MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: COMINT Capability Against Chinese Communist Communications.

References:
(a) USCIB 9.2/7 dated 25 October 1954.
(b) USCIB 29.13/5 dated 25 October 1954.

1. USCIB met in special session on 26 October 1954 to consider the ways and means of obtaining communications intelligence on Communist China, particularly with respect to early warning for attack on Formosa or the off-shore islands.

2. With particular reference to the views presented by the Department of Defense Member, COMINT was recognized as a major component of the national intelligence effort against Communist China and USCIB agreed that every possible effort must be directed toward solution of the Chinese Communist COMINT problem in priority second only to the COMINT effort against Russian communications. Conclusions contained in references (a) and (b) above were accepted.

3. Consideration was then given to the policy aspects of:
   a. Obtaining U.S. COMINT base rights in Formosa.
   e. Feasibility of employment of ship-borne intercept.

With respect to sub-paragraphs a and b above, it was agreed that for COMINT reasons the recommendations contained in reference (a) to provide no significant payment except cash and certain already programmed equipment and training support are sound. In addition, to overlook the already overwhelming payment received by the Chinese Nationalist Government in the form of United Nations support, protection by the Seventh Fleet, assistance through MAAG, and so forth, would be parochial. It was agreed, however, that there is a very real possibility that the exercise of maximum pressure on the Chinese Nationalist Government to satisfy these demands will be unsuccessful if this pressure is not made a part of an integrated U.S. policy.
4. USCIB recognized that it is not within its competence to implement the conclusion reached in paragraph 3 above, but believes that this Government should be in a position to demand and obtain Formosan bases and CHICOM COMINT on the grounds that these are necessary to successful continuation of existing national policy. If existing negotiation channels are unsuccessful, it is felt that necessary approaches should be made at highest Government levels. In the way of additional payment, the U.S. should need only recognize an obligation to advise the Chinese Nationalist Government promptly of any known Chinese Communist intentions to attack Formosa, without necessarily identifying or compromising the source.

5. With respect to sub-paragraph 3c above, the three following possibilities should be exhaustively examined:

a. That DCI resources can provide the assistance required by NSA.

b. That the military services have unique unused resources whose employment can be authorized by the DCI.

c. That the requirements outlined in paragraph 3 above exist.

6. With regard to sub-paragraphs 3d and 3e above, it was agreed that a broad statement from USCIB should be paralleled by specific and detailed proposals from the Director, NSA, as formulated by him concerning expansion of COMINT facilities at and that USCIBEC should continue its study of the feasibility of employment of ship-borne intercept.

7. The following courses of action were then approved:

a. That the National Security Council be advised through the Special Committee as follows: (See enclosure)

(1) That the requirements outlined in paragraph 3 above exist.
Subject: COMINT Capability Against Chinese Communist Communications.

(2) That the conclusions outlined in paragraphs 3 and 4 above are considered valid and consistent with national policy as understood by the Board, which requests the assurance of integrated national support, if required.

(3)

b. That the Director, Central Intelligence, be advised as follows:

(1)

(2) That USCIB recommends maximum use be made of all available resources for this purpose.

c. That the military members of USCIB advise the Director, Central Intelligence, of any unused capabilities for direct action.

d. That the Director, National Security Agency, be advised as follows:

(1) The U.K. is to be notified of USCIB actions as outlined in USCIB 9.2/7 and USCIB 29.13/5.

(2)

(3)

e. That USCIB be advised as follows:

(1) Recommendations contained in USCIB 9.2/7 and USCIB 29.13/5 are approved.
Subject: COMINT Capability Against Chinese Communist Communications.

(2) USCIBEC is to supervise implementation of unfinished action with respect to subject problem.

(3) USCIBEC is to continue to study in detail the problem of ship-borne intercept and processing as an alternate solution to the Chinese Communist problem.

(4) Further policy guidance will be provided when received from the National Security Council.

8. Enclosed herewith is a draft of a proposed memorandum for the members of the Special Committee for approval by the members of USCIB. It is requested that the members send their approval or comment to the office of the Executive Secretary by the close of business on Monday, 8 November 1954.

RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
a/s
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FOR COMINT:

Subject: U.S. COMINT Capabilities Against Chinese Communist Communications.

1. The United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) met in special session on 26 October 1954 to consider ways and means of obtaining adequate communications intelligence on Communist China, particularly with regard to early warning of an attack on Formosa or the off-shore islands. The following immediate COMINT requirements were determined to exist:

   a. A need for U.S. COMINT base rights in Formosa.

   d. 

   e. A study of the feasibility of employment of ship-borne intercept.

2. With respect to base rights on Formosa, USCIB agreed that no significant payment beyond cash and equipment already programmed plus training support should be made. USCIB feels that to overlook the already overwhelming payment received by the Chinese Nationalist Government in the form of United Nations support, protection by the Seventh Fleet, assistance through MAAG, and so forth, would be parochial. However, it was agreed there is a very real

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possibility that the exercise of maximum pressure on the Chinese Nationalist Government to satisfy these demands will be unsuccessful if this pressure is not made a part of an integrated U.S. policy.

3. USCIB recognizes that it is not within its competence to implement the conclusion reached in paragraph 2 above, but believes that this Government should be in a position to demand and obtain from the Chinese Nationalists Formosan bases and Chinese Communist COMINT on the grounds that these are necessary to successful continuation of existing national policy. If existing negotiation channels are unsuccessful, it is felt that necessary approaches should be made at highest Governmental levels. In the way of additional payment, the U.S. should need only recognize an obligation to advise the Chinese Nationalist Government promptly of any known Chinese Communist intentions to attack Formosa, without necessarily identifying or compromising the source of such knowledge.

a. That the DCI resources can provide the assistance required by the National Security Agency (NSA).

b. That the military services may have unique unused resources whose employment can be authorized by the DCI.
5. With regard to the feasibility of employment of ship-borne intercept, it was agreed that a broad statement from USCIB to the should be paralleled by specific and detailed proposals from the Director, NSA, as formulated by him, and that USCIB should continue its study of the feasibility of employment of ship-borne intercept.

6. USCIB recommends:

a. That the conclusions indicated in paragraphs 2 and 3 above be considered valid and consistent with national policy and that it be assured of integrated national support, if required.

(DRAFT)
Chairman, USCIB