

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~(Equals British ~~MOST SECRET~~)Copy to: M.I.8,  
WAR OFFICEALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
A.P.O. 512.

B-389.783

15 May 1943.

Subject: Security of information derived from Field Intercept Sources.

1. It appears that a certain amount of information is still being given away to the enemy, which he must know can only come from field interception of his signals.

The fact that we are intercepting his Plain Language and Low Grade traffic is known to the enemy, as is the fact known to us that he is intercepting ours. What is not known to him is the degree of success which we enjoy, how far we are able to make use of the material intercepted, and above all, which links, and which of his codes, yield us useful intelligence.

2. It therefore follows that it is absolutely vital to keep secret anything which reveals the results obtained from field intercept sources if the service is to continue to furnish information.

To take a concrete example, the enemy may well suspect that there is an intercept organization on his front, and do nothing particular about it; it is one of the general hazards of war, covered by his general security measures. But if he learns that the intercept organization heard the exact location of P.G.R. AFRIKA on the night 22/23 February, a fact which would only have been obtained by reading a coded message, he will surely not only change that code which was read, but will probably also alter all codes similarly constructed, and a great deal of valuable information will be lost.

3. It is pointed out that, except in the case of Officers who are directly responsible for the evaluation and judgment of intercepted material, the source from which any information about the enemy is derived can only be a matter of interest, and is not of operational importance. In the interests of security, therefore, the identity of this source should always be concealed in documents with even a limited distribution, since in modern warfare no documents can be described as absolutely safe.

4. Four main sources of leakage appear to exist:-

- a References to this source in Intelligence Summaries or G-2 Reports.
- b Information of operational importance from this source not passed in SECRET cipher.
- c Insufficiently disguised information paragraphs in written orders.
- d Insecure use of Radio Telephony (R/T).

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-18-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. In G-2 reports and Intelligence Summaries every possible risk of leakage must be eliminated and the following security rules are brought into force with immediate effect:-

a. No reference will be made in an Intelligence Summary or G-2 Report to the source of any information derived from field interception.

b. No information derived solely from field interception will be included in any Intelligence Summary of G-2 Report any of whose recipients are located further forward than Corps H.Q.

6. Information from field interception which is of operational importance will only be passed from Corps to Division in High Grade cipher marked SECRET (British: MOST SECRET I(E)) or by Liaison Officer. If it is necessary to pass this information further forward to H.Q.s not in possession of High Grade cipher, the information will, wherever possible, be disguised as an order, and in any case no mention of the SOURCE will be made.

Phrases such as "Following from Yorker", "From Y or intercept source" or "From reliable or usual source" will never be used except in messages in SECRET (British MOST SECRET I(E)) cipher.

7. With regard to para 4c, since it is now evident that phrases such as "reliable source" or similar are known to the enemy to conceal field interception information they must no longer be used. Camouflage is the only other expedient and a few examples follow to indicate the lines on which this may be achieved:-

Intelligence received	What the Commander wishes to pass on.	How to convey it.
Attack of enemy unit in map ref. postponed for two hours.	Warn the formation or unit Commanders in the area to expect an attack at x hours.	Recce (or Air recce) shows considerable enemy concentration in O area. Prepare for attack within next 3 hours (or before noon or night-fall).
Enemy unit on height 123 will withdraw to previous posn. at dusk.	Enemy to be prevented from withdrawing from height 123.	Close contact to be kept with enemy on height 123. If he shows signs of withdrawing attack him.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Urgent request for ammunition by Bn. in certain posn. Apparent likelihood of delay in its arrival until B hrs.

(i) Advise troops in that area of enemy precarious situation.  
(ii) Pass information of possible convoy on road(s) leading to posn.

(i) No information need be given. As an example order for attack might be given  
(ii) P.W. reveals that convoys normally use road(s) and arrive between A and C hours.

Inference from messages that Battle Group of 90 and 100 Pz Divs working together on certain flank.

Warn formation or unit Commanders that enemy tank strength likely to be higher than originally anticipated.

Photo interpretation shows larger concentration of tanks than estimated. Probably nearer 70 than 50.

The above examples could be multiplied and are only given as a general guide.

8. With regard to 4d, it must be taken as axiomatic that every conversation in R/T is monitored by the enemy. Jargon codes are not sufficient disguise and must be regarded as the equivalent of plain language. It is therefore imperative that any information which has to be passed by R/T be so effectively disguised that the enemy cannot possibly deduce the real source from which the intelligence has been obtained. A further safeguard before using R/T is to write out before-hand what is to be said and not depart from the "script" when speaking.

By Command of General EISENHOWER

W. B. SMITH  
Major General, U.S. Army,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

(Sgd) K. W. D. Strong.

K.W.D. STRONG,  
Brigadier, G.S.,  
A.C. of S., G-2

~~SECRET~~