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ANNUAL HISTORICAL SUMMARY

FISCAL YEAR 1963



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U.S. ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY SECURITY AGENCY
ARLINGTON HALL STATION
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22212

US ARMY SECURITY AGENCY
ANNUAL HISTORICAL SUMMARY

FISCAL YEAR 1963

Prepared by
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
(Reports Control Symbol CSHIS-6(R2))

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~~SECRET SAVIN~~INTRODUCTION

(U) The US Army Security Agency continued to grow and expand during its eighteenth year. This report is intended to highlight some of the more important developments and activities of the Agency during Fiscal Year 1963.

~~(SIVCOO)~~ One of the most outstanding developments was the increased USASA interest in Army aircraft for airborne radio direction finding. This was reflected in the procurement of U-6A (Beaver), U-8D (Seminole), OV-1C (Mohawk) and CV-2B (Caribou) aircraft, and the development of the AN/ARD-15 airborne direction finding equipment in South Vietnam. It is anticipated that Agency use of aircraft will continue to increase in the coming years as new techniques and improved aircraft are developed, and as the flexibility and practicability of such aircraft becomes more evident.

~~(SCW)~~ Exposure of Soviet missiles in Cuba in October 1962, brought about an intensive augmentation of personnel and intercept positions of the 326th ASA Company. The company, temporarily stationed in Florida on a training mission, found itself suddenly tasked with a mission of national strategic import. Even after the crisis subsided, the mission continued to expand.

~~(SCW)~~ Of particular interest also was the increased use of automatic data processing (ADP) equipment. This is perhaps best illustrated by the establishment of the Southeast Asia Processing and Integration Center at the 9th USASA Field Station, Philippine Islands. SEAPIC's mission was

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final field processing and reporting of Southeast Asia communications, and in particular, North and South Vietnam. It thus was able to produce a final composite report on SIGINT from that area. The importance of ADP equipment continues to grow, and its future use in the Agency appears unlimited.

~~(S//FOUO)~~ Other important developments were the transfer of RED WIND and DAWN STAR systems from the Signal Corps to USASA, development of the "over-the-horizon" missile detection system, and the implementation of a four year initial enlistment policy.

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ADMINISTRATIVE HIGHLIGHTSCOMMAND

Chief, USASA - Maj Gen William H. Craig, USA, 019526

Deputy Chief, USASA - Brig Gen Orman G. Charles, USA, 029954

Sp Asst to the Deputy Chief, USASA - Col Dayton W. Eddy, SigC, 024565
(28 Feb 63-30 Jun 63)

Chief of Staff, USASA - Col Robert T. Walker, GS, 031368

Chief, USASA, Europe - Col James H. Keller, Inf, 021871

Chief, USASA, Pacific - Col George A. Godding, Inf, 040790

Chief, USASA, Alaska - Lt Col Norman B. Rolle, Inf, 079715

Chief, USASA, Caribbean - Lt Col Chester W. Tuckerman, AS(Armor), 01825992
(1 Jul 62-25 Jul 62)
Lt Col Jack P. Lansford, SigC, 080956
(25 Jul 62-30 Jun 63)

Commanding Officer, 4th USASA Field Station - Col William C. Newman, AIS,
0354474 (1 Jul 62-10 Jun 63)
Lt Col Arthur W. Hackwood, Inf,
036109 (11 Jun 63-30 Jun 63)

ORGANIZATION

(U) Headquarters, US Army Security Agency remained located at Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia during FY 1963. Organizational changes made within staff elements follow:

1. (U) Effective 1 November 1962, responsibilities and functions of the Military Personnel Division, Office of the Adjutant General (AG) (less Unit Personnel Section and Personnel Procurement and Processing Section) were transferred to the OACofS, G1. Concurrently, responsibilities and functions of the Personnel Services Division, G1 (less Safety Section) were transferred to AG. The new activities transferred to AG were combined with those retained and designated as the Personnel Services Division, AG. Implementation of the reorganization brought about by this major change was accomplished by establishing separate branches for Officer, Enlisted and Reserve personnel. Each branch was aligned

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to permit a more direct coordination with the Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army. Two additional sections--Senior Assignment Section and Special Projects Section--were established within the Enlisted Assignments Branch. These sections permitted more effective control, flexibility and utilization of senior USASA enlisted personnel; and allowed more flexibility in the utilization of TDY personnel and insured special operational training for individuals enroute overseas.

2. (U) Plans and Program Division of OACofS, G1 was redesignated as the Plans and Policy Division, on 1 November 1962, and assigned the additional responsibility for the office of the Personnel Management Supervisor and the office of the Safety Engineer.

3. ~~(S)~~ Acoustical intelligence (ACOUSTINT) systems RED WIND and DAWN STAR were transferred from the Signal Corps to USASA effective 1 July 1962 and 1 August 1962, respectively.

4. (U) On 1 November 1962, the combat developments element of the USASA Board (Concepts Division, Operations Research Division, and Objectives Division) were transferred to OACofS, Developments.

PERSONNEL

~~(S)~~ Strength figures for US Army Security Agency at the beginning and end of FY 1963 were as follows:

	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Total</u>
1 Jul 62	1735	248	21,605	1403	24,991
30 Jun 63	1630	259	21,556	974	24,419

(U) DA approved a four-year initial enlistment policy for ASA, effective 1 May 1963, as one measure in reducing the problems arising from the heavy personnel turnover among first term enlistees. On 28 June 1963, DA announced the establishment of a two-year service requirement for all active military personnel receiving promotions to colonel, lieutenant colonel; CWO, W-4; CWO, W-3; and enlisted pay grades E-7, -8, -9.

~~(S)~~ During the report period, background investigations on 24,633 persons were initiated; 39,356 security clearances were issued; and 826

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clearances were denied or revoked.

(U) The Army Intelligence and Security (AIS) Branch was established effective 1 July 1962 as a branch of the Active Army. DA Circular No 611-14, 19 October 1962, authorized the transfer of all Active Army and Reserve Component Forces officers of USASA to the AIS Branch, following certain procedures.

(U) A design for the branch insignia was approved and authorized for wear by personnel of the AIS Branch, 20 December 1962. Oriental Blue and Silver Gray were also approved as official AIS Branch colors.

UNITS

~~(C)~~ At the beginning of the fiscal year, there were 80 TD units (exclusive of US Strategic Army Forces (STRAF)). By 30 June, the number of TD units (exclusive of STRAF) had increased to 97. During this period DA increased personnel spaces for USASA support to US Strategic Army Corps (STRAC)/STRAF to allow for an additional battalion Hq & Hq Co, two divisional support companies, and an ASA operations company (A). The following changes in status of USASA units took place: 21 units were organized, one discontinued, and one redesignated.

(U) AS-USAR: All USASA Reserve units were reorganized under TOE. Organization and equipment guides for use with the TOE, while units are in a reserve status, were developed and forwarded to US Continental Army Command for approval and publication. As a result of the reorganization of the Department of the Army in late FY 1962, the Chief of Staff, US Army, approved a recommendation that Chief, USASA, be allowed to retain his own proponent authority. This left the Chief, USASA in a very enviable position

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since he became the only DA commander to have proponent authority for all authorization documents used by elements of his command.

(U) The following units, called to active duty during FY 1962, were demobilized 15 July 1962:

324th USASA Battalion
325th USASA Battalion
197th USASA Company (Op A)

BUDGET

(C) In FY 1963, total funding, both direct (O&M,A and RDT&E) and indirect (MCA, PEMA, MPA) amounted to \$175,655,000 with distribution made as follows:

O&M,A	\$ 37,011,000
RDT&E	17,265,000
MCA	11,479,000
PEMA	22,200,000
MPA	87,700,000
Total	<u>\$175,655,000</u>

(C) Three new programs were included in the Agency funding responsibility for FY 1963, namely:

1. The Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army (PEMA), in the amount of \$22,200,000 for procurement of USASA equipment.
2. The Military Family Housing Program (P1900), in the amount of \$890,000.
3. The Reserve Personnel, Army Program (P1800), in the amount of \$18,000 to support training of reserve personnel at the Army Language School.

(U) The USASA FY 1963 MCA Program, consisting of Title I projects in the amount of \$4,480,000; Title IV projects (DOD-sponsored facilities for Projects BANKHEAD and STONEHOUSE) in the amount of \$3,376,000; and Title

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VII (Family Housing) projects in the amount of \$3,533,000, was successfully justified before the four Armed Services Congressional Committees and funds for construction were included in the appropriate legislation bill.

~~(SUVCEC)~~ During the report period, 17 commercial contracts were completed with a total value of \$1,762,540. At the end of the year, there were seven contracts in progress with a total dollar value of \$3,641,867.90. In addition, various operational and support projects in the amount of \$2,740,000 were under construction at seven locations.

ELECTRONIC POSITIONS WORLD-WIDE

~~(SUVCEC)~~ Operational positions at end of FY 1963 were as follows:

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COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC)

~~(C)~~ An evaluation of COMSEC for calendar year 1962 indicated that transmission security remained unsatisfactory. Unless positive, corrective measures are developed and implemented, this situation will continue.

~~(C)~~ A total of 3,769,958 plain language messages was analyzed with 3,925 security violations and practices dangerous to transmission security detected. Compared with FY 1962, this represents an increase of 51,268 messages analyzed and an increase of 301 security violations and practices

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dangerous to transmission security. Cryptosecurity analysis was applied to 48,075 encrypted messages, disclosing 26 possible compromises and 127 practices dangerous to cryptosecurity. This was an increase of 11,869 messages analyzed and a decrease of 28 possible compromises; however, there was an increase of 72 practices dangerous to cryptosecurity.

