April 2001

ATTN OF: Inspector General

SUBJECT: Office of the Inspector General Semiannual Report to Congress - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

TO: DIR
Thru: D/DIR D/SECRETARIAT

1. (U//FOUO) This memorandum advises you that the NSA/CSS Office of the Inspector General submitted to the Department of Defense Inspector General the Semiannual Report to the Congress on Intelligence-Related Oversight Activities for the period 1 October 2000 - 31 March 2001. For your information, I am providing you with a copy of this report.

2. (U//FOUO) If you require additional information, please contact on 963-3544s.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

ETHAN L. BAUMAN
Inspector General

cc: SID
    IAD
    CoS

Encl: a/s

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OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

SEMIANNUAL REPORT FOR THE PERIOD
1 OCTOBER 2000 - 31 MARCH 2001
(U) SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

FOR THE PERIOD October 1, 2000 THROUGH March 31, 2001

(U) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Related Activities; NSA/CSS IG, IN-00-0010, 27 October 2000

Summary. (U) At the request of Senior Leadership, the NSA/CSS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted a functional inspection of agency activities related to FOIA requests. This inspection evaluated the effectiveness of the existing processes; the experience and training of those involved in the processes; workload and resource factors; and the impact on NSA’s public image. The following improvements to FOIA processes are needed to make NSA function more effectively in this area: FOIA and Privacy Act Services needs to take a more proactive, strategic approach to developing and implementing FOIA-related policy; NSA is not fully compliant with the Electronic FOIA (E-FOIA) amendments of 1996 that require posting frequently requested material on the internet; and more training for FOIA case officers and Key Component personnel with FOIA responsibilities.

Management Action. (U/FOOU) Management concurred with all recommendations and actions have either been completed or are ongoing. We noted, however, that the FOIA release process is inextricably connected to the classification process. Improvements in the process will require leadership from the policy organization - to whom many of our recommendations are directed - but also full compliance by the Key Components to the policy organization’s-generated policies.

Overall Report Classification: (U) UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

(U) Overhead Collection Management Center (OCMC); NSA/CSS IG, IN-00-0011, 21 November 2000

Summary. (U/FOOU) This inspection of the OCMC found that, despite dramatic changes in the target set and overhead missions, the Memorandum of Agreement establishing the OCMC has not been updated since 1984. Failure to define new authorities, responsibilities, and roles has produced an extremely complicated and expensive system that operates without the formal direction needed to optimize its activities and to ensure that it will perform well in a crisis.

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The position of Chief, OCMC, is now used as a developmental assignment, diminishing its effectiveness in dealing with high-ranking OCMC partners. Although most tasks, once executed, are successful, inefficient practices characterize the complex tasking process. Finally, OCMC work spaces are extremely dilapidated.

Management Action. (U) The new Chief, OCMC, will review the charter and begin drafting a document that codifies the complex overhead tasking process. The Collection Management Office will start documenting the extent to which resource constraints degrade the OCMC mission.

Overall Report Classification: (U) TOP SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE

Summary. (S) At the request of the Office of Global Response, the OIG performed this audit of supplemental funds shortly after the Office of Global Response assumed management of these funds. There were two concerns regarding the Crisis Management Office (CMO), from where the transfer occurred: 1) possible inadequate documentation and controls over the use of travel funds; and 2) possible diversion to _______________. We found no evidence that anyone misused travel funds or diverted SIGINT equipment. However, we found that the CMO had not instituted robust controls in two major areas.

Management Action. (U) Management agreed to improve the internal controls over the use of supplemental funds during contingency operations. Additionally, management will also supplement the Crisis Action Management System Concept of Operations to document the requirements and budget processes and will include a standard checklist of expenses common to contingency operations.

Overall Report Classification: (U) SECRET

(U) NSA's Implementation of DoD 5000 Series; NSA/CSS IG, AU-00-0002, 5 January 2001

Summary. (U) This audit focused on NSA/CSS Circular 5000, Acquisition Management, which implements DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000.1 and its accompanying regulation. It establishes a structured process for reviewing major acquisitions at specific milestones and making an informed decision on whether to proceed. The audit found problems in Agency implementation of DoDD 5000.1, including: 1) NSA had not finalized and implemented a formal plan to implement NSA 5000, due to the
Cryptologic Acquisition Program Board's failure to perform its assigned role; and 2) the process prescribed by NSA 5000 was not rigorously followed, as funding for programs we reviewed was released before a Mission Needs Statement was developed.

Management Action. (U) Management agreed with our recommendations to designate, by charter, the Senior Acquisition Executive (SAE) as the responsible authority for oversight of NSA's acquisition management system and to develop a policy and a formal process that require SAE approval of acquisition documentation before program funding is released.

Overall Report Classification: (U) UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

(U) Intelligence Community Coordination of Foreign Liaison Intelligence Relationships and Intelligence Disclosures to Other Countries; NSA/CSS IG, AU-00-0013, 22 January 2001

Summary. (U) This interagency review, conducted with representatives who comprise the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, determined the effectiveness of the mechanisms and administrative processes established under the Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs) for coordination of US espionage, counterintelligence, and related intelligence liaison activities with foreign governments and international organizations.

