

Notes from research at the Marshall Library, Lexington, VA ^{19+20 May 1976 (R.L. Benson)} ~~Marshall Library~~ pertaining to Army Intelligence, Comint and Signal Corps 1939-45

1. Signal Intelligence Service/Alfred McCormack March 1942

From ~~Part~~ Part of the Story 1941-42, the diary of Colonel Paul M. Robinett, WDGS and GHQ (G-2), in typed manuscript form:

p. 418 On 3 Mar 1942 Colonel Robinett then with G-2 GHQ had lunch with Alfred McCormack and ~~then~~ later "went over with him possible use to be made of the S.I.S. intercepts, that he now handles for the Secretary of War and Mr. McCloy." Robinett had had access to Comint since 10 Dec 41. He tried to impress McCormack with the need to disseminate Comint to field commanders in time for them to use the information. "I also pointed out to him as best I could that the field commanders are not interested in the source of information or the exact text of messages." Robinett was not impressed with McCormack, finding him unimaginative and not receptive to ideas. (Note: ~~the~~ the Robinett diary is a superior source for pre-war G-2, though not for Comint)

2. Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 30 Apr 1940-31 Jan 1942

a. From the Robinett diary, p333: Miles is described as inept. P349-50: On 18 Dec 41 Miles was sent on a tour of inspection to Brazil and the Carribean. The implication is that he was being gotten out of the way during the post-Pearl Harbor crisis period. When he returned to Washington he was unable to assume control of the Military Intelligence Division and he was soon replaced. Robinett also notes that earlier in 1941 (date not given), General Marshall had told Robinett that he intended to relieve Miles.

b. From file box marked-- Sec of War, folder D 3-SOW Stimson (24). Unsigned, untitled paper dated 12 Feb 1941. Appears to be a personnel actions summary from General Marshall to Secretary of War Stimson:

President Roosevelt had told General Watson, his military aide, that he wanted Miles relieved as G-2. Marshall states that Raymond Lee (attache in London) would probably be the most suitable replacement for Miles.

c. From Marshall Miscellaneous Correspondence File (in alphabetical order): several letters to Marshall from Miles, assuring Marshall that he (Miles) remains loyal and resents the adverse comments about Marshall at the various Pearl Harbor hearings. These letters are later 1945 (after V-J day).

3. Raymond E. Lee, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 1 Feb 42-4 May 42

From the Robinett diary p. 374 : "Lee---did not seem to measure up. I could not help feeling at the time that he would not improve things and would not last as War Department Chief of Intelligence."

4. ~~Ex~~ George V. Strong, A.C. of S. G-2, 5 May 42-6 Feb 44

From Marshall Miscellaneous Correspondence File: various memos Jan-Feb 44 stating that Strong was leaving G-2 and retiring due to physical disability.

5. Marshall-Dewey Correspondence on Comint Sep 1944

From folder marked: Thomas E. Dewey:

Copies of both letters that General Marshall sent to Governor Dewey in Sep 44 via Carter Clarke. Also a memo, that preceded by a few hours the first letter to Dewey, to Admiral King. Copy made of the memo to King and attached.

6. Joseph O. Mauborgne, Chief Signal Officer 1938-41

a. from Folder B /F 25, Directives-the Deputy Chief of Staff, ~~Ex~~ 41- Mar 42:

A memorandum from Marshall to General Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff, 31 July 1941. Marshall reports that he had just had a conversation with General Mauborgne to ~~prepare~~ prepare the latter for his early relief. They discussed possible replacements as ~~substitutes~~ C.S.O. "I was appalled at Mauborgne's rating on the colonels. He practically has not a man that is worth keeping. The same refers to a number of lieutenant colonels." Not knowing (wrote Marshall) that Marshall had tentatively chosen Dawson ~~Olmstead~~ Olmstead as the next C.S.O. Mauborgne opined that Olmstead's health was uncertain and that he was not fully qualified for the position. Mauborgne highly recommended Harry C. Ingles for the position-- called him outstanding, high above the others. Marshall concludes by asking Moore for his opinion. (NOTE: Olmstead got the job. In 1943 he was relieved due to atrocious performance and was replaced by Harry C. Ingles)

b. also some unimportant items in the ~~Mar~~ Marshall Miscellaneous Correspondence file.