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General George H. Decker, seated, Chief of Staff, US Army signing the General Order establishing Intelligence and Security as a basic Branch of the Army effective 1 July 1962. (LtoR) Maj Gen Alva R. Fitch, ACSI; Lt Gen Russell L. Vittrup, DCofS for Personnel; Col Richard S. Smith, Chief, I&S Division, OAD; Col John M. Farnell, DACSI Project Officer; Maj Gen Garrison B. Coverdale, CG, US Army Intelligence Center; and Maj Gen William H. Craig, Chief, USASA. The signing took place in the Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

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USASA FIELD ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS

CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

USASA Training Center and School, Fort Devens, Mass

~~(C)~~ Overall programmed training objectives at USASA Training Center and School (USASATCES) during FY 1963 were, in general, satisfactorily attained. Actual overall input exceeded programmed by 3% but actual overall output fell short by 3.7%. A total of 5637 USASA personnel were enrolled in courses at the school compared to a programmed 5934. There were 5924 USASA graduates from all courses compared to a programmed 6195. USASA input to the US Army Language School during FY 1963 exceeded the number programmed as shown below:

<u>Language</u>	<u>Programmed Input</u>	<u>Actual Input</u>

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In addition, a Language Maintenance Program was established 4 December 1962. It was designed to maintain language proficiency of USASA linguistic personnel not working in a linguist assignment. Language laboratories were established at USASATCES; Arlington Hall Station; 2d USASA Field Station; Hq USASAPAC; and the 318th and 319th USASA Battalions in Europe.

326th USASA Company, Homestead Air Force Base, Fla

~~(SUV000)~~ When the Cuban crisis arose in October 1962, the 326th USASA Company was on a training mission at Homestead AFB, Florida. As the crisis

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developed in intensity, the unit was built up to include COMINT, ELINT, DF and Radio fingerprinting (RFP) capabilities. The change from a STRAC unit on training to a temporary field station with national strategic missions was effected in mid-October. The company commenced intercept, collection, and processing activities on the Cuban problem 15 October 1962. In order to provide high frequency direction finding (HFDF) support of the unit, a DF net was formed by utilizing four DF stations of the 13-station Navy Atlantic DF net. This group of stations was designated the USN Caribbean DF Net. DF flash operations commenced in this net on 14 November 1962.

~~(S)~~ In April 1963, NSA transferred operational control of the Caribbean HFDF net to USASA. The 326th USASA Company assumed DF net control responsibilities, 15 April 1963. Included were five tip-off stations. This action permitted the establishment of direct teletype communications between the Net Control Station (326th USASA Co) and the Caribbean HFDF stations, and the institution of USASA HFDF flashing, tracking and reporting procedures. As a result, the productivity and effectiveness of the net's coverage of the Cuban problem was greatly improved.

2d USASA Field Station (Two Rock Ranch Station), Petaluma, Calif

~~(S)~~ During the fiscal year, great strides were made in intercept, analysis, and reporting efforts directed against the Soviet missile range, space vehicles programs, and Soviet Missile Range Instrumentation Ships (SMRIS). This effort resulted in a system which insured immediate intercept, tip-off, analysis, and on-line reporting to NSA and consumers of any Soviet missile ranges and missile associated entities. The primary purpose of this


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system was to develop indicators based on scrambler and morse intercept and to establish an in-house capability to follow a missile range operation from initial indicators through launch and impact or orbit/re-entry. It included all known radio printer entities, morse links, and broadcast tip-off facilities. The missile problem, one of the primary tasking areas at this station, was developed to allow the complete and comprehensive cover of all Soviet Far Eastern missile associated entities on a selective basis.

USASA Processing Center, Fort Monmouth, NJ


~~(S)~~ The USASA Processing Center was organized 21 January 1963 as headquarters for the combined network activities of USA Signal Research Activity (DAWN STAR) and USA Signal Operations Activity (RED WIND). DAWN STAR and RED WIND are unclassified designators of two acoustic detection systems which perform the acoustic intelligence (ACOUSTINT) mission of USASA. Control of Project RED WIND, a system for long range detection of foreign missile launches and reentries, and Project DAWN STAR,

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
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it passes from the earth's atmosphere and later makes re-entry. From this data it is possible to determine the impact area of the missile as well as the range and approximate speed.

~~(S)~~ One of the outstanding achievements of the RED WIND system occurred in 1961, when several stations reported signals having the characteristics of missile launches and re-entries from areas within Red China. With the information obtained, it was possible for Chinese Nationalists to make U-2 flights deep within Red China and thus verify its missile capabilities.

~~(TSCM)~~ Project RED WIND was assigned the mission of detecting, recording and reporting all Russian and Communist China missile firings. A total of 14,586 signals were analyzed by the seven stations and the headquarters. From these signals it was determined that 226 probable and 513 possible missile events had occurred. Between 1 January and 30 June 1963, non-ACOUSTINT sources reported 132 Russian missile launches, 92 of which were detected by RED WIND. Of the 40 events undetected by RED WIND acoustint, 16 were Cruise Missiles and 14 were Surface-to-Surface missiles (SS-1). Cruise Missiles travel at extremely low speeds over short range which makes detection difficult. Non-detection of the other ten could result from one of several factors, such as, the direction of the launch, the trajectory, and atmospheric conditions.

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COMMAND

(U) Colonel James H. Keller, Inf, 021871, was Chief, USASA, Europe (USASAEUR) during the fiscal year. Hq USASAEUR remained located in the I. G. Farben Building, Frankfurt/Main, Germany. This headquarters was directly subordinate to Chief, USASA and was responsible for the command of all USASA units located in Continental Europe, United Kingdom, and Turkey.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ORGANIZATION

~~(C)~~ The major organizational change during this period was the transfer of six RED WIND and DAWN STAR units (SRU #2, SRU #6, SRU #10, SOU #21, SOU #23 and SRU #10-A) from US Army Signal Research Activity and US Army Signal Operations Activity to Hq USASAEUR effective 20 January 1963.

MANPOWER

~~(C)~~ The following figures present the strength of the command at the beginning and end of the fiscal year:

	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>DAC</u>	<u>Indig</u>	<u>Total</u>
1 Jul 62	303	70	6240	34	433	7080
30 Jun 63	314	56	6485	40	270*	7165

*Does not include TUSLOG units.

~~(C)~~ The military personnel authorization of the command reached a new high due primarily to the authorization of spaces required for the effective operation of the Central Processing Center and the assignment of RED WIND and DAWN STAR units. The rate of turnover in personnel for the year totaled approximately 42 percent. Enlisted strength continued to exceed authorization; however, the subtraction of 290 casual personnel assigned at the end of the fiscal year actually put the command understrength. Enlisted personnel shortages existed mainly in the following MOS categories:

MOS

723 (Communication Center Specialist)
 059 (Teletype Interceptor)
 056 (DF Operator)
 054 (SIT Supervisor)
 993 (Countermeasures Search Specialist)
 983 (Analytic Equipment Operator)
 980 (Communications Security Clerk)
 981 (Cryptanalytic Technician)

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~~(e)~~ Losses of personnel as a result of security clearance revocations decreased substantially. The clearances of 81 personnel were revoked due to marriage to foreign nationals, and 65 were revoked due to undesirable traits, habits or associations. Seventy-seven individuals were granted waivers to remain assigned to USASA even though married to foreign nationals.

BUDGET

(U) Total funding for USASAEUR (including 13th USASA Field Station and TUSLOG Det 27) is shown below:

<u>Annual Funding Program</u>	<u>Obligated</u>	<u>Unobligated</u>	<u>Percent Obligated</u>
\$9,610,188	\$9,559,728	\$50,460	99.5

TRAINING

~~(c)~~ The training program of this command was conducted in accordance with Training Circular Number 20-1, Hq USASA, 24 September 1962, in conjunction with additional directives promulgated by Hq USASAEUR. A total of 67 hours of non-technical training was required during the year. Other training included a 4-week IBM 1401 Computer programming course conducted by IBM in Frankfurt, and a 4-week transistor circuitry and recorder maintenance course conducted by NSA, Europe. During 10-15 August 1962, a special 059 training course was conducted at the 13th USASA Field Station to accelerate effectiveness and versatility of personnel entering on station's OJT period of apprenticeship. It was designed as a refresher course on training received at the USASATC&S, and also for orientation on the mission, policy, and equipment of the station. The success of the original course resulted in others being conducted in August, September, December and April, and a similar one set up for 059 Supervisors.

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~~(c)~~ The following USASAEUR units participated in field and command post exercises as shown below:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No of Exercises</u>
507th USASA Gp	2
319th USASA Bn	15
318th USASA Bn	7
600th USASA Co	11
102d USASA Scty Det	6
103d USASA Scty Det	3

EQUIPMENT

~~(c)~~ As a result of Command Maintenance Management Inspections, it was found that support furnished USASAEUR's ordnance equipment by the Seventh US Army was not up to standards required. So, during the fourth quarter, a changeover to support by USAREUR Ordnance Service Centers was effected.

