MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject: Consolidation of CIBD #7 and CIBD #14 (Hazardous Activities).
Reference: USCIB 4.2/42 (Item 2 of the Agenda for the 27th Meeting of USCIBEC).

1. Pursuant to the decision reached at the Twenty-seventh Meeting of USCIBEC on 25 March 1955 the Security Committee has reached unanimous agreement regarding a complete draft directive on "Hazardous Activities". The complete draft and a forwarding report by the Chairman, SECCOM are enclosed herewith.

2. It is requested that the members execute the attached vote sheet and return it to this office by the close of business 28 April 1955.

Enclosures

RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

USCIB: 4.2/43
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

Subject: Consolidation of CIBD #7 and CIBD #14

References:
(a) USCIB 4.2/40 dated 15 March 1955
(b) USCIB 4.2/41 dated 18 March 1955
(c) USCIB 4.2/42 (Item 2 of the Agenda for the 27th Meeting of USCIBEC, 25 March 1955)

1. Pursuant to the decision reached at the Twenty-seventh Meeting of USCIBEC on 25 March 1955, the Security Committee, after thorough study, has reached unanimous agreement on the attached draft directive on "Hazardous Activities" including Annexures A and B.

2. The attached draft includes changes formally agreed upon by USCIBEC and, in addition, includes changes obtained from individual USCIBEC members by their SECCOM counterparts.

3. The following major changes were made by SECCOM:

   a. In order to allow more flexibility in placing restrictions on individuals assigned to Group C, the flat six months restriction has been amended to read "six months or longer" (page 4, paragraph 2b). This change is also reflected in Annex B.

   b. A provision has been added to the directive in recognition of the need for standing exceptions (to restrictions on hazardous activities) to be granted in specific situations requiring an individual to engage in hazardous activities on a routine basis. This provision is intended to cover such individuals as the Commanding General, USFA, who, for example, must, in the best interests of the nation, attend periodic official meetings in the Soviet Sector of Vienna (an area of unacceptable risk) (page 5, paragraph 5).

   c. Annex A has been rewritten to include specific areas deemed to involve unacceptable risk as well as those involving an undue risk.

   d. Annex B now includes a general guide for assignment of individuals (consumers as well as producers) to Groups B and C, and a more specific guide for Group D. The need for uniformity in the evaluation of situations requiring longer than normal periods of restriction for Groups B and C individuals was realized. Under the
provisions of the Annex, such uniform action will be accomplished, in part, through the establishment of a central file and reference point within the office of the Executive Secretary. USCIB members making such restrictions will be required to file a report with that office describing the circumstances involved and the action taken. Such reports will be catalogued and will be available as a ready reference to any USCIB member. Uniformity will be accomplished also through coordination among USCIB members concerned in cases involving joint commands, Service personnel assigned to NSA, CIA, etc.

4. The Security Committee recommends approval of the attached directive.

WILLIAM R. CULMER
Major, Arty., USA
Chairman, SECCOM

Enclosure
a/s
I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this Directive is to describe activities considered to be hazardous, to delineate geographic areas considered to be exposed and to prescribe policy with respect to the following three categories of situations, each of which is covered in a separate section as indicated:

Section II - Engagement in hazardous activities by individuals having knowledge of current value about COMINT. (Page 1)

Section III - COMINT collection and/or production in exposed areas. (Page 6)

Section IV - COMINT dissemination to consumers in exposed areas. (Page 10)

II. ENGAGEMENT IN HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES BY INDIVIDUALS HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT VALUE ABOUT COMINT

A. DEFINITIONS

Hazardous Activities - For the purpose of this Directive, hazardous activities are those which place a person in a position where he runs a substantial risk of being captured or otherwise subjected to interrogation, e.g.:

a. Hazardous Activities involving situations of unacceptable risk, include:
(1) In time of war:
(a) Duties behind enemy lines, or inshore operations off an enemy or Iron Curtain country.
(b) Flights over enemy territory.
(c) Raids, minor formation attacks, underwater demolition operations, and in an active theater of operations service with a unit or formation forward of division headquarters.