Another finding pertained to the Special Assistant to the DCI for Foreign Intelligence Relationships (SA/DCI/FIR). Since 1991, the SA/DCI/FIR has advised and assisted the DCI in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to foreign intelligence relationships.

Management Action. (S//NF) Management officials from the participating
Overall Report Classification: (U) SECRET//NOFORN

(U) Intelligence Oversight Inspection of the Global Network Management Division; NSA/CSS IG, IN-01-0004, 24 January 2001

Summary. (U) This Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspection of the Global Network Management Division evaluated the office’s program to comply with Executive Order (E.O.) 12333 and its implementing directives and regulations. The inspection found the Global Network Management Division was in basic compliance with E.O. 12333 and derivative documents, managers and employees demonstrated a keen awareness of their individual IO responsibilities, and several office elements had best practices, including online IO working aids and training verification. However, the office needs to formalize IO training for new employees and refresher training for its entire work force, and there is no formal procedure for reporting or logging potential violations.

Management Action. (U) During an interim status briefing, management immediately instituted process and program improvements to address the office’s IO shortcomings. As a result, the Global Network Management Division now has an excellent IO web site, an official has been named to standardize training for new employees and annual refresher training, and a procedure to report and log incidents is in development.

Overall Report Classification: (U) SECRET//COMINT

(U) Office of Facilities Engineering; NSA/CSS IG, IN-00-0012, 25 January 2001

Summary. (U) This organizational inspection of the Office of Facilities Engineering evaluated their ability to perform their mission and identify any impediments to success. The inspection found the office’s employees to be customer-focused, dedicated, and have introduced several innovative “best practices” into their daily routines. Nevertheless, we identified two concerns that could jeopardize the office’s ability to perform its mission in the near future: substantial cuts in funding and an eroding skills base.

estimate of the impact of the upgrade; NSA and the Service Cryptologic Elements
(SCEs) do not have Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) on the responsibility for field support; and Technical Security Countermeasure (TSCM) inspections are not routinely performed on newly renovated OPS 1 cores.

**Management Action.** (C) Management concurred with most of the recommendations. The office of physical security routinely completes informal assessments of the technical security risk to mission after renovations plan and will establish MOAs that assign funding responsibilities for facilities support at field sites.

**Overall Report Classification:** (U) SECRET

(U) **Time Sensitive and Field Support Division:** NSA/CSS IG, IN-00-0013, 13 February 2001

**Summary.** (C) The Time Sensitive and Field Support Division has two missions: providing end-to-end support to the National Time Sensitive System (NTSS) and serving as the Program Manager for Information Technology Infrastructure (ITI) modernization for the extended Enterprise. This organizational inspection found a major impediment to a critical mission: lack of an Agency program to implement the Chief Information Officer's policy of... Other findings include key Division processes have not been documented, which impede NSA's effort to privatize delivery of ITI support services; the Division has an enviable record of maintaining NTSS availability but needs to gather performance data in order to identify improvements; and employees are anxious to find out how GROUNDBREAKER will affect them.

**Management Action.** (U) The OIG recommended that the Director of Information Technology Services (ITIS) implement a program to transition automated analysis and reporting tools and applications so that etc., can run on operating systems. Other recommendations include the Division documenting their processes; develop standard operating procedures; and utilize performance data to foster a continuous improvement mentality. Finally, the Director, ITIS, needs to give the work force concrete answers about how GROUNDBREAKER will affect their jobs.

**Overall Report Classification:** (U) CONFIDENTIAL
Followup on the Joint Inspection of
NSA/CSS IG,

Summary. (U/FOUO) This joint followup inspection, conducted jointly by the Inspectors General (IGs) of the Service Cryptologic Elements (SCEs) and NSA/CSS, focused on the serious electronic maintenance and life safety deficiencies observed during the original joint inspection in June 2000. Regarding electronic maintenance, the inspection found that has taken all of the right steps to solve immediate deficiencies and to establish credible processes that ensure the sustainability of all maintenance programs. Accordingly, all of the findings have been closed. Regarding safety and fire protection, the inspection found that, where possible, interim controls and work-arounds have been instituted. These existing deficiencies do not pose a serious threat to personnel, but continue to place mission equipment at risk. Site management will continue long-term monitoring of the project status to ensure continued action on the fire protection deficiencies.

Overall Report Classification: (U) SECRET//COMINT

Joint Inspection of Medina Regional Security Operations Center (MRSOC):
NSA/CSS IG, JT-01-0001, 20 February 2001

Summary. (U/FOUO) The inspection, conducted jointly by the IGs of the SCEs and NSA/CSS, found the site's responsibility for has increased; as well as space, parking, and facility issues; and a centralized focal point at NSA to serve as a one-stop-shop for MRSOC concerns and questions, has not been successfully addressed since the last inspection about two years ago. Despite the positive command climate, several issues demand immediate attention

Management Action. (⊕) Management stated that the report validates the best practices of the MRSOC, provides a road map for management to improve the site, and recommendations are already being implemented. Management continues to provide periodic status updates on actions taken to correct the deficiencies noted in the report. The inspection produced several recommendations directed to higher headquarters and the site

Overall Report Classification: (U) SECRET//COMINT