~~(c)~~ Interference caused by new, powerful radars installed at Templehof Air Base necessitated relocation of the 78th USASA SOU's ten intercept positions at the air base to the rubble pile in Grunewald park. The first phase of this project, known as SURF BOARD, took two months to complete. Construction on the second phase was incomplete at the end of the fiscal year. This phase included placing the positions in semi-permanent buildings, and antennas in a radome.

~~(S)~~ The total number of intercept positions by type, programmed and actually manned, as of 30 June 1963, are shown below:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual Manned</u>
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CONSTRUCTION

~~(c)~~ Construction progress was generally excellent throughout the fiscal year, particularly in the field of MCA (Military Construction, Army). Difficulties previously encountered in the preparation and processing of construction projects were largely eliminated through liaison with host commands and the decision to incorporate all known requirements at any one outstation into a single project for MCA funding (either minor or normal MCA). This resulted in more comprehensive planning by the units and eliminated the piecemeal attempts to obtain urgently required facilities.

~~(c)~~ For the first time in five years no MCA construction was in progress at TUSLOG Det 27. The active MCA program at that station was completed during the second quarter. MCA programs at TUSLOG Det 4 and the 13th USASA Field Station were reduced to one uncompleted project each, both more than 90% complete. In addition to the completion of virtually all prior years' MCA construction, preliminary planning was completed for forthcoming construction. The value of construction completed, based on the current working estimates as reported, was in excess of \$5,000,000.

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OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

[redacted]

(TSCN) Evidence of the Soviet short-range tactical surface-to-surface missile (FROG - Free Rocket Over Ground - range 11-26 nm) was first noted in [redacted] October 1962.

From that date, reflections of missile activity were observed with increasing frequency.

[redacted]

Refelctions

of FROG missile activity were [redacted]

[redacted] confirmed by visual sightings of

FROG equipment, in January 1963, in the Third Shock and Eighteenth and

Twentieth Guards Armies, and on one occasion confirmed [redacted] reflections of an exercise.

(TSCN) SS-1 type missile (maximum range 150 nm) activity in GSFG [redacted]

[redacted] Reflections of SS-1 activity,

probably from an army SS-1 brigade, had been noted in all ground armies in GSFG. [redacted]


[redacted] This [redacted] information was confirmed by visual sightings of SS-1 missiles in the Letzlingen/Heide - Camp Dorn area during May 1963.

[redacted]

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
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
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~~(TSCM)~~ During the year, the Soviet Union performed two experiments in simultaneous flights of two manned vehicles. The first occurred 11-15 August 1962 and involved two manned space vehicles (Sputnik XX and Sputnik XXI) which were launched into similar orbits one day apart.


Both astronauts were recovered within minutes of each other in the eastern portion of the Kazakh SSR as one began his 64th orbit and the other his 48th orbit.

~~(TSCM)~~ The Soviet Union performed a similar space experiment of simultaneous flight 14-19 June 1963. Sputniks XLI and XLII were launched from the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range (TMTR), 14 and 16 June, respectively. Sputnik XLII (designated Vostok 6) carried the world's first woman cosmonaut.

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
TAREX

~~(TSCM)~~ Due to the erection of the wall in Berlin and the general tightening of security along the zonal border, the number of defectors and refugees available for debriefing by TAREX was reduced. This, however, permitted a more thorough debriefing of those who came across the border. Reports published by TAREX contained detailed information in such areas as the radio networks of the East German Border Guard Water Police and a copy of the Signal Operation Instructions (SOI) used by the Water Police.

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~~(TSCM)~~ The responsibility for handling the various double agent operations remained with the 513th INTC Group. Through coordination with the group, TAREX was able to debrief two agents and obtain detailed information concerning a new East German intelligence service matrix system and a new method for the rapid transmission of messages.



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~~(TSCM)~~ TAREX continued extensive coverage of fairs, exhibits and symposiums. This coverage served the dual purpose of bringing brochures and other technical information concerning latest developments in the telecommunications, cryptographic and electronic fields to the attention of technical, engineering, and research and development consumers; and of establishing new personal contacts in these fields for possible future exploitation. To these ends, fairs and symposiums were attended in Paris, London, Stockholm, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Vienna, Cologne, Dusseldorf, Tel Aviv, Lisbon, Basel and Milan. Additionally, TAREX maintained overt contact with European industrialists, technicians and engineers who provided timely information on research, development, production, engineering, testing and utilization of many types of electronic equipment manufactured by Western European electronic firms. These contacts resulted in access to such items as a ruby laser rod (manufactured by Carl Zeiss), and a miniature direction finder

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(produced by Telefunken), as well as other electronic equipment from such firms as Rhode and Schwarz.

~~(TSCW)~~ TAREX was invited to participate with CIA and the Air Force (OSI) in establishing a "Blue Fly" technical team. This team's mission was quick reaction to aircraft crashes to exploit such incidents for possible crypto communications or technical information, especially if they were of Soviet Bloc registry. TAREX exploited one such incident when two Czech MIG-15 fighters crashed in the West. Flight documents and extensive communications hardware were obtained.

ELSEC

~~(SHWCCC)~~ The Electronic Security (ELSEC) effort in US Army, Europe continued to be small in scope due to the total absence of ELSEC equipment. In some instances ELINT positions were diverted to accomplish ELSEC missions. This situation limited Hq, USASAEUR's responsibilities to an advisory service, which was in the nature of answers to queries posed by supported commands.

~~(SHWCCC)~~ Hq, USASAEUR conducted one ELSEC monitoring mission during the year. This mission was in support of Corporal missile systems of the First USA Missile Command in the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) located in northern Italy. SETAF is charged with guarding the mountain passes and securing the northern Italian plains and is programmed to perform this function exclusively by means of missile strikes on targets of opportunity. During FY 1962's mission, it was learned that missile guidance radar and missile transponder radar frequencies used within SETAF were extremely vulnerable to hostile ELINT exploitation. Further, it was found that the

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in-garrison closed loop check-out procedures were exposing actual war reserve missile frequencies due to faulty or improperly installed cabling. As a result of those findings and certain interim guidance, the situation was vastly improved during FY 1963's monitoring mission.

~~(S)~~ Augmented by elements of the 77th USASA Special Operations Unit, the 600th USASA Company provided ELSEC support to SETAF during PTX KING NEPTUNE III (8-14 Mar 63).

COMSEC

~~(S)~~ Monitoring was neither performed nor programmed for Hq USASAEUR; however, results of SIGSEC monitoring and analysis by subordinate units indicated that transmission security throughout USAREUR was still inadequate for a wartime situation. Plain language messages transmitted over all means of communications, particularly conventional telephone, continued to be a lucrative source of intelligence. Encrypted for Transmission Only (EFTO) procedures were used more extensively than in the past, yet did not reach their maximum potential.

~~(S)~~ The USASA Field Radiation Test Team completed TEMPEST tests for four communications facilities in the Berlin area and at the Hq USASAEUR facility in Heidelberg. The tests were conducted as a result of the expressed concern of CINCUSAREUR over possible COMSEC leaks reflected by unusually quick reactions of the Soviets to US military plans in that area. Security hazards in the form of space radiation were detected at the Berlin Brigade and the US Mission (State Department) communications. No TEMPEST hazards

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were detected in the communications facilities of the 513th Military Intelligence Group or the Special Security Detachment, Berlin. A hazard existed at Hq USASAEUR Communications Center on the circuits utilizing TSEC/KW-9.

Automatic Data Processing (ADP)

~~(TSEC)~~ ADP machine utilization during this fiscal year was 60% of capacity. The volume of incoming Machine Aids Technical Summary (MATSUM) line items to Hq USASAEUR increased 16.7%, and Machine Intercept Analysis Report (MIAR) volume rose by approximately 12%. Effectiveness of the MIAR quality control procedures instituted in December 1962 was shown by an unbroken decline in error rate from 7.9% in December to a low of 4.7% in June 1963.

~~(TSEC)~~ MATSUM, a machine recoverable data handling vehicle, remained the primary medium for reporting manual morse activity on an accurate and timely basis. It was also the format for all current magnetic tape historical files. MATSUM processing has undergone extensive sophistication for both local consumption and forwarding to NSA . This sophistication was directed toward improvement of the analytical product while at the same time improving the files in a manner which would allow the most economical use of facilities. Such improvements included the following:

1. MATSUM File Split - The split of the master MATSUM file into individual card type records was a significant aid in reducing the time required to satisfy periodic and/or special requests. In conjunction with the file split, procedures to enter more recent data in the file were completed.
2. MATSUM Periodic Proof List - Revision of the periodic proof listing used for analytical consumption was implemented. The new procedure permitted more flexibility with fewer machine passes. A new entity code system was established to permit processing of all foreseeable entities.

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3. Call Sign Book Block Reconstruction - First phase programs were completed and found workable in initial attempts to recover new books in the event of a major Soviet call sign change. The basic problem in book recovery was to separate into groups those call signs which belonged together.

4. Flexible Analytic Support Technique (FAST) - The FAST concept had the express purpose of helping reduce the response time required to satisfy requests for machine generated analytic displays. Under this concept, a rather broad grouping of all GFO programs, as well as other clearly defined and sufficiently generalized programs, was developed under one job titled- "FAST."

[redacted]
electrical MATSUM was initiated. The changes grouped all schedule activity by frequency within each case and also deleted redundant communications groupage.

6. Optimum Processing of Intercept Utilization by Machine (OPIUM) - This program package was developed to satisfy a Hq USASAEUR requirement for "SIGINT Effectiveness Records." The program relieved subordinate units of a major portion of the bookkeeping involved in maintaining these records. The program had two purposes: serving as a management tool, and as an aid to intercept assignment.

