

103rd USCIB Meeting

BRIEFING SHEET FOR GENERAL CANINE  
ITEM 5 OF USCIB AGENDA

1. It is proposed by the U.K. to make [redacted] to France in order to force her to increase her communications security.

[redacted]

3. It is recommended that the proposal be rejected.

4. The U.K. proposal is undesirable for the following reasons:

[redacted]

[redacted] have had very little time to make any changes which they may wish to make as a result of the talks which ended less than two weeks ago. [redacted]

b. The proposal is an oversimplification.

(1) The long range problem is not a one-shot affair. The French [redacted] must be kept under careful scrutiny and future strategy based on observations. Arrangements were carefully made before breaking off the talks in Paris for resuming talks at any time simply and expeditiously through existing channels.

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c. The proposal is premised on the insecurity of a single system, and ignores other vital aspects.


(1) It is felt that physical security in Indo China is so bad and the Comsec of all of the other ciphers used in Indo China is so low that little is to be gained by a simple correction of the B-211 usage. If it is felt necessary to do so, however, it can be done far better as a part of the long range program.

d. The single system in question has been adequately covered in the existing program.

(1) The B-211 machine was a major subject of the discussions in Paris. Carefully keeping within terms of reference it was forcefully and repeatedly pointed out to the French that in the opinion of the British and Americans they could expect every message in this machine to be read by the Communists in a matter of hours. It was clear that these statements were understood. Nothing could be gained by going further.

5. It is suggested that a better approach to the problem would be to wait about ten days, in the hope that M. Parodi will call the U.S. and/or U.K. Ministers in to give them a report on French Foreign Office views on the recent conference. If he has not done so at the end of the ten days, then the U.S. and/or the U.K. Minister should call upon M. Parodi with a view to eliciting French reaction to the conference.

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605


3. As of 10 December 1953, the Signal Corps had the following M-209's in stock:

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
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1692	- Class A, ready for issue
714	- Ready for assembly
30,319	- For repair by cannibalization. These could yield about 15,000 machines.
20,059	- In theatre stocks or in hands of troops.

4. As of 18 December 1953, the U.S. Navy had about 20,000 M-209's in good condition, in storage at Great Lakes.

5. U.S. stocks of these machines are sufficiently large that a considerable number of them could be withdrawn without detriment to the current U.S. interests. In this connection, the M-209 will become obsolete in a year or two, since it will be replaced by AFSAM-7 or AFSAM-47B.



a. From military stocks on hand, M-209's could be transferred to DCI at current book value of \$30.00 each; CIA could then arrange to sell them to Hagelin at the same price, and reimburse the Army or Navy supply source.

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Item 67 (continued)



before 30 June 1954, to resolve all the problems involved in formulating such a policy.

CURRENT CONSIDERATION

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
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Item 7 (continued)

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
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RECOMMENDATION

12. It is recommended that the Director, NSA, support USCIB approval of the proposals set forth in the paper under consideration.

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Item 6

SUBJECT: Release of AFSAM 7 to NATO Nations

Background:

1. The US (SDFICC) approved release of the AFSAM 7 for NATO military communications and you so informed the Cypher Policy Board. At the same time you informed USCIB that you had taken this action.
2. The Cypher Policy Board, through the British cryptographic liaison officer, stated LSIB had also approved this release, and at the same time had "in principal" approved release to meet anticipated requests for national uses of AFSAM 7. They asked you to inform them whether USCIB also approved in principle release of the AFSAM 7 to NATO nations for national purposes.
3. You submitted to USCIB (circulated on vote sheet by USCIB Secretary) a proposed answer stating USCIB did agree in principle but that this was in no way a commitment to furnish any machines (USCIB 29.2/1).

Current Consideration:

4. CIA [ ] informed Austin that CIA would not concur in this letter until it had been discussed at a USCIB meeting. He gave as a reason the opinion that on the surface this action appeared slightly inconsistent with what you had told Mr. Dulles in discussing with him the recent French request for cipher machines (you had told him that you could not become involved in the piecemeal provision of cryptographic aid to foreign governments. This is also in substance what you reported to USCSB at its first meeting.) [ ] indicated CIA would approve your answer to the UK,

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but thought discussion by you would be beneficial to the other members of the board.

Recommendations:

5. If the subject does come up you should say:

"a. The proposed letter to the UK indicates only "agreement in Principle" to national non-military use. As I pointed out in USCIB 29.2/1, it is to be expected that release of a large quantity of machines for international purposes will almost certainly lead to national use, and that this is in keeping with our agreed objective of improving the national communications security of the members of NATO.

b. Furthermore, the recommended answer to the UK makes it clear that this agreement in principle does not constitute a commitment to furnish any machines. I do not intend to deal with individual requests for material aid until I have received from USCIB the authority to do so and a policy governing the handling of such requests. Just such a policy is now in preparation."