(2) In time of peace:
(a) Flights over Iron Curtain territory unless on recognized corridor routes.
(b) Transit through the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria unless on official business via air, sealed rail transport, or authorized convoy on U.S. approved routes. (This does not preclude personnel stationed in Berlin or Vienna from proceeding on leave from or returning to their duty stations provided that only those transportation means and routes approved herein are utilized.)
(c) Duty in or visits to Iron Curtain countries, Communist dominated zones and other areas where, from time to time, similar local conditions exist. (Set forth in paragraph 1 of Annex A.)

b. Hazardous Activities involving situations of undue risk include, in time of peace, duty assignments and visits, other than unavoidable transit stops while traveling on official orders, in the areas named in paragraph 2 of Annex A.
B. POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who has knowledge of current value about COMINT, such that his capture or interrogation could be a substantial risk to the security of COMINT shall be assigned to or engage in activities of a hazardous nature.

1. Assignment to Groups

a. Whenever the duties of any person who has had access to COMINT are about to be terminated or he is scheduled for reassignment and is deemed to have knowledge of current value about COMINT (whether currently indoctrinated or not) such that his capture or interrogation could be a substantial risk to the security of COMINT, a determination shall be made in accordance with the extent of that knowledge, into which of the following groups he shall belong: (Guide lines to assist in arriving at this determination are listed in Annex B.)

(1) GROUP A - Producers of Category I COMINT who have no knowledge of other categories.

(2) GROUP B - Individuals who have knowledge of current value about Category II COMINT.

(3) GROUP C - Individuals, other than those specified in paragraph (4), below, who have knowledge of current value about Category III COMINT.

(4) GROUP D - Individuals with precise knowledge of COMINT processing techniques, competence or potential regarding the more sensitive Category III COMINT material.
b. Responsibility for such assignment and cancellation after specific post debriefing intervals (see paragraph 2, below) rests with the parent USCIB member. A USCIB member department or agency using indoctrinated persons from another member department or agency shall, upon release of such individuals to their parent activity, furnish that activity with suitable recommendations regarding the group to which those individuals should be assigned.

2. Assignment of Personnel to Hazardous Activities

The following restrictions apply to permanent and temporary duty assignments involving hazardous activities:

a. GROUP A personnel may be assigned to hazardous activities only on the authority of senior officers. (NOTE: No special restrictions need be applied to recipients.)

b. GROUP B personnel may be assigned to hazardous activities only after a separation of six months or longer from this type of information.

c. GROUP C personnel may be assigned to hazardous activities only after a separation of one year or longer from this type of information.

d. GROUP D personnel shall not be assigned to hazardous activities at any time.

3. Engagement by Personnel in Hazardous Activities While in Official Non-Duty Status

Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who has knowledge of current value about COMINT shall engage in activities of a hazardous nature while on leave, liberty or other official non-duty status.
4. Engagement by Personnel in Hazardous Activities in Any Unofficial Capacity

All possible action shall be taken to prevent any person who has terminated service with a USCIB member department or agency for any reason and who is still deemed to have knowledge of current value about OOMINT from engaging in hazardous activities at any time.

5. Exceptions to the policy enunciated in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, above, shall be authorized only after careful consideration in each instance of the advantage to be gained as opposed to the risk involved. Standing exceptions may be authorized in specific situations which, in the best interests of the nation, require an individual to engage in hazardous activities on a routine or periodic basis.

a. In considering exceptions, the protection offered by diplomatic status should not automatically be considered sufficient, but should be assessed in the light of the particular circumstance involved.

b. An exception involving an unacceptable risk, in the case of Group B or C personnel, shall be approved by the USCIB member of the department or agency concerned. All such exceptions granted will be reported to USCIB.

c. An exception involving an undue risk, in the case of Group B or C personnel may be granted by the USCIB member concerned without reporting to USCIB, and authority to grant exceptions to permit temporary
visits to such areas, other than for leave, may be delegated to the senior field representative of the USCIB member concerned. In each such case, a record shall be maintained of the exception granted.

d. Any exception in the case of Group D personnel shall be approved by USCIB.