7. General Marshall and Intelligence

From Pogue Research File marked Chief of Staff-Intelligence. Two letters from Brig Gen (ret) Louis J. Fortier to Pogue in response to latter's request for information about General Marshall:

28 Oct 60 letter-- Fortier explains that on 9 Dec 1941 he took charge of the working committee of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) remaining in that position until 30 June 1942. He had free access to Marshall and briefed him on JIC studies of foreign political matters, strategic defense raw materials etc. (for example: politics in North Africa; areas the U.S. must protect to secure raw materials). Marshall always politely listened but never contributed or made any serious comments. ~~When~~ When Marshall had the time he would turn the conversation to battles and campaigns of the Civil War -- nothing he did not know about the fighting in Virginia 1861-65. But, wrote Fortier, no indication that Marshall had ever read Clausewitz or Marx. "I left him with the distinct impression that G-2 or 'Intelligence' was of very little interest to him

and that his basic background did not include any extensive knowledge of political science."

30 Jul 61 letter-- "Reference General Marshall's attitude toward G-2, it is my impression that he lacked the cultural background to appreciate the 'art' of intelligence. In sharp contrast, both Generals MacArthur and Patton had an amazing knowledge and understanding of their respective enemies in the two major theaters of ~~war~~ operations. It was a challenge to discuss any phase of enemy capabilities with either MacArthur or Patton. Patton instinctively could foresee how the Germans would react because he was a thorough student of German history and psychology." Discussion of pre-World War II problems of G-2, its poor reputation, attache positions reserved for the rich, G-2 avoided by ambitious officers etc. "In my opinion, however, the downgrading of G-2 had little, if any, bearing on General Marshall's so-called 'blind spot'. As a political scientist you can well appreciate the vast knowledge you must acquire to cope with Grand Strategy as opposed to minor tactics. It appeared to me, in my ~~own~~ association with General Marshall, that he was circumscribed in his basic educational formation and was never fully able to understand what made other nations tick."

By way of further illustration Fortier recalls a letter he wrote to Marshall in 1944 describing a set-piece battalion operation against a chain of German pill boxes. Fortier, commanding a task force, had overseen the planning of this operation. After the war Marshall saw Fortier on the street, invited him to join him in his car. They discussed a position for which Fortier was suited. Then Marshall turned the conversation to Fortier's letter of 44 and asked for more tactical details of the operation.

8. Army-Navy Intelligence Consolidation 1943-- Stimson's views

From folder B/ F-22, Directives-the Deputy Chief of Staff Apr 43-May 44: a memorandum from Marshall to General McNarney, 9 Nov 43. Marshall recalls that "sometime ago" Admiral King had proposed consolidation of Army-Navy intelligence, especially in the Pacific. "This business fell through for some reason that I do not recall now." That morning, wrote Marshall, Stimson, Knox and Stettinius were discussing intelligence. Knox said that he had relieved the recalcitrant Navy member and he opined that Army ~~is~~ restrictions now posed a problem. "Mr Stimson, as you know, is not favorably inclined to G-2 and he desires the matter to be gone into immediately and thoroughly to see if some consolidation of effort cannot be made without delay."

9. Certain activities/~~is~~ whereabouts of Gen Marshall 1943

Taken from two 1943 appointment books. This information of great importance to me for my study but too involved to explain here.

9 Jan 1943--left for Casablanca
 28 Jan-- returned
 appointments with Sir John Dill in Feb: 18 Feb/1515; 25 Feb/1100
 vacationed in Miami 7-14 Mar 43, accompanied by the Dills, Gen Somervell