6. Should the members of the board ask the nature of the policy you should say "In essence the policy, if approved, will include the following main points.

a. The USCIB, after appropriate coordination with USCIB, will establish an approved list of nations to whom release of various categories of information and material can be supplied.

b. The Director, NSA will be authorized to provide reasonable assistance, on request, to countries within the approved lists.

c. Requests for assistance beyond the criteria established in the lists will be referred to the boards in each instance.

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d. All departments will be required to refer such requests for assistance as they receive from foreign nations to the Director, NSA; all replies to such requests will follow the same channels in reverse."

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605  
EO 3.3(h) (2)

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BRIEFING SHEET FOR GENERAL CANINE  
ITEM 5 OF USCIB AGENDA

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3. It is recommended that the proposal be rejected.

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Item 4

PROGRAM TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS  
SECURITY OF NATO COUNTRIES  
(Approach to the French)BACKGROUND

1. On 11 February 1954 USCIB approved the recommendations of the Combined Working Group (CWG) for the initial approach to the French and for other matters connected with the program to improve communications security of NATO countries (USCIB 29.1/20).

2. The first step in the approach to the French was made jointly by the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors in Paris on or about 24 March 1954. The start was excellent and reported in detail by Mr. Polyzoides in USCIB 29.1/21.

CURRENT CONSIDERATION

3. Mr. Polyzoides, Chairman of the CWG, will make an oral presentation of developments following the Ambassadorial approach.

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Item 3

PRINCIPLES FOR USE IN JAMMING  
AND INTERCEPT OPERATIONSBACKGROUND

1. On 25 September 1953, the CEMSA panel considered a draft report on "Principles to be Used as a Guide by Commanders in the Conduct of Jamming and Intercept Operations." The NSA members stated that the Director, NSA, would very probably have to discuss the report with USCIB before a final decision was made.

2. On 29 September 1953, the Senior NSA member of CEMSA recommended (1) that the Director, NSA, obtain the views of USCIB on the draft report and forward those views to the Director, Communications-Electronics (D,C-E) and (2) that D,C-E forward a committee report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporating the views of USCIB. It was pointed out that the JCS, as promulgating authority, would be required to act twice on the report unless the views of USCIB were first obtained. By awaiting USCIB action, the JCS would have the benefit of USCIB comments before making a decision.

3. On 21 October 1953 the Chairman, CEMSA concurred in these recommendations and incorporated them in a joint memorandum to Director, NSA, and Director, C-E.

4. On 10 November 1953 the NSA member of USCIB forwarded these recommendations to the Executive Secretary, together with the CEMSA draft report, and requested that the matter be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of USCIB.

5. At the 93rd Meeting on 13 November 1953 USCIB considered the matter (USCIB 20./6) and referred it to the Intelligence Committee for study and recommendation via the Executive Committee (USCIB 20./8).

6. The IMPCOM recommendations on the subject were circulated to USCIBEC for vote sheet action on 14 December 1953 (USCIB 20./9). IMPCOM rejected the CEMSA draft report and submitted an entirely new paper.

7. Results of the vote sheet action indicated a divergence of opinion among the members (USCIB 20./10 dated 15 January 1954). NSA disapproved the IMPCOM report and recommended acceptance of the CEMSA paper on the grounds that it represents the best arrangement which could be agreed to by negotiation between NSA and JCEC, and would materially improve the present situation.

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8. The divergent views were discussed at the 10th USCIBEC Meeting on 27 January 1954 (USCIB 20./11). The NSA member moved for adoption of the CEMSA paper. When subsequent discussion made it clear that the members seemed to be trying to develop an operational scheme, the Chairman reminded them that they had been asked only to comment with respect to the Director, NSA's reply to the Director, C-E. The members finally agreed that the CEMSA paper could stand as USCIB's views on this matter, if revised by NSA as follows: (a) provide a mechanism for insuring that important targets are not interfered with; (b) relax NSA's recommendations re "taboo targets"; and (c) insure that field commanders will be able to discriminate between targets.

9. The NSA member prepared a draft revision of the CEMSA paper, as directed by USCIBEC, but upon informal coordination with USCIBEC members most concerned (Army, Navy, AF, OGD, CIA) it became clear that agreement could not be reached thereon.

