103rd USCIB Meeting

BRIEFING SHEET FOR GENERAL COUNCIL
ITEM 5 OF USCIB AGENDA

1. It is proposed by the U.K. to make ______ to 
   France in order to force her to increase her communications security.

2. It is recommended that the proposal be rejected.

4. The U.K. proposal is undesirable for the following reasons:

   a. The proposal is an oversimplification.

   (1) The long range problem is not a one-shot affair. The 
   French ______ must be kept under careful scrutiny and future strategy based 
   on observations. Arrangements were carefully made before breaking off the 
   talks in Paris for resuming talks at any time simply and expeditiously 
   through existing channels.

   b. ______ have had very little time to make any 
   changes which they may wish to make as a result of the talks which 
   ended less than two weeks ago.
c. The proposal is premised on the insecurity of a single system, and ignores other vital aspects.

(1) It is felt that physical security in Indo China is so bad and the Comsec of all of the other ciphers used in Indo China is so low that little is to be gained by a simple correction of the B-211 usage. If it is felt necessary to do so, however, it can be done far better as a part of the long range program.

d. The single system in question has been adequately covered in the existing program.

(1) The B-211 machine was a major subject of the discussions in Paris. Carefully keeping within terms of reference it was forcefully and repeatedly pointed out to the French that in the opinion of the British and Americans they could expect every message in this machine to be read by the Communists in a matter of hours. It was clear that these statements were understood. Nothing could be gained by going further.

5. It is suggested that a better approach to the problem would be to wait about ten days, in the hope that M. Parodi will call the U.S. and/or U.K. Ministers in to give them a report on French Foreign Office views on the recent conference. If he has not done so at the end of the ten days, then the U.S. and/or the U.K. Minister should call upon M. Parodi with a view to eliciting French reaction to the conference.
3. As of 10 December 1953, the Signal Corps had the following M-209's in stock:

- 1692 - Class A, ready for issue
- 714 - Ready for assembly
- 30,319 - For repair by cannibalization. These could yield about 15,000 machines.
- 20,059 - In theatre stocks or in hands of troops.

4. As of 18 December 1953, the U.S. Navy had about 20,000 M-209's in good condition, in storage at Great Lakes.

5. U.S. stocks of these machines are sufficiently large that a considerable number of them could be withdrawn without detriment to the current U.S. interests. In this connection, the M-209 will become obsolete in a year or two, since it will be replaced by AFSAM-7 or AFSAM-47B.

a. From military stocks on hand, M-209's could be transferred to DCI at current book value of $30.00 each; CIA could then arrange to sell them to Augelain at the same price, and reimburse the Army or Navy supply source.
before 30 June 1954, to resolve all the problems involved in formulating such a policy.
RECOMMENDATION

12. It is recommended that the Director, WSA, support USCIB approval of the proposals set forth in the paper under consideration.
103rd USCIB Meeting

Item 6

SUBJECT: Release of AFSAE 7 to NATO Nations

Background:

1. The US (GCHQ) approved release of the AFSAE 7 for NATO military communications and you so informed the Cypher Policy Board. At the same time you informed USCIB that you had taken this action.

2. The Cypher Policy Board, through the British cryptographic liaison officer, stated that had also approved this release, and at the same time had "in principal" approved release to meet anticipated requests for national uses of AFSAE 7. They asked you to inform them whether USCIB also approved in principle release of the AFSAE 7 to NATO nations for national purposes.

3. You submitted to USCIB (circulated on vote sheet by USCIB Secretary) a proposed answer stating USCIB did agree in principle but that this was in no way a commitment to furnish any machines (USCIB 29.2/1).

Current Consideration:

4. CIA indicated Austin that CIA would not concur in this letter until it had been discussed at a USCIB meeting. He gave as a reason the opinion that on the surface this action appeared slightly inconsistent with what you had told Mr. Dulles in discussing with him the recent French request for cipher machines (you had told him that you could not become involved in the piecemeal provision of cryptographic aid to foreign governments. This is also in substance what you reported to USCIB at its first meeting.) indicated CIA would approve your answer to the UK,
but thought discussion by you would be beneficial to the other members of
the board.

