

USCIB: 4.2/39

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24 February 1955

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject: Consolidation of CIBD #7 and CIBD #14 (Hazardous Activities).

Reference: USCIB 4.2/38 (Item 3 of the Agenda for the 24th Meeting of USCIBEC).

1. In the course of reviewing USCIB policy on the questions of (a) engagement in hazardous activities by individuals having knowledge of current value about COMINT, (b) conduct of COMINT activities in exposed areas, and (c) COMINT dissemination to recipients in critical areas, the USCIB Security Committee was asked by the Executive Secretary to consolidate existing policy statements (particularly CIBD #7, CIBD #14 and Annexure B2 to Appendix B, UKUSA) into one coherent directive.

2. Meanwhile minor modifications to CIBD #14 to provide uniform criteria for its application were taken under consideration. As indicated in the reference, these modifications were referred to the SECCOM for incorporation in the consolidated directive upon which they were working.

3. A report by the Chairman, SECCOM forwarding a consolidated draft directive in accordance with the intent outlined above and in the reference is enclosed herewith for consideration.

4. Attention is invited to several editorial (and one substantive) points in the enclosed directive which it is believed would be improved by the emendations indicated below:

<u>Page</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Emendation</u>
2	4	1	Re-number and relocate as para 5. Insert at the beginning the words: "Activities such as those described in paras 1 through 4 above and".
2	4 (new 5)	3	Underline the word "unacceptable".
2	5	All	Re-number and relocate as para 6.
2	5 (new 6)	3	Underline the word "undue".
2	6	All	Re-number and relocate as para 4.

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Subject: Consolidation of CIBD #7 and CIBD #14 (Hazardous Activities).

<u>Page</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Emendation</u>
2	6 (new 4)	Last	Add: "(This does not preclude personnel stationed in Berlin or Vienna from proceeding on leave from or returning to their duty stations provided that only those transportation means and routes approved herein are utilized.)"
6	5b.	All	Rewrite the entire paragraph as follows: "In situations involving <u>unacceptable</u> risk an exception in the case of <u>Group B or C</u> personnel shall be approved by the USCIB member of the department or agency concerned. All such exceptions granted will be reported to USCIB. In situations involving an <u>undue</u> risk, authority to grant exceptions to permit temporary official visits, other than for leave, to 'undue risk' areas by Group B or C individuals may be delegated to the senior field representative of the USCIB member concerned, provided a record is maintained of the purpose and authorization of all such visits. (See Note 2 to Appendix A.)"
7	2a.	4	Delete the word "so".
10	2a.	9	Delete the word "so".
10	2b.(1)	All	Change to read: "Determine whether the task to be performed can be, in fact, performed satisfactorily only in that area under consideration."

App. A Note 2 Last line Add: "(See page 6, SECTION III, paragraph 5b.)"

5. It will be noted that the change recommended for paragraph 5b. on page 6 is, in part, substantive whereas the rest of the changes are editorial in effect. In the opinion of the Executive Secretary the granting of an exception to permit the taking of what is considered to be normally an unacceptable risk is (if the risk is indeed normally unacceptable) likely to be a rare occurrence not to be taken lightly. Such action may affect the security of all and should, therefore, be reported to USCIB as provided in the existing directive on the subject (CIBD #14, SECTION III, paragraph c.1.).

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
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Subject: Consolidation of CIBD #7 and CIBD #14 (Hazardous Activities).

6. Lastly, attention is invited to the fact that the enclosed draft directive constitutes not only a consolidation of existing policy statements, but also some alteration thereof insofar as CIBD #7 and CIBD #14 are concerned.

7. It is requested that your views and comment, including your reaction to the recommended changes set forth in paragraph 4 above, be entered on the attached vote sheet and returned to this office by the close of business, Tuesday, 8 March 1955.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
a/s

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SEC # 0002

18 February 1955

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

Subject: Draft Directive on Hazardous Activities

1. The Security Committee, as requested by the Executive Secretary, has prepared a draft directive (attached) combining the provisions of CIBD #7 (Revised 25 October 1950) and CIBD #14 dated 25 June 1954, with provisions for conduct of COMINT activities in exposed areas. During discussion of this draft, the Committee considered pertinent comments (regarding USCIB 4.2/30 dated 29 November 1954, subject "Revision of USCIB Directive No. 14") contributed by members of USCIBEC during their 112th Meeting held on 28 January 1955.