6. Implementing Instructions

Instructions implementing the above policy shall be issued by each USCIB member department and agency. A copy of these instructions shall be provided the Executive Secretary, USCIB, for information.

III. COMINT COLLECTION AND/OR PRODUCTION IN EXPOSED AREAS

A. DEFINITIONS

Exposed Areas - For the purpose of this Directive, exposed areas are those which are susceptible of being quickly overrun by enemy forces or those wherein the local political or military situation is such as to pose a distinct threat to the security of COMINT.

1. Exposed areas at present comprise areas under control of the USSR, Soviet Satellite countries, other Communist dominated areas, and areas adjacent thereto which are beyond defense lines expected to be tenable.

2. In proportion to the risk of loss of COMINT personnel and/or classified material located therein, such areas involve two situations:
a. Dangerous situations, i.e., those in which it is unlikely that complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and/or removal or effective destruction of classified material will be accomplished.

b. Risky situations, i.e., those in which it is likely that complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and/or removal or effective destruction of classified material will be accomplished.

B. POLICY AND PROCEDURES

It is recognized that effective intercept of certain communications and effective COMINT support of field commanders may require the establishment or continuation of COMINT collecting and/or producing activities in exposed areas which may suddenly fall under unfriendly control with consequent loss of COMINT personnel and/or COMINT material.

1. Decision to Locate COMINT Collection and/or Production Activities

   a. A determination as to whether a given situation falls into a risky or dangerous category will be obtained by the Director, NSA, through the appropriate Service USCID member from the senior headquarters responsible for the defense of the area. Such determination shall be made in the light of the political, military, or other factors affecting the safety of the personnel and material involved. Appropriate coordination shall be effected with such other members of USCID as may be concerned. The Director, NSA, will arrange to be notified immediately in case of a change in a previously determined situation.
b. Upon obtaining a determination that a given situation is risky or dangerous, the Director, NSA, will decide whether a COMINT collection or production activity may be conducted in that area. In making this decision, the Director, NSA, will:

(1) Determine whether the task to be performed by the COMINT activity meets the criteria set forth in paragraphs 2a and 3a, below.

(2) Weigh the advantages to be gained by the national COMINT effort as against the disadvantages of the COMINT losses which may result if the area concerned is suddenly overrun, and the probable effect of such losses upon the conduct of COMINT collection or production activities elsewhere.

2. Safeguards for Dangerous Situations

a. Only unique intercept tasks which cannot be accomplished elsewhere shall be assigned, and only such analysis as is locally required to support these tasks and permit essential technical reporting shall be performed.

b. Only COMINT documents or technical aids essential and of current application to these tasks shall be held.

c. No Category III COMINT or related documents and technical material shall be held.

d. Personnel technically informed in COMINT of a higher level or broader scope than is required for the limited mission of the unit shall not be assigned if avoidable.
e. No person in Group C, as defined in Section II, paragraph B.l.a.(3), above, shall be assigned unless his presence is vital for the effective functioning of the unit.

f. No person in Group D, as defined in Section II, paragraph B.l.a.(4), above, shall be assigned in any circumstance.

g. Facilities shall be provided with which the minimum number of persons on duty at any one time can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT materials within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.

h. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that adequate arrangements are made for safe evacuation of all personnel whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

3. Safeguards for Risky Situations

a. Only intercept, analytic and reporting tasks which cannot be performed satisfactorily in safe or more protected situations shall be assigned.

b. No Category III or related documents and technical material shall be held except those essential to the assigned task and of current application thereto, and the latter shall be maintained in such condition as to ensure immediate destruction, if necessary, upon sudden threat of seizure.
c. No person in Group D, as defined in Section II, paragraph B.1.a.(4), above, shall be assigned, unless required by considerations involving highly specialized technical knowledge.

d. Facilities shall be provided with which one third of the complement can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT materials within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.

e. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that adequate arrangements are made for safe evacuation of all personnel whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

4. The Director, NSA, will submit a semi-annual report to USCIB containing a list of COMINT collection and/or production activities being conducted in dangerous or risky areas.

