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USCIB: 4.2/40

15 March 1955

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject: Consolidation of CIBD #7 and CIBD #14.

Reference: USCIB 4.2/39 dated 24 February 1955.

1. Vote sheet comments on the reference indicate a need for discussion at USCIBEC. They also indicate a need for reorganization of the proposed new directive to eliminate elements of confusion that can lead to misinterpretation of substance. There were no objections to the changes proposed by the Executive Secretary. Several additional changes have been suggested, three of which, in the opinion of the Executive Secretary, will require coordination with ISIB. One is particularly helpful and is expected to result in the addition of an Appendix B to the proposed directive. Specific comments are as follow:

STATE: "To be consistent with the change proposed on page 6, the reference to Note 2 within Appendix A should be moved from b(3) to b itself."

CIA: "For the sake of clarity recommend the last sentence of the Executive Secretary's rewrite of para 5b, page 6, be deleted and the following sentence substituted therefor: 'In situations involving an undue risk, an exception may be granted by the USCIB member concerned without reporting to USCIB and authority to grant exceptions to permit temporary visits, other than for leave, to such areas by Group B or C individuals may be delegated to the senior field representative of the USCIB member concerned. For all such cases a record shall be maintained of the exceptions granted.' Delete the parenthetical reference to Appendix A and in Appendix A itself, delete Footnote 2."

ARMY: "Subject paper, including emendations recommended by Executive Secretary, is approved, provided:

- "a. It is understood and recognized that paragraph III A5b permits the ACoFS, G-2, to issue a general standing exception for the USCOB, the CG USAREUR and the CG USFA and all indoctrinated members of their staffs to attend official meetings or to accept invitations from Soviet or GDR officials to visit the Soviet Sectors of Berlin or Vienna.

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"COMMENT: In these cases, it is the considered opinion of this office that the risk involved would be negligible. Additionally, since the USCOB, CG USAREUR, CG USFA and members of their staffs, in the performance of their duties, are frequently required, on short notice, to visit the Soviet Zones of Berlin or Vienna, it would be unrealistic and impracticable for the ACoFS, G-2, to approve and notify USCIB of each individual visit. However, it is contemplated that after a standing exception has been granted, each of the headquarters involved will be required to maintain a record of all such visits.

"b. The following emendations are made:

<u>Page</u>	<u>Para.</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Emendation</u>
1	3	2	"Change to read 'and during hostilities in an active theater of operations service with a unit or formation forward of division headquarters'."
3	1a		"Change to read 'Indoctrinated personnel who are scheduled for reassignment, temporary duty travel or debriefing will be divided into four groups:'." *
3	1a(2)		"Change to read 'Group B - Individuals who have precise knowledge of processing techniques or information of current value about Category II COMINT.'." *
4	1a(3)		"Change to read 'Group C - Individuals, other than those specified in paragraph (4), below, who have precise knowledge of processing techniques or information of current value about Category III COMINT.'." *
7	2a	10,11	"After words 'Director, NSA' insert 'or his designated representative'."
7	2b	2	"After words 'Director, NSA' insert 'or his designated representative'."
10	2a	9-13	"Delete."
10	2b	1	"Substitute 'obtaining a determination' for the word 'notification'."

*See paragraph 3, below.

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<u>Page</u>	<u>Para.</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Emendation</u>
11			"Insert as new paragraph 3 'USCIB members having COMINT dissemination activities located in exposed areas will establish appropriate procedures whereby they will be notified immediately in case of a change in a previously determined situation.'"
11	3		"Renumber as paragraph 4."
11	3b(1) (new 4)		"Change to read 'Such items delivered shall be transmitted in crypto systems specifically authorized for such use.'"
11	3b(2) (new 4)		"Change to read 'the physical security of the crypto system involved.'"
12	4		"Renumber as paragraph 5."
13	5		"Renumber as paragraph 6."
13	6	1	"Renumber as paragraph 7. Change '3 and 4' to '4 and 5'."
App A	b		"Add number '2' after word 'risk'."
App A	b(1)		"Delete."
App A	b(2)		"Renumber as paragraph (1)."
App A	b(3)		"Renumber as paragraph (2)."
App A	b(3) (new (2))		"Change to read 'U.S., British and French Sectors of Berlin, U.S., British, French and International Sectors of Vienna, Yugoslavia, Macao, and The Associated States (Indo China).'"