(TSCW) During the first quarter, FY 1963, Tagging and Associating for Retrieval in a Uniform System (TARUS) was developed and designed to satisfy a European requirement to provide data processing support on Tactical Voice and Mercury Grass. The system concept was based upon a free flow data input, with no format requirements, usable with or without data processing equipment. Items of interest in the stream were marked for significance (tagged). USASA and NSA wrote 22 computer programs which were required for TARUS. Sample processing procedures were developed and used during a test conducted in USASAEUR during March 1962. TARUS was scheduled for implementation in USASAEUR in first quarter, FY 1964 on the [redacted] problem. Expansion into other areas will be based upon success of the USASAEUR efforts. It is anticipated that full participation [redacted] will be achieved.

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~~(TSCM)~~ In February 1963, Hq USASAEUR received its second IBM 1401 data processing system. This system was justified on the basis of the increase in daily volume of intercept material, the anticipated implementation of TARUS, and the general increase in usage of data processing equipment for special runs. TARUS was expected to contribute 10 hours a day processing time when fully implemented.

~~(TSCM)~~ Of significant importance also was the quality control effort maintained on all data received within the machine section. This effort was concerned with format correction rather than content correction, but a function of this effort was to serve as a centralized unit for the correction and up-dating of all files. The results of this effort were verified during the year by NSA and CUSASA.

SPECIAL PROJECTS

~~(SCW)~~ Project SALTIN - The purpose of Project SALTIN was to establish a system which would insure that imminence indicators were readily available to appropriate consumers and producer elements of the US Army intelligence effort. This file, to be retained indefinitely, contained all available pertinent and significant intelligence. This information was to be stored on magnetic tape for immediate retrieval, manipulation and analysis using high-speed electronic equipment.


~~(SCW)~~ Many important indicators appeared to have become normal features of Soviet Bloc military training. A comprehensive listing of such indicators was prepared for use in conjunction with the SALTIN program. Recently developed features of the TARUS program were also included in the system.

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
The list was selected in the belief that preparation for an attack would be evidenced by some combination of the actions and developments delineated therein. The flexibility of this program permitted rapid manipulation of data and ready access to imminence information.

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~~(SOW)~~ "Guzhenkov Speaks" - Representatives of the SIGSEC Division of Hq USASAEUR were called upon throughout the year to give advice and guidance on COMSEC to supported commands. To make these briefings more meaningful, a film, "Guzhenkov Speaks," was produced which provided its audience with insight into Soviet capabilities. This means proved very effective and should bring about even further improvement.

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


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German Teletype Intercept Room,
78th USASA Special Operations Unit
Berlin, Germany


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COMMAND

(U) Colonel George A. Godding, 040790, Inf, commanded USASAPAC during FY 1963. Hq USASAPAC remained located at Camp Zama, Japan and subordinate to Chief, USASA. Hq USASAPAC was responsible for USASA units in Japan, Korea, Hawaii, Okinawa, Formosa, South Vietnam, Thailand and Philippine Islands.

ORGANIZATION

~~(c)~~The major organizational change during this period was the transfer of six RED WIND and DAWN STAR units (SRU #3, SRU #4, SRU #8, SRU #11,

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SOU #24, and SOU #25), effective 20 January 1963. SRU's #3, #8, #24 were further assigned for administrative and logistical control to the 14th, 9th, and 12th USASA Field Stations, respectively.

The 3d RRU's COMSEC section was reorganized and designated the 101st USASA Security Detachment effective 1 March 1963, given cover designator of 7th RRU, and assigned 82d USASA Special Operations Unit. Two other changes, effective 15 March 1963, were the organization of the 252d USASA Processing Company and the discontinuance of US Army Garrison, 12th USASA Field Station.

MANPOWER

~~(C)~~ USASAFAC personnel strengths at the beginning and end of the fiscal year were, as follows:

	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>LM</u>	<u>Total</u>
1 Jul 62	280	49	5592	5921
30 Jun 63	291	55	6358	6704

~~(C)~~ Throughout the year, a personnel ceiling set at 238 was a continuing problem at the 5th RRU. The Thailand Government increased emphasis on maintaining personnel strength at, or below, this ceiling, which included all assigned personnel, the Air Force detachment, and TDY personnel. As of 30 June 1963, the aggregate strength figure was within the prescribed limits at 209.

(U) During the entire fiscal year, there was a general shortage of enlisted promotion quotas, especially in the E-4 grade. This shortage had a definite impact on the command. Complaints were received both in the form of command complaints and congressional correspondence. Because of the disparity of promotion quotas to grade E-4, a requirement was established

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effective first quarter, FY 1964 that enlisted personnel must have 12 months in grade for consideration for promotion to E-4.

(U) The 3d RRU received a Meritorious Unit Citation for Distinguished Service in the Republic of Vietnam, the first awarded since the Korean War.

(U) Realizing that the weakest link in the security chain is the individual, Hq USASAPAC continued an aggressive elimination program concerning those who did not maintain the required ASA security standards. Results are shown in the following figures:

Clearance Revocations, FY 1963

<u>Reason</u>	<u>Number</u>
Marriage to Foreign National	95
Unsuitable	59
Undesirable	18
As Directed by Hq USASA	15
Total	<u>187</u>

BUDGET

(U) The Annual Funding Program (AFP) for FY 1963 was 11.55 percent lower than FY 1962. In spite of this, financial requirements increased due to unprogrammed missions and cost of living raises. The situation became acute during the third quarter; however, the command succeeded in completing the year solvent by means of close fiscal management.

<u>AFP</u>	<u>Obligated</u>	<u>Unobligated</u>	<u>Percent Obligated</u>
\$7,931,984	\$7,887,048	\$44,936	99.6

TRAINING

~~(C)~~ During FY 1963, USASAPAC units provided support to approximately 55 major communications exercises, field exercises, and training tests.

(U) In addition to the regular training at the 51st USASA SOC, formal

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MOS refresher courses were held by each branch. The quality of these programs was demonstrated by the results of the Proficiency Pay Tests. In MOS's 054, 057, 059, 986, and 988 all assigned personnel passed their pro-pay tests. In MOS 058, 94% passed the test, and in MOS 982, 92% passed. MOS evaluation testing was discontinued during the fourth quarter for personnel stationed in South Vietnam and Thailand at the direction of the Department of the Army.

~~(C)~~ Personnel of the 400th USASA SOD (Abn) participated in seven Special Forces FTX's and 15 command theater schools and courses.

EQUIPMENT

~~(SINCCO)~~ Two new equipments were introduced in USASAPAC area during FY 1963--AN/FRD-10 (CDA) and the AN/TRD-15 (Quasi-Doppler). Sensitivity and accuracy of the equipment proved to be far superior to any other DF sets.

~~(SINCCO)~~ To decrease outage problems of the ESGX-3's, an improved preventive maintenance program was implemented and resulted in increased efficiency and effectiveness of the operation of ELINT equipment.

~~(C)~~ A new antenna field was designed and installed at Phu Bai, South Vietnam during third and fourth quarters of the fiscal year. Total cost was approximately \$74,000. Generators at the 5th RRU were a constant source of problems until the 100 kw replacement generators became operational, 23 March 1963.

(U) A major equipment shortcoming at the 51st USASA SOC in Okinawa, was the two newly installed 500 kw generators in Building 101 that were to furnish immediate power in case of a power failure. It was found that 15 minutes were required to heat the lubricating oil to 100° F before the

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generator could be coupled to the motor--this at a time when the operations building had no power. Efficiency of the AN/TRD-10 DF position at Site Manza was continually hampered by excess outages.

CONSTRUCTION

~~(C)~~ The scope of USASAPAC engineer activities was enlarged in January 1963 by the assignment of two RED WIND and five DAWN STAR units to the command, adding three new geographic locations to the 42 already being served.

(U) The executed portion of the programmed \$1,359,300 FY 1963 O&MA Construction Program included the expenditure of \$390,860 for minor one-time construction projects and \$81,000 for alteration, repair and maintenance projects at Kuma Station. The remainder of the program was not executed due to transfer of R&U responsibilities of USASAPAC tenant units to the host command, and deferral of maintenance projects at Kuma Station.

(U) The programmed FY 1963 MCA construction included 13 line items at a total estimated cost of \$4,866,000, three of which, at a cost of \$113,000, were awarded during the year. Although several line items (including family housing at Kuma Station) were scheduled for award in early FY 1964, the remainder were deferred or cancelled by gold flow restrictions.

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~~(S)~~ The most significant event of the year in the theater was the establishment of the Southeast Asia Processing and Integration Center (SEAPIC) at the 9th USASA Field Station. SEAPIC was created as a result of the increasing communist pressure and encroachment within Southeast Asia, and the United States decision to prevent its inevitable conclusion within South Vietnam. This situation prompted Chief, USASAPAC's concept and subsequent plan for a comprehensive and responsive processing and integration center at the 9th Field Station. The mission of the center was to perform final field processing, integration and reporting on all communications of North Vietnam, communist forces in South Vietnam, Laos (including neutralist forces), and to include Thailand and Cambodia, when isolated. The center was to further integrate that SIGINT derived from other Southeast Asia or peripheral area countries which could be directly related to the communist threat in Indochina. In addition SEAPIC was designed to provide an immediate workable solution to the SIGINT requirements of the Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (MACV) and other theater and national level consumers.

