

CHRONOLOGY (23 Jan 68)

1st day or so

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IV

The following is a brief statement of actions taken by NSA in response to the PUEBLO incident:

At 22/2345 (Local) a CRITIC message was received by NSA from COMNAVFOR Japan concerning the PUEBLO; NSA key personnel were immediately notified. I was called by Mr. Walter Rostow, Special Assistant to the President, concerning the PUEBLO. He wished to know what command control procedures were applicable in instances such as this. I told Mr. Rostow that there was a clear division of responsibility between NSA and the JCS in connection with such reconnaissance patrols; that NSA provides technical guidance and support for the SIGINT collection mission; however, the JCS (JRC) retains full responsibility for deployment of the ship to include the evaluation of physical risk factors. I indicated that it appeared that any action to be taken regarding the PUEBLO at this point was a matter under JCS cognizance.

At 23/0055 (Local) ADNSG advised NSA that they were taking action to determine the names of all crew members of the PUEBLO and documents which were aboard. A request was also sent by NSA to requesting a listing

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 793
(b) (3)-E.O. 11652

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of any classified documents sent directly or indirectly to the PUEBLO.

At 23/0320 (Local) in response to a request from the JRC concerning the PUEBLO NSA advised them that according to information to NSA that the PUEBLO had departed YO KUSUKA for SASEBO on 4 January (see message attached) and subsequently departed SASEBO on 10 January for her patrol area. According to her "sail orders" the PUEBLO was to sail under EMCON throughout her patrol until, and if, she encountered Soviet Naval Units in the Tshushima Straits area. Until the incident NSA had received no messages from the ship.

At 23/0334 SIGINT Readiness ALPHA was established. At 23/0335 the JCS/JRC requested that NSA query appropriate stations for any reflection of the PUEBLO presence since 8 January.

At 23/0430 NSA readdressed all [redacted] reports

[redacted] on the incident to the White House.

At 23/0505 NSA requested JCS/JRC for immediate and continuous ACRP cover off the East Coast of Korea; targetting to be against all N Korean service communications with maximum attention devoted to N Korean naval HF and VHF R/T and [redacted] operations.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-E.L. 86-36

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Status of equipment and personnel of PUEBLO, thus far
COMINT has indicated (231515Z [redacted] spot report KCN Ro2-68)
as underlined.

A [redacted] spot report (NR 18) 68/24 Jan FM [redacted]
concerned the interrogation of U.S. personnel captured
by North Korea. In brief the report reflected a conversation
between two high ranking N Koreans Pyongyang concerning
the length of interrogation. It was stated that a
conference was held to discuss the matter and when they
will be allowed to return. One of the two persons, believed
to be the North Korean Defense Minister (Kim Chang Bang),
stated that "We are going to wait for a couple of days
because they are not cooperating with us"; he was then
asked how many days he would interrogate them. In reply
it was stated that he planned to hold them ten days.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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