5. Exceptions to paragraphs 2 and 3, above, shall be made only with the approval of USCIB.

IV. COMINT DISSEMINATION TO CONSUMERS IN EXPOSED AREAS

A. DEFINITIONS

The definitions in Section III, above, apply.

B. POLICY AND PROCEDURES

The determination of the "need to know" of an official, and the responsibility for satisfying that need in the case of any particular item or category of COMINT, are functions of command or departmental or agency authority, residing with the appropriate
USCIB member either in its own capacity or as the executive agent of the Secretary of Defense. Nothing in this policy should be regarded as abrogating that principle. Nevertheless, USCIB recognizes that, under certain circumstances, the consideration of security in the common interest may override. This policy is formulated in the light of that recognition.

1. Decision to Locate COMINT Dissemination Activities in Exposed Areas

   a. A determination as to whether a given situation falls into a risky or dangerous category will be obtained by the USCIB member desirous of locating a unit, through the appropriate Service USCIB member, from the senior headquarters responsible for the defense of the area. Such determination shall be made in the light of the political, military, or other factors affecting the safety of the personnel or material involved. Appropriate coordination shall be effected with such other members of USCIB as may be concerned.

   b. Upon obtaining a determination that a given situation is risky or dangerous, the USCIB member concerned will decide whether a COMINT dissemination activity may be conducted in that area. In making this decision that member will:

      (1) Determine whether the task to be performed can be, in fact, satisfactorily performed only in that area under consideration.
(2) Weigh the advantages to be expected from such dissemination as against the disadvantages of the COMINT losses which may result if the area concerned is suddenly overrun, and the probable effect of such losses upon the conduct of COMINT activities elsewhere.

2. USGIB members having COMINT dissemination activities located in exposed areas will establish appropriate procedures whereby they will be notified in case of a change in a previously determined situation.

3. Safeguards for Dangerous Situations
   a. Only those COMINT items essential to the operational responsibilities of a senior recipient shall be delivered into such areas. All Category III and II items will be so worded as to minimize disclosure of the source, should the material fall into unauthorized hands.
   b. Except in cases of urgency, will not be delivered into such areas.
      (1) Such items delivered shall be transmitted in cryptosystems specifically authorized for such use.
      (2) No physical copies or files of this information, even in extract or gist, shall be retained under any circumstance and special care shall be exercised to maintain the physical security of the cryptosystem involved.
   c. No person in Group C, as defined in Section II, paragraph B.1.a.(3), above, shall be assigned unless his presence is vital for the effective functioning of the unit.
d. No person in Group D, as defined in Section II, paragraph B.1.a.(4), above, shall be assigned under any circumstance.

e. Facilities shall be provided with which the minimum number of persons on duty at any one time can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT materials within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.

f. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that adequate arrangements are made for safe evacuation of all personnel whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

4. Safeguards for Risky Situations

a. Only those COMINT items having important and direct bearing on the operational responsibilities of a senior recipient shall be delivered into such areas. Such material may include **providing special care is exercised in maintaining the security thereof. Files of **or of extracts or gists thereof, shall be kept to a minimum, and shall be maintained apart from files of other types of COMINT. Procedures shall be instituted to ensure immediate and complete destruction of the files in case of emergency.

b. No person in Group D, as defined in Section II, paragraph B.1.a.(4), above, shall be assigned under any circumstance.
c. Facilities shall be provided with which one third of the complement can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT material within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.

d. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that adequate arrangements are made for safe evacuation of all personnel whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

5. Each USCIB member will submit a semi-annual report to USCIB containing a list of COMINT dissemination activities being conducted by that member in risky or dangerous situations.