"With reference to paragraph III A, it is requested that appropriate action be taken to:

- "a. Clarify the phrase 'current value'.
- "b. Determine specifically which Category III material is considered to be 'more sensitive'."

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2. Several of the charges suggested apply to Appendix A. The Executive Secretary believes that the following additional emendations will serve to clarify that Appendix even more:

<u>Page</u>	<u>Para.</u>	<u>Line</u>	
2	4(new 5)	4	Delete "(See Appendix A.)"
App A	Title	1	Delete word "LIST"; insert word "EXAMPLES".
		2	Delete word "SUBSTANTIAL"; insert word "UNDUE".
		3.	Delete footnote "1".
	1	1-3	Delete.
	1a	All	Delete.
	1b	Title	Delete.
	1b(2)	All	Delete.
	1b(3)	1	Delete "(3)". Place areas in the form of a list using a separate number for each area.
Note 1	1	1	Delete "NOTE: 1".

3. Accordingly, the Executive Secretary has reorganized the proposed directive incorporating therein all suggested changes except those which constitute, in effect, changes to the wording of Appendix B. These were all included in the Army Member's recommendation and have been designated with an asterisk for convenience. Enclosed herewith is the result of that effort for consideration at the next regular meeting of USCIBEC. No drastic changes have been made, and, in my opinion, the essential substance as agreed by the Security Committee has been preserved in a more coherent form. No effort has been made to indicate just what changes have been made in the hope of preserving as much smooth copy as possible to send to the Board when USCIBEC has finished its consideration. However, each change stems from a comment listed in the reference or in the vote sheet comments quoted in paragraph 1, above, or in the comments by the Executive Secretary listed in paragraph 2, above. It is therefore suggested that the enclosure be reconsidered as a whole in the light of the above comments. The Appendix B mentioned in Section II, paragraph B.1.a. on page 3, is not available at this writing but it is hoped will be ready for consideration at the meeting.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
a/s

USCIB DIRECTIVE NUMBER ____ (CIBD #____)

(Approved by USCIB on _____)

HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this Directive is to describe activities considered to be hazardous, to delineate geographic areas considered to be exposed and to prescribe policy with respect to the following three categories of situations, each of which is covered in a separate section as indicated:

Section II - Engagement in hazardous activities by individuals having knowledge of current value about COMINT. (Page 1)

Section III - COMINT collection and/or production in exposed areas.
(Page 5)

Section IV - COMINT dissemination to consumers in exposed areas.
(Page 9)

II. ENGAGEMENT IN HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES BY INDIVIDUALS HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT VALUE ABOUT COMINT

A. DEFINITIONS

Hazardous Activities - For the purpose of this Directive, hazardous activities are those which place a person in a position where he runs a substantial risk of being captured or otherwise subjected to interrogation, e.g.:

1. Duties behind enemy lines, or inshore operations off an enemy or Iron Curtain country.
2. Flights over enemy or Iron Curtain territory unless on recognized corridor routes.
3. Raids, minor formation attacks, underwater demolition operations, and, during hostilities in an active theater of operations, service with a unit or formation forward of division headquarters.

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4. Transit through the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria unless on official business via air, sealed rail transport, or authorized convoy on U.S. approved routes. (This does not preclude personnel stationed in Berlin or Vienna from proceeding on leave from or returning to their duty stations provided that only those transportation means and routes approved herein are utilized.)
5. Activities such as those described in paragraphs 1 through 4, above, and duty in or visits to Iron Curtain countries, Communist dominated zones and other areas where, from time to time, local conditions are considered to involve an unacceptable risk.
6. Duty assignments and visits, other than unavoidable transit stops while traveling on official orders, in areas considered currently to involve an undue risk. (See Appendix A.)

B. POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who has knowledge of current value about COMINT, such that his capture or interrogation could be a substantial risk to the security of COMINT shall be assigned to or engage in activities of a hazardous nature.

1. Assignment to Groups

- a. Whenever the duties of any person who has had access to COMINT are about to be terminated or he is scheduled for reassignment and is deemed to have knowledge of current value about COMINT (whether currently indoctrinated or not) such that his capture or interrogation could be a

substantial risk to the security of COMINT, a determination shall be made in accordance with the extent of that knowledge, into which of the following groups he shall belong: (Guide lines to assist in arriving at this determination are listed in Appendix B.)

- (1) GROUP A - Producers of Category I COMINT who have no knowledge of other categories.
 - (2) GROUP B - Individuals who have knowledge of current value about Category II COMINT.
 - (3) GROUP C - Individuals, other than those specified in paragraph (4) below, who have knowledge of current value about Category III COMINT.
 - (4) GROUP D - Individuals with precise knowledge of COMINT processing techniques, competence or potential regarding the more sensitive Category III COMINT material.
- b. Responsibility for such assignment and cancellation after specific post debriefing intervals (see paragraph 2, below) rests with the parent USCIB member. A USCIB member department or agency using indoctrinated persons from another member department or agency shall, upon release of such individuals to their parent activity, furnish that activity with suitable recommendations regarding the group to which those individuals should be assigned.

2. Assignment of Personnel to Hazardous Activities

The following restrictions apply to permanent and temporary duty assignments involving hazardous activities.

- a. GROUP A personnel may be assigned to hazardous activities only on the authority of senior officers. (NOTE: No special restrictions need be applied to recipients or non-indoctrinated producers of Category I COMINT only.)

- b. GROUP B personnel may be assigned to hazardous activities only after six months separation from such material.
 - c. GROUP C personnel may be assigned to hazardous activities only after a separation of one year or longer from this type of information.
 - d. GROUP D personnel shall not be assigned to hazardous activities at any time.
3. Engagement by Personnel in Hazardous Activities While in Official Non-Duty Status

Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who has knowledge of current value about COMINT shall engage in activities of a hazardous nature while on leave, liberty or other official non-duty status.

4. Engagement by Personnel in Hazardous Activities in Any Unofficial Capacity

All possible action shall be taken to prevent any person who has terminated service with a USCIB member department or agency for any reason and who is still deemed to have knowledge of current value about COMINT from engaging in hazardous activities at any time.

5. Exceptions to the policy enunciated in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, above, shall be authorized only after careful consideration in each instance of the advantage to be gained, as opposed to the risk involved.
- a. In considering exceptions, the protection offered by diplomatic status should not automatically be considered sufficient, but should be assessed in the light of the particular circumstance involved.

- b. In situations involving unacceptable risk an exception in the case of Group B or C personnel shall be approved by the USCIB member of the department or agency concerned. All such exceptions granted will be reported to USCIB. In situations involving undue risk an exception may be granted by the USCIB member concerned without reporting to USCIB and authority to grant exceptions to permit temporary visits, other than for leave, to such areas by Group B or C individuals may be delegated to the senior field representative of the USCIB member concerned. In all such cases a record shall be maintained of the exceptions granted.

6. Implementing Instructions

Instructions implementing the above policy shall be issued by each USCIB member department and agency. A copy of these instructions shall be provided the Executive Secretary, USCIB, for information.

III. COMINT COLLECTION AND/OR PRODUCTION IN EXPOSED AREAS

A. DEFINITIONS

Exposed Areas - For the purpose of this Directive, exposed areas are those which are susceptible of being quickly overrun by enemy forces or those wherein the local political or military situation is such as to pose a distinct threat to the security of COMINT.

