

THIRD US ARMY

US. Third Army

## THIRD U.S. Army

## Contents.

|                                                    |       |
|----------------------------------------------------|-------|
| Critique                                           | 1-9   |
| Summary                                            | 1     |
| I. Development of the Mobil Reserve Concept.       | 1-8   |
| II. Formulating of the Data.                       | 8-9.  |
| Documentation                                      | 10-31 |
| I. G-2 Periodics                                   | 10-31 |
| A. Significant O/B Facts. - Week - 44              | 10-19 |
| B. Overall Reserve + Conclusions (weekly)          | 19-24 |
| C. Strategic & Tactical Intelligence of O/B Notes. | 25-28 |
| D. Misc. Extracts from the G-2 Periodics.          | 29-30 |
| E. Enemy Capabilities.                             | 30    |
| F. Quotations from the British                     | 30-31 |
| II. G-2 Estimates.                                 | 31.   |

## THIRD U. S. ARMY

\*\*\*\*\*

## CRITIQUE

## Summary.

The enemy's formation of a mobile reserve in the northern portion of the Allied front was observed by the Third Army since early October, and TUSA expected a counteroffensive, but anticipated it as a spoiling attack in the north, not in TUSA's zone, unless southern operations forced piecemeal commitment of this force, the Sixth Panzer Army. Sharing significance with its conception of the enemy's potentialities was TUSA's receipt and reporting of intelligence data. The striking feature in this connection were the indications that TUSA's data was acquired from higher commands, and not through TUSA's intelligence resources, and that TUSA regarded it as important and reported it in great detail in its daily G-2 Periodics.

## I. Development of the Mobile Reserve Concept.

The Third Army was long concerned with the mobile reserve concept, and noted its implementation and mutations in the form of the Sixth Panzer Army during the last two months prior to the Counteroffensive. Equally, TUSA considered the northern portion of the Allied front as the attack locale, not the southern. Counteroffensive possibilities were recognized, and one was expected, in the form of a spoiling attack, in the AACHEN-DUREN sector (northern FUSA zone), unless the southern operations forced a division of the northern portioned reserve and its piecemeal commitment in the south. This reserve army was location was considered as of 15 December to be between DUESSELDORF and COLOGNE. Actual dispositions, however, were a question mark, inasmuch as eight Panzer, three Para and 3 Infantry divisions were out of contact.

A chronology of the TUSA's opinion of the enemy potentiality briefly traces the development of the mobile reserve concept:

## September.

The GOETTERDAEMERUNG series were formed for the last-ditch defense of the REICH, mostly on the Western front. Panzer Brigades were identified as another version of the Kampfgruppen device, but less battleworthy.

## October.

The enemy's lack of mobile reserves was illustrated by the enemy's use of the panzer shuttle system for threatened areas in connection with FUSA's AACHEN battle, TUSA's NANCY salient, and SUSA's BELFORT Gap. On 11 October, the reformation of certain

panzer and infantry divisions suggested the constitution of a strategic mobile reserve, the initial allusion to this concept. And, on the 25th, mention was made of a possible new Panzer army's regrouping of battered Panzer divisions by 1 December, for use in the north, to stall the Allied advance for the winter on the WEST WALL or on the RHINE.

7 Nov.

Despite a Twelfth Army Group report that a force designated as Sixth Panzer Army was regrouping on 10 October in the BIELEFELD area, and TUSA's recognition of a considerable concentration of armor in NW German, TUSA thought that the Fifth Panzer Army remained as a candidate for such regrouping.

8 Nov.

WESTPHALIA as the location of the above force was initially made on this date.

12 Nov.

The strategic reserve would not be committed until the scope and objective of the Allied main effort had been determined.

15 Nov.

The Sixth Panzer Army divisions were designated for the first time as the 1 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS, and 130 Pz Lehr Division. None of the divisions had been contacted on the TUSA's front as yet. Sixth Panzer Army was regarded as the most important reserves, with certain Para divisions also reforming the the North as an extremely formidable infantry reserve.

19 Nov.

The TUSA's envelopment of METZ and the Allied offensive on the Western front had compelled some of the WESTPHALIA mobile reserves to be moved to positions of tactical reserve. While no Sixth Panzer Army divisions had been contacted, indications were that some had moved.

26 Nov.

The RUHR was still the highest priority in strategy of the enemy. Note was taken that despite seriousness of enemy's situation, he had only moved the Sixth Pz Army from strategic to tactical reserve without committing it, nor had he committed reformed Para divisions, nor were there large-scale enemy reinforcements. The view was stressed that the tactical Panzer reserve was in the North which the Germans apparently regarded as the most dangerous area.

3 December.

Allied still had the initiative, and while the enemy could launch a counteroffensive, it was unlikely at that time due to emergency commitment of one Panzer and three reformed Para divisions, the critical fuel shortage, and the lack of training of the reformed Panzer divisions. If his high November losses continued he would be forced to commit his Panzer and Para reserves piecemeal and/or draw upon VG divisions and other theaters.

10 Dec.

TUSA referred to actual withdrawal of two Panzer divisions from contact on the Allied line, as well as continued to hold the bulk of infantry reserve out of line. The reserve enabled a possible spoiling offensive. However, since September no such critical dilemma had perplexed the enemy as that confronting him currently, briefly, whether to employ the Sixth Panzer Army on the Northern front or the southern, or split it on both, or to bring reinforcements from the Eastern front thus sacrificing it.

13 Dec.

As of this period, the enemy's dispositions were a question mark, inasmuch as 14 divisions were out of tact, 8 Panzer, 3 Para, and 3 Infantry. The Sixth Panzer Army was regarded as being West of the REINE near COLOGNE. It was expected to launch a counter-offensive in the North, unless the Allied southern operation compelled its diversion. The locale would be the AACHEN-DUREN sector.

15 Dec.

The Sixth Panzer Army was considered to be between DUESSELDORF and COLOGNE, consisting of the 12 1, 2, 9, 10, 12 SS and 116 Pz Divisions. The 2 Panzer and 130 Pz Lehr Divisions were thought to be in the TRIER-KILLBUNG-WITTLICH area, and the 9 Panzer and 3 Pz Grenadier Divisions in the Ninth Army and VII Corps (FUSA) areas respectively. TUSA concluded that the battered Panzer divisions were being reformed and refitted, but available to meet serious breakthrough threats. Also, his armor was being massed in tactical reserve presumably for a large-scale counteroffensive.

### Analysis:

During early September the view was expressed that the GOETTERDAEMERUNG series were formed for the last-ditch defense of the REICH and most them would be used to defend Germany's western borders. (I, A, 2-9 Sep) Several new Panzer Brigades, another version of the Kampfgruppe device, but less battleworthy, were identified by the First and Third U.S. Armies during the week of 9-16 September. (I, A, 9-16 Sep) Desperate resistance along the REICH's western border was the enemy's action during the period 16-23 September, and he was unable to concentrate reserves for a major concerted offensive. (I, A, 16-23 Sep) During the last week of September four Panzer divisions were reported out of contact, but a captured document indicated their conversion into Panzer Brigades. (I, A, 23-30 Sep) The Periodic of 4 October noted that the 2 and 130 Panzer Divisions and a Battlegroup of 1 SS Pz Division had been reported as reforming; a number of other divisions in addition to nine GOETTERDAEMERUNG ones were believed forming in GERMANY, but no new SS divisions; and, by 18 October the enemy could bolster his Western defenses with the equivalent of eight divisions of reserves, any or all of which could be used against the Third Army. (I, B, 4 Oct) During the second week of October the First U.S. Army's AACHEN battle forced a major transfer of German armor from HOLLAND, illustrating lack of mobile reserves, and the the Third Army's NAUJ salient and the Seventh Army's BELFORT Gap also demonstrated the expedient "Panzer shuttle system" between threatened areas. (I, A, 7-14 Oct.) Furthermore, while this system contained the Western front to some extent, it did

#### 14. TUSA Critique.

not permit reconstitution of battered Panzer divisions nor the formation of a striking force large enough to launch a major counteroffensive, instead, the armor was committed piecemeal in defense. (Ibid.) However, the 11 October Periodic stated that the 1 SS, 2 and 130 Panzer, and 348 Infantry Divisions were reported as reforming, and elements of the 2 SS and 12 SS Panzer Divisions were believed to be reforming "for the possible constitution of a strategic mobile reserve." (I, B, 11 Oct.)

The concept of constituting a powerful strategic mobile reserve began to be stressed from approximately the middle of October, and was expressed as part of the summary of significant order of battle data for the week of 15-22 October and in the Periodic of the 18th. (I, A, 15-22 Oct; I, B, 18 Oct.) The former stated that the enemy's overall attitude continued defensive, that he would continue to delay and defend to gain time for such a reserve; the latter expressed the idea that poor quality forces such as MG and Fortress Battalions were substituting for more capable units to enable organizing such a reserve by reconstituting battered Panzer divisions. This latter thought was again expressed on 25 October, adding that such a reserve had not been created in the West. (I, B, 25 Oct) On the next day, 26 October, the Periodic of that date discussed the subject of reserves and intervention forces in a section titled, New Pz Army. (I, D, 1) According to this issuance, reports from GEFANT mentioned the possibility of a new Panzer army grouping battered NORMANDY Panzer divisions, particularly SS formations; at least five such divisions had been in the REICH since early September; deserters tended to corroborate the reports by claiming the reformation of the 12 SS and 21 Pz Divisions at ARNSBERG (B2212) and the 1 SS Pz Division south of it. This commentary quoted from the Twelfth Army Group that Allied penetration had been sealed off and exploitation prevented by armor switching, but an enemy armored reserve was being built up and might form a powerful striking force of Panzer divisions by 1 December, to be presumably used in the north of the Western front. This reserve might "enable the enemy to achieve his major objective of stalling the Allied advance for the winter at the West Wall or the RHINE."