6. Exceptions to paragraphs 3 and 4, above, shall be made only with the approval of USCIB.
ANNEX A

TO

USCIB DIRECTIVE NO.

CURRENT EXAMPLES OF

SPECIFIC AREAS INVOLVING UNACCEPTABLE OR UNDUE RISK

TO INDIVIDUALS HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT VALUE ABOUT COMMINT

1. Areas involving unacceptable risk:
   a. Iron Curtain countries -
      (1) USSR
      (2) Korean Democratic Peoples Republic (North Korea)
      (3) Chinese Peoples Republic (China)
      (4) Tibet
      (5) Outer Mongolia
      (6) Estonia
      (7) Latvia
      (8) Lithuania
      (9) Poland
      (10) Czechoslovakia
      (11) German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
      (12) Hungary
      (13) Rumania
      (14) Bulgaria
      (15) Albania
      (16) North Viet Nam
   b. Communist dominated zones -
      (1) Porkkala Area of Finland
      (2) Soviet Sector of Berlin
      (3) Soviet Sector of Vienna
      (4) Soviet Zone of Austria
   c. Other areas - None

2. Areas involving undue risk:
   a. U.S., British and French Sectors of Berlin
   b. U.S., British, French and International Sectors of Vienna
   c. Yugoslavia
   d. Macao
   e. The Associated States (Indo China)

3. SECCOM shall review this list not less than semi-annually with a view to recommending appropriate revisions.
ANNEX B

TO

USCIB DIRECTIVE NO.

GUIDE TO UNIFORM ASSIGNMENT TO GROUPS UNDER SECTION II

1. It is considered at present that all persons who have been indoctrinated for Category II or III COMINT and have been exposed to the end products of, or processing within these categories, will have "knowledge of current value" and should be assigned to at least Groups B and C respectively. In addition, possession of the following related information would warrant assignment to Group C:
   
   a. Knowledge of the overall distribution of the U.S.-U.K. COMINT effort including the size, location and purpose of advanced processing units and intercept establishments. (The intent here is that the knowledge should be both broad and deep.)
   
   b. Knowledge of programming techniques of general purpose computer equipments for cryptanalytic problems.
   
   c. Knowledge of U.S. capability to intercept radio transmissions where the equipments and techniques required go significantly beyond equipments and techniques in general use in the art. This may include, for example, special equipments and techniques necessitated by very high or low frequencies encountered, new multiplex transmissions, ciphony, cifax, ultra-speed, noise type communications, etc.

2. In anticipation of the assignment of Groups B and C personnel to hazardous activities, any USCIB member should, whenever he considers advisable, in view of special circumstances affecting the degree of
knowledge held by an individual or a group of individuals, require a longer prior separation from COMINT than the minimum separation of six months and one year required for these groups. In such cases that USCIB member will (a) if applicable, consult with any other USCIB member directly concerned (as in the case of Service personnel released to their parent Service upon completion of duty at NSA), and (b) inform the Executive Secretary of the circumstances and action taken. This consultation and reporting is considered necessary in order to assure the greatest possible uniformity in applying these restrictions.

3. Any person indoctrinated for Category III COMINT whose knowledge includes any of the following should be assigned to Group D:

   a. Intimate knowledge of the nature of the technical methods and means of successful cryptanalytic attack employed against Communist Category III systems or intimate knowledge of projected new technical methods.

   b. Broad overall technical knowledge of our success or failure against our various non-Communist targets together with the reasons therefor, the techniques developed, and the key personalities involved. (In general, this would apply only to persons who had held senior posts in NSA proper on a career basis. It is aimed at the person who is dangerous through sheer bulk of accumulated knowledge and experience.)

   c. Knowledge of the technical methods and end products resulting therefrom of one or more of the highly sensitive "compartmented" problems during the time that such problems may remain compartmented within NSA. (Compartmented problems are few in number
and usually small. The end product, if any, is usually distributed in a very limited fashion.)

d. Knowledge of the performance and specific employment of special purpose high speed cryptanalytic equipments aimed primarily at Communist problems.