1. Exposed areas at present comprise areas under control of the USSR, Soviet Satellite countries, other Communist dominated areas, and areas adjacent thereto which are beyond defense lines expected to be tenable.

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2. In proportion to the risk of loss of COMINT personnel and/or classified material located therein, such areas involve two situations:
 - a. Dangerous situations, i.e., those in which it is unlikely that complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and/or removal or effective destruction of classified material will be accomplished.
 - b. Risky situations, i.e., those in which it is likely that complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and/or removal or effective destruction of classified material will be accomplished.

B. POLICY AND PROCEDURES

It is recognized that effective intercept of certain communications and effective COMINT support of field commanders may require the establishment or continuation of COMINT collecting and/or producing activities in exposed areas which may suddenly fall under unfriendly control with consequent loss of COMINT personnel and/or COMINT material.

1. Decision to Locate COMINT Collection and/or Production Activities
 - a. A determination as to whether a given situation falls into a risky or dangerous category will be obtained by the Service USCIB member concerned from the senior headquarters responsible for the defense of the area. Such determination shall be made in the light of the political, military, or other factors affecting the safety of the personnel and material involved. Appropriate coordination

shall be effected with such other members of USCIB as may be concerned. When a situation has been determined, the Director, NSA, or his designated representative will be notified accordingly. The Director, NSA, or his designated representative will be notified immediately in case of a change in any situation previously reported.

- b. Upon notification that a given situation is risky or dangerous, the Director, NSA, or his designated representative will decide whether a COMINT collection or production activity may be conducted in that area. In making this decision the Director, NSA, will:

- (1) Determine whether the task to be performed by the COMINT activity meets the criteria set forth in paragraphs 2a and 3a, below.
- (2) Weigh the advantages to be gained by the national COMINT effort as against the disadvantages of the COMINT losses which may result if the area concerned is suddenly overrun, and the probable effect of such losses upon the conduct of COMINT collection or production activities elsewhere.

2. Safeguards for Dangerous Situations

- a. Only unique intercept tasks which cannot be accomplished elsewhere shall be assigned, and only such analysis as is locally required to support these tasks and permit essential technical reporting shall be performed.
- b. Only COMINT documents or technical aids essential and of current application to these tasks shall be held.

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- c. No Category III COMINT or related documents and technical material shall be held.
- d. Personnel technically informed in COMINT of a higher level or broader scope than is required for the limited mission of the unit shall not be assigned if avoidable.
- e. No person in Group C, as defined in Section II, paragraph B.1.a.(3), above, shall be assigned unless his presence is vital for the effective functioning of the unit.
- f. No person in Group D, as defined in Section II, paragraph B.1.a.(4), above, shall be assigned in any circumstance.
- g. Facilities shall be provided with which the minimum number of persons on duty at any one time can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT materials within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.
- h. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

3. Safeguards for Risky Situations

- a. Only intercept, analytic and reporting tasks which cannot be performed satisfactorily in safe or protected situations shall be assigned.
- b. No Category III or related documents and technical material shall be held except those essential to the assigned task

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- and of current application thereto, and the latter shall be maintained in such condition as to ensure immediate destruction, if necessary, upon sudden threat of seizure.
- c. No person in Group D, as defined in Section II, paragraph B.l.a.(4), above, shall be assigned, unless required by considerations involving highly specialized technical knowledge.
 - d. Facilities shall be provided with which one third of the complement can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT materials within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.
 - e. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that adequate arrangements are made for safe evacuation of all personnel whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.
4. The Director, NSA, will submit a semi-annual report to USCIB containing a list of COMINT collection and/or production activities being conducted in dangerous or risky areas.
5. Exceptions to paragraphs 2 and 3, above, shall be made only with the approval of USCIB.

IV. COMINT DISSEMINATION TO CONSUMERS IN EXPOSED AREAS

A. DEFINITIONS

The definitions in Section III, above, apply.