2. This proposed directive deals with two main interrelated conditions concerning the existing risk to COMINT: that which involves a COMINT knowledgeable individual subjecting himself (or being subjected) to possible capture or interrogation; and that which involves COMINT individuals and COMINT documents within a COMINT unit located in an area susceptible to being quickly overrun by hostile forces.

3. In regard to the first condition, the Committee fully realizes that absolute control of the activities of each COMINT knowledgeable individual is an impossible task. The Committee, at the same time, recognizes the necessity for each USCIB member to take all possible action to control the activities of such an individual in order to enhance, to the greatest extent possible, the security of his COMINT knowledge. It is in this light that the guidance and the basis for such action contained in this directive has been written. An appendix to this document has been added to meet the expressed needs of certain members of current guidance regarding specific areas deemed to involve varying degrees of risk to individuals. It should be noted that the time restrictions regarding assignment of individuals to hazardous activities (page 4 of the enclosure) are applicable only to assignments involving non-COMINT duties. Considerations involving assignment of COMINT personnel to COMINT units are dealt with in sections concerning restrictions on personnel composition of such units as are located in areas deemed to be exposed, (pages 7-9 and 11-13 of the enclosure).

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SEC #0002

Subject: Draft Directive on Hazardous Activities

4. In regard to the second condition, the Committee feels that a determination as to the degree of risk to COMINT present within a COMINT unit in an exposed area should be based primarily on the ability of the local military forces (a) to delay hostile action long enough for COMINT personnel to destroy classified documents within that unit, and (b) to evacuate the COMINT personnel involved. The Security Committee believes, therefore, that the initial determination as to whether a given unit will be in a protected, risky or dangerous situation should be made by the senior headquarters charged with the defense of that area. The USCIB member having operational control of that COMINT unit, upon examination of the initial determination in light of additional facts known to him, may redetermine a situation as involving a greater risk. In the case of a unit which cannot operate effectively under pertinent safeguards imposed by this directive, the USCIB member concerned may make such exceptions to those safeguards as are approved in advance by USCIB. That member may not, however, determine a situation as involving a lesser risk than that reported by the field commander.

5. The above discussion is submitted in order to outline postulates deemed by the Security Committee to form the proper basis for USCIB policy in this matter.

6. The enclosure has received extremely thorough consideration by this Committee and is forwarded with a unanimous recommendation for approval.

William R Culmer

WILLIAM R. CULMER
Major, Arty., USA
Chairman, SECCOM

Enclosure
a/s

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USCIB DIRECTIVE NUMBER ____ (CIBD #____)

(Approved by USCIB on _____)

HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this Directive is to describe activities considered to be hazardous, to delineate geographic areas considered to be exposed and to prescribe policy with respect to:

- A. Engagement in hazardous activities by individuals having knowledge of current value about COMINT. (Page 3)
- B. COMINT collection and/or production in exposed areas. (Page 6)
- C. COMINT dissemination to consumers in exposed areas. (Page 9)

II. DEFINITIONS

A. Hazardous Activities - For the purpose of this Directive, hazardous activities are those which place a person in a position where he runs a substantial risk of being captured or otherwise subjected to interrogation, e.g.:

1. Duties behind enemy lines, or in shore operations off an enemy or Iron Curtain country.
2. Flights over enemy or Iron Curtain territory unless on recognized corridor routes.
3. Raids, minor formation attacks, underwater demolition operations, and service with a unit or formation forward of division headquarters.

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4. Duty in or visits to Iron Curtain countries and also other areas where from time to time local conditions are considered to involve an unacceptable risk. (See paragraph D, below, and Appendix A.)
5. Duty assignments and visits, other than unavoidable transit stops while traveling on official orders, in areas considered currently to involve an undue risk. (See paragraph B, below, and Appendix A.)
6. Transit through the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria unless on official business via air, sealed rail transport, or authorized convoy on U.S. approved routes.

