

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Serial:

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OGA

MEMORANDUM FOR

[Redacted]

SUBJECT: Plain-text Processing

for the Personnel Committee

1. Among the subjects on which you asked that I write a paper, was that of similarities and differences [Redacted] organizations, methods and arrangements for processing plain-text traffic for the production of COMINT. Attached hereto, as an enclosure, is the paper I have prepared on the subject, which I hope will be adequate for your purposes. There are two comments I wish to add in this covering *minor changes since they apply to the paper as a whole.*

2a. *The first comment is* ~~It may be pertinent to add that there is reason to think that~~ the importance of [Redacted]

[Redacted]

sages is decreasing; a large part of what is now being obtained merely repeats what is well-known. This may not be true in all areas of the problem; only a careful review of the situation could serve to indicate what could now be eliminated or reduced in scale.

b. *what I have written, especially the comments*

3. As before, I must state that ~~the enclosure represents~~ my personal views and ~~do~~ not to be regarded as an official ~~document~~.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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REPORT ON

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

IN REGARD TO ORGANIZATION, METHODS, AND ARRANGEMENTS

FOR

PROCESSING PLAIN-TEXT TRAFFIC FOR THE PRODUCTION OF COMINT

AND A FEW COMMENTS THEREON

By: WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN

Date: 31 March 1952

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1. a. The term Communications Intelligence (COMINT) designates the information and technical material resulting from the interception and study of intercepted communications.¹

b. The term traffic analysis (T/A) designates the operations involved in the study of the "externals" and characteristics of intercepted communications (procedure signals, message headings, call signs, etc., D/F bearings, [redacted] data, and other technical aids) for the purpose of obtaining information² concerning the organization and operation of the communication system or networks on which the communications are passing.

c. The term traffic intelligence (T/I) is that COMINT which is produced by drawing inferences or deductions from the information obtained by T/A operations defined above.

d. The term plain text (P/T) includes communications of two sorts:

(1) Category 1 - Plain-language communications passed on internal radio links of the country involved.

(2) Category 2 - Plain-language and [redacted]

of the world.³

e. The term processing refers to the steps and operations performed on intercepted communications, up to and including their translation. It does not include the preparation of reports, appreciations, digests, etc., based upon the information constituting the end-product of the COMINT, T/A and T/I operations; that is, the term does not include the preparation of so-called finished "intelligence."

2. a. The principal differences [redacted] organizations and arrangements for the processing of plain-text are as follows:

(1) The [redacted] COMINT establishment is currently organized on a centralized functional basis, that is, the structure as a whole


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1. This and the following definitions apply to the terms as specifically used in this report.
 2. This information is used (1) as a guide to efficient intercept control and operation, (2) as an aid to cryptanalysis, and (3) as a basis for what is defined in 1c.
 3. Commercial code is included in this category because such codes are available and are intended for economy, not secrecy.

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


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


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


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e. Finally, as to the fourth suggestion, it is hardly necessary to point out the administrative and other problems of having personnel who do not belong to you work in your quarters but not under your administrative or operational control. There are enough cases of this sort of thing already - where the necessity for them is much more evident than in the case under consideration.

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN
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