A recapitulation of the enemy's situation was expressed in two documents, the TUSA G-2 Estimate #10, on 1 November, and The G-2 Periodic of 5 November. (II; I, A, 28 Oct-4 Nov) The chief importance of the former rested in the fact that 1 November G-2 Estimate was the last Estimate issued prior to the 16 December Counteroffensive, indicating that the G-2 Estimate was not used as a frequent statement of G-2 opinions. It expressed the view that seven Panzer and three Para divisions were undergoing reconstruction and were in immediate reserve in the West. They could be employed for local counterattacks to contain Allied forces "or for a general counteroffensive." The 5 November Periodic observed that during the past two months the enemy had considerably rebuilt his military structure in the West. By containing the Allied advances with very poor quality forces, the enemy permitted creation of

## #5. TUSA. Critique:

a strategic mobile reserve of rebuilt Panzer and Para divisions, which was strategically situated for immediate employment in the North. Control over remnants of broken infantry divisions and nondescript battlegroups was obtained by reorganizing them into regularly numbered regiments and divisions.

Note is taken that a particularized location and designation of the new Panzer army reserve force had not been stated prior to early November. The only stated purpose of it was offered on 26 October on which date the opinion was expressed that the force might stall the Allied advance for the winter on the WEST WALL or the RHINE. Its location, designation, and commander's identity were ascertained during November, and its mission and potentialities were also assessed.

The 7 November Periodic stated that the Twelfth Army Group reported a deserter claiming the Sixth German Panzer Army, commanded By Sepp DIETRICH, was regrouping on 10 October in the BIELEFELD(B58) area. (I, D, 7 Nov) Third Army added that there was considerable concentration of armor in NW GERMANY, chiefly represented by reforming divisions. But, "although the regrouping of Sixth German Pz Army is possible, Fifth German Pz Army also remains a candidate."

The initial mention of WESTPHALIA as the location of this force was made by the 8 November Periodic, which estimated the enemy had 600 tanks in the WEST, 400 of them in reserve in WESTPHALIA, and these reserve forces gave "the enemy the capability of launching a large-scale counteroffensive or reinforcing with powerful tank elements against an offensive anywhere in the WEST." (I, B, 8 Nov.) The mission of this reserve was more specifically announced in a 12 November summary of the enemy's Order of Battle for 5-12 November, which opined "that the strategic reserve in WESTPHALIA will not be committed until the enemy believes he has determined the scope and objective of the Allied main effort." (I, A, 12 Nov.)

On 15 November, reference was made to a 6 November photo reconnaissance which revealed heavy loading in and nearby PADERBORN(B74), which might indicate "preparation for movement from that area." (I, C, 15 Nov) In fact, this Periodic observed: "There is considerable evidence that Sixth Pz Army, with at least 1 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS, and 130 Pz Lehr Divs and possibly 2 SS Pz Div, is reforming in the PADERBORN area. ... The area PADERBORN-BIELEFELD(B58)-MUNSTER(A97) formed the WESTPHALIA triangle, is estimated to contain at least four or five reforming Pz Divs and two or more Inf Divs. Including is an estimated 500 tanks of all types. There are also an estimated 55,000 to 65,000 combat troops, probably in reforming Divs of Sixth Pz Army and 1 SS Pz Corps." None of the WESTPHALIA Panzer divisions had been contacted on the Third Army front so far, however, (I, B, 15 Nov.) The five Panzer divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army in WESTPHALIA were regarded as the most important of the enemy's overall reserves, and the next most important reserves were five

## #6. TUSA. Critique.

uncontacted Panzer divisions in the Northern sectors of the Western front, namely the 2, 9, 116 Panzer, 10 SS Panzer, and 15 Panzer Grenadier Divisions. In addition to the Panzer type there was "an extremely formidable Infantry reserve" of five Para divisions reforming also in the NORTH numbered 2, 3, 5, 6, 7. It was uncertain whether they would be employed only in the north by the German First Para Army or "on some other sector of the Western Front where good Infantry is needed.1..."

Forced dispersal of the enemy's reserve was the fundamental point cut by the 19 November Periodic, (I, A, 19 Nov.) The Third Army's envelopment of METZ and the Allied offensive on the Western front had compelled a breakup of the mobile reserves by movement from WESTPHALIA to positions of tactical reserve in the most seriously threatened Western sectors. While none of the Sixth Pz Army division had been contacted, PW statements and Tac/R indicated some movements. The 1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS and 13 Pz Divisions had moved according to indications.

Current events, their significance and the enemy reaction were summarized by the 26 November Periodic. (I, A, 26 Nov) Defense of the RUHR still had the highest priority in the enemy's strategy. While advanced armor originally intended for coordinated employment under the Sixth Panzer Army in the North the enemy apparently did not regard his situation as critical. Although the Fifth Panzer Army was transferred from strategic to tactical reserves, the reformed Para divisions had not been committed nor were there large-scale infantry reinforcements, all indicating the enemy still did not "consider the situation in the West to have reached a critical stage, either for a counterattack to avert destruction or a counteroffensive to force the Allies back." This analysis of the enemy stressed the point that while certain Panzer divisions under the German Fifth Panzer Army in the North mainly facing the Ninth U.S. Army, with an estimated 195 tanks, the more significant fact was the tactical reserve of 400 tanks of the reformed SS Panzer divisions, the 1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, and 12 SS which could launch a counter-offensive or be employed piecemeal to contain an Allied breakthrough. Equally important this Periodic expressed the view that this tactical Panzer reserve was also in the North, a section "which the German High Command obviously considers the most dangerous area of the Western Front." The thought was also expressed that new Volksgrenadier divisions were employed in quiet sectors, "thereby relieving more experienced Infantry divisions for recommitment in more active sectors."

A summary for the week of 26 November - 3 December asserted that while the Panzer concentrations demonstrated that the RUHR and SAAR were the main areas of threat, the large Panzer reserve in the North signified the RUHR as the most dangerous. (I, A, 3 Dec) The Allies still had the initiative. "While the enemy could launch a counteroffensive, "it is considered unlikely at this time, in view of the emergency commitment of 130 Pz Div and three reformed Para divisions and the critical German fuel shortage and the lack of training of the reformed Panzer divisions. During the approximate last two weeks of the Allied offensive the enemy did not apparently find it necessary to employ reinforcements from other theaters or from the reformed VG divisions. "Nevertheless, if the enemy continued to suffer the high losses he did in November,



## 77. TUSA. Critique.

he will have to commit his Panzer and Para reserves piecemeal and/or draw upon the Volksgrenadier divisions and other theaters to replace the units being blasted to oblivion in the line."

During October and November the Third Army recognized the formation of the Sixth Panzer Army in WESTPHALIA by regrouping battered Panzer Divisions to constitute a mobile reserve force for a counteroffensive or for piecemeal commitment in threatened areas. Despite Allied pressure, this force was still intact as of early December. It was still in the North, where the enemy considered the greatest dagger to lie. In addition to this Sixth Panzer Army there were Para, Infantry, and other Panzer forces also in the North, some of which had been committed, but the mobile reserve force was yet uncommitted and was the Sixth Panzer Army. In fact, the enemy actually had used inferior forces to defend, but had not committed sizeable, strong reinforcements from other theaters or from its reserves. This tendency to maintain a cohesive line without drawing heavily from armored and infantry significant reserves was significant.

During early December Third Army was impressed by the enemy action or actually withdrawing two Panzer divisions from contact on the Allied line, as well as continuing to hold the bulk of his Infantry reserve out of line. (I, A, 10 Dec.) This reserve enabled him "to mount a spoiling offensive in an effort to unhinge the Allied assault on Festung Deutschland." However, the enemy was experiencing a critical dilemma, which was described by the 6 December Periodic's section on reserves and intervention forces. (I, D, 26 Dec.) "At no time since Sept. (had) such a critical dilemma confronted the enemy. It would seem doubtful that the enemy can hold in the AACHEN area without committing Sixth Pz Army. It also seems doubtful that he can hold the WESTWALL in South without additional reinforcements including Armor. The enemy may have to divide Sixth Pz Army thus risking defeat both in the North and in the South, if he holds Sixth Pz Army in the North, run a good chance of Third and Seventh US Armies reaching the RHINE this year in the area of MAINZ. Finally, to solve this problem with reinforcements from the Russian front is to invite disaster in the EAST."

Three days prior to the Counteroffensive, the TUSA G-2 Periodic of 13 December analyzed the German reserve forces potential in detail. (I, B, 13 Dec; I, C, 13 Dec) In the first place, "German reserves of Armor and Infantry in the Northern sectors of the WESTERN Front continue to be the biggest question mark in enemy dispositions." Out of contact were the following:

|                     |                                          |
|---------------------|------------------------------------------|
| 8 Panzer Divisions: | SS -- 1, 2, 9, 10, 12; Pz - 2, 116, 130. |
| 3 Para              | : 2, 5, 8.                               |
| 3 Infantry          | : 59, 85, 331.                           |

Even so, the Sixth Panzer Army was regarded as consisting of the SS Panzer divisions, the 1, 2, 9, 12. They remained West of the RHINE in the vicinity of COLOGNE. Another German reserve appeared to be concentrated North of the MOSELLE, close to the First and Third Armies' boundaries,

consisting of the 2 and 130 Panzer Divisions. Still another important source of armor reinforcements for the WEST, which could be ignored, were the Panzer units fighting on the Eastern Front.

The opinion was expressed by this 13 December Periodic that the Sixth Panzer Army would launch a counteroffensive in the North, unless the Allied southern operations compelled its diversion. "Indications continue that the enemy is planning an operations that would employ the four divisions of Sixth Panzer Army (1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS) to spearhead a counteroffensive, apparently in the AACHEN-DUREN sector." It was "bending over backward to wait placement commitment. It would appear therefore that if Third and Seventh SS Armies continue to exert their breakthrough threats, 2 Pz 116 Pz, 130 Pz, and 10 SS Pz Divs may have to be committed in the South. However, if Third and Seventh SS Armies do achieve a rapid breakthrough of the GIERFELD line, they may have to forego further his offensive plans in the North and commit SS Sixth Pz Army in an effort to exert another AVANCEMENT(72) under circumstances." As to the Infantry, his losses were estimated at a minimum of three divisions weekly, and more units would be needed to reinforce. "It is believed that if no breakthrough occurs, the Germans will achieve this reinforcement by committing the remaining three Para divisions and three ROLLAND divisions. However if a rapidly exploited Allied breakthrough does occur in the SAAR, the enemy will be forced to employ both Volksgrenadier divisions and units from other theaters in an attempt to avoid collapse."