~~(S)~~ The organization consisted of two operating divisions. The Collection Division contained a Mission or Target Control Branch, an Intercept Branch consisting of Manual Morse, Radio Teletype and Radio Direction Finding Sections and an Intercepted Communications Identification Section. The Processing and Integration Division includes an Area Studies Branch which performs integration and reporting, a Data Processing Branch for manipulation

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of technical data, a Vietnamese and Laotian Processing Branch, and a ChiCom Scanning and Surveillance Section.

~~(SOW)~~ When fully organized, the center contained the following branches:

1. Area Studies - provided integrated reporting on communist communications in the above mentioned areas.
2. Data Processing - produced machine listings with conventional punch card equipment.
3. Vietnamese Processing - was the hub of the SEAPIC operation and made great initial strides in developing and exploiting Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) communication networks. It was tasked with both first instance and final field processing of Vietnamese communist networks, and integrated SIGINT results obtained from US Air Force and Navy intercept, to provide a complete Vietnamese order of battle.
4. Laos Processing - was organized to assume the responsibility of wrap-up and summary reporting on the Laotian problem.
5. ChiCom Scanning and Surveillance - scanned items intercepted by Radio Printer Section and provided items of military significance in feeder reports to the Joint Sobe Processing Center, Okinawa.
6. SIT - consisted of a DF plotting center which consolidated plots from the SEA and WHITE BIRCH DF net for use by 9th Field Station analysts.
7. Mission Control - was concerned with the assignment and control of missions.

~~(TSOW)~~ During December 1962, the 9th USASA Field Station was authorized to establish a small intercept detachment at Phu Bai (South Vietnam). A 10-man team became operational at Phu Bai on 14 December, manning the site with 1.23 positions through 3 February 1963 when it was absorbed by the 3d RRU. Results of this operation were exceptional when compared to results of any other station intercepting internal DRV communications. Most significant was the number of backlink recoveries made which were a rarity throughout the history of the DRV problem. This operation, coupled with the augmentation of traffic analysis activities under the SEAPIC concept, was responsible

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for significant breakthroughs which a year before were not thought possible.

~~(SCW)~~ On 3 February 1963, the move of USM-626J and USM-414T Marine Detachment from DaNang and Pleiku, respectively, to Phu Bai was completed. At the end of the fiscal year, the Phu Bai Detachment had 12 positions installed in three M-292 vans. Vietnamese Communist targets were assigned to 7.2 of these positions. Upon completion of construction at Phu Bai, the positions were to be installed in a permanent operations building. Positions formerly programmed for Thailand were to be installed at Phu Bai because of the stringent manpower ceiling in Thailand.

~~(TSCW)~~ The most important COMINT development in South Vietnam was the rapid expansion of the Viet Cong Military Network (VCMN). Beginning in August 1962, this problem was given priority over its political counterpart (VNG).


~~(TSCW)~~ A concentrated effort was performed on the Liberation News Agency (INA). This resulted in reports such as the extent of damage claimed to have been inflicted on GVN Strategic Hamlet Program; summary of Viet Cong propaganda for a given time frame; information concerning new committees and fronts established; and activities of such organizations already known to exist.

~~(TSCW)~~ The 76th USASA SOU continued to assist the Air Force by providing information on ChiCom AAA reactions and the tracking of Chinese Nationalist special mission penetration flights over the Chinese mainland. Due to the timeliness of this information, it was possible for the Joint Operations Center to cancel flights when ChiCom reactions threatened the safety of the flights. The 76th also reported ChiCom AAA reactions to high and low altitude

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SIGINT flights over the mainland.



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
~~(TSCM)~~ On 19 April 1963, the 12th USASA Field Station began monitoring NEWCOMER as a Soviet Missile tip-off to BANKHEAD II. Since its advent, NEWCOMER has provided timely information to alert the [] facility concerning impending Soviet Missile Range activity and has proven to be an essential tip-off source for the [] mission.

~~(TSCM)~~ "SOAPFLAKES," a procedure for providing perforated tape copy of Russian commercial single channel plain language transmissions, was initiated 27 November 1962 with no additional manpower requirements. However, it had limited production due to a lack of targets utilizing this type of transmission.




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
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~~(S) (U)~~ A USASA Earth Satellite and Space Probe Surveillance Facility, designated BANKHEAD II, was accepted on 22 February by the 12th USASA Field Station




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~~(S)~~ CUSASAPAC was tasked with the responsibility of placing an ELINT package and operating detachment aboard the USS American Mariner in connection with JIM DANDY operations. JIM DANDY was the covername given to US collection operations against Soviet missile activity in the mid-Pacific. The detachment's mission was to intercept telemetry signals from Soviet ICBM's fired into the mid-Pacific area. Only one ICBM was launched during the time the USASA detachment was aboard the USS American Mariner.

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SPECIAL IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES (SIT)

~~(S)~~ The Southeast Asia (SEA) DF Net underwent considerable change during the fiscal year.



Installation of AN/TRD-15

equipment at Phu Bai, South Vietnam and Ubon, Thailand, in September, provided full-time positions at those locations in both the SEA and WHITE BIRCH DF Nets. The SEA Net provided the first usable information on the location

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of COMINT targets in Southeast Asia.

~~(SIWVCOO)~~ The airborne direction finding (ARDF) effort in South Vietnam was in its earliest stages at the close of FY 1962 with four U-6 aircraft (formerly known as L-20) equipped with DF capability. The 3d RRU closed FY 1963 with three U-6 and one U-8 aircraft (previously called the L-23) in operation. As of 20 May 1963, at least 17 ARVN tactical operations had been conducted based on locations supplied by the 3d RRU's DF aircraft. The 3d's capacity to locate targets was greater than the capacity of the Vietnamese Armed Forces to mount combat operations against the targets. At the end of the year, 59 COMINT targets had been located by ARDF.

~~(SCH)~~ The redeployment of ChiCom ground forces into the Fuchou Military Region during June and July 1962, presented the DF Section of the 76th USASA SOU with its most challenging task of the year. DF results on these units were immediately obtained and included the location of two army headquarters, seven infantry divisions, one artillery division and one railway engineer division.

~~(SIWVCOO)~~ The introduction of AN/TRD-15 equipment to Southeast Asia, operation of the AN/FRD-10 (Wullen-Weber) on Okinawa, and development of the AN/ARD-15 airborne DF equipment in South Vietnam were the major innovations in the SIT field.

COMMUNICATIONS

~~(S)~~ During the first and second quarters, FY 1963, communications to the 5th RRU in Thailand ranged from unsatisfactory to chaotic. The problem was attributed to poor circuit support and antiquated terminal equipment. Action

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was taken with CINCUSARPAC and Defense Communications Agency (DCA), Pacific, to improve the circuit support. Much of the difficulty was caused by poor signal propagation; accordingly, little was done to improve the system. All other possible corrective actions were taken by DCA. Hq USASAPAC attempted to procure new equipment (terminal) on a crash basis without success. Since immediate remedial action was required, two van mounted communication centers were secured from the US Air Force Pacific Security Region.

~~(S)~~ Hq USASAPAC was notified during the latter part of FY 1963 that the NSA Initiated Binary Stream Communications was programmed for certain USASAPAC units. This would require installation of new equipment at the affected stations. It was determined that all units, except the Primary Criticom Relay Station (PCRS) at Clark Air Base, would be able to accommodate this change with little difficulty. At PCRS Clark Air Base, this requirement was found to compound an already intolerable situation, caused by a lack of floor space. In order to provide space for the Binary Stream System, a project was initiated for a new 10,000-square foot Criticom Relay Station. It was approved as part of a larger project which would provide 30,000 square feet for operations and criticom communications.

SIGSEC

~~(C)~~ The 3d RRU, as a result of tasking by CINCUSARPAC, was augmented with a signal security (SIGSEC) capability. The initial success of the unit resulted in the closing down of the 45th US Army Transportation Battalion radio net. This net remained closed until the battalion radio operators could meet the high standards of COMSEC as promulgated by the 3d RRU.


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~~(e)~~ On 1 March 1963, responsibility for the SIGSEC mission in Southeast Asia was undertaken by the 7th RRU. This separate SIGSEC detachment, based in Saigon, South Vietnam, deployed mobile teams throughout South Vietnam and Thailand in support of the major commands.

~~(e)~~ The Strategic Army Communications network and all major tactical circuits of supported commands were subjected to comprehensive monitoring and analysis. A total of 1,777,454 transmissions were monitored and analyzed; 1,053 transmission security violations and practices dangerous to security were detected. These violations showed a general upward trend during all four quarters of the fiscal year. The increase over previous years was attributed to an excess number of call sign/call word compromises during training exercises and normal garrison operations.

~~(e)~~ The 7th RRU also accomplished monitoring on all conventional telephone circuits which originated, terminated or passed through US-operated switchboards within the Saigon/Cholon area. The majority of these circuits terminated in this area, thus providing much valuable information to supported commands.



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Corps Group active sources who had a capability of furnishing information of interest to cryptologic consumers.

AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING (ADP)


~~(SCW)~~ A staff study was prepared by Hq USASAPAC, during December 1962, concerning realignment of data conversion facilities in electrical accounting machines (EAM) units. The study proposed installation of an IBM 870 system and an additional IBM 024 card punch, and the turn-in of two IBM 046 tape-to-card machines and the IBM 063 card-to-tape machine in each EAM facility. CUSASA approved the change at the 12th USASA Field Station; it was programmed to take place during first quarter, FY 1964.

