Alleged Executive Order 12333 Violation

(U) This report might not be releasable under the Freedom of Information Act or other statutes and regulations. Consult the NSA/CSS Inspector General Chief of Staff before releasing or posting all or part of this report.
(U) OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) Chartered by the NSA Director and by statute, the Office of the Inspector General conducts audits, investigations, inspections, and special studies. Its mission is to ensure the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of NSA operations, provide intelligence oversight, protect against fraud, waste, and mismanagement of resources by the Agency and its affiliates, and ensure that NSA activities comply with the law. The OIG also serves as an ombudsman, assisting NSA/CSS employees, civilian and military.

(U) AUDITS

(U) The audit function provides independent assessments of programs and organizations. Performance audits evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of entities and programs and their internal controls. Financial audits determine the accuracy of the Agency’s financial statements. All audits are conducted in accordance with standards established by the Comptroller General of the United States.

(U) INVESTIGATIONS

(U) The OIG administers a system for receiving complaints (including anonymous tips) about fraud, waste, and mismanagement. Investigations may be undertaken in response to those complaints, at the request of management, as the result of irregularities that surface during inspections and audits, or at the initiative of the Inspector General.

(U) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

(U) Intelligence oversight is designed to insure that Agency intelligence functions comply with federal law, executive orders, and DoD and NSA policies. The IO mission is grounded in Executive Order 12333, which establishes broad principles under which IC components must accomplish their missions.

(U) FIELD INSPECTIONS

(U) Inspections are organizational reviews that assess the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency components. The Field Inspections Division also partners with Inspectors General of the Service Cryptologic Elements and other IC entities to jointly inspect consolidated cryptologic facilities.

--TOP SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY--
I. (U) SUMMARY

(S/#/REL) On 6 November 2013, an auditor from [REDACTED] conducted two queries of SIGINT databases that appeared to be in violation of NSA's SIGINT procedures. The

(U/#FOUO) In addition to obtaining sworn testimony from [REDACTED], we conducted an interview of his immediate Government lead at the time of the incident. We also obtained all pertinent records from SSG Oversight and Compliance and the Associate Directorate for Education and Training.

(S/#/REL) The preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that although [REDACTED] queries were reportable incidents, he did not violate Executive Order 12333, DoD 5240.1-R, or USSID SP0018, as he did not intentionally collect communications of or concerning United States (U.S.) Persons, or persons in the United States.

(U/#FOUO) The OIG will notify [REDACTED] of the results of this investigation.

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20130930
Declassify On: 20401001
II. (U) BACKGROUND

(U) Introduction

(U/FOUO) [BEGAN WORKING AS A CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEE SUPPORTING IN APPROXIMATELY LATE SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER 2013. PRIOR TO HIS EMPLOYMENT AS AN NSA CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEE, HE CHOSE INSTEAD TO PURSUE FULL TIME EMPLOYMENT AS AN NSA CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEE.]

(S//REL) IN CURRENT POSITION AS A [HOME PAGE ON NSANET (AS OF 6 JULY 2015):]

According to the [CLASSIFIED BY: Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20130930 Declassify On: 20401001]
(U) Applicable Authorities

(U) Below is a listing of citations. Refer to Appendix A for the text of relevant excerpts.

- Executive Order 12333 – United States Intelligence Activities
- DoD Regulation 5240.1-R – Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons
- USSID SP0018 – Legal Compliance and U.S. Persons Minimization Procedures
III. (U) FINDINGS

(S//SI/REL) ALLEGATION: Did intentionally collect communications of or concerning U.S. Persons, or persons in the United States, in violation of law or policy?

(S//SI/REL) CONCLUSION: Unsubstantiated. The preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that although queries were reportable incidents, he did not violate Executive Order 12333, DoD 5240.1-R, or USSID SP0018, as he did not intentionally collect communications of or concerning U.S. Persons or persons in the United States.

