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The History of Applesauce

HSC 403	nickname for our
	in civilian operation
of an intercept statio	n () / / / /
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1045 40) -1 TIG	
In the immediate post-war era (1945–48), the U.S.	
Navy's radio intelligence organization shrank from its vartime position of great strength to a mere cadre. It had	Mason thought this was worth pursuing and directed me to
een decided, of course, that a principal post-war target	begin the necessary planning. (My principal job at that
een decided, of course, that a principal post-wal target	time was Intercept and D/F Control Officer for the Naval
	Security Group; this project was additional.)
	We estimated that we would need to establish about
	intercept positions, to cover both
perating in various parts of the world. Our collection	and that we could accomplish this
apability was In the Pacific we had	with about highly skilled people. We realized that
mall units in	recruiting that many skilled operators would be a
	formidable task.
	////
	//// all planning
	was to be done by the Navy.
	At that time, NSG had within its reserve components an
	organization known as the Reserve Listening Service
	(RLS). This consisted of civilians who had served as NSG
ur mainstay in the area, was	operators during World War II and who had joined NSG
	reserve components throughout the U.S. These men
ler	performed their Navy drills by copying foreign targets in
The station was a great distance from its	their homes two hours a week with Navy radio equipment.
rincipal target area Most of the targets -but there was very little	The intercepted material was mailed to NSS for processing, and certain feedback information was returned to the
perational activity on the part of the	operators. The RLS was not a smashing success, but it did
permitted on the part of the	keep alive the interest of former operators and gave us a
Everyone complained about this problem	minor return on our investment.
aily and we were trying desperately to find a solution.	The RLS was a natural choice as a recruiting pool.
This was one of the problems presented to Captain	One day LCDR I. E. Willis, who was in charge of the
edfield Mason, when he returned to duty with the Naval	NSG/Reserve program, said he needed a project name to
ecurity Group in 1947. Captain Mason began discussions	use in correspondence. Several were suggested and one
rith newly established CIA,	amused Mr. Willis, who remarked that "that one sounds
collection. It appeared that we might be able to	like a lot of applesauce to me." And we had our project
\	name.
	In 1949 the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) was
After a year's negotiation,	formed, and the Navy and Army operations were consolidated. The Production organization was moved to

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Arlington Hall Station, with Captain Mason as the Chief. He reaffirmed the requirement for the station and directed that I step up the effort to establish it.	The formation of AFSA assisted Project Applesauce in some ways because it gave a wider base for planning. John McIntire, who had experience in facilities planning with ASA, designed the station, as well as the training facility at Arlington Hall Station that was a near replica of the actual station. In addition to the RLS operators we hoped to hire, we combed the ASA Reserve records for experienced men who might be available. We also checked AFSA personnel files.
There was one difficulty in the operation of intercept stations at that time that we particularly wanted to remedy. The operators were ordinarily cleared only as high as Confidential, which prevented them from knowing about the results of T/A or C/A efforts; thus they received no feedback information and operated in a vacuum. We insisted that all of the Project Applesauce crew receive the same Top Secret clearance, and, though we had to fight this one all the way to the top in CIA, we finally won—a victory that, I am sure, ultimately contributed to the success of the station.	We then embarked on a unique recruiting effort for cryptologic specialists by mailing a letter to approximately 300 men scattered throughout the U.S., asking if they would be interested in civilian employment with a Government Agency (unspecified) at an overseas location (unspecified) at an unspecified salary, doing work similar to that in which they had been engaged during the recent war. Ind I applied the signature. We were highly gratified to receive a large number of replies.
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The entire communications complex, with the wing which housed USF 61 in the lower right. (U. S. Navy photograph)