On the last day, 15 December, prior to the Counteroffensive, TUSA's appraisal of the strategic intelligence indicated that the Sixth SS Pz Army was East of the ROER and West of the RUHR, "between DUISBURG and COLOGNE," with the 1, 2, 9, 10, 12 SS and 116 Pz Divisions reforming. In the THUR, KILLBOM, WITTLICH areas, the 2 Pz and 130 Pz later Divisions appeared to be reforming with the 116 Pz Div reportedly slated for attack soon. Also reforming, in the Sixth SS Army and VII Corps sectors (First U.S. Army) were respectively were the 9 Pz and the 3 Pz Grenadier Divisions. TUSA conclusions were:

- "(1) The enemy is reforming and restoring his battered Pz Divs but at the same time is keeping them available for immediate employment in the event of a serious threat of a major breakthrough."
- "(2) The enemy is moving his armor in positions of tactical reserve presumably for a large-scale counteroffensive."

\*\*\*

## II. Formulating of Data.

The significant aspect of this subject was the receipt of intelligence data by the Third Army from its own commands, rather than TUSA's through subjects of data.

This receipt and employment of the data was manifested in certain matter (2) TUSA previously discussed enemy strategy, problems and potentials reasonably were within the purview and the information acquisition

f9. TUSA. Or [redacted] Aque.

resources of higher commands than even an army; (2) TUSA frequently acknowledged the superior command sources; (3) although TUSA obviously received numerous data and information sources by higher commands, it equally conspicuously used the data, and did not disregard it.

### (1) Subject Contact.

One particular indication of TUSA's discussion of enemy potentials beyond the Third Army's boundaries was the fact that detailed analysis and comments generally pertained to the Allied Front, not the Third Army's. Of especial comment was the northern portion of the Allied Front, which was far distant from the TUSA sector. TUSA was the northern flank of the First Army Group, and above it were the First and Ninth U.S. and Second British Armies. Too, as the reader notes in the G-2 Periodics, TUSA resembled upon the enemy's overall strategy in detail pertaining to his total manpower, materiel, and reinforcements of and from other theaters, and the dispositions and intentions of various enemy units such as the Sixth Panzer Army. That data about the enemy and the warlike relationships to various other Allied forces was reasonably more of a function of higher coordinating commands.

### (2) Frequent References to Sources.

While TUSA paraphrased the bulk of data without designating specific sources, the Third Army strongly indicated some sources by frequent references to them. Of the daily G-2 Periodics, September - 15 December, a dozen references were made to the sources, or the date itself was quoted with acknowledgment. Five were Third Army Group, on 26 September, 7 November, and 6, 13, 14 December. Four were Fourth US Army Group on 1 and 11 October, 24 November, and 6 December. One each were First Army - 1 October, TUSA - 11 October, and Second British Army - 24 November. TUSA was not a center better for the G-2 Periodic, or at least no acknowledgments were made, as in the case of other commands.

### (3) TUSA Did Not Ignore the Data.

TUSA used the data obtained from higher commands. The significance TUSA attached to the information was demonstrated by the systematic reporting devoted to it. TUSA's primary G-2 functions, the daily Periodics, was extensively using supplied with various sections and summaries in which high level weekly conclusions were furnished, and overall German resources were analyzed, and intelligence data was even separated into strategic and tactical, all unsurprisingly dealing the German forces on the Western Front, rather than those facing the Third Army. For instance, the main section of the Periodic included an entitled section entitled G., dealing with strength, overall resources, and closed with a paragraph or two on Overall Conclusions Book \_\_\_\_\_. Annexed weekly was the significant Daily Order of Battle in Part \_\_\_\_\_. Book \_\_\_\_\_. Also annexed, daily, was Order of Battle Notes, which, among other copies discussed intelligence in two aspects, strategic and tactical.

## THIRD U. S. ARMY

\*\*\*\*\*

## DOCUMENTATION

## I. G-2 Periodics.

(Sources: Sept.-12 Oct. 44 in L-752(1); 13-31 Oct. in L-752(2);  
Nov. in L-752(3); 1-13 Dec. in L-752(4); 14-15 Dec. in  
L-752(4A) )

## 1. Significant Order of Battle Facts -- Week \_\_\_\_ '44.

This was an Annex to week daily G-2 Periodics, of approximately three or four pages.

2-9 Sept. #92. 10 Sept.

## 2. Germany.

"Documents, referred to in Par 1, indicate that nine or ten of the '500' Divs are either inside GERMANY or manning the SIEGFRIED Line. It would appear that the 'GOTTTERDAEMERUNG' series was formed for the last-ditch defense of the REICH, and although some of the Divs may be used on the Eastern Front, it can be expected that the majority of them will be used to defend GERMANY's E borders."

9-16 Sept. #99. 17 Sept.

\*\*\*

## 2. PANZER BRIGADES.

"Another phase of the operation of the total mobilization program was uncovered during the week in the identification of several new Panzer Brigades. These impressive fighting units are another version of the Kampfgruppe device. From their showing in battle and the caliber of PW taken so far, these Brigades are even less combat-worthy than Kampfgruppe. Three of these Brigades were identified during the week; 105 by the First US Army, 111 and 112 by the Third US Army. A number of indications provide sound basis for the conclusion that there is at least one more, unidentified, of these Brigades in the Third Army zone, and others probably can be expected to show up soon."

16-23 Sept. #106. 24 Sept.

## 1. Enemy Attitude.

"a. The week demonstrated that even though the Nazi war machine may be on its last legs, it still is capable of mounting desperate resistance. Everywhere Hitler's cohorts tenaciously contested every foot of ground of the crust of defense that is frantically being concocted along the Western border of the Reich. The enemy's attitude continued wholly defensive. No where was he able to concentrate reserves sufficient to propel a major concerted offensive. Yet everywhere, he conducted an aggressive defense, characterized by

## #2. TUSA. Documentation.

piecemeal and open-handed expenditure of Panzer forces in his last ditch efforts to contain the Allied advances.

"b. The enemy's operations are reminiscent of the early stages of the NORMANDY battle. In the COTENTIN Peninsula the German soon and committed piecemeal all the available Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions in an effort to contain the Allied beachhead. Now, once more, a temporary front exists, and once again the German is expending his mobile reserves in piecemeal armor-spearheaded local counterattacks of a pure defensive nature. ..."

23-30 Sept. #113. 1 Oct.

## #1. Enemy Armor.

"c. Another significant fact regarding enemy armor was that four Panzer divisions (2, 12SS, 116, and 130) were reported out of contact. 21 Army Group reported contact with 9 SS and 10 SS Pz Div and 107 and 109 Pz Brig, and First US Army identified in contact 9 Pz, 2 SS Pz, 1 SS Pz Div and 105 Pz Brig. 109 Pz Brig was the only new Panzer unit identified during the week. Nothing definite is known about the four unlocated Panzer divisions, but it is indicated they are reforming to reappear shortly as new Panzer Brigades. A document captured early in the week disclosed that 10 SS Pz Div ~~FERNDE-ERND~~ was to have been reorganized into a Pz Brig ~~FUNDSEKKE~~, but the Allied thrust into HOLLAND apparently upset this plan. However, this was the first concrete evidence that remnants of the SS Panzer divisions are to be converted into Panzer Brigades. Thus it may be expected that the once proud SS Panzer divisions will reappear in the reduced regalia of newly organized Panzer Brigades."

30 Sept.-7 Oct. #120. 8 Oct.

## #1. Enemy Armor.

"a. The overall disposition of German armor on the Western Front again was the most significant CB fact the past week. While in numbers the strength of the Panzer Schwerpunkt against Third US Army lessened somewhat, there still remained an estimated 140 tanks on this front, with some 60 more in immediate reserve. The shift of the main body of 15 Pz Gren Div and 113 Pz Brig to the Seventh US Army Zone, coupled with the southward move of 21 Pz Div and 112 Pz Brig, can be interpreted as an admission that Army Group 'G' failed its attempts to wipe out the NANCY salient, and that VON RUMSTEDT was forced to move some of his armor to meet the Allied threat to the BELFORT GAP. ..."

7-14 Oct. #127. 15 Oct.

## #1. Enemy Armor.

"b. The bitter battle for AACHEN produced the most significant enemy CB change last week. The First US Army's determined drive forced RUMSTEDT to shift some of the armor he had concentrated in HOLLAND the week before. 9 and 116 Pz Divs and 106 Pz Brig were withdrawn from the AACHEN salient rushed to the threatened AACHEN front, where all except 9 Pz Div have been contacted. In addition, elements of 1 SS and 2 Pz Divs also were committed in this area."

## #3. TUGA. I mentation.

"b. Thus, for the second time in two weeks, there has been a major reshuffle of the Armor in MODEL's Army GROUP 'G'. This constant reshuffling of Armor is a graphic illustration of the enemy's lack of a mobile reserve. This paucity of Armored units has repeatedly forced embarrassing decisions upon RUNDSTEDT and his subordinate commanders, MODEL (CG of Army Group 'B') and BLASKOWITZ (CG of Army Group 'G'). MODEL, in the North, faces two main Allied threats: (1) The AACHEN breakthrough of the SIEGFRIED Line; (2) The ARNHEM salient in HOLLAND. BLASKOWITZ, in the South, also faces two main threats: (1) Third US Army's HECY salient; (2) Seventh US Army's thrust to the BELFORT Gap. Since neither BLASKOWITZ or MODEL has enough Armor to counter these double threats, they must resort to makeshift expedients. The result has been the development of a sort of 'Panzer shuttle system' between threatened areas. Thus, two weeks ago MODEL concentrated his Armor at ARNHEM, and last week he pulled these Panzer units out and rushed them to AACHEN. In BLASKOWITZ' sector a similar shuttle service has been going on. Two weeks ago, his Panzer Schwerpunkt was engaged against the Third US Army's HECY salient. Last week there was evident a definite shift southward of a portion of the Armor in Army Group 'G', as a result of which an estimated 80 tanks now remain on the Third US Army front as compared to over 200 on 1 Oct.

