MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: SACLANT Y Program.

References: (a) USCIB 7./7 of 18 June 1954.
(b) SAC/E/R/(6) FINAL of 14 November 1952
    (see USCIB 14/260 of 1 December 1952).
(c) TRI 53/2 FINAL of 25 March 1953
    (see USCIB 3/99 of 8 April 1953).

1. In view of the action that may be taken on reference (a) and
   considering the possibility of a misunderstanding arising out of the
   several papers approved for SACLANT Y planning, reference (b), corrected
   in accordance with reference (c), is enclosed herewith as a re-issue for
   current information and file.

2. The enclosure (a corrected version of reference (b)) is a
   shortened version of Annexure P2 and Exhibits 1 and 2 thereto of
   Appendix P to the UKUSA Agreement. It is to be used as a guide by
   SACLANT in any approach to Third Parties. In this connection particular
   attention is invited to the fact that the substance of paragraphs 20 and
   21 of Exhibit 2 to Annexure P2 of Appendix P does not appear in the
   Security Appendix (App. B) to SAC/E/R/(6).

Enclosure
SAC/E/R/(6) Final
dtd 14 Nov 1952
(corrected version)
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE (Y) ARRANGEMENTS FOR SA CLANT

I

GENERAL

1. It being recognized that some aspects of Communication Intelligence (COMINT) will remain purely national secrets, nothing in these proposals should be construed as suggesting compulsory disclosure of information hazardous to national security or vital interests. It is at the same time considered that cooperation in war between the Communication Intelligence units provided for the direct support of the forces under SA CLANT (hereinafter called Y units) is an essential requirement.

2. Detailed planning for this wartime cooperation should be initiated as soon as possible.

3. The following principles are suggested as the basis for this planning.

NOTE: Pertinent definitions are given in Appendix A hereto.

II

DETAILED PROPOSALS

SACLANT Y Structure

4. The SACLANT Y Structure should have the following elements:

   a. A senior Y officer at SACLANT Headquarters (SACLANT Y Officer) assisted by a Y staff.

   b. Y Officers and Y Staffs, where required, at headquarters of major subordinate Commanders under SACLANT.

   c. National Y units provided for support of SA CLANT forces.

5. It is recommended that the responsibility for formulating and implementing SACLANT's Y policy lie with A.C. of S. (I), SACLANT.
Participation in SACLANT Y Structure

6. Participation in the SACLANT Y Structure, including Y staffs, should be open to all nations contributing combat forces to SACLANT command, together with Y units, adequate for their direct support or contributing Y units for general support of the SACLANT Command. It shall be a condition of participation that these nations undertake to enforce appropriate security measures as set forth in Appendix B hereto, and also undertake to apply the principles set forth therein, as a minimum, to all other COMINT activities under their control.

7. Participation in the activities of the SACLANT Y Structure will be limited to those nations whose geographical location and Y units can, in SACLANT's opinion, contribute to the over-all effectiveness of the structure.

8. Participation only in the shore-based direction finder operations will not necessarily entitle a nation or its nationals to receive other types of Y information.

9. Only nationals of those nations participating in the SACLANT Y Structure may have any detailed knowledge of the Y plans or other Y arrangements made.

10. Each participating nation should provide and maintain its own Y units contributed for the support of SACLANT, or forces under his command, and should ensure their operational efficiency.

Functions of the SACLANT Y Staff

11. The functions of the SACLANT Headquarters Y officer and Y staff should include:

   a. effecting any necessary general coordination of the SACLANT Y effort;

   b. establishing as far as national differences permit uniform operational procedures between Y units of different nations;

   c. giving technical advice as required to the SACLANT Headquarters Intelligence Staff on the interpretation of Y information received by SACLANT Headquarters, and arranging for the SACLANT Headquarters Intelligence Staff to receive all the Y information available in the SACLANT Command which may be of value to it;
d. formulating and supervising compliance with security regulations and policies governing the production, handling and dissemination of Y material within the SACLANT Command in accordance with the agreed security principles in Appendix B hereto;

e. arranging for Y units to receive such technical material and end-products, whether produced in the SACLANT Command or received from national sources, as may be necessary for efficient conduct of their operations;

f. subject to security regulations, maintaining effective liaison with other activities, such as radio warfare, which may relate to or affect the discharge of his COMINT responsibilities. (The arrangements in this paper do not include radio warfare.)

g. arranging within the procedures stipulated for NATO, for material of technical Communication Intelligence interest, including prisoner of war interrogations, prisoner of war reports, and captured documents and equipment to be made immediately available as appropriate to the elements of the SACLANT Y Structure and to national Communication Intelligence authorities;

h. establishing and stating to the appropriate authorities requirements for such special communications and crypto-channels as necessary to meet operational and security requirements of the Y effort within SACLANT's Command.

Functions of Y Staffs at Subordinate Commands

12. Y officers and Y staffs at subordinate commands should perform functions corresponding to those of the Y staff at SACLANT Headquarters.