B. Exposed Areas - For the purpose of this Directive, exposed areas are those which are susceptible of being quickly overrun by enemy forces or those wherein the local political or military situation is such to pose a distinct threat to the security of COMINT.

1. Exposed areas at present comprise areas under control of the USSR, Soviet Satellite countries, other Communist dominated areas, and areas adjacent thereto which are beyond defense lines expected to be tenable.
2. In proportion to the risk of loss of COMINT personnel and/or classified material located therein, such areas involve three situations:
 - a. Dangerous situations, i.e., those in which it is unlikely that complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and/or removal or effective destruction of classified material will be accomplished.

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- b. Risky situations, i.e., those in which it is likely that complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and/or removal or effective destruction of classified material will be accomplished.
- c. Protected situations, i.e., those in which there is no reasonable expectation of such a loss.

III. POLICY AND PROCEDURES

A. Engagement in Hazardous Activities by Individuals Having Knowledge of Current Value About COMINT

Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who has knowledge of current value about COMINT, such that his capture or interrogation could be a substantial risk to the security of COMINT shall be assigned to or engage in activities of a hazardous nature.

1. Assignment to Groups -

- a. Whenever the duties of any person who has had access to COMINT are about to be terminated or he is scheduled for reassignment and is deemed to have knowledge of current value about COMINT (whether currently indoctrinated or not) such that his capture or interrogation could be a substantial risk to the security of COMINT, a determination shall be made in accordance with the extent of that knowledge, into which of the following groups he shall belong:
 - (1) GROUP A - Producers of Category I COMINT who have no knowledge of other categories.
 - (2) GROUP B - Individuals who have knowledge of current value about Category II COMINT.

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- (3) GROUP C - Individuals, other than those specified in paragraph (4), below, who have knowledge of current value about Category III COMINT.
 - (4) GROUP D - Individuals with precise knowledge of COMINT processing techniques, competence or potential regarding the more sensitive Category III COMINT material.
- b. Responsibility for such assignment and cancellation after specific post debriefing intervals (see paragraph 2, below) rests with the parent USCIB member. A USCIB member department or agency using indoctrinated persons from another member department or agency shall, upon release of such individuals to their parent activity, furnish that activity with suitable recommendations regarding the group to which those individuals should be assigned.

2. Assignment to Hazardous Activities

The following restrictions apply to permanent and temporary duty assignments involving hazardous activities.

- a. GROUP A personnel may be assigned to hazardous activities only on the authority of senior officers. (NOTE: No special restrictions need be applied to recipients or non-indoctrinated producers of Category I COMINT only.)
- b. GROUP B personnel may be assigned to hazardous activities only after six months separation from such material.

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- c. GROUP C personnel may be assigned to hazardous activities only after a separation of one year or longer from this type of information.
- d. GROUP D personnel shall not be assigned to hazardous activities at any time.

3. Engagement in Hazardous Activities While in Official Non-Duty Status

Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who has knowledge of current value about COMINT shall engage in activities of a hazardous nature while on leave, liberty or other official non-duty status.

4. Engagement in Hazardous Activities in Any Unofficial Capacity

All possible action shall be taken to prevent any person who has terminated service with any USCIB member department or agency for any reason and who is still deemed to have knowledge of current value about COMINT from engaging in hazardous activities at any time.

5. Exceptions to the policy enunciated in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, above, shall be authorized only after careful consideration in each instance of the advantage to be gained, as opposed to the risk involved.

- a. In considering exceptions, the protection offered by diplomatic status should not automatically be considered sufficient, but should be assessed in the light of the particular circumstance involved.

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- b. An exception in the case of GROUP B or C personnel shall be approved by the USCIB member of the department or agency concerned. Each member department and agency of USCIB shall maintain a record of exceptions granted.
- c. An exception in the case of GROUP D personnel shall be approved by USCIB.