"c. Though this 'Panzer shuttle system' may have operated to some extent, to contain the Western front, it has not allowed RUNDSTEDT to regroup and reconstitute any appreciable portion of his better Panzer divisions. 100 Pz Div is the only Armored unit which still continued uncontacted. At no time has the enemy had sufficient Armor out of the line to build up a striking force large enough to launch a major counteroffensive. Instead, he has been compelled to expend his Panzer in relatively small scale local counterattacks of a purely defensive nature. This has enabled the German to buy time, but only at a very high price. The cost has run into hundreds of tanks which the Wehrmacht could ill afford to lose. It is estimated that on the whole Western front, the enemy now has only an estimated 450-475 tanks.

...  
#3. Strategic Reserves.

"b. From several sources information was received that 26 and 227 Inf Divs. from the Eastern front, are in GERMANY or Eastern FRANCE presumably ready for early commitment in the West. Both of these units suffered heavy losses in RUSSIA and were very much in need of rest and refit. How much they received is questionable. Several incomplete reports of heavy train movements and unidentified Panzer divisions near the front may presage the appearance in the line of a new Panzer Brigade or of a battered Panzer division.

15-22 Cote #134. 22 Oct.

...  
#3. Summary.

"On the basis of the above enumerated significant facts it is indicated:

"a. That the enemy now considered the AACHEN area as presenting the major threat in the West, with the BELFORT sector

## #4. TUSA. Documentation.

second and the 21 Army Group front third in importance.

"b. That his overall attitude continues defensive and that he will continue to delay and defer through the West in an effort to gain the time to constitute a powerful strategic mobile reserve.

"c. That the enemy's build-up of reinforcements from other Fronts continued to lag due to increasing difficulties in moving units from SCANDINAVIA, equipment and other shortages for the New GOTTENDAMMERUNG units and other divisions being organized in GERMANY, and grave reverses on the Eastern Front. ITALY is the only Front that offers any hope of early reinforcements for the West but so far there have been no indications of any substantial movements from ITALY. Also, the Russian advances in EAST PRUSSIA and sweep through HUNGARY may foreclose even this hope. The Eastern situation confronts the enemy with the desperate dilemma of having to determine priority between a blazing West and a flaring East. Until the Russians' resumption of the offensive, the West received the bulk of the reserves which the Total Mobilization program was about to squeeze out. Now the slender stock of available reserves must be split between the two Fronts, with the enemy facing the nerve-racking ordeal of deciding which is the lesser threat of his early annihilation."

22-29 Oct. File. 29 Oct.

## Summary.

"On the basis of these significant facts it is indicated:

"a. That the enemy is distributing his forces along the Western Front to best counter possible major Allied threats. The AACHEN (KPA) area which he considered the most menaced the previous week received no new reinforcements last week. On the other hand, the other three areas of possible major threat were bolstered. Thus, elements of 9 Pz and 15 Pz Gren Divs were contacted in the Dutch salient, the BELFORT Gap was reinforced by 249 Inf Div and the sector against the Third US Army was strengthened by 361 Inf Div and a number of miscellaneous battalions.

"b. That while the enemy's overall attitude continued defensive, he is further strengthening his front by building every effort toward building a powerful strategic mobile reserve of reformed Panzer and Pz divisions, which could be used for offensive operations.

"c. That while possibly bringing other divisions to the West from SCANDINAVIA, the enemy's HSB build-up from other Fronts continues to lag. This is considered due to the lull in the fighting in the West and the increased demands of the Eastern Front. Developments in POLAND and HUNGARY are directly affecting enemy forces in ITALY and the BALKANS. Any reserves which may be scraped together in ITALY and the BALKANS are now more likely to be employed against the Russians than against the West. That leaves only SCANDINAVIA and the Reich itself to furnish new divisions for RUNDSTEDT. However, even here, Russian advances in the North may preempt any priority RUNDSTEDT may claim for reserves produced from these sources."

18. TUSA Documentation.

28 Oct.-4 Nov. #148. 5 Nov.

"1. Western Front.

...

"c. Enemy's Regrouping, Stabilization of the Front.

"It is apparent that the enemy's attempts the past two months to rebuild his military structure in the WEST have achieved considerable headway. This is one of the most significant developments on this Front. At its roots, this factor is the basis for the successful effort to recreate a strategic mobile reserve of rebuilt Panzer and Para divisions.

"In order to effect this crucial result, the enemy employed every conceivable type of makeshift unit to stem the West Wall and resist Allied thrusts into the Reich. Battlegroups were hastily concocted from the remnants of the broken and destroyed divisions, and the halt, lame, sick and deaf were scooped up to form a series of Fortress and other miscellaneous battalions. Training and Administrative divisions were rushed from their Wehrkreise (Corps) Areas in Western GERMANY to assume combat missions. This cooperation policy played havoc with the enemy's replacement and training system, but it was the only alternative and as time showed it was an effective expedient.

"Once the Allied sweep was contained, the enemy concentrated on regaining cohesive control over the hodge-podge mass. The scores of nondescript and helter-skelter battlegroups were merged into regularly numbered regiments and divisions. The personnel of these units may not be up to the pre-D-Day WEHRMACHT standards, but at least the troops now know the names of their commanders and their regimental and divisional assignments. In short, the enemy has succeeded in recreating a front of organized regiments, divisions, Corps, Armies, and Army Groups under effective tactical control. A chaotic 'mob' has been organized into a military force. This is an achievement and significant fact of utmost importance.

"2. "d. Defensive Attitude.

"In an obvious attempt to disrupt the tenacious powerful Allied pressure in Western HOLLAND, the enemy launched a relatively strong counteroffensive against the South flank of the Dutch salient with 9 Pz and 15 Pz Gren Divs. However, the attack failed to achieve major proportions and did not succeed in diverting the 21 Army Group's drive to clear the approaches to ANTWERP. This attack was the first offensive of any moment undertaken by the enemy since the ineffectual Panzer drive last August to cut the Third Army's bottleneck of communications at AVANCHE (T2717) and the fact is very significant as indicating the revised state of enemy resources and aggressiveness.

...

...

"3. Summary.

"On the basis of the above significant facts it is indicated:

18

"a. That by the substitution of low-grade Infantry units in the line and by the use of favorable terrain, weather, and defensive



## #6. TNA. Documentation.

positions, to release battered Panzer and Para divisions for reforming and refitting, the enemy has developed a strategic mobile reserve, that while qualitatively deficient, quantitatively gives him the capability of launching a counter-offensive. Further, this reserve is strategically situated for immediate employment in the North, and possesses piecemeal (equivalent of one division within one week) relatively speedy reinforcement of the Sx sectors.

"b. That while the Russians are threatening NORMAN in the E and BULFEST in the S, the stability of the WESTERN Front has enabled the Germans to hold reinforcements there to a minimum. ... Further, despite all the Nazi blarney about the Volksturm and the Volksgrenadiere, indication during the week pointed to the cannibalization of the Gebryo 20th wave GOTTESDAEMERUNG divisions to remake destroyed divisions of earlier series, thus, demonstrating how bare the enemy's manpower cupboard basically is. As presented above, the enemy has succeeded to some extent in creating a mobile reserve but all indications are that it is the last he has in his bag."

5-12 Nov. #155. 12 Nov.

## #3. Summary.

"On the basis of the above significant facts it is indicated:

"a. That German Army Group 'G' has committed the bulk of its available reserves to stem the Third US Army attack and that further reinforcements against their threat must come from another sector or front.

"b. That the strategic reserve in WESTPHALIA will not be committed until the enemy believes he has determined the scope and objective of the Allied main effort.

"c. That while 3 new divisions appeared on the WESTERN Front during the past week, it is evident that as the final show-down approaches, the two-front war is exerting almost equal pressure on the straining enemy war machine both in the WEST and in the East. ..."

12-19 Nov. #162. 19 Nov.

## #1. Western Front.

## #a. General.

"Highlighted by the Third US Army's historic envelopment of METZ and the renewed large-scale Allied offensive all along the WESTERN Front, enemy Order of Battle developments for the week were characterized by the following significant facts:

...  
#b. Dispersal of WESTPHALIA Strategic Reserves.

"The mounting tempo of the Allied offensive apparently forced the enemy to break up his precious mobile reserve and disperse it for piecemeal employment. While none of the Sixth Pz Army divisions have been contacted on the front as yet, PW statements leave little doubt that two of the reformed Panzer divisions are in the First US Army zone of advance and two reports of rail movements indicate another of these divisions, equipped with Tiger and Panther tanks, is in the Third US Army zone.

"This means that after two months of painstaking

#7. TUSA. Documentation.

care and efforts to build-up the Sixth Pz Army as a counteroffensive force, the enemy once again has been compelled by the urgent pressure of developments to parcel out his reserves over a number of sectors in an effort to contain penetrations before they attain breakthrough proportions. On the basis of reports so far received, it is indicated that 1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS and 130 Pz Divs have been moved from WESTPHALIA to positions of tactical reserve in the most seriously threatened WESTERN sectors.

...  
Summary.

"On the basis of the above significant facts, it is indicated:

"a. That the enemy views the situation in the WEST as approaching a critical stage and therefore has begun to move his WESTPHALIA Armor in an attempt to be in position to contain any dangerous ALLIED penetrations in the SAAR or AACHEN areas.

"b. That at least two SS divisions from SCANDINAVIA may be contacted in the WEST, but that the bulk of enemy's Infantry reinforcements must come from Para divisions in strategic reserve or from divisions in GERMANY itself."

19-26 Nov. #159. 26 Nov.

"1. Western Front.

"a. General.

"During a week in which the Allied offensive wreaked a heavy toll on German divisions in the WEST, the outstanding significant facts were:

"(1) Collapse of enemy resistance on the Seventh US Army front, forcing the emergency employment thereof 130 Pz Div and a reshuffling of divisions throughout the theater to meet the threat to the Southern sector.

"(2) The concentration of Panzer strength in the North, with the weight centered in Ninth US Army zone.

"(3) The employment of new Volksgrenadier divisions in quiet sectors, thereby relieving more experienced Infantry divisions for recommitment in more active sectors.

...

"c. Panzer Concentration in North.