Functions of Y units

13. Y units should intercept and process material and provide D/F information to meet the requirements prescribed by SACLANT. Any combination of Y units of one nationality with those of another nationality will be subject to agreement of the cognizant national Communication Intelligence authorities if required.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

14. International cooperation in Y within SACLANT's Command is expected to consist of:

a. Coordinated shore-based direction finder operations, by national nets and stations organized and controlled as mutually agreed among the participating stations.
b. Direction finder and intercept operations in allied vessels.

c. Interception and processing by national Y units of enemy communications of tactical interest to SA CLANT.

**Communication Intelligence Units in the SA CLANT Area not Engaged in Support of Forces under SA CLANT**

15. Each nation with forces serving under SA CLANT may individually arrange to operate in SA CLANT's area national Communication Intelligence units not provided specifically or exclusively for support of the forces under SA CLANT. These units will not operate as part of the SA CLANT Y Structure, and will not be subject to the arrangements for inter-allied cooperation - unless agreed by the nations providing them.

16. It is recognized that certain Communication Intelligence units at the higher levels would be directly supporting both SA CLANT and their national Communication Intelligence organizations. Each participating nation would have discretion about such matters as the right of access of other nationals to these units.

**Cooperation within SA CLANT Y Structure**

17. Cooperation within the SA CLANT Y Structure should be that necessary to meet the essential Y needs of SA CLANT and the forces under his command.

18. The Y units and Y staffs of the participating nations will be at liberty to pass to their own national Communication Intelligence organizations and to other participating nations, but to those nations only, the technical material and traffic produced or received by themselves. The national Communication Intelligence organizations of the participating nations should in turn provide such technical support both to their own Y units and through the SA CLANT Y staff to the Y units of other participating nations as they may consider would be appropriate and of assistance to the Y effort under SA CLANT. Such material shall be handled in accordance with the regulations in Appendix B hereto.

19. For security reasons, the technical material and end-products released to Y units in the SA CLANT Y Structure must be limited to the details essential to enable them to provide to the commands and formations they support the immediate service that is required.

20. Exchange of technical material and end-products within the Y structure will be limited by the need of individual units to receive such material and by their ability to make use of it.

21. In order to ensure a degree of uniformity in operation of Y units it may be necessary to introduce certain common operational procedures.
Planning Requirements

22. In order to carry out his planning task, and in order to advise participating nations, the SACLANT Y officer will require pertinent information on the subjects listed below. The nations concerned should each designate the authority with whom he may communicate on these and other Y matters.

Types of Y units

Number of units planned

Administration

Basic operational organization

Manpower complements (by function)

Number of intercept positions
  (in broad categories, e.g., H/F Voice, D/F)

Frequency ranges of intercept equipment

Communications equipment of Y units
1. **COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE:** Information and technical material resulting from the interception and study of telecommunications for intelligence purposes. (Communication Intelligence includes Y, q.v.)

2. **COMINT END-PRODUCT** Intelligence information produced by Communication Intelligence activities.

3. **PARTICIPATING NATIONS:** Nations contributing Y activities to the SACLANT Y structure and entitled to receive the results of the COMINT arrangements for SACLANT.

4. **PROCESSING:** The action required to produce Communication Intelligence from traffic.

5. **RAW TRAFFIC:** Traffic showing no evidence of processing for Communication Intelligence purposes.

6. **TECHNICAL MATERIAL:** Data concerning cryptographic systems, communications procedures and methods of target countries and related information.

7. **TRAFFIC:** Intercepted telecommunications activity (including messages, chatter, procedure, etc.).

8. **Y:** Communication Intelligence derived from the timely processing of traffic procured by listening to enemy communications for the purpose of providing tactical intelligence for the commanders of the combat forces.

9. **Y UNITS:** COMINT units engaged in the production of Y.
Appendix B to COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SA CLANT

SECURITY PRINCIPLES FOR THE HANDLING OF Y

INTRODUCTION

1. These principles shall be the basis in peace and war of all security regulations and policies governing the production, handling, and dissemination of Y.

DEFINITION

2. Y is Communication Intelligence derived from the timely processing of traffic procured by listening to enemy communications for the purpose of providing tactical intelligence for the commanders of combat forces. It includes raw traffic, end-products, technical material, working documents, and captured material used in its production. It also includes intelligence reports and summaries based on Y unless the information is so generalized that it cannot be traced back to a particular item of Y or to Y in general.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

3. Nations participating in the SA CLANT Y effort must, as a condition of participation, agree to accept and adhere to these principles.

4. Each country participating in the SA CLANT Y effort will designate a national authority to deal with all questions of Y security and enforce these principles.

5. Each national authority will designate a Y Security Officer to whom Y materials and communications relating thereto shall be addressed.

6. SA CLANT will formulate and supervise compliance with security regulations and policies for Y within the SA CLANT command.