~~(TSCW)~~ During the period, 22 July to 16 August 1962, a systems analysis study on the Southeast Asia Manual Morse Processing was conducted by staff members from Hq USASAPAC. As a result, this team recommended that a new data reduction form (proforma) be established for recording traffic for analytic purposes. This new proforma was to be compatible, in format, for machine processing and to be flexible enough to provide the capability for recording all Southeast Asian target entities. The system, known as SEAMATSUM, was approved by NSA and Hq USASA and initiated at the 9th USASA Field Station on 1 February 1963. By the end of the fiscal year, SEAMATSUM was well established with local, national and forward stations pleased with its workable flexibility.

SPECIAL PROJECTS

~~(TSCW)~~ In November 1952, Hq USASAPAC was requested to establish a Mercury Grass collection effort in Korea during the period, May through September 1963.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~



P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3b(3)


~~(S)~~ NSA instituted a requirement that a record of signal strength and readability of target signals be maintained during periods of Soviet high altitude tests. On 3 July 1962, the 14th USASA Field Station was informed that a nuclear test was scheduled for 5 July. The test actually occurred on 9 July causing a fade out of signals for a few minutes and heavy interference for approximately four hours.

~~(S)~~ In October 1962, the testing of "Project Andy" at the 226th USASA Operations Company was completed. This project was an experimental VHF Spectrum Analyzer which searched the frequency band 60-70 mcs, and visually displayed all radio carriers on a facsimile paper. Upon completion of the tests, "Andy" was put into full operational use. It proved to be a great help to operators in following frequency changes, and was being considered for use as a master intercept control as the reporting period ended.


~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Manual Morse Intercept Room,
51st USASA Special Operations Command
Sobe, Okinawa

SECRET
KIM



Overall View of Army DF Positions at the Navy Wullenweber
Facility, Site Hanza, Okinawa.



SECRET KIMBO


SECRET KIMBO


KIMBO

Overall View of the SIT Branch,
51st USASA Special Operations Command
Sobe, Okinawa

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~SECRET KIMB~~



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ALASKACOMMAND

(U) Lt Colonel Norman B. Rolle, AIS, 079715, commanded USASA, Alaska (USASAAL), Fort Richardson, from 1 July 1962 through 30 June 1963.

MISSION

~~(S)~~ The operational mission of Hq USASAAL was to provide signal intelligence, signal security, communications countermeasures (including communications jamming, imitative communications deception), and the cryptologic phases of communications cover and deception activities in support of US Army, Alaska and the National SIGINT/ACOUSTINT effort as directed.

~~(TOP SECRET)~~ The operational mission increased during FY 1963 to include the administrative and logistical control of DAWN STAR (ACOUSTINT activities related to nuclear explosions), on 20 January 1963. Operational control of DAWN STAR was the responsibility of the USASA Processing Center, Fort Monmouth, NJ; however, direct supervision was maintained by the Office of the Operations Officer, Hq USASAAL. Tasking was done by the Air Force. The mission also included intercept of emissions from or in support of the Soviet Guided Missile and Space Exploration Program.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~MANPOWER

(U) Assigned strength figures for USASAAL, FY 1963, follow:

	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>
1 Jul 62	13	5	307	325
30 Jun 63	18	3	299	320

OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTSCOMINT


~~(S)~~ From 1 August 1962 to 24 September 1962, a mobile spectrum search team from Hq USASAAL operated from various locations in Western Alaska to determine hearability of selected targets and to search for new and unusual signals for further exploitation.

~~(S)~~ Tests were conducted at Kotzebue and Tin City, but little success was achieved until a detachment became operational on 25 September at Gambell. This test was programmed for 20 days, but analysis by NSA of data obtained resulted in instructions from CUSASA to continue operations there as long as weather and logistical conditions permitted. Operations were conducted inside a shelter type S141/G utilizing an SSGV-4 position. Interest taken by higher headquarters in the results of the test dictated the establishment of a semi-permanent site at Gambell. Therefore, in early November, the position was transferred to a Jamesway Hut on top of Sevooghak Mountain.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3b(3)

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

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P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3b(3)

ACOUSTINT


~~(S)~~ In carrying out its mission, the USA Signal Research Unit No 5

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

picked up, on 1 September 1961, the first Russian shot that broke the nuclear test moratorium between the Soviet Union and the United States and continued to report the entire 1961 and 1962 test series. The Russians tested heavily through December 1962. Included in the mission was checking the credibility of announced sizes of nuclear detonations. Since the equipment recorded the true intensity of the bomb, Russian claims were not always valid.


P.L. 86-36
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MANEUVERS

(U) Exercise TIMBER LINE was a joint US Army, Air Force and Canadian Army maneuver, conducted by the Alaskan Command, 11-20 February 1963. USASAAL support consisted of VHF multichannel COMSEC monitoring, COMJAM, ICD, and pseudo COMINT. The pseudo COMINT effort was generally successful and reflected improvement over the previous year's exercise. Primarily responsible for this success was the utilization of manpack intercept systems placed clandestinely behind and forward of opposing units. Results from this effort illustrated the desirability for further utilization and testing of manpack intercept teams in support of northern operations.

~~SECRET~~CARIBBEANCOMMAND

(U) USASA, Caribbean (USASACARIB), Fort Clayton, CZ, was commanded by Lt Colonel Chester W. Tuckerman, AS(Armor), 01825992 from 1 July 1962 until 25 July 1962 when Lt Colonel Jack P. Lansford, 080956, assumed command for the remainder of the fiscal year. The 401st USASA Special Operations Detachment (SOD) was assigned to Hq USASACARIB, effective 15 December 1962. The detachment was further attached to 8th Special Forces Group (Abn) with duty station at Fort Gulick, CZ.

MISSION

~~(S/NVCCO)~~ The specific mission of USASACARIB was directed primarily against Latin American internal communications networks. The following countries were on mission assignment: Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Haiti, Cuba and the Soviet Union.

MANPOWER

(U) Assigned strength figures for USASACARIB, FY 1963, follow:

	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Total</u>
1 Jul 62	12	0	228	1	241
30 Jun 63	14	0	276	0	290*

*(Includes 3 Off, 31 EM asgd the 401st USASASOD)

~~SECRET~~ HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

TRAINING

(U) The command conducted 21,000 hours of on-the-job training. As a result, 55 enlisted men were awarded new Primary MOS's; 58 were awarded advanced skill level digits to their Primary MOS; and 23 were awarded secondary or additional MOS's.

OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

COMINT

~~(SCW)~~ Sixty-eight messages of intelligence significance were intercepted on Argentina military, naval, air and police targets. They pertained to a variety of subjects, but mostly with the numerous revolts of elements of the armed forces in governmental crises experienced periodically throughout the year. Traffic analysis resulted in the identification and location of 105 of the 110 stations in the military network.

~~(SCW)~~ Next to Argentina, Ecuador was the most secure entity on assignment. As a result, few items of intelligence significance were found in its traffic. This degree of security presented traffic analytical challenges unique in Latin American traffic analysis. Infrequent compromises, however, did enable some trigraphs to be equated with geographic locations. Early in the fiscal year, it was decided that machine support to the analytical effort would enable Hq USASACARIB to solve the problem. A request for such support was sent to Chief, USASA in August 1962, but no reply had been received at the close of the reporting period.

SPECIAL PROJECTS

~~(SCW)~~ Station procedure called for translations to be released only

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after review by one of the senior translators who worked straight days. This meant a delay in release of as much as 72 hours. Since the primary justification for field processing was the timeliness of the product, such delays were inconsistent with expanded or even continued field processing. Therefore, after a period of training and close supervision of trick translators, the station adopted a program of "real-time" processing. This involved, essentially, the release of a finished translation to the intelligence consumers as soon after intercept as possible, without recourse to straight day translators, except when the trick translator felt uncertain of his work. The system proved successful. Timeliness of the product increased, and senior translators were freed from processing routine translations.

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AFRICA

4TH USASA FIELD STATION

COMMAND

(U) The 4th USASA Field Station, Asmara, Ethiopia, was directly responsible to the Chief, USASA. The station was commanded by Colonel William G. Newman, 0354474, AIS, from the beginning of the fiscal year until 11 June 1963, when he was replaced by Lt Colonel Arthur W. Hackwood, 036109, AIS.

(U) USA Signal Research Unit Number 9, previously assigned USA Signal Research Activity, was assigned to the station on 20 January 1963. Other assigned or attached units were Headquarters Company; Operations Company; Guard Company; Medical Detachment, US Army Hospital; USA Middle East Regional Communication Command; US Naval Communications Unit, Asmara; US Air Force Liaison Detachment; and Resident Engineer, Asmara.

MISSION

~~(C)~~ The operational mission of the 4th USASA Field Station was to provide, operate and control assigned intercept facilities and SIGINT production resources, and to conduct such processing as directed by the Chief, USASA, in support of the national SIGINT effort and designated US military commands.