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	It appeared that we could probably hire an adequate	
	number of people; however, they were scattered all over	
	the U.S. and personal interviews were required. We	
	therefore planned to have our interviewing team, consisting	
	of Major Thorsten Erickson, USA, an AFSA employee, of CIA, visit principal cities in each	
	section of the country.	
/	Major Erickson, in musti, and traveled about	
/	10,000 miles in three weeks; they interviewed a large	
	number of applicants and hired most of them. During the	
/	interviews, the candidates were not told for whom they	
	would be working, other than the U.S. Government; they	
	were not told where they were going, except that it would	
To annual services	be in the area; and they were not told exactly what they would be doing. The team carried a large	
4	amount of cash and paid some men on the spot for travel	$\setminus \setminus$
(b)(1) (b)(3)	and other expenses.	
OGA	Major Erickson was quite pleased with the men he had	$\setminus \setminus \setminus$
CTT	been able to hire and said he believed they would make a	
CIA	good crew with a minimum of training. Most of the hiring	
	was done at the GS 5-7 level with an occasional GS-9 as a	
	supervisor.	M = M + M + M + M + M + M + M + M + M +
*	We also had to find a suitable person to be the civilian	
	in charge and the deputy. This proved to be a monumental	
\	undertaking requiring approximately six months. I had several possible candidates; however, for personal reasons,	
\	most of them declined, and one was rejected for security	
	reasons. Fortunately we had an ace in the hole in the form	The operations room taken about 3
	of USN (Retired) and Chief	years after the station was established. The facil-
	Radioman USN (Retired), highly experienced	ity originally had positions, most of which are
	individuals who very reluctantly agreed to come out of	Shown here. (b) (1) (Photo classified CONFIDENTIAL) (b) (3) -50 USC 403
1	Florida retirement and head the project at salaries of	(b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
	\$10,000 per year—a lot of money in those days.	
(b)(3)-P-L 86-36	In the meantime, had been working frantically to finish installation of the training facility in A	and underline of their knowledge. There hired to man the
	Building. AHS.	and updating of their knowledge. Those hired to man the communications circuits worked in the Arlington Hall
	Finally, all of our new	Station Communications Center. The men regained their
	employees were brought to Arlington Hall to be briefed.	code-copying speed and learned as much as we knew about
4	Fitzpatrick explained to them, for the first time, exactly	the They were also briefed on
	where they were going and what they would be doing.	personnel matters, living conditions and all of
	When was mentioned, I watched their	the other things they needed to know about their new job.
	faces and concluded that most of them had a general idea	There was an absolute minimum of complaining, sickness,
•	of where they were going; however, it was obvious a few of them did not. One man told me he had been sure he was	and absenteeism; we had a gung-ho crew. In the fall of 1950, the men completed training and
	going to At the end of the briefing, we asked if	The transfer of 1990; the men completed training and
	anyone wanted to back out: we were cheered to see not a	
-	single hand.	Post-Log
De :	For the next two months the men worked in the training	The intercept station was a success from the
	facility: those hired as supervisors established watch lists,	beginning. The men proved to be highly motivated
	and the men copied targets that could be heard in	operators, and hearability was excellent. For the
	Washington. They also visited the Navy's	first time, we were able to keep up with the
 36.	section at Arlington Hall Station for on-the-job training	problem.

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After a few years, it became difficult to hire replacements and to place the skilled men in jobs once they returned from AFSA, NSA, and CIA hired many of the returnees, but it was eventually decided that it would be better to man the station with military operators. Accordingly the Navy took over in June 1957, with the facility redesignated USN-16. Thus ended the first U.S. civilian operator experiment.	This later became USM-49 under ASA. Why could not these sites also have been used for Comint at that time? As far as were concerned, I doubt if they would have ever known the difference—or cared if they did know. (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
In retrospect, I wonder why we had so much trouble finding a suitable site for this station. For example, in 1948-49, the U.S. Navy (not NSG) established an Elint site Was later turned over to NSG and became USN-18. At this same period, the U.S. Army (not ASA) began operating an ELINT site	Executive Officer of the National Cryptologic School. As a career cryptologic officer, he has served in Sigint activities in many parts of the world, and as Commanding Officer of five of them. He has had several tours in NSA in jobs involving virtually every cryptologic discipline. He has also contributed to the NSA Technical Journal.
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