MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Release of [Blank]

1. The Chairman, USCIB, has received a memorandum from the Chairman, [Blank], which suggests that USCIB acted prematurely in reaching a decision on the above subject without prior consultation with [Blank] (see Enclosure 1).

2. The Director, NSA, was requested to prepare a draft reply to this memorandum for USCIB consideration. The reply proposed by the Director, NSA, is contained in Enclosure 2, herewith.

3. It is requested that your views with regard to the proposed reply be entered on the attached vote sheet, which should be returned to the Secretary by Tuesday, 27 January 1953.

Enclosures - 2
1. [Blank], 317/52, 8 Dec 52.
2. Draft Memo to Chairman, [Blank] from Chairman, USCIB.

Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB
EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN,

SUBJECT: Release of

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 8 December 1952 respecting the release of communications (317/52).

2. USCIB is pleased to learn that concurred in USCIB's decision to release the. It is regretted, however, that finds cause for surprise and concern in that decision seems to have been made by USCIB without consideration of's interest in the matter. USCIB desires to assure that its accession to the request, without prior consultation with regarding COMINT implications, was not a conscious omission but resulted rather from an uncertainty as to the need for such consultation. This uncertainty arose from a combination of circumstances.

5. The matter was placed before USCIB in July 1952. In weighing the advisability of aiding the, USCIB gave careful consideration to the possible COMINT repercussions. After prolonged U.S.-U.K. discussions, the British views as to the paramount importance of security of communications of NATO Powers had been accepted. USCIB believed that a basic and general agreement in principle had been reached on the necessity of improving the over-all communication security of those Powers, so that USCIB felt that the release of the under certain conditions for that purpose, was warranted. It was felt, moreover, that the situation differed materially from that involved in the problem, since the initiative had been taken by the, and it was, therefore, presumed.

that they were already aware of the actual or potential insecurity of their communications. This presumption was strengthened by the report of a possible disclosure to the
communications, which was the subject of a U.S.-U.K. exchange of correspondence in March-April 1952. Consequently, the delicate and sensitive problem of approaching the on the matter of insecurity did not arise, as in the case of the and Additional factors were the advent of certain significant which were likely to be available to the and an intimation by the representative in Washington that the might seek other means of fulfilling their needs if U.S. assistance were not forthcoming.

6. Based upon these considerations, a decision was finally made by USCIB in favor of assisting the, and was advised of U.S. intentions in advance of any definite commitment to the. In fact, the machines requested by them have not yet been provided nor has any other technical assistance been supplied.

7. With respect to your inquiry concerning "technical assistance as an alternate or supplement," the latter refers to changeable elements, instructions for operation, security regulations, etc., and even the possibility of providing keys and of wiring rotors. The former refers in particular to a paper and pencil cryptographic system as a substitute for a cipher machine. However, a suggestion that such a system might be used met with no interest on the part of the representative.

8. Although there is no explicit provision in the U.S.-U.K. COMINT Agreement governing cryptographic assistance to third parties, USCIB desires to assure of its belief that consultation prior to action is desirable when questions arise concerning such assistance which may have implications affecting U.S.-U.K. COMINT collaboration.

(Draft)
WALTER B. SMITH
Chairman, United States Communications Intelligence Board

- 2 -