

GEORGE C. MARSHALL RESEARCH FOUNDATION

DRAWER 920

LEXINGTON, VIRGINIA 24450

(703) 463-7103

October 29, 1981

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GENERAL OF THE ARMY
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PRESIDENT

ROBERT A. LOVETT
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BOARD OF TRUSTEES

FRED L. HADSEL
DIRECTOR

FORREST C. POGUE
BIOGRAPHER

Mr. Wallace R. Winkler
5020 Lake Circle Court
Columbia, Maryland 21044

Dear Mr. Winkler:

Enclosed are the copied materials that I neglected to give you yesterday. Please excuse my oversight.

I trust that you and your colleagues had a pleasant trip back home. I appreciate all of the material you provided the Marshall Library -- especially for the checklist of documents which have recently been made available.

Dr. Hadsel, Royster, and I very much enjoyed meeting the three of you. As was mentioned in our conversations, we hope that this visit will serve to maintain and strengthen the working relationship which has existed between the National Security Agency and the Marshall Library for over fifteen years.

Sincerely yours,



John Jacob
Archivist

JJ:ajl

Enclosures: 19 pages from box 64, folder 2, of the Marshall Papers.

Mrs. WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN

310 SECOND ST, SE WASHINGTON E, D. C. 20003

January 8, 1971

General Marshall Carter, President
George C. Marshall Research Foundation
Lexington, Virginia 24450

Dear General Carter:

Your letter to me following the shipment of my husband's Collection is much appreciated.

The date of your letter is December 24--two weeks ago now. Every day is a reproach to me--delay in this case is reprehensible. But I was the victim of a pleurisy-type virus for 12 days which incapacitated me through Christmas and New Year. Then upon returning to the library-office here in my house I found my typewriter afflicted with a determination not to move ahead, and other malicious tricks. Oh, the total depravity of inanimate things!--Yesterday a gifted friend of mine came by and persuaded the mean-minded machine to behave.

Going to Lexington shall be my first sojourn, once some disposition, temporary or otherwise, can be made of my house. Dr. Pogue tells me that weather in the month of January in Lexington can be very unpleasant and suggests I not hurry too much.

It is most kind of you to arrange for the search in NSA files and library for additional items from my husband's Collection. I say "from" advisedly. I was present when the two Security men from NSA did their search-and-seizure act, taking some articles out of the Army's own safe in this library. (Later one of those two men was dismissed from NSA for security reasons).

Dec. 30
← 1958
1958

May I say, to you as President of the Marshall Research Foundation, how pleased I am that you are its President; and that I am certain that the Foundation will be enriched by the William F. Friedman Collection. I refer not only to his incomparable analytical gifts; his catholicity of taste; his universality of knowledge--as typified by the ruling precept of his life: "Knowledge is Power"--; all of these qualities were enhanced by the stardust of genius--true original genius. For he launched a new age. (Just as the Space Age was launched in a later generation) When we staffed the Cipher Bureau at Riverbank Laboratories in 1917, doing all the deciphering work for all Departments of Government, there were no more than five persons in the whole of the U.S. who so much as knew what ^{one} words "cipher" and "code" meant. We were at one and the same time, the students, the teachers,

the workers. Even the translators. When the Cipher Bureau was established in Washington (Military Intelligence) that staff had complete cribs, consisting of our solved messages and their accompanying cipher texts. H.O. Yardley's inability to give any one any credit, even his own staff persons, is now a matter of history. (It has been said that Yardley's "American Black Chamber" is tenpercent fact and 90 percent fiction.) In May of 1918 1st Lieut. William F. Friedman left for GHQAEF, refusing to stay any longer out of uniformed service; during that six months, the Cipher Bureau in Washington, preceded by the French and British experts in France, had declared two systems unbreakable; WFF proved otherwise, while still at Riverbank, with no assistance from anyone and no co-workers. Thus began a series of "challenges", a kind of "William F. Friedman-against-the-world": the solution of the A.T.&T. Printing Telegraph Cipher in 1919-and-20; the Hebern Machine in 1924.....I could go on and on, but I shall not tire you further-at this time, at least.

The postscript to the above long paragraph should be: There MUST be a Biography. Little-Brown wants very much to do the biography, but so far all the "name" writers they have approached have either been bound by one or two advances for already planned volumes; or the writer is afraid of the technicality of the subject. The latter objection is based on false premises; the biography need contain no technicalities-except the most primitive that any teen-ager could understand... This brings me to my question;- do you have any name or names to suggest as writer? Either for Little-Brown(who suggests the first one or two instalments would be published in LIFE) or without Little-Brown?

Thanking you for your patience, I am

Most sincerely

Elizbeth Smith Friedman

Elizbeth Smith Friedman

REF ID: A2918974 MARSHALL PAPERS

FROM

BOX 64 FOLDER 2

GEO. C. MARSHALL RESEARCH LIBRARY
LEXINGTON, VA. USE RESTRICTED TO

NSA

NOT TO BE PLACED ON DEPOSIT IN ANY
REPOSITORY OR USED FOR ANY PURPOSE
EXCEPT THAT DESIGNATED THROUGH THE
MARSHALL LIBRARY.