6. Implementing Instructions

Instructions implementing the above policy shall be issued by each USCIB member department and agency. A copy of these instructions shall be provided the Executive Secretary, USCIB, for information.

B. COMINT Collection and/or Production in Exposed Areas

1. General

It is recognized that effective intercept of certain communications and effective COMINT support of field commanders may require the establishment or continuation of COMINT collecting and/or producing activities in exposed areas which may suddenly fall under unfriendly control with consequent loss of COMINT personnel and/or COMINT material.

2. Decision to Locate COMINT Collection and/or Production Activities

- a. A determination as to whether a given situation falls into a protected, risky, or dangerous category will be obtained by the Service USCIB member concerned from the Senior Headquarters responsible for the defense of the area. Such determination shall be made in the light of the political, military, or other factors affecting the safety.

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of the personnel and material involved. Appropriate coordination shall be effected with such other members of USCIB as may be concerned. When a situation has been so determined the Director, NSA, will be notified accordingly. The Director, NSA, will be notified immediately in case of a change in any situation previously reported.

b. Upon notification that a given situation is risky or dangerous the Director, NSA, will decide whether a COMINT collection or production activity may be conducted in that area. In making this decision the Director, NSA, will:

- (1) Determine whether the task to be performed by the COMINT activity meets the criteria set forth in paragraphs 3a and 4a, below.
- (2) Weigh the advantages to be gained by the national COMINT effort as against the disadvantages of the COMINT losses which may result if the area concerned is suddenly overrun, and the probable effect of such losses upon the conduct of COMINT collection or production activities elsewhere.

3. Safeguards for Dangerous Situations

a. Only unique intercept tasks which cannot be accomplished elsewhere shall be assigned, and only such analysis as is locally required to support these tasks and permit essential technical reporting shall be performed.

- b. Only COMINT documents or technical aids essential and of current application to these tasks shall be held.
- c. No Category III COMINT or related documents and technical material shall be held.
- d. Personnel technically informed in COMINT of a higher level or broader scope than is required for the limited mission of the unit shall not be assigned if avoidable.
- e. No person in Group C, as defined in paragraph A.1.a(3) above, shall be assigned unless his presence is vital for the effective functioning of the unit.
- f. No person in Group D, as defined in paragraph A.1.a(4) above, shall be assigned in any circumstance.
- g. Facilities shall be provided with which the minimum number of persons on duty at any one time can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT materials within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.
- h. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

4. Safeguards for Risky Situations

- a. Only intercept, analytic and reporting tasks which cannot be performed satisfactorily in safe or protected situations shall be assigned.

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- b. No Category III or related documents and technical material shall be held except those essential to the assigned task and of current application thereto, and the latter shall be maintained in such condition as to ensure immediate destruction, if necessary, upon sudden threat of seizure.
 - c. No person in Group D, as defined in paragraph A.1.a(4), above, shall be assigned, unless required by considerations involving highly specialized technical knowledge.
 - d. Facilities shall be provided with which one third of the complement can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT materials within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.
 - e. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that adequate arrangements are made for safe evacuation of all personnel whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.
5. The Director, NSA, will submit a semi-annual report to USCIB containing a list of COMINT collection and/or production activities being conducted in dangerous or risky areas.
6. Exceptions to paragraphs 3 and 4, above, shall be made only with the approval of USCIB.

C. COMINT Dissemination to Consumers in Exposed Areas

1. General

The determination of the "need to know" of an official, and the responsibility for satisfying that need in the case of any particular item or category of COMINT, are functions of command or departmental or agency authority, residing with

the appropriate USCIB member either in its own capacity or as the executive agent of the Secretary of Defense. Nothing in this policy should be regarded as abrogating that principle. Nevertheless, USCIB recognizes that, under certain circumstances, the consideration of security in the common interest may override. This policy is formulated in the light of that recognition.