10. However, agreement was reached on a "consideration" concerning a draft USCIB Directive setting forth its policy on jamming foreign radio communications, and on the draft Directive itself. These papers were forwarded to USCIBEC for vote about action on 12 April 1954 (USCIB 20./12). It was pointed out that NSA was unable to obtain agreement on the revision of the CEMSA papers which USCIBEC had called for.

11. The vote was completed on 28 April 1954 and indicated approval by all members in the substance of the paper. However, the Navy member could not agree as to form, contending that the statements in the paper were acceptable only as guidance for the Director, NSA, upon which to base his reply to the Director, C-E. Navy felt that a USCIB Directive on jamming principles was premature at this time.

12. At the 14th Meeting on 29 April 1954, USCIBEC members were asked whether they could agree with the Navy member to withhold issuance of the proposed Directive and instead issue the substance of it as a statement of USCIB's views to the Director, NSA.

13. The NSA member did not support the Navy view because he felt, as did the other members, that the statement would have no force or effect and would leave the question unresolved. USCIBEC was, therefore, left with a split decision and the matter has been referred to USCIB by the Executive Secretary (USCIB 20./13), as required by paragraph 2 of USCIB Directive No. 2.

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Item 3 (continued)

CURRENT CONSIDERATION

14. It was thought that USCIB would have to decide only a procedural issue, since the Navy agreed to the substance of the paper.

15. It has just been learned, however, that the JCEC members of CENSA are very unhappy about the prospects of a USCIB Directive on Jamming. They point out that, inasmuch as Director, NSA, went to USCIB to obtain the views of the Board members, NSA should not have actively supported the formulation of a USCIB Directive. Such a climate could easily result in a worsening of NSA's relations with CENSA and with the Service communicators.

16. It should be emphasized that NSA has consistently advocated that USCIB adopt the CENSA paper. It was not until the interested members could not agree to the NSA revision of the CENSA paper that NSA finally agreed to go along with the idea of a USCIB Directive. This was done in the hope of getting some definite decision on a problem that had been referred to USCIB on 10 November 1953.

17. It is believed that JCEC's discontent results from a feeling that the JCS are being short-circuited. Colonel Sampson advances the quite logical argument that it would be wrong for Secdef to approve the Directive (through his OSD membership), then later sit as judge in deciding between the Directive and the JCS position if these differ (as seems likely).

18. It should be noted that the original CENSA paper was written as JCS guidance to Cinc's and 'Specified Commanders' on all aspects of jamming whereas, at the stated desire of USCIBEC, the jamming Directive is concerned exclusively with communications targets.

19. It has been learned unofficially that the position of the OSD member will be as follows: General Erskine will make a short speech pointing out that issuance of the USCIB Directive on jamming would place him in a tough spot; he would, in effect, have to act as judge, jury, and Supreme Court, in attempting to resolve the differences between the USCIB Directive and the JCS position on jamming. As a way out of this dilemma, General Erskine will offer the following recommendations: that USCIB approve the jamming paper under consideration, not as a USCIB Directive, not as a statement of policy on which the Director, NSA, may take such action as is appropriate, but as a statement of agreed USCIB policy concerning jamming of foreign radio communications, to be handed over to the Secretary of Defense for his use in formulating Service policy on the broad problem of jamming any foreign electromagnetic emissions.

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Item 3 (continued)

RECOMMENDATION

20. Director, NSA, can support USCIB agreement to defer action on the Directive for, say, sixty days, pending referral of the draft to JCS for comment either (a) directly from USCIB, (b) via OSD, or (c) through Director, NSA, and D/CE. Any of these would (a) insure reasonably rapid action, (b) preserve the Director's reputation for forthright dealings with the Service communicators, and (c) not place the OSD in the awkward position outlined above.

21. However, the recommendation to be offered by General Erskine will be more acceptable than any of the above, will attain the same ends, and should be supported by Director, NSA. If it is accepted, the Director, NSA, can then inform the Board that this action will enable him to get off the hook with regard to the JCRC. The members should be informed that the Director will advise the Director, Communications-Electronics: (a) that USCIB was unable to accept the CENSA report on jamming because it was too broad in scope and went beyond USCIB's present responsibilities, and (b) that USCIB will forward to the SECRETARY a statement of its policy on jamming foreign radio communications for his guidance in formulating Service policy on jamming in general. A copy of this statement would be included in the reply to D/CE.

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Item 1

APPROVAL OF FINAL MINUTES OF THE  
101ST AND 102ND USCIB MEETINGS

1. Changes submitted by NSA have been incorporated in the final version of the minutes of the 101st USCIB Meeting.
2. NSA has submitted a change to the tentative minutes of the 102nd Meeting. It is understood, however, that the final version of the minutes will not be ready by meeting time.
3. It is recommended that these minutes be approved.

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