MANPOWER

(U) Strength figures for the 4th USASA Field Station during FY 1963 were as follows:

	1 July 1962					30 June 1963				
	Off	WO	EM	DAC	Indig	Off	WO	EM	DAC	Indig
4th USASAFS	62	10	841	5	339	66	9	935	6	356

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

	1 July 1962					30 June 1963				
	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>DAC</u>	<u>Indig</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>DAC</u>	<u>Indig</u>
4th USASAFS										
Attached Units:										
USAF Ln Det	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
USN Comm Unit, Asmara	5	1	132	0	23	5	1	150	1	36
USA Middle East										
Regional Comm Comd	20	4	225	6	25	18	1	244	12	25
Resident Engr, Asmara						1	0	0	3	

(U) Arrival of skilled replacement personnel early enough to maintain overlap remained a major problem. This was alleviated to some extent, however, through cross-training, utilization of men in two or more positions, and additional work hours. Mission accomplishment could have reached a higher degree if requisitioned personnel had arrived on time and in the grades authorized. Attempts to resolve the problem were made through means of personal visits and correspondence to Chief, USASA.

OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

CONGO

~~(TSOW)~~ During the first half of the fiscal year, intercept from and to the Congo dealt mainly with efforts of the Congolese National Army (CNA) and the United Nations Forces to quell insurgent Katanga Province. Intercept described troop movements and battles. On 15 January 1963, Katanga President, Moise Tshombe, declared that he was prepared to terminate the secession; however, the proof of his sincerity did not materialize until 6 February, when 23 Katangan officers took the oath of allegiance to the Central Government, the Katanga police force was turned over to Resident-Minister Ileo, and President Tshombe left for Southern Rhodesia. The bulk of traffic was plain

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text French with some Lingala; cipher traffic followed the same pattern.

YEMEN [redacted]

~~(TSEC)~~ Intercept on the Yemen [redacted] problem concerned the military coup in Yemen, which established the Yemeni Arab Republic on 27 September 1962, and the subsequent war with Royalist forces. [redacted]

[redacted] Forces of the UAR were fully committed to the support of the Yemeni Arab Republic. Jordan lent its support to the Yemeni Royalists, as did Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Although a UN Team had been sent to the area, fighting still continued at the end of the fiscal year. During this entire period of conflict, USM-4, through its intercept and processing facilities, kept the COMINT community abreast of developments.

SOMALI

~~(SEC)~~ The Somali problem centered around Ethiopian Army-Somali tribal border clashes. The border between the two countries was ill-defined, thus lending itself to mutual incursion. The situation was aggravated by the desire of both countries to acquire the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya. A heavy concentration of Somalis in that area was cause for Somali claims. Ethiopian claims were based partly on the geographic projection of the NFD into southern Ethiopia and partly to an undisguised acquisitive desire. The Kenyan Government did not sanction claims of either country.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

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~~(SCW)~~ Intercept up to March 1963 concerned the two countries' attempts to better their positions in the NFD dispute. In early March, matters came to a head when England indicated it would support the cementing of NFD to Kenya upon its independence. This action caused a month-long upheaval in both Somali and Ethiopia. Somali declared its intentions to break diplomatic relations with England and her Western Allies and reports were received of intensified Ethiopian troop movements and alerts.

~~(SCW)~~ In early April, a measure of calm returned to the situation. However, an increase in Ethiopian-Somali clashes occurred again in May, and continued to the end of the fiscal year.

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

~~(S)~~ A recapitulation of USASA TOE and TD Units in CONUS during period
1 July 1962 - 30 June 1963, follows:

<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TOE UNITS</u> <u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
303d ASA Battalion (Corps)	Fort Wolters, Tex	
Company A (Div Spt)(Armd)	Fort Carson, Colo	
Company B (Div Spt)(Inf)	Fort Benning, Ga	
313th ASA Battalion (Corps)	Fort Bragg, NC	
Company A (Div Spt)(Abn)	Fort Bragg, NC	
Company B (Div Spt)(Abn)	Fort Campbell, Ky	
Company C (Div Spt)(Inf)	Fort Lewis, Wash	
Company D (Div Spt)(Armd)	Fort Hood, Tex	
326th ASA Company (Op A)	Homestead AF Base, Fla	Relocated from Ft Bragg, NC 25 Oct 62.
330th ASA Company (Op A)	Fort Wolters, Tex	
	<u>TD UNITS</u>	
Headquarters, USASA	AHS, Arlington, Va	
USASA Board	AHS, Arlington, Va	Concepts Div, Operations Research Div, & Objectives Div trfd to OACofS, Devel- opments eff 1 Nov 62.
US Army Garrison, AHS	Arlington, Va	
USA Communications Unit	Arlington, Va	
USASA, Fort Meade	Fort George G. Meade, Md	

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<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
USA Element, NSA	Fort George G. Meade, Md	
1st USASA Field Station	Vint Hill Farms Station, Warrenton, Va	
USASA Special Projects Unit	VHFS, Warrenton, Va	
USASA Supply and Maintenance Center	VHFS, Warrenton, Va	
2d USASA Field Station	Two Rock Ranch Station, Petaluma, Calif	
52d USASA Special Operations Command	Fort Huachuca, Ariz	
Detachment A	White Sands Missile Range, NMex	Disc eff 15 Mar 63.
USASA Training Center and School	Fort Devens, Mass	
USASA Student Liaison Detach- ment/USASA Student Company	Fort Gordon, Ga	USASA Stu Ln Det org eff 15 Sep 62 with pers previously asgd 33d USASA Ln Det w/dy sta at Ft Gordon reasgd.
403d USASA Special Operations Detachment	Fort Bragg, NC	
410th USASA Special Operations Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Md	
USA Signal Operations Activity	Fort Monmouth, NJ	USA Sig Op Activity (TD 11-6403-02) disc eff 1 Jul 62 & pers trfd to concurrently org USA Sig Op Actv (TD 87-9380). Asgd Hq USASA. Disc eff 21 Jan 63.
USA Signal Operations Unit Nos 21 & 23		(See Recap of USASAEUR Units)

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<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
USA Signal Operations Activity (Cont)		
USA Signal Operations Unit Nos 24 & 25		(See Recap of USASAPAC Units)
USA Signal Research Unit No 10-A		(See Recap of USASAEUR Units)
USA Signal Research Activity	Fort Monmouth, NJ	USA Sig Rsch Actv. (TD 11-6403-03) disc eff 1 Aug 62 & pers trfd to concurrently org USA Sig Rsch Actv (TD 87-9390). Asgd Hq USASA. Disc eff 21 Jan 63.
USA Signal Research Unit No 7	Thule, Greenland	Disc under TD 11-6475 eff 1 Aug 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9380-05; asgd USA Sig Rsch Actv. Reasgd 1st USASAFS under TD 87-9466 eff 20 Jan 63.
USA Signal Research Unit No 9	Asmara, Eritrea	Disc under TD 11-6479 eff 1 Aug 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9390-08; asgd USA Sig Rsch Actv. Reasgd 4th USASAFS under TD 87-9468 eff 20 Jan 63.
USA Signal Research Unit Nos 2, 6, 10		(See Recap of USASAEUR Units)
USA Signal Research Unit Nos 3, 4, 8, 11		(See Recap of USASAPAC Units)
USA Signal Research Unit No 5		(See Recap of USASAAL Units)
USASA Processing Center	Fort Monmouth, NJ	Org eff 21 Jan 63 concu- rently with disc of USA Sig Op Actv & USA Sig Rsch Actv. Asgd Hq USASA.
31st USASA Liaison Detachment	Governors Island, NY	

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<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
32d USASA Liaison Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Md	
33d USASA Liaison Detachment	Fort McPherson, Ga	
34th USASA Liaison Detachment	Fort Sam Houston, Tex	
35th USASA Liaison Detachment	Chicago, Ill	
36th USASA Liaison Detachment	Presidio of San Francisco, Calif	
USASA Personnel Procurement & Processing Detachments:	Fort Dix, NJ Fort Jackson, SC Fort Leonard Wood, Mo Fort Ord, Calif	

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~USASA, EUROPE

B

~~(e)~~ A recapitulation of USASA, Europe TD Units during period 1 July 1962-30 June 1963, follows:

<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Hq USASA, Europe	Frankfurt, Germany	
507th USASA Group (Field Army)	Baumholder, Germany	
319th USASA Battalion (Corps)	Herzogenaurach, Germany	
319th USASA Battalion (Corps)	Rothwesten, Germany	
Company A	Bahrdorf, Germany	
Company B	Lubeck, Germany	
Company C	Rothwesten, Germany	
320th USASA Battalion (Corps)	Bad Aibling, Germany	
Company A	Bad Aibling, Germany	
Company B	Bad Aibling, Germany	
182d USASA Operations Company (A)	Herzogenaurach, Germany	
183d USASA Operations Company (A)	Herzogenaurach, Germany	
184th USASA Operations Company (A)	Rothwesten, Germany	
251st USASA Processing Company	Frankfurt, Germany	
600th USASA Company	Camp Ederle, Vicenza, Italy	

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<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
77th USASA Special Operations Unit	Frankfurt, Germany	
78th USASA Special Operations Unit	Berlin, Germany	
102d USASA Security Detachment	Heidelberg, Germany	
103d USASA Security Detachment	Orleans, France	
402d USASA Special Operations Detachment	Lenggries, Germany	Relocated from Bad Tolz, Germany eff 22 Mar 63.
2d Detachment	Frankfurt, Germany	
5th USASA Field Station	Sinop, Turkey	
13th USASA Field Station	Harrogate, England	
USASA, Turkey/15th USASA Field Station	Ankara, Turkey	
USA Signal Research Unit No 2	Zweibrucken, Germany	Disc under TD 11-6571 eff 1 Aug 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9390-01; asgd USA Sig Rsch Actv. Reasgd Hq USASAEUR under TD 87-9461 eff 20 Jan 63.
USA Signal Research Unit No 6	Ankara, Turkey	Disc under TD 11-6599 eff 1 Aug 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9390-05; asgd USA Sig Rsch Actv. Reasgd Hq USASAEUR under TD 87-9465 eff 20 Jan 63.
USA Signal Research Unit No 10	Teheran, Iran	Disc under TD 11-6548 eff 1 Aug 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9390-09; asgd USA Sig Rsch Actv. Reasgd Hq USASAEUR under TD 87-9469 eff 20 Jan 63.

