

Friedman

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*In our file
MR*

From: Helsinki (HELGS)
To: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff)
14 April 1944
JAS

#114, parts 1-5

Part 1. Answer to your wire #717^a.

1. The matter of the Turkish codes.

a, As far as this matter is concerned, we reported the Finnish answer to your wire #626^b of last November in our wire #454^c (dispatched 10 December 1943) (The Finns offered to supply us with material necessary for the decrypting of code telegrams.)

However, we learned subsequently through your wire #365^d (dispatched 17 December 1943) that the telegraphic material was being collected in Turkey, and receiving no further instructions from you, we naturally broke off negotiations with the Finns on this matter.

Part 2. Furthermore, the Finns have also told us that while they were intercepting wires from the Japanese wireless transmitting station(s), they were not able to discover any wire which used Turkish code; consequently, the form of the Turkish wires which the Japanese have been able to collect is unknown to them.

Consequently, assuming that we are to negotiate with the Finns, please report to us here on the types and forms of the Turkish wires which

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have been collected as well as telegraphic material dealing with this.

b. Turkish diplomatic codes vary in value depending upon the types and senders of the wires, but since by decrypting them we would be able to have a general idea of internal conditions in America, Britain, and Russia, their value is very great.

Part 3. 2. Exchange of material

a. It is necessary in the negotiations that we know the exchange material which you have prepared; so please report this.

b. We can use any material you have in our negotiations with the head of the Finnish Scientific Espionage Agency. However, the people working on Russian codes and diplomatic codes of other countries work in a different place. In order to get any results in our inquiries from these people who are directly concerned with the work, it would facilitate our negotiations greatly if you were to prepare exchange material on Russian codes, particularly the Russian diplomatic codes.

Part 4. 3. Cooperation with Sweden.

a. Collaboration with the Swedes is difficult and the advantage is considered small.

Reasons:

1. Sweden is a neutral country. However, her sympathies are pronouncedly anti-axis and therefore, the possibility is great that she is cooperating with the U. S. and Britain in this type of espionage.

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Hence, for Japan to cooperate with Sweden is not only difficult but it's dangerous as well.

2. They say that it is even impossible for Finland, who is her neighbor, to cooperate with Sweden. (However, there are visible indications that Finland is negotiating with Sweden. Still, it doesn't reach the point of (?abandoning?) the use of spies and keeping in contact --G--.)

Part 5. 3. We have received no reports so far of any particular progress by the Swedes in scientific espionage. Therefore, we don't think there would be any great advantage. However, based on your request, we are working hard on investigations on the problem of the actual capabilities of the Swedes, on the question of whether or not Sweden is collaborating with other countries, and on the matter of the efficiency of the Swedish War Ministry cipher machine(s).

a - AI-466.
b - AI-339.
c - AI-299.
d - Not available.

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