TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject: Consolidation of CIBD #7 and CIBD #14.


1. The enclosure is submitted for consideration in connection with item 2 of the agenda for the 27th Meeting of USCIBEC.

2. In this connection, attention is invited to the parenthetical mention of an Appendix "B" near the top of page 3 of the enclosure with the reference. The enclosure herewith is intended to form the basis for that Appendix "B". (It now occurs to me that we would have done better to use the word "Annex" in the enclosure with the reference thus avoiding the possibility of confusion with the UKUSA Appendices. The members might add that point to their consideration.)

RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U.S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure

DRAFT APPENDIX,
NSA TSC NO. 550636-B

TOP SECRET
GUIDE TO UNIFORM INTERPRETATION
OF SECTION III OF GIBD #

Appendix B to the UKUSA Agreement provides for the assignment of personnel to four groups (A, B, C, D), depending upon their degree of COMINT familiarity, and provides safeguards to govern their assignment to hazardous duty - duty where they would be exposed to capture and interrogation. The definitions provided for groups A, B, C, D, being extremely broad and general in nature, the U.S. COMINT community has derived the following expansions for purposes of providing ready and uniform decisions.

1. Group A.
   No expansion is considered necessary.

2. Group B.
   No expansion is considered necessary, but for the sake of clarity it is stated that the term "knowledge of current value" is to be interpreted, in each case where any doubt arises, in favor of a strict safeguarding of security. It is probable that a majority of COMINT cleared and indoctrinated persons would fall in this group or a higher group. It would apply, for example, to large numbers of field processing personnel as well as to most of those who have been assigned to NSA or the Service Cryptologic Agency headquarters.

3. Group C, which is defined as "personnel having knowledge of current value about Category III COMINT," requires further elaboration. Any of the...
following types of knowledge would be sufficient to cause assignment to this or the next higher group:

a. Our present state of progress in terms of degree of readability with respect to any Communist nation but without detailed knowledge of the means or methods employed or the mechanics of the crypto-systems involved.

b. As in a. above with respect to any major non-Communist target, but with the added requirement that some potentially useful knowledge of the means or methods employed or the mechanics of the crypto-systems involved is present. (This distinction would omit certain persons who had knowledge that substantial success was being obtained against, for example, Italy through knowledge of the nature or existence of current end-product, but who could tell nothing as to the reasons for success. It is a frank liberalization of the strict letter of UKUSA Appendix B.)

c. The degree of success attained by the technique of synthesis of large volumes of T/A and Plain Language (P/L) data to yield vital information against Russia. (This means intimate knowledge of the scope and nature of Russian T/A published as Category III or of the Russian PL reporting and the dependence placed upon it.)

d. Knowledge of the overall distribution of the U.S.-U.K. COMINT effort including the size, location and purpose of advanced processing units and intercept establishments. (The intent here is that the knowledge should be both broad and deep and include not only the present moment but the historic aspects and future plans as well.)
e. Programming techniques of general purpose computer equipments for cryptanalytic problems.

f. Capability to intercept radio transmissions where the equipments and techniques required go significantly beyond equipments and techniques in general use in the art. This may include for example, special equipments and techniques necessitated by very high or low frequencies encountered, new multiplex transmissions, ciphony, cifax, ultra-speed, noise type communications, etc.

These criteria will inevitably lead to the assignment of large numbers of personnel to Group C.

4. Group D also requires elaboration if any real distinction from Group C is to be established. Any of the following would be sufficient for assignment to Group D.

a. Knowledge of the nature of the methods and means of attack employed against Communist Category III systems or knowledge of projected new methods.

b. Broad overall knowledge of our success or failure against our various non-Communist targets together with the reasons therefore, the techniques developed, and the key personalities involved. (In general this would apply only to persons who had held senior posts in NSA proper on a career basis. It is aimed at the person who is dangerous through sheer bulk of accumulated knowledge and experience.)

c. Knowledge of the status of one or more of the highly sensitive "compartmented" problems during the time that such problem may remain compartmented. (Compartmented problems are few in number and usually small.)
The end-product, if any, is usually distributed in a very limited fashion.)

d. Knowledge of the performance and employment of special purpose high speed cryptanalytic equipments aimed primarily at Communist problems.