(U) Documentary Evidence

(U//FOUO) NSA/CSS Intelligence-Related Incident Report

(S//SI/REL) This incident report (Appendix B) summarizes the event that occurred on

(U//FOUO) NSA/CSS Intelligence-Related Incident Report

(S//SI/REL) This incident report (Appendix C) summarizes the event that occurred on

(U//FOUO) Training Record

(U//FOUO) training record revealed that prior to October 2013, he completed numerous courses regarding SIGINT authorities including:

- OVSC1100 Overview of Signals Intelligence Authorities (Most recent date of completion prior to the aforementioned incidents: 30 September 2013)
- OVSC1806 USSID SP0018 Training for Technical Personnel (Most recent date of completion prior to the aforementioned incidents: 30 September 2013) (A portion of this training module is located in Appendix D)
- OVSC1000 NSA/CSS Intelligence Oversight Training (Most recent date of completion prior to the aforementioned incidents: 21 March 2013)
- OIAC1180 2010 Annual IA Awareness Training (Most recent date of completion prior to the aforementioned incidents: 19 June 2010)

(U//FOUO) Email Message from SSG Intelligence Oversight Officer, dated 13 November 2014

(S//SI//REL) This email message forwards additional information about the incidents provided by (Appendix E):

(U) Testimonial Evidence

(U//FOUO) On 18 February 2014, ______ assigned to support SSG, was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony:

(S//SI//REL) works on ______

_______ has been employed in his current position since approximately late September or early October 2013. Prior to this employment, ______ as he chose instead to pursue full time employment as an NSA contractor employee.
(S//SI//REL) Soon after beginning employment with [redacted], was involved in two documented incidents. In approximately

(S//SI//REL) was unable to recall the 5 November 2013 incident

(S//SI//REL) Although [redacted] had taken all required NSA SIGINT training prior to the incidents,

(U//FOUO) After he was contacted by SSG Oversight and Compliance, after the first incident, [redacted] was told by his Project Manager.
and Contracting Special Security Officer (CSSO).

(U//FOUO) On 7 January 2014, [Redacted] was interviewed and provided the following sworn testimony:

(S//SI//REL) [Redacted] is an NSA contractor employee, employed by [Redacted]. He has worked on a project called [Redacted].

(U//FOUO) In approximately early October 2013, a few weeks before the reported incident,

(S//SI//REL) Several weeks later, in approximately early November 2013, one of the SSG Oversight and Compliance auditors sent an email to [Redacted] asking about two specific queries that [Redacted] performed. The

(U//FOUO) [Redacted] He talked also talked to [Redacted] managers and explained that [Redacted] needed additional training and recommended that his CSSO talk to him about the significance of his actions.
(U//FOUO) Several weeks ago, actions were not malicious. The incidents occurred because of "flat out stupidity" and because was not aware of any work-related problems with he wanted to err on the side of caution, not because he thought actions were malicious.

(U) Analysis and Conclusions

(U//FOUO) According to Executive Order 12333, section 2.3, elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) are authorized to collect information concerning U.S. persons only in accordance with established procedures approved by the Attorney General. DoD Regulation 5240.1-R contains the Attorney General-approved procedures for all DoD IC components and has a Classified Annex that governs SIGINT activities. The Classified Annex to DoD 5240.1-R requires the Director of NSA, or his designee, to issue directives and instructions implementing the procedures found in the Classified Annex. USSID SP0018 is the directive that implements the Classified Annex.

(S//SI//REL) Section 3.1 of USSID SP0018 prohibits the intentional collection of communications to, from, or about U.S. Persons, or persons or entities in the United States, except as set forth in USSID SP0018. In accordance with section 9.18 of USSID SP0018, "[a] person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a U.S. Person unless reasonably identified ... [not to be a U.S. Person]." Section 4.1 provides the rules for collection of communications of or about U.S. Persons.
(S//SI//REL) admitted to the auditor and to the OIG that he

(U//FOUO) Although should have known that his unauthorized queries were prohibited, there is no evidence that he had any malicious intent or even that he intended to collect information about U.S. Persons; rather, his intent was to When first questioned by the auditor,

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Classified By:
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20130930
Declassify On: 20401001
(S//SI//REL) The preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that although queries were reportable incidents, he did not violate Executive Order 12333, DoD 5240.1-R, or USSID SP0018, as he did not intentionally collect communications of or concerning U.S. Persons or persons in the United States.
IV. (U) CONCLUSION

(S//SI//REL) The preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that although [redacted] queries were reportable incidents, he did not violate Executive Order 12333, DoD 5240.1-R, or USSID SP0018, as he did not intentionally collect communications of or concerning U.S. Persons or persons in the United States.
V. (U) DISTRIBUTION OF RESULTS

(U//FOUO) will be notified of the results of this investigation.

 concurrency:

Instructor

Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

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Classified By: [Blank]
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20130930
Declassify On: 20401001
APPENDIX A

(U) Applicable Authorities
(U) EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(U) Part 2.3 Collection of information

(U) Elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning United States persons only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the Intelligence Community element concerned or by the head of a department containing such element and approved by the Attorney General, consistent with the authorities provided by Part 1 of this Order, after consultation with the Director.