War Department
Office of the Chief of Staff

September 27 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

W. H. H. H.

I think a copy of the new document should be taken to Admiral King by me, after Colonel Clarke's departure.

McCarthy

*copy did not send
copy to Ad. King
9/27/44
mlm*

*He will not be back in town
until Monday.*

General Marshall:

I understand from Col. Pasco that Admiral King is not leaving Washington until tomorrow. Nason

EX-105

DEWEY, THOMAS

THE ORIGINAL OF THIS COPY IS LOCATED IN THE
GEORGE C. MARSHALL RESEARCH FOUNDATION,
LEXINGTON, VA. AND THE CONTENTS SHOULD NOT
BE PUBLISHED WITHOUT FOUNDATION PERMISSION.

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

✓ King, E. J.
✓ Hawaii

September 25, 1944

E. J. King

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING:

Concern - All Headquarters

Attached is the draft of a letter which I feel it advisable to send to Governor Dewey. It may be that you do not care to be involved in the matter and, if so, I can strike out the reference to you. In any event, I would like your opinion.

A recent speech in Congress had deadly implications and I now understand much more is to be said, possibly by Governor Dewey himself. This letter of course puts him on the spot, and I hate to do it but see no other way of avoiding what might well be a catastrophe to us.

Just what ^{he} can do in the matter without giving reasons I do not know, but at least he will understand what a deadly affair it really is. I had in the back of my mind the possibility, without telling him, ~~convinced~~ that if he responds favorably I would secretly, here in my office, tell Republican Floor Leader Martin the dangers of the business so that he, on the Washington side of the fence, would understand something of Governor Dewey's attitude, without being informed that Governor Dewey had the same facts in his possession that I was giving Martin.

The whole thing is loaded with dynamite but I very much feel that something has to be done or the fat will be in the fire to our great loss in the Pacific, and possibly also in Europe.

✓ DEWEY, THOMAS E.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff

this memo & draft of Dewey ltr. taken by hand to ad. King by col. McCarthy 2:45 pm. 9/25/44

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority *off. N.N.D. 740046*
By *[Signature]* NARS, Date *2/4/74*

~~TOP SECRET~~

9/21/44

FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES ONLY

Hand, destroying Carter copy. Get done mlu person

D. Wise Dewey, Thomas E.

My dear Governor,

I am writing you without the knowledge of any other ~~party~~ ^(who concurs) except Admiral King because we are approaching a grave dilemma in the political re- actions of Congress regarding Pearl Harbor.

What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you either to accept it on the basis of your not com- municating its contents to any other person and destroying this letter or not reading any further and returning the letter to the bearer.

I should have preferred to talk to you in person but I could not, devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, to be delivered by hand to you by Culand ^{Carter} Clark who has

Charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy
In brief, the military dilemma resulting from Congressional political

battles of the presidential campaign is this:

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this

~~TOP SECRET~~

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)
Authority *NND 740046*
By *PN* NARS, Date *2/4/74*

otherwise we almost certainly would have been 4,000 miles out of place.

We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely results from the fact that we know the routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper point. (c)

As a further example, this morning we obtained their new air deployment in the Philippines, the number of fields that are operational and the number that have been virtually abandoned.

You can see from the foregoing the tragic consequences of a public investigation at this time regarding Pearl Harbor, which certainly would disclose to the enemy, German and Jap, our most vital source of information, which contributes greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and looking towards the early termination of the war.

The Roberts' Report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

As a further example of the delicacy of the situation, Donovan's organization (The OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

C
I am presenting this matter to you in the hope that you can lend your influence, which I assume would be determinative, to the support of no investigation of this matter by Congress during the period of the war. Further, I feel that whatever action you might see fit to take, it is imperative in my opinion that no use be made of King's or my name.

Please destroy this letter.

Faithfully yours,

~~TOP SECRET~~

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D), or (E)

Authority *ANN 742046*

By *PA* NARS, Date *2/27/74*

a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphered their messages.

Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department - rather than as is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information - but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions towards Hawaii until the last message ^{before December 7th,} which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtaining ¹ from Baron Oshima's messages ^{from Berlin} reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government, ^{These} ~~which~~ ¹ are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To further explain the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, ~~(when we had only one undamaged carrier left in the Pacific and one damaged)~~ ^{Y 3} ~~(but still operational and the Japanese had 9 or 10)~~ we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when

Some 3,000

otherwise we almost certainly would have been ~~4,000~~ miles out of place.

We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally

After and
landed troops on Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points.

The current ~~destructive~~ *carrier* raids by Admiral Halsey's forces on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.

You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we now possess.

The Roberts' Report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from

it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

As a further example of the delicacy of the situation, ^{Dome 15} Donovan's ~~organization~~ ^{people} (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion.

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific ~~was~~ ^{is} closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you, for your secret information, in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign. I might add that the recent action of Congress in requiring Army and Navy investigations for action before certain dates has compelled me to bring back the Corps commander, General Gerow, whose troops are fighting at Trier, to testify here while the Germans are counterattacking his forces there. This, however, is a very minor matter compared to the loss of our code information.