Recommendations:

5. If the subject does come up you should say:

"a. The proposed letter to the UK indicates only "agreement in
Principle" to national non-military use. As I pointed out in USCIB 29.2/1,
it is to be expected that release of a large quantity of machines for
international purposes will almost certainly lead to national use, and
that this is in keeping with our agreed objective of improving the national
communications security of the members of NATO.

b. Furthermore, the recommended answer to the UK makes it clear
that this agreement in principle does not constitute a commitment to
furnish any machines. I do not intend to deal with individual requests for
material aid until I have received from USCIB the authority to do so and
a policy governing the handling of such requests. Just such a policy is
now in preparation."

6. Should the members of the board ask the nature of the policy you
should say "In essence the policy, if approved, will include the following
main points.

a. The USCIB, after appropriate coordination with USCIB, will
establish an approved list of nations to whom release of various categories
of information and material can be supplied.

b. The Director, ESA will be authorized to provide reasonable
assistance, on request, to countries within the approved lists.

c. Requests for assistance beyond the criteria established in
the lists will be referred to the boards in each instance.
d. All departments will be required to refer such requests for assistance as they receive from foreign nations to the Director, NSA; all replies to such requests will follow the same channels in reverse."
1. It is proposed by the U.K. to make direct ________ to France in order to force her to increase her communications security.

3. It is recommended that the proposal be rejected.

4. The U.K. proposal is undesirable for the following reasons:
c. The proposal is premised on the insecurity of a single system, and ignores other vital aspects.

(1) It is felt that physical security in Indo China is so bad and theComsec of all of the other ciphers used in Indo China is so low that little is to be gained by a simple correction of the B-211 usage. If it is felt necessary to do so, however, it can be done far better as a part of the long range program.

d. The single system in question has been adequately covered in the existing program.

(1) The B-211 machine was a major subject of the discussions in Paris. Carefully keeping within terms of reference it was forcefully and repeatedly pointed out to the French that in the opinion of the British and Americans they could expect every message in this machine to be read by the Communists in a matter of hours. It was clear that these statements were understood. Nothing could be gained by going further.

5. It is suggested that a better approach to the problem would be to wait about ten days, in the hope that M. Parodi will call the U.S. and/or U.K. Ministers in to give them a report on French Foreign Office views on the recent conference. If he has not done so at the end of the ten days, then the U.S. and/or the U.K. Minister should call upon M. Parodi with a view to eliciting French reaction to the conference.
103rd USCTB Meeting

Item 4. PROGRAM TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY OF NATO COUNTRIES
(Approach to the French)

BACKGROUND

1. On 11 February 1954 USCTB approved the recommendations of the Combined Working Group (CWG) for the initial approach to the French and for other matters connected with the program to improve communications security of NATO countries (USCIB 29.1/20).

2. The first step in the approach to the French was made jointly by the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors in Paris on or about 24 March 1954. The start was excellent and reported in detail by Mr. Polyzoides in USCIB 29.1/21.

CURRENT CONSIDERATION

3. Mr. Polyzoides, Chairman of the CWG, will make an oral presentation of developments following the Ambassadorial approach.
Present Situation.

By recommendation between NSC and JOC, and without recommendation by the Intelligence Committee, the JOG was to request the Joint Intelligence Committee to reconsider the Joint Intelligence Committee's report and recommend a course of action (NSC 20/6). A majority of the members of the Committee agreed to this request after a lengthy discussion.

4. The Joint Intelligence Committee's recommendation to the Executive Committee (NSC 20/6) was referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee for consideration, and the Committee recommended that the report be adopted and endorsed.

5. At the 3rd meeting on 13 November 1963, the Joint Intelligence Committee considered the recommendations and endorsed the report in a joint memorandum to the Director.

End Memorandum 1963. A majority of the Joint Intelligence Committee recommended a course of action before a final decision was made.

The Joint Intelligence Committee, after receiving the joint report of the Joint Intelligence Committee, recommended a course of action, and the Joint Intelligence Committee recommended a course of action before a final decision was made.

1. On 29 September 1963, the Joint Intelligence Committee reconsidered a draft report.
DIRECTORATE 5-2.

I (s) [Signature of Director]

Secretary General (USCIR 20/17) is required by paragraph 2 of USCIR

with a spirit of dedication and the utmost care has been furnished to USCIR by the

government ministerial. USCIR is therefore, in a letter dated 19-04-1974, USBF member

that the statement could have no force or effect.