2. Decision to Locate COMINT Dissemination Activities in Exposed Areas

- a. A determination as to whether a given situation falls into a protected, risky or dangerous category will be obtained by the appropriate Service USCIB member from the senior headquarters responsible for the defense of the area. Such determination shall be made in the light of the political, military, or other factors affecting the safety of the personnel or material involved. Appropriate coordination shall be effected with such other members of USCIB as may be concerned. When a situation has been so determined, the USCIB member desirous of locating such dissemination facilities will be notified accordingly. That USCIB member will be notified immediately in case of a change in any situation previously reported.
- b. Upon notification that a given situation is risky or dangerous that USCIB member will decide whether a COMINT dissemination activity may be conducted in that area. In making this decision that member will:
 - (1) Determine whether the task to be performed can, in fact, only be satisfactorily performed in that area under consideration.

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- (2) Weigh the advantages to be expected from such dissemination as against the disadvantages of the COMINT losses which may result if the area concerned is suddenly overrun, and the probable effect of such losses upon the conduct of COMINT activities elsewhere.

3. Safeguards for Dangerous Situations

- a. Only those COMINT items essential to the operational responsibilities of a senior recipient shall be delivered into such areas. All Category III and II items will be so worded as to minimize disclosure of the source, should the material fall into unauthorized hands.
- b. Except in cases of urgency, Russian and Satellite COMINT will not be delivered into such areas.
 - (1) Such items delivered shall be encrypted with certain one-time cipher elements, the possession of which is necessary for decryption, and the decrypted versions plus the one-time cipher elements involved shall be completely destroyed, normally immediately, but in any case within 24 hours after decryption.
 - (2) No physical copies or files of this information, even in extract or gist, shall be retained under any circumstance and special care shall be exercised to maintain the physical security of the one-time cipher elements.
- c. No person in Group C, as defined in paragraph A.1.a(3), above, shall be assigned unless his presence is vital for the effective functioning of the unit.

- d. No person in Group D, as defined in paragraph A.1.a.(4), above, shall be assigned under any circumstance.
- e. Facilities shall be provided with which the minimum number of persons on duty at any one time can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT materials within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.
- f. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

4. Safeguards for Risky Situations

- a. Only those COMINT items having important and direct bearing on the operational responsibilities of a senior recipient shall be delivered into such areas. Such material may include Russian or Satellite COMINT providing special care is exercised in maintaining the security thereof. Files of Russian or Satellite COMINT, or of extracts or gists thereof, shall be kept to a minimum, and shall be maintained apart from files of other types of COMINT. Procedures shall be instituted to ensure immediate and complete destruction of the files in case of emergency.
- b. No person in Group D, as defined in paragraph A.1.a.(4), above, shall be assigned under any circumstance.
- c. Facilities shall be provided with which one third of the complement can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT material within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities.

- d. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that adequate arrangements are made for safe evacuation of all personnel whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.
5. Each USCIB member will submit a semi-annual report to USCIB containing a list of COMINT dissemination activities being conducted by that member in risky or dangerous situations.
6. Exceptions to paragraphs 3 and 4, above, shall be made only with the approval of USCIB.

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APPENDIX A
TO
USCIB DIRECTIVE NO.

CURRENT LIST OF
AREAS INVOLVING SUBSTANTIAL RISK TO INDIVIDUALS
HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT VALUE ABOUT COMINT¹

To assist in determining areas involving an unacceptable or undue risk insofar as individuals are concerned, the following geographic guidance shall apply:

a. Areas involving unacceptable risk:

Areas under control of the USSR, Soviet Satellite countries and other Communist dominated areas.

b. Areas involving undue risk:

- (1) Areas adjacent to those specified in paragraph a, above, which are beyond defense lines expected to be tenable.
- (2) Porkkala Area of Finland.
- (3) Berlin, Vienna, Yugoslavia, Macao, and The Associated States (Indo China)²

NOTES:

- 1/ SECCOM shall review this list not less than semi-annually with a view to recommending appropriate revisions.
- 2/ In the case of Groups A, B or C individuals, authority to grant permission for temporary official visits, other than for leave, may be delegated to the senior field representative of the USCIB member concerned, provided a record is maintained of the purpose and authorization for all such visits.