"At the end of the period 15th of Four Panzer type divisions were on Ninth US Army's narrow front. 9 Pz and 10 SS Pz Div were disposed entirely on this front, 15 Pz Gren Div was divided between Ninth US Army and Second British Army, and 3 Pz Gren Div was similarly divided between Ninth and First US Armies. These four divisions are under the command of the German Fifth Panzer Army and together have an estimated total of 195 tanks, the largest concentration of enemy armor in the WEST. However, even more important than this number of tanks in the line, is the estimate that at least 400 tanks are in tactical reserve in this area. Thus, the four reformed SS Panzer divisions (1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, and 12 SS) are in readiness for coordinated employment in a counteroffensive, or for piecemeal commitment to contain an Allied breakthrough in this sector which the German High Command obviously considers the most dangerous area of the Western Front.

"As a result of the week's movement of German armor only 2 and 116 Pz Divs remain unaccounted for. PW captured by First

#3. RUSA Documentation.

US Army stated that the bulk of 116 Pz Div was East of the RHINE. There were no definite reports during the week regarding 2 Pz Div.

...  
 \*\*\*  
 #3. Summary.

"On the basis of the above significance facts it is indicated:

"a. That the defense of the RHINE still has the highest priority in the enemy's strategy, but that the advances made by Third and Seventh US Armies in the South forced the dispersal of armor originally intended for coordinated employment under Sixth Panzer Army in the North.

"b. That although the Germans have suffered heavy losses in personnel and equipment and were compelled to transfer Sixth Panzer Army from strategic to tactical reserve, the continued non-commitment of the reformed Para divisions and the lack of any large-scale Infantry reinforcements indicates that the enemy still does not consider that the situation in the WEST has reached a critical stage, either for a counterattack to avert destruction or a counteroffensive to force the Allies back."

26 Nov.-3 Dec.. #176. 3 Dec.

"1. Western Front.

...  
 \*\*\*  
 "a. Para and Panzer Reserv.

"During the week, there were no indications of the dispersal of the Strategic Reserve which the enemy assembled here before the November Allied offensive. The bulk of the German Sixth Pz Army is still in tactical reserve in First and Ninth US Army zones of advance, but three of the six reformed Para Divs (3, 6, and 7) apparently have been committed. All three regiments of 3 Para Div were contacted by First US Army during the week while 6 and 7 Para Divs are carried by 21 Army Group as in its zone. This leaves 2, 5, and 8 Para Divs unaccounted for; however, 5 Para Div has been reported moving S possibly to Third US Army area.

...  
 \*\*\*  
 #3. Summary.

"On the basis of the above significant facts it is indicated:

"a. That the enemy's Panzer concentrations show that the RHINE and the SAAR are the main areas of threat, but the large Panzer reserve in the North indicates that the enemy considers the threat to the RHINE as the most dangerous.

"b. That the initiative still rests with the Allies. Although the enemy has the capability to launch a counteroffensive, it is considered unlikely at this time, in view of the emergency commitment of 130 Pz Div and three reformed Para divisions and the critical German fuel shortage and the lack of training of the reformed Panzer divisions.

"c. That the enemy did not find it necessary to employ reinforcements from other theaters or from the reformed VG divisions in GERMANY this week. Nevertheless, if the enemy continues to suffer

## #9. TUSA. Documentation.

the high losses he did in November, he will have to commit his Panzer and Para reserves piecemeal and/or draw upon the Volksgrenadier divisions and other theaters to replace the units being blasted to oblivion in the line.

3-10 Dec. #183. 10 Dec.

## \*1. Western Front.

## \*a. General.

"With the Allied winter offensive grinding into its second month, and the Germans losing an estimated three divisions a week, the following significant facts stood out in the WEST during the week:

"(1) Despite the drain of large losses the enemy continued to maintain a cohesive line along the entire Front without drawing heavily on his Panzer reserves. During the week, the enemy actually withdrew two Panzer divisions from contact.

"(2) Although committing 719 Inf Div against the Third US Army, his only major reinforcement in the WEST during the week, the enemy continued to hold the bulk of his Infantry reserve out of the line.

## \*b. Panzer Reserves.

"Despite continued heavy losses in men and equipment, the enemy, powerfully aided by the weather and his prepared defensive positions was able without apparent undue difficulty to maintain a well controlled defend and delay struggle along the entire Front. It is significant that this defense has been conducted with a minimum of armor. By the end of the week only six Panzer type divisions (9, 11 and at 21 Pz; 15, 25 and 17 SS Pz Gren) were definitely in contact and of these divisions, two (9 Pz and 15 Pz Gren) were in the North against Ninth US Army and 21 Army Group, while four (11 Pz, 21 Pz, 25 Pz Gren and 17 SS Pz Gren) were in the South opposing the Third and Seventh US Armies. During the week the badly battered 130 Pz Div was withdrawn from the XII/IV US Corps fronts and the equally beat up 10 SS Pz Div left the Ninth US Army and 21 Army Group zone. Also, 3 Pz Gren Div has not been contacted for several days on the First and Ninth US Army fronts and it too may have been withdrawn from the line.

"Thus, excluding 3 Pz Gren Div, as of this date the enemy has eight Panzer divisions (152, 236, 988, 10 SS, 12 SS, 2, 116, 130) out of the line, with the strong possibility that 5 SS Pz Div may have come to the WEST, making a total of 9 Panzer divisions in reserve. Of these units, five are in the North, available for speedy employment against First and Ninth US Armies, and at least two (2 and 130 Pz) are disposed further South close to the First and Third US Army boundary. PW have stated that 12 SS Pz Div also is near the Third US Army front. Overall, the initiative still rests with the Allies, but the massive Armored force the enemy has built up in reserve gives him the definite capability of launching a spoiling (diversionary) offensive to disrupt the Allied drive.

## \*c. Infantry Reserves.

"With 719 Inf Div identified on the Third US Army front, three (59, 85 and 331) of the seven divisions reported moving

## 10. NSA. Documentation.

from HOLLAND remain uncontested. As with Panzers, the enemy has kept his infantry reinforcement to a minimum. How effectively he has accomplished this is shown by the fact that while his losses as a result of battle attrition has amounted to not less than five divisions in the WEST during the past two weeks, he only committed one new Volksgrenadier division (333) from the 20-25 divisions of this type organized for forming or reforming in GERMANY. Nor has the enemy committed any infantry in the WEST from other theaters. 560 Gren Div, 710 Inf Div, and 8 SS Mountain Div have been definitely reported moving from SCANDINAVIA to GERMANY, but none has yet been contacted on the Eastern Front.

"On the basis of the above factors it would appear that unless a breakthrough occurs it is the enemy's purpose not to employ either new Volksgrenadier divisions or units from other theaters to meet replacement requirements in the WEST, but to wait until instead the remaining HOLLAND (59, 85 and 391) and three Para (2, 5 and 6) divisions for that purpose. This will leave him free to continue to build up his Panzer and Infantry reserves to meet more desperate commitments he may anticipate are likely to arrive in either the EAST or WEST or both in the not distant future.

## 11. Summary.

"On the basis of the above enumerated significant facts it is indicated that:

"a. Although the Allied offensive is destroying weekly a number of German divisions, nevertheless the enemy has been able to maintain a cohesive front without drawing on the bulk of his Infantry and Armor reserves, thereby giving him the capability of mounting a spoiling offensive in an effort to unhinge the Allied assault on Festung Deutschland.

"b. It would appear that there is a growing concern on the part of the enemy as regards the mounting threat to the SAAR and he may be forced to bolster this sector with elements of his Infantry and Panzer reserve in an effort to block a breakthrough that could easily prove catastrophic."

## B. Overall Reserve and Conclusions (Weekly).

Section 1. Enemy Situation at End of Period of week each daily G-2 Periodic was extended periodically, approximately once a week, to include a subsection (2 (a)), which in turn contained several paragraphs usually designated as the following: Estimate of Enemy Strength in Third US Army Zone; Overall (or Strategic) Reserves; Third US Army Front; Overall Conclusions Week \_\_\_\_\_.

These paragraphs dealing with Reserves and Conclusions discussed the enemy's potentialities, and problems and intentions. The following extract these two paragraphs, whichever was applicable and informative, on a weekly basis, beginning with that of 4 October. The one of that date seemed to initiate information concerning the enemy's overall capability, and, in particular, in respect to the formation of a reserve force.

~~filed in G-2~~

~~filed in G-2~~

~~filed in G-2~~

#116. 4 Oct.

"(2) Strategic Reserves.

"a. 2 Pz, 130 Pz and a Battlegroup of 1 SS Pz Div have been reported as reforming.

...

"d. In addition to the nine GOETTERDAEMERUNG divisions, a number of other Wehrmacht divisions are believed in process of organization in GERMANY. No reports of the formation of new SS divisions have been received.

...

"f. It is estimated that by 18 Oct the enemy has the capability of bolstering his defenses in the WEST with the equivalent of eight divisions, three of them mobile. Any or all of these units constituted reserves capable of employment against the Third US Army."

#123. 11 Oct.

"(2) Strategic Reserves.

"a. 1 SS Pz, 2 Pz, 130 Pz and 348 Inf Divs have been reported reforming. Contact with battlegroups of 2 SS and 12 SS Pz Divs has been reported by Ninth US Army and 21 Army Group respectively. The other Elm of these Divs are believed reforming for the possible constitution of a strategic mobile reserve.

...

#130. 18 Oct.

"(4) Conclusions.

"The continued thinning out of enemy forces on the Third US Army front has reduced the total there to an estimated equivalent of 4 Divs, a drop of 3 since 1 Oct. The situation in the AACHEN (K8343) area apparently was deemed so critical that Army Group 'G' had to release 3 Pz Gren Div to Army Group 'B'. Also 553 Inf Div, the remaining Elm of 15 Pz Gren Div and 106 Pz Brig were moved S to the Seventh US Army zone. The identification in the Third US Army zone the last few days of three MG and Fortress Bns indicates that the enemy is employing this type of GHQ units to thicken his attenuated lines on this front. This considered only a temporary improvisation to tide over more pressing commitments in other sectors, and also to enable the enemy to make another attempt to build-up a strategic mobile reserve by reconstituting batt red Panzer divisions."

#137. 25 Oct.