13. USBF member did not support the very view because he felt the

USCIR's view to the Director, W/N.

on Commerce Agreement was premature of the time.

the recommendation was premature of the time.

vote was completed on 20 April 1974 and therefore

the recommendation was premature of the time.

the recommendation was premature of the time.

9. The USBF member referred a draft version of the USBF

agree to the Director, W/N, that the agreement

between United States of America, joint agreement

The USBF member referred a draft version of the USBF

10. The USBF member referred a draft version of the USBF

11. The USBF member referred a draft version of the USBF

12. By all members in the presence of the Director. However, the

20/4-22. It was agreed that the VCN report were returned to USCIR for

request of the members, they were returned to USCIR for

20/4-22. It was agreed that the VCN report were returned to USCIR for

request of the members, they were returned to USCIR for

10. The USBF member referred a draft version of the USBF
14. It was thought that USCIB would have to decide only a procedural issue, since the Navy agreed to the substance of the paper.

15. It has just been learned, however, that the JCC members of CENSA are very unhappy about the prospects of a USCIB Directive on Jamming. They point out that, inasmuch as Director, NSA, went to USCIB to obtain the views of the Board members, NSA should not have actively supported the formulation of a USCIB Directive. Such a climate could easily result in a worsening of NSA's relations with CENSA and with the Service communicators.

16. It should be emphasized that NSA has consistently advocated that USCIB adopt the CENSA paper. It was not until the interested members could not agree to the NSA revision of the CENSA paper that NSA finally agreed to go along with the idea of a USCIB Directive. This was done in the hope of getting some definite decision on a problem that had been referred to USCIB on 10 November 1953.

17. It is believed that JCC's discontent results from a feeling that the JCS are being short-circuited. Colonel Sampson advances the quite logical argument that it would be wrong for SecDef to approve the Directive (through his OSD membership), then later sit as judge in deciding between the Directive and the JCS position if these differ (as seems likely).

18. It should be noted that the original CENSA paper was written as JCS guidance to CinC's and 'Specified Commanders' on all aspects of jamming whereas, at the stated desire of USCIB, the jamming Directive is concerned exclusively with communications targets.

19. It has been learned unofficially that the position of the OSD member will be as follows: General Erskine will make a short speech pointing out that issuance of the USCIB Directive on jamming would place him in a tough spot; he would, in effect, have to act as judge, jury, and Supreme Court, in attempting to resolve the differences between the USCIB Directive and the JCS position on jamming. As a way out of this dilemma, General Erskine will offer the following recommendations: that USCIB approve the jamming paper under consideration, not as a USCIB Directive, but as a statement of policy on which the Director, NSA, may take such action as is appropriate, but as a statement of agreed USCIB policy concerning jamming of foreign radio communications, to be handed over to the Secretary of Defense for his use in formulating Service policy on the broad problem of jamming any foreign electromagnetic emissions.
103rd USCIB Meeting

Item 3 (continued)

RECOMMENDATION

20. Director, NSA, can support USCIB agreement to defer action on the Directive for, say, sixty days, pending referral of the draft to JCS for comment either (a) directly from USCIB, (b) via OSD, or (c) through Director, NSA, and D/CE. Any of these would (a) insure reasonably rapid action, (b) preserve the Director’s reputation for forthright dealings with the Service communicators, and (c) not place the OSD in the awkward position outlined above.

21. However, the recommendation to be offered by General Erskine will be more acceptable than any of the above, will attain the same ends, and should be supported by Director, NSA. If it is accepted, the Director, NSA, can then inform the Board that this action will enable him to get off the hook with regard to the JCEC. The members should be informed that the Director will advise the Director, Communications-Electronics; (a) that USCIB was unable to accept the CE/ESA report on jamming because it was too broad in scope and went beyond USCIB’s present responsibilities, and (b) that USCIB will forward to the SECDEF a statement of its policy on jamming foreign radio communications for his guidance in formulating Service policy on jamming in general. A copy of this statement would be included in the reply to D/CE.
TOP SECRET

103rd USCIB Meeting

Item 1  APPROVAL OF FINAL MINUTES OF THE 101ST AND 102ND USCIB MEETINGS

1. Changes submitted by NSA have been incorporated in the final version of the minutes of the 101st USCIB Meeting.

2. NSA has submitted a change to the tentative minutes of the 102nd Meeting. It is understood, however, that the final version of the minutes will not be ready by meeting time.

3. It is recommended that these minutes be approved.