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B. POLICY AND PROCEDURES

The determination of the "need to know" of an official, and the responsibility for satisfying that need in the case of any particular item or category of COMINT, are functions of command or departmental or agency authority, residing with the appropriate USCIB member either in its own capacity or as the executive agent of the Secretary of Defense. Nothing in this policy should be regarded as abrogating that principle. Nevertheless, USCIB recognizes that, under certain circumstances, the consideration of security in the common interest may override. This policy is formulated in the light of that recognition.

1. Decision to Locate COMINT Dissemination Activities in Exposed Areas

- a. A determination as to whether a given situation falls into a risky or dangerous category will be obtained by the appropriate Service USCIB member from the senior headquarters responsible for the defense of the area. Such determination shall be made in the light of the political, military, or other factors affecting the safety of the personnel or material involved. Appropriate coordination shall be effected with such other members of USCIB as may be concerned.
- b. Upon obtaining a determination that a given situation is risky or dangerous that USCIB member will decide whether a COMINT dissemination activity may be conducted in that area. In making this decision that member will:

- (1) Determine whether the task to be performed can, in fact, only be satisfactorily performed in that area under consideration.
 - (2) Weigh the advantages to be expected from such dissemination as against the disadvantages of the COMINT losses which may result if the area concerned is suddenly overrun, and the probable effect of such losses upon the conduct of COMINT activities elsewhere.
2. USCIB members having COMINT dissemination activities located in exposed areas will establish appropriate procedures whereby they will be notified in case of a change in a previously determined situation.
3. Safeguards for Dangerous Situations
- a. Only those COMINT items essential to the operational responsibilities of a senior recipient shall be delivered into such areas. All Category III and II items will be so worded as to minimize disclosure of the source, should the material fall into unauthorized hands.
 - b. Except in cases of urgency, Russian and Satellite COMINT will not be delivered into such areas.
 - (1) Such items delivered shall be transmitted in cryptosystems specifically authorized for such use.
 - (2) No physical copies or files of this information, even in extract or gist, shall be retained under any circumstance and special care shall be exercised to maintain the physical security of the cryptosystem involved.

- c. No person in Group C, as defined in Section II, paragraph B.1.a.(3), above, shall be assigned unless his presence is vital for the effective functioning of the unit.
- d. No person in Group D, as defined in Section II, paragraph B.1.a.(4), above, shall be assigned under any circumstance.
- e. Facilities shall be provided with which the minimum number of persons on duty at any one time can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT materials within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.
- f. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

4. Safeguards for Risky Situations

- a. Only those COMINT items having important and direct bearing on the operational responsibilities of a senior recipient shall be delivered into such areas. Such material may include Russian or Satellite COMINT providing special care is exercised in maintaining the security thereof. Files of Russian or Satellite COMINT, or of extracts or gists thereof, shall be kept to a minimum, and shall be maintained apart from files of other types of COMINT. Procedures shall be instituted to ensure immediate and complete destruction of the files in case of emergency.

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- b. No person in Group D, as defined in Section II, paragraph B.1.a.(4), above, shall be assigned under any circumstance.
 - c. Facilities shall be provided with which one third of the complement can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT material within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.
 - d. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that adequate arrangements are made for safe evacuation of all personnel whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.
5. Each USCIB member will submit a semi-annual report to USCIB containing a list of COMINT dissemination activities being conducted by that member in risky or dangerous situations.
6. Exceptions to paragraphs 3 and 4, above, shall be made only with the approval of USCIB.

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APPENDIX A

TO

USCIB DIRECTIVE NO.

CURRENT EXAMPLES OF

SPECIFIC AREAS INVOLVING UNDUE RISK

TO INDIVIDUALS HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT VALUE ABOUT COMINT

1. U.S., British and French Sectors of Berlin.
2. U.S., British, French and International Sectors of Vienna.
3. Yugoslavia.
4. Macao.
5. The Associated States (Indo China).

SECCOM shall review this list not less than semi-annually with a view to recommending appropriate revisions.