"(4) Overall Conclusions Week 19-25 Oct: The relative stability

of the Western Front, plus the demands of the Russian front, reduced the enemy's build-up in the West to a trickle. Reinforcements identified for the most part were Fortress, MG and Honeguard Bns. of low combat value but apparently deemed adequate to defend and delay while the enemy attempts to constitute a Mobile Strategic Reserve by reforming battered, but battle experienced, Pz and para divisions. He has never yet been able to create such a reserve in the West and is obviously fighting desperately for time to do so. The First US Army's breakthrough of the SIEGFRIED Line at AACHEN is still considered by the enemy as the most menacing of the Allied thrusts. In Third US Army zone, the enemy's strength remains the same as last week, equivalent to 4 divisions."

## 12. THE Documentation.

1144. 1 Nov.

## \*(4) Overall Conclusions Week 26 Oct - 2 Nov:

"The enemy's reinforcement of the Western front continued to lag behind his estimated capability of three new divisions a week (only one new division, 269 Inf, appeared during the week). The enemy continued to employ Fortresses and other low-grade miscellaneous units to pad his 600-mile front, while intensifying his efforts to build up a powerful strategic reserve of Panzer and Para divisions. In Third US Army Zone the replacement of the depleted 11 Pz Div by the fresh 361 Inf Div raised the total of equivalent enemy divisions to 3. If 11 Pz, estimated to be in immediate reserve, is counted in the total, the enemy strength is estimated at 5 1/2 divisions."

1151. 8 Nov.

## \*(4) Overall Conclusions Week 2 Nov - 9 Nov:

"Only one new enemy division appeared in the WEST during the past week, 18 Volksgrenadier Div, actually an abridged edition of the destroyed 18 GAF. However, it is estimated that the enemy now has 500 tanks in the WEST, 400 of them in reserve in WESTPHALIA. These reserve Panzer forces given the enemy the capability of launching a large-scale counteroffensive or reinforcing with powerful tank elements against an offensive anywhere in the WEST."

1155. 15 Nov.

## \*(2) Overall Reserves.

"While the Third US Army's drive forced Army Group 'G' to unearth a newly-reformed Panzer Grenadier division and to commit all its available Infantry and Panzer reserves, none of the Panzer divisions in the R sectors or the WESTPHALIA strategic reserve have yet been contacted on Third US Army front. However, the enemy's quick reaction to the Third US Army's assault, coupled with reports of heavy rail movement in the PALERBORN (B 74) area indicate a capability of being able to commit one or more of the WESTPHALIA divisions on Third US Army front at any time. The commitment of these four reformed divisions (272, 26, and 212 VG Div on First US Army Front and 2708 VG Div on Seventh US Army Front) during the week further implements the enemy's capability of committing new Volksgrenadier units on Third US Army Front at any time. The pool of overall reserves available for such reinforcements are as follows:

"(a) First, and most important, are the five Panzer divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army in WESTPHALIA. These units (1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS, and 130 Pz Divs) have had almost two months to rest and refit and it is estimated that they have a total of 500 tanks, 100 per division. While the striking power of this armor may be limited to some extent by lack of seasoned tank crews and oil supplies, the Sixth Panzer Army definitely has the capability of launching a counteroffensive at any point on the Western Front at any time.

"(b) The next most important reserves available to the enemy are the five uncontacted Panzer divisions in the Northern sectors of the Western Front which are now being held in Army or Army Group reserve. These five units (21 Pz, 9 Pz, 10 SS Pz, 116 Pz, and 15 Pz Gren Divs) together with 103 Pz Brig are estimated to have 300 tanks. xxx To this force must be added 233 Pz Gren Div, reported reforming in BERNARD, with an estimated 50 tanks or assault guns. If 233 Pz Gren Div



and the newly identified 25 Pz Gen Div on Third US Army Front are included, the enemy now has 16 Panzer type divisions in the WEST. Only five of these are in contact, and four of them are in Third US Army zone of advance; further implementation of the offensive capability discussed in Par (2) (a) above.

"(c) An extremely formidable Infantry reserve is the five Para divisions reforming in the North (2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 Para Divs). Whether these units will be employed only in the North under command of Generaloberst STUMPF's German First Pz Army or on some other sector of the Western Front where good Infantry is needed remains to be seen. One thing is certain: These Para divisions have had from 6/8 weeks to reform and all are now ready for commitment at any time as ground troops.

"(d) The Volksgrenadier divisions, both in the GOSTERDADELAUNG waves and in the new wave of reconstituted divisions previously destroyed, constitute a complicated problem in analyzing enemy reserves. ...

"(e) Since the commitment 28 Oct of 269 Inf Div from NORWAY on 3rd US Army Front, the other theaters have not contributed any of their divisions to the WEST. However, they are capable of contributing at least ten divisions to this Front in the next 30 days. ..."

#172. 30 Nov.

"(4) Overall Conclusions Week 23-30 Nov.

"(a) At least six Panzer divisions and four para divisions remain available to the enemy in the West as tactical reserve, while the relief of divisions in quiet sectors may release five more Inf Divs for combat commitment. These units, together with possible reinforcements from SCANDINAVIA and ITALY and the VG divisions now reforming in GERMANY give the enemy the capability of reinforcing threatened areas of the Western front with ten Infantry and five Panzer divisions in the next two weeks.

"(b) Due to the Panzer and Para concentration which still persists in the Northern part of the Western Front, the enemy's capability to launch a coordinated counteroffensive cannot be discounted; however, piecemeal commitment may have been precluded by the emergency employment of 130 Pz Div and 3 Para Div and the possible commitment of 6 Para Div.

#179. 6 DezDec.

"(2) Overall Reserves.

"(a) As of this date it is estimated that in the WEST the enemy has six Panzer divisions (1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS, 2 Pz, and 116 Pz), three Para divisions (2, 5 and 8) and four Infantry divisions (39, 85, 331 and 719), a combined total of 13 divisions, in tactical reserve.

"(b) The most important factor regarding the enemy's reserves continued to be the large Panzer concentration W of the RHINE in the Northern portion of Twelfth Army Group's zone of advance. This concentration contains at least three SS Panzer divisions (1 SS, 2 SS and 9 SS). Of the remaining Pz reserves, 12 SS and 2 Pz Divs have been reported moving South to the Third US Army area, and 116 Pz Div



## #14. TUSA. Documentation.

undergoing reforming E of the RHINE.

"(c) The need for Infantry units has become increasingly acute, so much so that the enemy apparently has been forced to commit some of his reformed Para divisions. The commitment of 6 and 7 Para Divs on 21 Army Group front and 3 Para Div on First US Army front leave only 2, 5, and 8 Para Divs still in reserve. The early appearance off the line of one or several of these divisions is not unlikely.

"(d) A total of seven Infantry divisions have now left HOLLAND, three of them (245, 256, 363) committed to battle. The other four (59, 85, 331, 719) are available for employment, and it is certain that one or more of them will appear on the Third US Army front. The enemy not only urgently needs Infantry in this sector, but reinforcements there are long overdue.

"(e) Volksgrenadier divisions undergoing formation in Germany and units from other theaters remain a potential source of enemy Infantry reserves for the WEST. However, the extent of such reinforcements depends on the situation in the EAST. If that becomes pressing the flow of new units to the WEST is certain to be effected.

"(f) From SCANDINAVIA, 560 Gren Div, 710 Inf Div, and 8 SS Mountain Div have all been reported moving to the WEST. But there have been no reports of divisional movements WESTWARD from the Italian theater. However, the departure of 64 Inf Div from ITALY to HUNGARY may indicate that 1 ALY will soon release units to the WEST.

“(A) Overall Conclusions Week 30 Nov - 7 Dec.

"(a) Defense of the RUHR still dominates the enemy's strategy, but the Third US Army's threatened breakthrough of the SIEGFRIED Line may force a shift of view. More of the WESTFALIA Panzer reserve may be shuttled South. In any effort, reinforcements against Third Army are urgent and certain to appear within or East of the SIEGFRIED Line defenses.

"(b) Apart from the Para divisions, the enemy has three major sources of Infantry reserves: (1) The four still unlocated divisions out of contact in HOLLAND; (2) The estimated eleven Volksgrenadier divisions in GERMANY; and (3) The divisions in ITALY and SCANDINAVIA. This is the cache that the enemy has immediately at hand to draw on to meet even any crisis in the EAST or WEST, or both.”

#15. 13 Dec.

"(2) Overall Reserves.

"(a) German reserves of Armor and Infantry in the Northern sector of the WESTERN Front continue to be the biggest question mark in enemy dispositions. There are now out of contact eight Panzer divisions (1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 10 SS, 12 SS, 7, 116 130), three Para Divisions (2, 5, 8), and three Infantry divisions (59, 85, 331).

"(b) Indications continue that the enemy is planning an operation that would employ the four divisions of Sixth SS Panzer Army (1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS) to spearhead a counteroffensive, apparently in the AACHEN-DUREN sector. These four reconstructed divisions remain W of the RHINE Via COLOGNE (F45) despite the growing Third US Army threats of a SIEGFRIED Line breakthrough. Further, during the week, 18 SS Pa Div was also reported out of contact, and may now be with

#15. TUSA. Presentation.

the other enemy armor in Vic COLONGNE (745).

"(c) Another German reserve appears concentrated N of the SIEGFRIED, close to the First and Third US Army boundary, where 2 Pz and 130 Pz Divs have been reported. 130 Pz Div was recently withdrawn from XII/AV US Corps front in a badly mauled condition, while 2 Pz Div has been out of the line for over a month and should be much more battleworthy than 130. Both divisions are strategically situated for rapid commitment against either the Third or First US Armies. Also, in the past few days no contact has been reported with 3 Pz Gren Div, but it is believed that the unit is nearby in immediate reserve.

"(d) Another important source of armor reinforcement for the WEST which cannot be ignored are Panzer units fighting on the EASTERN front. Reports have persisted for several weeks that 5 SS Pz, 8 Pz, and Pz Div Grossdeutschland have come to the WEST. Further, on 22 Dec, First French Army reported contact with Elm of 16 Pz Div in the ELZ (77402) pocket. This well indicates that rather than commit units of Sixth US Army prematurely to delay and defend in the South, the enemy proposed to shift Panzer units from the EAST to provide the necessary armor reinforcements for the WEST.