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(U) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons

(U) Chapter 5, Procedure 5. Electronic Surveillance

C5.3. PART 3: SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

C5.3.1.2. This part of Procedure 5 shall be supplemented by a classified Annex promulgated by the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, which shall also be approved by the Attorney General.

(U/#FOUO) Classified Annex to DoD 5240.1-R

Sec. 3: Policy

(U) The Director, National Security Agency, is assigned responsibility for signals intelligence collection and processing activities. In order to assure that these activities are conducted in accordance with the provision sof Executive Order 12333, the Director, or his designee, will issue appropriate directives and instructions implementing these procedures and governing the conduct of the United States Signals Intelligence System.
(U) United States Signals Intelligence Directive (USSID) SP0018, Legal Compliance and U.S. Persons Minimization Procedures

(U) Section 3 – Policy
3.1 (U) The policy of the USSS is to TARGET or COLLECT only FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS.*The USSS will not intentionally COLLECT communications to, from or about U.S. PERSONS or persons or entities in the U.S. except as set forth in this USSID...

(U) Section 4 – Collection
4.1. (S/SH/REL) Communications which are known to be to, from or about a U.S. PERSON

   a. (U) With the approval of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court . . .
   b. (U) With the approval of the Attorney General of the United States . . .
   c. (U) With the approval of the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (DIRNSA/CHCSS), so long as the COLLECTION need not be approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Attorney General, and
   d. (U) Emergency Situations.

(U) Section 9 – Definitions
9.18. (U) UNITED STATES PERSON:
   a. (U) A citizen of the UNITED STATES,
   b. (U) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the UNITED STATES,
   c. (U) Unincorporated groups and associations a substantial number of the members of which constitute a. or b. above, or
   d. (U) CORPORATIONS incorporated in the UNITED STATES, including U.S. flag nongovernmental aircraft or vessels, but not including those entities which are openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by them.
   e. (U) The following guidelines apply in determining whether a person is a U.S. PERSON:

      (1) (U) A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a U.S. PERSON unless that person is reasonably identified as an alien who has not been admitted for permanent residence or if the nature of the person's communications or other indicia in the contents or circumstances of such communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not a U.S. PERSON.

      (2) (U) A person known to be currently outside the UNITED STATES, or whose location is not known, will not be treated as a U.S. PERSON unless such person is reasonably identified as such or the nature of the person's communications or other indicia in the contents or circumstances of such communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a U.S. PERSON...
APPENDIX B

(U) Incident Report
APPENDIX C

(U) Incident Report

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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IV-14-0029
(U) APPENDIX D

(U) OVSC1806 USSID SP0018 Training for Technical Personnel
OVSC1806 - USSID SP0018 Training for Technical Personnel

Resources | Glossary

LESSON 3: (U) TARGETING CONSIDERATIONS AND COLLECTION AUTHORITIES

(U) Lesson Objectives

(U) Lesson Objectives


(U) NSA/CSS's SIGINT authority is derived from EO12333, as amended in 2008. EO12333 authorizes NSA to conduct SIGINT activities for the purposes of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and support to military operations.

(U) USSID SP0018 Section 3.1 states that "The policy of the USSS is to target or collect only foreign communications. The USSS will not intentionally collect communications to, from or about U.S. Persons or persons or entities in the U.S. except as set forth in this USSID."

(U//FOUO) (Narrator)

(U//FOUO) Upon completion of this lesson, you should be able to:

- Identify guidelines to apply in determining whether a person or entity is a U.S. Person, and
- Summarize EO12333 and FISA, including FAA (FISA Amendments Act) authorities.

...(U) Presumption of Status

(U) Presumption of Status

 Classified By: [Redacted]
 Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
 Dated: 20070108
 Declassify On: 20391001

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(U) (Narrator) There may be times when you cannot determine the nationality of a proposed target because of insufficient information. When this happens, follow the guidelines in USSID SP0018 Section 9.18.e. First, look at the location of the proposed target:

- If the proposed target is known to be currently outside the United States, or their location is not known, then presume the target is NOT a U.S. Person.
- If the proposed target is known to be currently in the United States, then presume the target is a U.S. Person.