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<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
USA Signal Research Unit No 10-A	Teheran, Iran	Disc under TD 11-6475 eff 1 Jul 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9380-05; asgd USA Sig Op Actv. Reasgd Hq USASAEUR under TD 87-9459 eff 20 Jan 63.
USA Signal Operations Unit No 21	Diyarbakir, Turkey	Disc under TD 11-6446 eff 1 Jul 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9380-01; asgd USA Sig Op Actv. Reasgd Hq USASAEUR under TD 87-9455 eff 20 Jan 63.
USA Signal Operations Unit No 23	Peshawar, Pakistan Kharlan, Pakistan	Disc under TD 11-6563 eff 1 Jul 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9380-02; asgd USA Sig Op Actv. Reasgd Hq USASAEUR under TD 87-9456 eff 20 Jan 63.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~USASA, PACIFIC

~~(e)~~ A recapitulation of USASA, Pacific TD Units during period 1 July 1962 - 30 June 1963, follows:

<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Hq USASA, Pacific	Camp Zama, Tokyo, Japan	
508th USASA Group (Field Army)	Yongdong-po, Korea	
51st USASA Special Operations Command	Sobe, Okinawa	
321st USASA Battalion (Corps)	Uijongbu, Korea	
Company A	Munsan, Korea	
Company B	Tongduchon-ni, Korea	
177th USASA Operations Company	Pyong Taek, Korea	
226th USASA Operations Company	Paengyang-do, Korea	
252d USASA Processing Company	Clark AFB, PI	Org eff 15 Mar 63.
76th USASA Special Operations Unit	Taipei, Taiwan	
81st USASA Special Operations Unit	Helemano, Hawaii	
82d USASA Special Operations Unit	Saigon, Vietnam	
83d USASA Special Operations Unit	Bangkok, Thailand	
USASA Communications Unit, Japan	Camp Drake, Tokyo, Japan	

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<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
101st USASA Security Detachment	Saigon, Vietnam	Org eff 1 Mar 63. Given cover designator 7th RRU.
104th USASA Security Detachment	Sobe, Okinawa	
400th USASA Special Operations Detachment	Fort Buckner, Okinawa	
9th USASA Field Station	Clark AFB, PI	
9th USASA Operations Company		
12th USASA Field Station	Chitose, Japan	Reorg to include Hq & Hq Co eff 15 Mar 63.
USAG, Kuma Station		Disc eff 15 Mar 63.
11th USASA Operations Company		
12th USASA Operations Company		
14th USASA Field Station	Hakata, Japan	
14th USASA Operations Company		
USA Signal Research Unit No 3	Itazuke AB, Japan	Disc under TD 11-6593 eff 1 Aug 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9390-02; asgd USA Sig Rsch Actv. Reasgd Hq USASAPAC under TD 87-9462 eff 20 Jan 63. Further asgd 14th USASAFS eff 1 Jun 63.
USA Signal Research Unit No 4	Misawa AB, Japan	Disc under TD 11-6666 eff 1 Aug 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9390-03; asgd USA Sig Rsch Actv. Reasgd Hq USASAPAC under TD 87-9463 eff 20 Jan 63.

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<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
USA Signal Research Unit No 8	Clark AFB, PI	Disc under TD 11-6524 eff 1 Aug 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9390-07; asgd USA Sig Rsch Actv. Reasgd Hq USASAPAC under TD 87-9467 eff 20 Jan 63. Further asgd 9th USASAFS eff 1 Jun 63.
USA Signal Research Unit No 11	Bangkok, Thailand	Disc under TD 11-6611 eff 1 Aug 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9390-10; asgd USA Sig Rsch Actv. Reasgd Hq USASAPAC under TD 87-9470 eff 20 Jan 63.
USA Signal Operations Unit No 24	Chitose, Japan	Disc under TD 11-6627 eff 1 Jul 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9380-03; asgd USA Sig Op Actv. Reasgd Hq USASAPAC under TD 87-9457 eff 20 Jan 63. Further asgd 12th USASAFS eff 1 Jun 63.
USA Signal Operations Unit No 25	Taegu, Korea	Disc under TD 11-6484 eff 1 Jul 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9380-04; asgd USA Sig Op Actv. Reasgd Hq USASAPAC under TD 87-9458 eff 20 Jan 63.

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USASA, ALASKA

~~(S)~~ A recapitulation of USASA, Alaska TD Units during period 1 July 1962 - 30 June 1963, follows:

<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Hq USASA, Alaska	Fort Richardson, Alaska	
Detachment A, Hq Co, USASA, Alaska	Clam Lagoon, Adak, Alaska	
Detachment J, Hq Co, USASA, Alaska	Gambell, St Lawrence Island, Alaska	Temp unit set up for period, 25 Sep62-30 Jun 63.
79th USASA Special Operations Unit	Shemya Island, Alaska	
USA Signal Research Unit No 5	Fairbanks, Alaska	Disc under TD 11-6604 eff 1 Aug 62 & concurrently org under TD 87-9390-04, asgd USA Sig Rsch Actv. Reasgd Hq USASAAL under TD 87-9464 eff 20 Jan 63.

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~~(C)~~ A recapitulation of USASA, Caribbean TD Units during period 1 July 1962 - 30 June 1963, follows:

<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Hq USASA, Caribbean	Fort Clayton, CZ	
Operations Branch	Chiva Chiva, CZ	
401st USASA Special Operations Detachment (Abn)	Fort Gulick, CZ	Transferred from Fort Bragg, NC eff 16 Dec 62.

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GLOSSARY

AAF/JOG	Army-Air Force Joint Operations Group
ACOUSTINT	Acoustical Intelligence
AIS	Army Intelligence and Security
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AFP	Annual Funding Program
ARDF	Airborne Radio Direction Finding
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARVN	Army Republic of Vietnam
BUE	Bulgarian Border Guard
CC&D	Communication Countermeasures and Deception
CCM	Communications Countermeasures
ChiCom	Chinese Communist
CNA	Congolese National Army
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
COMJAM	Communications Jamming
COMSEC	Communications Security
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DF	Direction Finding
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
EAM	Electrical Accounting Machine
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
ESGM	Earth Satellite Guided Missile
ESV	Earth Satellite Vehicle
FAST	Flexible Analytic Support Technique
FROG	Free Rocket Over Ground
GSFG	Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
GVN	Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
HF	High Frequency
HFDF	High Frequency Direction Finding
ICD	Imitative Communications Deception
Indig	Indigenous
INTC	Intelligence Corps
JSPC	Joint Sobe Processing Center

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KGB Soviet Union State Security
 KOP South Korean Police
 KYMTR Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range

 LNA Liberation News Agency

 MACV Military Advisory Command, Vietnam
 MATSUM Machine Aids Technical Summary
 MCA Military Construction, Army
 MG Mercury Grass
 MIAR Machine Intercept Analysis Report
 MOAD Moscow Address Calls
 MPA Military Personnel, Army

 NM Nautical mile
 NCS Net Control Station
 NFD Northern Frontier District (Kenya)
 NKA North Korean Army
 NSA National Security Agency

 OMA Operations and Maintenance, Army
 OPIUM Optimum Processing of Intercept
 Utilization by Machine

 PEMA Procurement of equipment and missiles,
 Army
 PCRS Primary Criticomm Relay Station
 PROPERF Prototype Fixed Electronic Receiving
 Facility

 RADINT Radar Intelligence
 RDTE Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
 RFP Radio Fingerprinting
 RMA Russian Military Mainline
 RRU Radio Research Unit
 R&U Repairs and Utilities
 RVN Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)

 SAM Surface-to-Air Missile
 SLA Southeast Asia
 SEAMATSUM Southeast Asia Machine Aids Technical
 Summary
 SEAPIC Southeast Asia Processing and Integration
 Center
 SETAF Southern European Task Force
 SIGINT Signal Intelligence
 SIT Special Intelligence Techniques
 SMRIS Soviet Missile Range Instrumentation Ships
 SOD Special Operations Detachment

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SOI	Signal Operation Instructions
SOU	Signal Operations Unit; or Special Operations Unit
SRF	Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces
SRU	Signal Research Unit
SSATC	Sary Shagan Anti-missile Test Range
SSM	Surface-to-Surface Missile
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
STRAC	US Strategic Army Corps
STRAF	US Strategic Army Forces
TARUS	Tagging and Associating for Retrieval in a Uniform System
TAREX	Target Exploitation
TTMTR	Tyura Tam Missile Test Range
TUSLOG	The US Logistics Group
USAFSS	US Air Force Security Service
USAREUR	US Army, Europe
USASAAL	US Army Security Agency, Alaska
USASACARIB	US Army Security Agency, Caribbean
USASAEUR	US Army Security Agency, Europe
USASAPAC	US Army Security Agency, Pacific
USASATC&S	US Army Security Agency Training Center and School
VCMN	Viet Cong Military Network
VHF	Very High Frequency

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