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USCIB: 20./23

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27 January 1956


~~TOP SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: USCIB Policy on Imitative Communications Deception.

Reference: USCIB 20./21 dated 29 November 1955.

1. As a result of vote sheet action on the reference, and subsequent coordination by telephone of a proposed amendment to paragraph 3, the reference was approved.

2. Enclosed herewith is a copy of the final memorandum on the above subject which was signed by the Chairman, USCIB and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.


ALLIN COLE, JR.
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
a/s

USCIB: 20./23

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CIB # 0003

5 January 1956

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Subject: USCIB Policy on Imitative Communication Deception.

1. The United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) forwarded to you in CIB # 000158, dated 20 May 1954, its views on the jamming of foreign radio communications. As a directly related item, USCIB notes that the employment of imitative communication deception involves parallel considerations. The more sophisticated methods of imitation or intrusion require skillful application of knowledge acquired through COMINT operations. However, it must be assumed that the revelation of this knowledge to the enemy will lead him to increase his communications and transmission security, to the detriment of COMINT. Therefore, the following USCIB views on the employment of imitative communication deception are furnished for guidance.

2. Within the framework of the doctrine expressed herein, imitative communications deception should be employed only as approved in advance by USCIB. Prior approval is particularly important and is required without exception for imitation of foreign cryptography or secure foreign communication procedures. USCIB has no objection, however, to transmission or retransmission of plain-language messages, random text resembling cipher, texts and headings taken verbatim from intercepted traffic, in any combination, and the imitation of conventional radio operating procedures and the format of message headings, on any communications circuit, without prior USCIB approval, if in the discretion of appropriate military commanders imitation of this type is essential.

3. Exceptionally, USCIB recognizes that commanders of major forces in affected areas should be permitted to imitate unenciphered military voice and radiotelegraph plain-language transmissions passing on foreign circuits which employ complex and varying communications procedures when, in the considered judgment of those commanders, such intrusion is essential in the National interest or for the safety of major military forces and time does not permit the obtaining of necessary clearances. When operations permit, COMINT authorities will be notified as soon as possible of the action taken.

Enclosure with USCIB 20./23 dtd 27 Jan 1956.

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Subject: USCIB Policy on Imitative Communication Deception.

4. In order that military commanders may be able to ascertain what foreign radio circuits have been approved by USCIB as targets of imitative deception and to what extent such intrusion has been approved, the Director, NSA, should keep COMINT field units informed of USCIB decisions on the subject.

5. To provide, further, for consideration by USCIB of any proposals by military commanders to intrude on communications circuits or to employ a type of intrusion other than those which have been previously approved by the Board, the Director, NSA, should establish, within the framework of USCIB policy, procedures which will facilitate prompt response to such proposals.

6. In support of any intrusion on communications circuits approved by USCIB or undertaken as provided above, the Director, NSA, should provide continuously to COMINT field units necessary technical circuit information and applicable traffic intelligence, and furnish technical assistance as required.

(Signed)

ALLEN W. DULLES
Chairman, USCIB

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