

USCIB: 7./4

) 10 May 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: COMINT Arrangements for SACLANT.

Reference: IRI 53/2 FINAL of 25 March 1953.

1. The enclosure, which is self-explanatory, is circulated for appropriate action.

2. Attention is invited to the reference in addition to those listed in the enclosure hereto.

3. THIS DOCUMENT AND ITS ENCLOSURE CONTAIN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EX-PRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.

Laptain, U. S. Navy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure DNI Serial 000517-54 dtd 30 Apr 1954.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

> 0p-322YB1/lar SY/000517-54

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From: Director of Naval Intelligence To: Executive Secretary, USCIB

Subj: COMINT arrangements for SACLANT

Ref: (a) USCIB 13/261 of 26 June 1952 (b) USCIB 13/274 of 18 July 1952 (c) USCIB 14/260 of 1 December 1952

1. The need of SACLANT for U.S./U.K./Canadian COMINT has long been recognized in principle by USCIB, and certain arrangements have been approved. However, in view of the increasing number of unsolved problems and the informal manner in which dissemination to SACLANT has been effected, it would seem that the time has come to review the entire SACLANT problem as it relates to: (1) the dissemination of COMINT to U.S., U.K., and Canadian recipients, and (2) SACLANT "Y" planning.

2. Dissemination of COMINT to U.S. and U.K. nationals has developed in a somewhat haphazard manner, fostered by the very close and informal working relationships which have always existed between the Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence), SACLANT, and the DNI. The responsibilities of the latter with regard to servicing SACLANT have been assumed more or less, as an accommodation to the former:

a. In April 1952, the Navy SSO CINCLANTFLT was advised that any communications regarding COMINT originating in SACLANT would be handled in Navy SSO channels.

b. By reference (a), DNI requested that the billets of Deputy Commander and ACofS(I), SACLANT, be serviced with U. S. COMINT. The following statement was contained: "Navy has an established SSO channel and will be responsible for dissemination." Board approval was given by reference (b), and LSIB concurred.

c. In July 1952, CINCLANTFLT raised the question of the use of D/F nets in combined exercises. This again brought the SACLANT problem before the Board, and resulted in a Tripartite Conference, November 1952, to "consider all aspects of the SACLANT COMINT problem." The conference results, forwarded by reference (c), contained among other papers SAC/E/R/5, "Arrangements for Exchange and Dissemination Within SACLANT's Command of COMINT Beyond the Scope of Third Party Collaboration," setting forth the OIC concept for SACLANT and subordinate commands.

3. The SACLANT "Y" plan has had a somewhat more orderly development. The Tripartite Conference referred to above drew up SAC/E/R/7, COMINT Arrangements

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Which May Be Made with Third Parties Within the Framework of Allied Commands, the original SACLANT "Y" concept. This paper was reconsidered at the UKUSA Planning Conference, March 1953, and resulted in Annexure P2, Annex P. Subsequently, there were further developments:

a. Commander George NOACK, USN, in April 1953, assumed the duties of SACLANT "Y" Officer, following SACLANT suggestion that he occupy the staff billet "C22, Director of Strategic Intelligence," oral concurrence in his nomination by the Naval Board, Ottawa, through the Canadian Liaison Officer, and formal approval of Admiralty through BJSM on 31 March 1953.

b. By SecDef memorandum of 18 January 1954, DIRNSA was designated as the U.S. authority with whom the SACLANT "Y" Officer could communicate on D/F matters. On 27 January, DIRNSA delegated his responsibilities in these matters to CNO.

c. Planning for SACLANT "Y" implementation is now in process.

4. From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that there are several aspects of both SACLANT problems still unsolved. With regard to dissemination to U.S., U.K., and Canadian recipients:

a. Little or nothing has been done toward implementation of SAC/E/R/5 which contains one immediate requirement; namely, that communication circuits and crypto channels be provided as soon as possible on a scale commensurate with peacetime requirements. This lacuna stems partly from the following:

(1) Despite specific recommendations in the document, no action has been initiated by SACLANT.

(2) There has been no COMINT executive agent designated for that command.

(3) Aside from the COMINT arrangements in SAC/E/R/5, the inability of U.S. and U.K. authorities to reach an agreement on the concept of OIC's for NATO commands, as such.

b. No formal SOP exists for the servicing of U.S., U.K., and Canadian recipients, again because of the lack of an executive agent.

5. With regard to the SACLANT "Y" plan, there is a feeling on the part of some members of the Board that:

a. The appointment of Commander NOACK as SACLANT "Y" Officer should be formalized.

b. Arrangements should be made within SACLANT for supervision and control of codeword and related material.

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6. It is recommended that this paper be circulated to the members of USCIB with a request that views of interested departments and agencies be submitted to the Executive Secretary. It is further recommended that, following receipt of these views, they and this paper be placed before USCIBEC at a regular meeting for recommendations in the premises.

> (Signed) Carl F. Espe Rear Admiral, USN



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