"(e) With 719 Inf Div contacted on Third US Army front this week, there are now only three HOLLAND Infantry divisions out of contact (5, 85, 331). 85 Inf Div may possibly have been committed on the First US Army front as a PW from 6 Para Regt (2 Para Div) stated his unit was fighting as a Kampfgruppe under 85 Inf Div. Despite this identification, three Para divisions (2, 5, 8) are still considered in reserve. It is indicated that 6 Para Regt is fighting independently as it did in NORMANDY and that its parent organization, 2 Para Div, is not committed against First US Army. 5 Para Div has consistently been reported moving from HOLLAND, but its exact whereabouts are unknown.

"(f) Nothing new has been learned of the reported moves of 6 SS Mountain, 560 Gren, and 710 Inf Divs from SCANDINAVIA to the WEST. Similarly in the Italian theater, although it has been definitely established that 44 and 71 Inf Divs left for HUNGARY, there have been no reports of moves to the WEST.

#### 74) Overall Conclusions Week 7-14 Dec.

"(a) It is evident from the determined horading of Sixth SS Pz Army units that the enemy is making every effort to employ this armor in a coordinated effort. He already is coming over backward to avoid piecemeal commitment. It would appear therefore that if Third and Seventh US Armies continue to exert their breakthrough threats, 2 Pz, 116 Pz, 130 Pz, and 10 SS Pz Divs may have to be committed in the South. However, if Third and Seventh US Armies do achieve a rapid breakthrough of the SIEGFRIED line, the enemy may have to scotch his offensive plans in the North and commit Sixth US Pz Army in an effort to avert another AACHEN (T21) catastrophe.

"(b) The enemy's Infantry losses continue high, estimated at a minimum of three divisions a week. It would thereafter appear that the enemy will have to commit more units to reinforce the battle-thinned ranks. It is believed that if no breakthrough occurs, the Germans will achieve this reinforcement by committing the remaining three Para divisions and three HOLLAND divisions. However, if a rapidly exploited Allied breakthrough does occur in the SAAR, the enemy will be forced to employ both Volksgrenadier divisions and units from other theaters in an attempt to avoid collapse."

## C. Strategic and Tactical Intelligence of Order of Battle Notes.

OB Notes were annexed to the daily G-2 Periodic, containing sections titled: Tactical Intelligence; Strategic Intelligence; Personalities; Summary of Artillery Units on Third US Army Front; Enemy Identifications in Third US Army zone. Informative portions of the Tactical and Strategic Intelligence Sections are extracted, dealing primarily with enemy potentialities and reserve forces.

#156. 13 Nov.

## Strategic Intelligence.

"SS General 'SEPP' DIETRICH (Fifth Pz Army)

"A captured march order for 17 SS Pz Gren Div, dated 30 Aug 1944, confirms DIETRICH as CG of Fifth Pz Army at that time. There had been only vague mention of his name in connection with that Army previously. More recently 'SEPP' DIETRICH was reported possibly commanding the reforming Sixth Pz Army in GERMANY."

#158. Nov. 15.

## Strategic Intelligence.

"Possible Activation of Sixth Pz Army.

"1. Photo Recon of 6 Nov, covering possible entraining stations in the PADERBORN (274) area, revealed that the main PADERBORN (374) railway station was heavily loaded, including many flats. Four trains were present, two of which were in motion, one having double engine. Sidings near BAD LIP SPRING (275) and SENNELAGER (265) were loaded mainly with empty flats. This heavy activity may indicated preparation for movement from that area.

"2. There is considerable evidence that Sixth Pz Army, with at least 1 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS, and 130 Pz Lehr Divs and possibly 2 SS Pz Div, is reforming the PADERBORN area. One report stated a Hitler-Jugend SS Div as well as another Div are reforming in GERMANY. This report probably refers to a Hitler Youth training organization (boys under 16). These young boys' organizations are known to have gone to SS Divs after completion of their youth training at the age of 17. At present, military training has probably received highest priority, with construction work running a close second. At all events, 12 SS Pz Div 'Hitler Jugend' is more acceptable in the PADERBORN area. 1 SS Pz Div has also been reported reforming near BUNDE (250) near HERFORD, in addition to the PADERBORN area. Supreme Hq stated that it is very likely that 1 SS Pz Div are reforming in both places.

"3. The area PADERBORN-NECKAR-BIELEFELD (258) MUSTER (497) forming the WESTPHALIA triangle, is estimated to contain at least four or five reforming Pz Divs and two or more Inf Divs. Included is an estimated 500 tanks of all types. There are also an estimated 55,000 to 65,000 combat troops, probably in reforming Divs of Sixth Pz Army and 1 SS Pz Corps."

#171. 23 Nov.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

## Tactical Intelligence.

"The Shuttle System in the West.

\*\*\*

"5. From these facts the following conclusion may

be drawn:

#17. TUSA. Presentation.

"a. More experienced Divs may be withdrawn from relatively quiet zones to be committed against Third and Sixth SS Armies.

"b. Newly formed TG divs and reformed Divs can be expected to be deployed on the more quiet fronts."

#172. Nov. 30.

Tactical Intelligence.

"Sixth Panzer Army.

"PW from 130 Pz Lehr Div reported that nine six Pz Divs had been concentrated in WESTPHALIA although they denied information concerning the other Pz Divs (further interrogations are being conducted). Heretofore only five Pz Divs (1, 2, 9, and 12 SS Pz Divs and 130 Pz Div) were believed reforming in WESTPHALIA under control of Sixth Panzer Army. If PW statements are true 2 Pz Div and 9 SS Pz Div 'Viking' become logical candidates for the Fifth Pz Div remaining under Sixth Panzer Army. 2 Pz Div has been unlocated for some time. Twelfth Army Group stated that 5 SS Pz Div has not been identified for some time on the Russian front. This Div has often been rumored to be in the WEST and in GERMANY, and PW have recently stated that 5 SS Pz Div was being refitted in the same general area as 1 SS Pz Div."

#180. 7 Dec.

Strategic Intelligence.

"1. 6 SS Panzer Army.

"a. A cooperative and well informed PW stated that the Army controlling 130 Pz Lehr Div while in WESTPHALIA was designated 6 SS Pz Army. PW also stated that 1 SS Pz Corps, 9 SS Pz Div 'Eichenstaufen', and 10 SS Pz Div 'Fandaber' were also under control of 6 SS Pz Army. Some PW claimed he saw the designation 'SS Pz AOK VI' on a document appointing Maj (GEC) WERNER (a Wehrmacht officer), formerly of 130 Pz Lehr Div, as G-2 (Ib) of this Army early in Nov. PW also stated SS Obergruppenführer (US Lt Gen) 'Sepp' DIETRICH commands 6 SS Pz Army.

"b. It has been suspected that the Panzer Army which reformed in WESTPHALIA was designated Sixth SS Pz Army. But this is the first concrete evidence of the SS designation. Logically, this title would be appropriate since the Army is commanded by an SS General and includes at least four SS Panzer Divisions (1, 2, 9, and 12) and two SS Panzer Corps (I and II). Further, the fate of Nazism rests with the success of this new Army. Just as DIETRICH the SS man, was originally HITLER's personal bodyguard, DIETRICH's SS Pz Army now attempts to guard the body of all Nazism. Under these circumstances, it would seem logical for the Nazis to honor the new army with the elite SS title."

"3. The following list shows commanders, where known, of all Higher Formations in the West.

|     |               |    |                         |      |
|-----|---------------|----|-------------------------|------|
| ... | Sixth Pz Army | CG | SS Oberstführ. und      | Oct. |
|     |               |    | Generel d. W f. SS SEPT |      |
|     |               |    | DIETRICH                |      |

..."

f. 16. TUSA. Documentation.

#186. 13 Dec.

## Strategic Intelligence.

## \*1. Sixth SS Panzer Army.

\*According to Twelfth Army Group 1, 2, 9 and 12 SS Pz Divs are still located E of the ROER River under control of Sixth SS Pz Army. It was estimated that under control of Sixth Pz Army are 32,000 troops and 320 Tks presumably belonging to the above named Divs. Thus, if the men and equipment are divided equally among these four Divs, each would have an estimated strength of 8,000 troops and 80 Tks. If 130 Pz Lehr Div is to be considered illustrative of the combat efficiency of Sixth SS Pz Army Divs, then it appears likely that these Divs are ready to take the field again. However, it is possible that the SS Pz Divs received preferential treatment over 130 Pz Lehr Div and may now be better prepared for combat than 130 Pz Lehr Div was. Gen BRUNN's statement that a number SPERR ('Blocking') Divs will be used to prevent the Allied from progressing beyond the outposts of Festung Deutschland seems acceptable. (See Par 3, Part I, Annex No. 3 to Chins US Army G-2 Periodic Report No. 185, 13 Dec 1944). Thus, Sixth SS Pz Army could constitute the reserve for a single large scale counterattack against the major Allied threat to the Reich.

...

U.S. --- The following is the same reference to Gen. BRUNN:

#185. 13 Dec. Annex #3, Order of Battle Notes.

## \*1. Strategic Intelligence.

## \*1. ...

...

## #3. German Assault Army.

\*The following is extracted from the report, published by Hq, Seventh US Army, of the interrogation of General Hans Hermann BRUNN and Lt. Col. Willi KAISER captured CO and C/S respectively of 553 VG Div (reliability rating B-2):

\*Gen BRUNN told PW KAISER that beginning Nov 44 he attended a meeting of Div commanders of First Army in ST AVOLD, MOSELLE, where they were told by Gen Von MANTEUFFEL that it was impossible to supply the Divs engaged on the Western front with fresh troops. All men that can be spared from the Navy, Luftwaffe, etc, have to join VOLKSGRENADIER Divs. These Divs (whose number was not divulged) are to form an assault army (STOSSARMEE) under the command of SS Col Gen ERICH 'Sepp' DIETRICH. With this army, equipped with new secret weapons, the German High Command hopes to drive the Allies out of FRANCE. Nevertheless, it was emphasized again the best weapon was still faith in an ultimate German victory.

\*Gen BRUNN told Maj CLARES that between end of July and the beginning of Sept 44 he attended a special course in HIRSCHBERG, Lower SILESIA. Approximately 80 Colonels and Generals attended this course. They lived in a special train parked outside the town. Gen BRUNN was recalled after three weeks, because the then CO of 553 VG Div, a Col LOHR, was considered of the charge of ordering a withdrawal despite orders to the contrary of his superior officers, and Gen BRUNN was chosen as his successor. Among other, Gen JOEL and Gen BRANNICKE addressed this special officers' course.

