactory, except for items (a) and (g).

[Redacted]

2. NOTE: Reference CIA draft. In the USAF view,

[Redacted] Hence USAF requirements have already been stated under Objective I c.

3. Same as CIA draft.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

4. NOTE: Add to CIA draft, "(c) [Redacted] and re-letter other items accordingly.

[Redacted]

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II m

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.
- 3. Same as CIA draft.
- 4. Same as CIA draft.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II n

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

1. NOTE: CIA draft is generally satisfactory, except for items (a) and (g). USAF [Redacted] have been covered in Highest Priority Category.

2. NOTE: Reference CIA draft. In the USAF view, [Redacted]

3. NOTE: Add phrase [Redacted] at end of CIA draft.

4. Same as CIA draft.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II o

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.
- 3. Same as CIA draft.
- 4. Same as CIA draft.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II p

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

1. Same as CIA draft.

2. NOTE: Add to end of CIA version the phrase [Redacted]

3. Same as CIA draft.

\*\*\*\*\*

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II q

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

1. Same as CIA draft.

2. Same as CIA draft.

NOTE: Although Air Force intelligence analysts could use to advantage the information outlined in these two requirements, there is considerable reason to question whether II q properly belongs in a list of priority COMINT objectives. Other sources presumably could supply much of the required information.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II r

[Redacted]

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REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II a

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II t

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.
- 3. Same as CIA draft.
- 4. Same as CIA draft.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II u

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II v

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.
- 3. Same as CIA draft.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II w

[Redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~REQUIREMENTS

1. Same as CIA draft.
2. Same as CIA draft.
3. Same as CIA draft.
4. Same as CIA draft.
5. Same as CIA draft.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III a

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

1. Same as CIA draft.

2. Same as CIA draft, plus additional item: (e)

[Redacted]

\*\*\*\*\*

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III b

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

1. Same as CIA draft.

2. Same as CIA draft.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III c

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

1. Same as CIA draft.

2. Same as CIA draft.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III d

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.
- 3. Same as CIA draft.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III e

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.
- 3. Same as CIA draft.
- 4. Same as CIA draft.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III f

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III g

[Redacted]

REQUIREMENTS

[Redacted]

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REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III i

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REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.
- 2. Same as CIA draft.
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III j

Economic conditions and trends in backward countries, particularly as they affect vulnerabilities to Communist propaganda on the one hand and attitudes toward the United States and the West on the other.

REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.

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REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Same as CIA draft.

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