(U) If you have questions about applying these guidelines, contact SV or OGC for additional guidance.

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(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20391001

Release 2022-8
NSA 21240
APPENDIX E

(U) Email Message from

SSG Intelligence Oversight Officer, dated 13 November 2014
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2014 7:36 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: FW: (U) IG request for information (RFI) concerning the attached incident reports
Attachments: IG review of [Redacted] incidents, Notes, and Key Terms.docx

Classification: SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, PVEY

The attachment contains information about the incidents provided by [Redacted].
The information in red are [Redacted] additions.

Information in black was contributed by [Redacted] Oversight and Compliance [Redacted] [Redacted]. It was asked to validate all information. If additional information or greater detail is necessary, the IG may wish to contact [Redacted] directly.

Let me know if I can be of further assistance.

V/r

(U//FOUO) *** Signature Block ***

Intelligence Oversight Officer
SSG [Redacted] Oversight & Compliance Team Member
SSG Oversight & Compliance Team

-----Original Message-----
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2014 11:37 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: (U) IG request for information (RFI) concerning the attached incident reports

Classification: SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, PVEY

I updated part of the previous RED text to make it more clear that the analyst did [Redacted].
----Original Message----
From: 
Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 2:56 PM
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: RE: (U) IG request for information (RFI) concerning the attached incident reports

Classification: SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

Please review the entire document once more. If it is possible to provide more detail on what data may or may not have been touched, please make necessary corrections and amplifications.

If this is as far as we can go, please finalize the information and pass it back. I will push it to the IG's office.

V/r

(U//FOUO) *** Signature Block ***

Intelligence Oversight Officer
SSG Oversight & Compliance Team Member

SSG Oversight & Compliance Team

----Original Message----
From: 
Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 10:04 AM
To: 

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Sorry this has taken awhile. I had to verify a few facts. The text in RED are the changes I made to your draft.

-----Original Message-----
From: 
Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2014 11:47 AM
To: 

Subject: RE: (U) IG request for information (RFI) concerning the attached incident reports

Classification: SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

et al.

The attached document is intended to help your efforts, as not everyone is an SME on

Based on our discussion this morning, I put together some information in a document. It is best to leverage existing terms that have definitions. Using key terms will aid IG/OGC review of the information because they will resonate with them and provide context for their analysis of the facts concerning the incident.

Please avoid use of local shop talk, jargon, or informal terms and phrases.

I can assist you in locating useful terms if needed.

V/r

(U//FOUO) *** Signature Block ***

Intelligence Oversight Officer
SSG Oversight & Compliance Team Member
SSG Oversight & Compliance Team

-----Original Message-----
From: 
Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 12:39 PM
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: FW: (U) IG request for information (RFI) concerning the attached incident reports
Importance: High
Classification: SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

Just getting back from leave. Did either of you provide with additional information? but can you provide more classification?

Thanks,

-----Original Message-----
From: 
Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 9:29 AM
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: (U) IG request for information (RFI) concerning the attached incident reports
Importance: High
Classification: SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

Good Morning et al.

(U) The IG’s office requested a response today, if possible or as soon as possible (ASAP).

(U) A representative from NSA’s Office of the Inspector General has requested SSG Oversight and Compliance assistance in gathering additional information about two incidents that occurred in the October/November 2013 timeframe. The IG investigator has expressed that insufficient information concerning query results was provided in the incident report and that additional information is needed to support the IG investigation and report.
(U/FOUO) Incident Reports:
1) (IR Primary POC) and (Secondary POC), reported on.
2) (IR Primary POC) and (Secondary POC), reported on.

(U/FOUO) The incidents involved and were then reviewed by the post query reviewer.

(U) Question posed about these incidents: What data was returned by the queries listed in these incident reports?

(U) Discussion:

(U) Please reply to with your response directly. You may call us with questions.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

V/r

(U/FOUO) *** Signature Block ***

Intelligence Oversight Officer
SSG - Oversight & Compliance Team Member

SSG Oversight & Compliance Team

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Classification: SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FYET

Classified By:
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20391101
(U) Incident Notes (DRAFT – a work in progress)

(U//FOUO) Incident Reports (IR):

(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (1)
(b) (3) - F.L. 86-36
(b) (5)

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