^{return}
Please ~~destroy~~ this letter. *by bearer. I will post it*

Faithfully yours,

in my secret file and this copy added to your reference. Please you to do so

[re Marshall to Dewey, 1944 Sept. 25]

MEMO. FOR THE RECORD:

The attached letter is the original letter delivered on September 26th by Col. Carter Clarke to Mr. Dewey. The pen changes are General Marshall's. This was torn up by me in conformance with the office procedure here of destroying reworked papers. I did this on my own initiative and had received no instructions to tear the paper up.

M. Nason
M. Nason

Sept. 27, 1944

FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES ONLY

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 September 1944

My dear Governor,

I am writing you without the knowledge of any other person except Admiral King (who concurs) because we are approaching a grave dilemma in the political reactions of Congress regarding Pearl Harbor.

What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you either to accept it on the basis of your not communicating its contents to any other person and returning this letter or not reading any further and returning the letter to the bearer.

I should have ^{much} preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel ~~Center~~ Clarke, who has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

In brief, the military dilemma ~~resulting from Congressional political battles of the presidential campaign~~ is this:

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department - rather than as is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information - but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions towards Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place

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
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority NND 740046
By 111 NARS, Date 2/4/74

greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you, ~~for your secret information,~~ in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign. I might add that the recent action of Congress in requiring Army and Navy investigations for action before certain dates has compelled me to bring back the Corps commander, General Gerow, whose troops are fighting at Trier, to testify here while the Germans are counterattacking his forces there. This, however, is a very minor matter compared to the loss of our code information.

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my ^{note} secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

Faithfully yours,



~~TOP SECRET~~FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES ONLY*1st letter*

25 September 1944

My dear Governor,

I am writing you without the knowledge of any other person except Admiral King (who concurs) because we are approaching a grave dilemma in the political reactions of Congress regarding Pearl Harbor.

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✓ DEWEY, THOMAS E.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority *NND 740046*By *[Signature]* NARS, Date *2/4/74*~~TOP SECRET~~

at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points.

The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.

You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, [German or Jap,] any suspicion of the vital sources of information we now possess.

The Roberts' Report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

As a further example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion.

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute

greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you, for your secret information, in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign. I might add that the recent action of Congress in requiring Army and Navy investigations for action before certain dates has compelled me to bring back the Corps commander, General Gerow, whose troops are fighting at Trier, to testify here while the Germans are counterattacking his forces there. This, however, is a very minor matter compared to the loss of our code information.

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

To
Gen. Bissell
by Col. McCarthy
Gen. B. making
all arrangements.
Col. Clarke to
delivered per ~~TOP SECRET~~
personally to Mr. D₃
somewhere in Oklahoma

(Tulsa)

Orig. to Col. Mc-
Carthy by mlen
5:00 pm. 9/25/44

FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES ONLY

as
this is 1st page -/rewritten
by Gen. Bissell

27 September 1944

My dear Governor,

2nd letter

Colonel Clarke, my messenger to you of yesterday, September 26th, has reported the result of his delivery of my letter dated September 25th. As I understand him you (a) were unwilling to commit yourself to any agreement regarding "not communicating its contents to any other person" in view of the fact that you felt you already knew certain of the things probably referred to in the letter, as suggested to you by seeing the word "cryptograph", and (b) you could not feel that such a letter as this to a presidential candidate could have been addressed to you by an officer in my position without the knowledge of the President.

As to (a) above I am quite willing to have you read what comes hereafter with the understanding that you are bound not to communicate to any other person any portions on which you do not now have or later receive factual knowledge from some other source than myself. As to (b) above you have my word that neither the Secretary of War nor the President has any intimation whatsoever that such a letter has been addressed to you or that the preparation or sending of such a communication was being considered. I assure you that the only persons who saw or know of the existence of either this letter or my letter to you dated September 25th are Admiral King, seven key officers responsible for security of military communications, and my secretary who typed these letters. I am trying my best to make plain to you that this letter is being addressed to you solely on my initiative, Admiral King having been consulted only after the letter was drafted, and I am persisting in the matter because the military hazards involved are so serious that I feel some action is necessary to protect the interests of our armed forces.

I should have much preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, with which Admiral King concurs, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Clarke, who, incidentally, has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

In brief, the military dilemma is this:

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~~TOP SECRET~~

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority *NN.D. 740246*
By *W* NARS, Date *2/11/74*

Department providing us with the information - but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions towards Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

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As another example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attaches Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

A further most serious embarrassment is the fact that the British government is involved concerning its most secret sources of information, regarding which only the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and a very limited number of other officials have knowledge.

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Earness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Earness and the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion.

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign.

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my most secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Orig. of this taken by Col. Passo to Gen. Bissell (19-2) at 3:15 pm 9/28/44. Col. Clark to deliver to Albany, N. Y. 9/28/44

Orig. was retained by Mr. Denny with Gen. Marshall's permission 9/29/44

at 10:10 a.m. 9/28/44 taken by Col. C. Clark to Mr. Denny in Albany, N. Y.