7. Before an individual in any capacity has access to the knowledge or results of the SA CLANT Y effort, he must be screened and cleared as being of unquestioned loyalty by his national authority. The screening must be as thorough as possible and at least as thorough as that given to individuals having access to COSMIC information. In addition to such clearance, these individuals serving under SA CLANT's Command must be specifically nominated to receive Y either by SA CLANT or by the concerned national authority. In the latter case the nomination must be approved by SA CLANT. In exceptional circumstances under operational conditions the above
requirements for screening, clearance and nomination may be waived for
those individuals appointed to certain key posts, a list of which should
be drawn up by SACLANT. Such personnel may be given access to Y upon the
authority of the appropriate commander.

8. Prior to being given access to Y, each individual will be Y
indoctrinated by a special warning on the sensitivity of Y sources to
compromise and be required to sign a document drawing attention to his
special responsibility for safeguarding Y and to the consequences which
the law or administrative or executive order of his country, or order of
SACLANT, provides, if either by intent or negligence he allows Y to come
to the notice of unauthorized persons. It must be stressed that there
is no time limit in that the information must be safeguarded indefinitely.

9. Distribution of Y must be on the need-to-know principle, i.e.,
each item of Y shall be made known only to those Y indoctrinated individuals
who require it in the performance of their duties. SACLANT will maintain
control lists of indoctrinated Y recipients in forces under his command
other than those engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence.
He will ensure that the number is kept to the minimum consistent with
essential intelligence and operational needs. National authorities will
maintain similar lists of their own nationals and apply similar restrictions.

10. Y indoctrinees must not be allowed to run a greater risk of
capture or interrogation by enemies or potential enemies than is absolutely
necessary for the efficient performance of their duties. This must also
apply to a period of six months after they have ceased to receive Y material
except during active operations in cases of impelling necessity.

11. The greatest care must be taken not to betray Y success by actions
based on it. Efforts should be made, if at all possible, to devise suitable
cover, such as reconnaissance. The source should on no account be needlessly
risked.

12. SACLANT will determine the level to which Y will be disseminated.
In exceptional instances, where it is essential for immediate operational
purposes, information based on Y may, as specifically authorized by a Y
indoctrinated commander, be disseminated below the normal level to unindoc-
trinated individuals provided the source is not disclosed. Where possible,
names, times, positions, and other data identical with that from the
original text must be omitted, or, if the retention of such an item or items
is essential, must be carefully paraphrased. Such information must be passed
by a secure courier service, by a secure line, or in a cipher system
approved by SACLANT. It must not be passed in clear by radio (including
radio telephone).
13. Knowledge of the methods and scope of, and the technical material resulting from, the SACLANT Y effort will be restricted to the nationals of the nations which participate in the SACLANT Y effort. Access to the Y end-products should, as far as possible, be similarly restricted.

14. All Y resulting from the SACLANT Y effort will be classified SECRET and designated by a codeword (except as provided in paragraph 19 below). The classification and the codeword shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of Y, except that, at the discretion of the unit commander, this provision need not be applied to purely working documents within a Y unit. The codeword indicates that the material must be handled in accordance with regulations based on these principles and when used in its codeword sense will also bear the classification SECRET. The codeword and its implication shall not be made known to persons not indoctrinated in Y nor shall it be used in its codeword sense in the presence of such persons.

15. In peacetime, if Y documents are to be transmitted by bag within SACLANT's Command, the route and procedure must be specially authorized by SACLANT, having regard to the adequacy of the security of the route and procedure. Documents should be double-wrapped and addressed to a Y indoctrinated officer (by name, not function); the inner envelope should bear the appropriate security classification but not the codeword. In wartime, discretion will be left to the local commander to make the most secure arrangements possible. As a minimum, documents must be sent by hand of officer or by a secure courier service.

16. Except in the exceptional instances described in Paragraph 12, if Y is transmitted within SACLANT's command by electrical means or by any physical means not completely secure, it must be encrypted in a secure cryptographic channel reserved exclusively for this requirement. Participating nations must additionally ensure that when Y is transmitted into, out of, or externally to the SACLANT command it is encrypted in a cryptographic channel specially approved by SACLANT for this purpose.

17. The highest standard of physical security must be applied to the custody of Y by national authorities and within SACLANT's command. Normally, except when in transit under conditions prescribed herein, Y materials and communications relating thereto must at all times be:

   a. under the direct surveillance of a Y indoctrinated person responsible for their safe-keeping, or

   b. locked in a three-combination safe accessible only to Y indoctrinated personnel, or

   c. stored in a locked compartment which is under constant surveillance by an armed sentry and which is accessible only to Y indoctrinated personnel.
18. Y documents must be destroyed as soon as they have ceased to be of use. This is particularly important under hazardous conditions.

19. In order that necessary operational use can be made of certain types of low-level tactical Y (such as Direction finder results and plain text messages) on which immediate action must obviously be taken in combat operations, SACLANT may permit the dissemination of such Y, without a codeword and at a classification not below Confidential, to unindoctrinated recipients who need to know.

20. National authorities and SACLANT must expand these principles into a set of regulations adapted to local conditions. Copies of the Y security regulations of each national authority will be forwarded to SACLANT through Y channels.