#19. TUSA Documentation.

"The officers were told that the German High Command is planning to activate about 70 VOLKSGRENADIER Divs. Of these, 10 are to be SPERR ('Blocking') Divs, intended to be used for stopping the Allies short of the German borders; the remaining Divs, called STOSS ('Assault') Divs, are to be used for a single large scale counterattack on the Western front, scheduled for the end of Dec. The main direction of this thrust is to be METZ, CHALON-SUR-MARNE, PARIS, and then to arde the Channel, the class was told. Furthermore, GAF aircraft are being held in reserve for this assault. The figure of 20,000 was mentioned in passing as the number of aircraft available. (This figure was cited more as an example than as a fact -Ed.) The officers were also told that Admiral DOENITZ solemnly assured the Fuehrer that he would be ready to start the campaign with the new U-boat (of SHEN Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 371, 3 Dec.) about beginning of Jan 45.

"The German High Command hopes to achieve a large scale break-through, because:

- Allied positions in FRANCE are not constructed in depth;
- The Allies have no reserve Divs behind the actual fighting lines;
- The American soldier is war-weary.

"Gen BRUNN attempted to calculate the maximum number of VOLKSGRENADIER Divs that could be organized at the present time; he was convinced that the number would not be more than 35-40."

#157. 14 Dec.

Annex #3, Order of Battle Notes, Part I. The Enemy in the West. This Part consisted of extracts from the Twelfth Army Group, Weekly Intelligence Summary #18, 12 Dec., for week ending 9 Dec. 44. TUSA cited verbatim the Army Group's sections on General Summary, and the annexes on the Sixth Army's Panzer Army and Panzer Lehr Div.

#186. 15 Dec.

## Strategic Intelligence.

## 1 Reforming Armored Reserves.

"b. Three significant indications are suggested by the above evidence:

(1) In Sixth SS Pz Army area N of the ROER R and N of the RHINE, between DUESSELDORF (F39) and COLOGNE (F45), 1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 12SS, 10 SS, and 116 Pz Divs appear to be reforming.

(2) In the area TRIER (L22), KYLLBURG (L15), WITTLICH (L35), 2 Pz and 130 Pz Lehr Divs appear to be reforming with 116 Pz Div reportedly slated for that area.

(3) Just out of the line and in positions of tactical mobile reserve 9 Pz Div (Ninth US Army zone) and 3 Pz Gren Div (Ninth US Army zone) appear to be reforming.

"c. From these indications it appears that:

(1) The enemy is reforming and refitting his battered Pz Divs but at the same time is keeping them available for immediate employment in the event of a serious threat of a major breakthrough.

(2) The enemy is massing his armor in positions of tactical reserve presumably for a large-scale counteroffensive.

...



#20. TUSA. Documentation.

## D. Miscellaneous extracts from the G-2 Periodics.

## 1. #138. 26 Oct.

"d. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention.

"(1) New Pz Army. Reports from GERMANY mention possibility of the formation of a new Pz Army under which will be grouped all the better Pz Divs from NORMANDY, particularly SS formations. At least five of the Divs have been in the REICH since early Sept. Statements of deserters from 12 SS and 21 Pz Divs tend to corroborate these reports. They claim 12 SS Pz Div is being reformed at BRUNNEN (B2212) and 1 SS Pz Div in area just S of there. Twelfth Army Group reports, "The enemy has so far been able to seal off or, at least to prevent exploitation of each Allied penetration of the West Wall by switching armor from one sector to another. He is now apparently endeavoring to build up an armor reserve and given sufficient time, say until 1 December, he could probably scrape together a powerful striking force of Pz divisions. This force would be employed, presumably, in the Northern sectors of the Western Front where Allied breakthroughs would be most dangerous to the enemy both because of terrain advantages to Allied ~~breakthroughs~~ mobility and the proximity of vital industrial areas in GERMANY. Such a reserve of armor might enable the enemy to achieve his major objective of stalling the Allied advance for the winter at the West Wall or the RHINE."

## 2. #150. 7 Nov.

Annex 1, Order of Battle Notes.

"IX. Reforming Panzer Army."

"Twelfth Army Group reported a deserter had stated that on 10 Oct Sixth German Pz Army, commanded by Sepp DIETRICH, was regrouping in BIELEFELD (B58) area. The reorganizing Pz Army is said to include 2 SS, 10 SS, 1 SS and Pz Lehr Divs. Higher Hq commented that 10 SS Pz Div is still believed to be in the AACHEN area but that 1 SS Pz Div might have been meant instead of 10 SS Pz Div.

"There is a considerable concentration of armor in NW GERMANY at present chiefly represented by reforming Divs. Although the regrouping of Sixth German Pz Army is possible, Fifth German Pz Army also remains a candidate. ..."

## 3. #179. 6 Dec.

"d. Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention.

"(2) According to Twelfth Army Group, tactical reconnaissance indicates additional divisions have arrived or are on way to reinforce enemy line in Third and Seventh US Army areas. 2 Pz Div, unlocated for some time, may be a candidate. However, it will probably be insufficient and enemy must then decide whether to move any part or all of Sixth Pz Army from COLOGNE area. At no time since Sept has such a critical dilemma confronted the enemy. It would seem doubtful that enemy can hold in the AACHEN area without committing Sixth Pz Army. It also seems doubtful that he can hold the WESTWALL in South without additional reinforcements including armor. The enemy may have to

## #21. TUSA. Documentation.

divide Sixth Pz Army thus risking defeat both in the North and in the South or, if he holds Sixth Pz Army in the North, run a good chance of Third and Seventh US Armies reaching the RHINE this year in the area of VAINZ. Finally, to solve this problem with reinforcements from the Russian front is to invite disaster in the EAST."

## F. Enemy Capabilities.

The last statement of this topic in the ENEMY CAPABILITIES section of the daily G-2 Periodics, was in issue #186, on 13 December, as follows:

## "4. Enemy Capabilities.

## "a. Capabilities.

(1) The enemy is capable of defending and delaying from prepared positions in an effort to block our advances and attacks on the SIEGFRIED Line.

(2) The enemy is capable of counterattacking locally with Inf and Armor, particularly against our main efforts, in an effort to contain these advances and to continue to resist our assault on the fortifications of the SIEGFRIED Line.

(3) The enemy is capable of a general withdrawal into the SIEGFRIED Line.

(4) The enemy is capable at any time of reinforcing against any section of our zone of advance with the equivalent of one Inf and/or one Pz division.

## "b. Conclusions.

Capabilities (1), (2) and (4) are favored in that order."

Periodics #184, 14 December and #188 of the 15th referred to the issuance of the 13th for TUSA's views on the enemy capabilities.

## F. Quotations from the British.

Two TUSA G-2 Periodics cited at length from British sources.

The latest citation was contained in the Order of Battle Notes of the G-2 Periodic for 6 December, #179. It was approximately a page quotation, and the following extracts indicate the fundamental views expressed therein. Quotes are the writer's, not TUSA's.

"The 'strategic reserve' of the West, Sixth SS Panzer Army under Sepp Dietrich, has not been committed, save in the case of the Panzer Lehr Division after a long and not very profitable refit in WESTPHALIA." "The enemy's aim has been to expend his infantry to stop a damaging breakthrough; to use his 'tactical reserve' to hold the infantry in line and to blunt the Allied assaults; not to use his Sixth Panzer Army until the moment is vital or favourable, more likely the former." Von Rundstedt is unlikely to risk this precious guard over the RHINE now amounting to five Panzer divisions (1, 2, 9 and 12 SS and 2) former of COLOGNE-BIELE until the Allies advance over the ROER to present a threat not to be blunted by such tactical reserves as Wadel has to hand within his Army Group or nearby; or until the Allies offer the enemy opportunity to take them off balance so that an abrupt counterstroke could put paid to future Allied



prospects for the winter. This latter is unlikely, for it demands five elements not readily to be found together: first, vital ground, there is nowhere obvious for him to go which would hurt us deeply. The bruted drive on ARTHUR, a 'dash to the wire' as of old, is just not within his potential. Secondly, he needs bad weather else our air superiority will disrupt his assembly, yet this very weather would clog his own intent. Third, he must find us tired and unbalanced. Fourth, he needs adequate fuel stocks not only to sustain a full-blooded operation but also to guarantee a withdrawal in his own time when it fails. Lastly, he needs more infantry and of better quality in the present terrain and weather. The moral prize would be great, for never was there greater need of a fillip, and to disrupt our winter campaigning would be a gain worth any risks. To lose Sixth Panzer Army in the doing of it would however be a disaster perhaps irreparable, for the RHINE can best be defended this side and with those five Panzer Divs removed might otherwise not be defended at all. It seems more probable, then, if von Rundstedt continues to conduct operations unimpeded, that he will wait to smash our bridgeheads over the ROER, then hold his hand. He is sixty-nine."

N.B.--- The above citation was from the 21 Army Group Intelligence Review, 3 Dec 44.

(2) The TUSA G-2 Periodic #167, 24 November, also cited British sources in its section of that issue titled Reserves and Other Forces Capable of Intervention.

One was a reproduction of a portion of the 21 Army Group Intelligence Review No. 167, 21 Nov 44. The major thought expressed was: "By the end of this year it is reckoned that perhaps as many as twenty-three further divisions will have arrived on the Western front: ... This assumes that the present priority which lies with the West is maintained. The Eastern Front, important as it is, is still taking second place to the defense of the Ruhr."

Some observations by the Second British Army were cited, as being supplied from the First US Army G-2 Periodic Report #155, 22 Nov 44.

## II. G-2 Estimates.

The last TUSA G-2 Estimate issued prior to the 16 December Counteroffensive was that of #10, 1 November 44. No. 11 was issued on 20 December.

(Source: After/Action Report, THIRD US ARMY, 1 August 1944 - 9 May 1945. Vol. II, Staff Section Reports: #10 G-2 Estimate, 1 Nov 44 on page G-2, CIII; #11, 20 Dec. on page G-2 CXIII.)

The salient feature of this G-2 Estimate #10 of 1 November 44 was the ~~assessing~~ enemy's "desperate dilemma of deciding where to employ the depleted reserves he is frantically trying to ~~smash~~ scrape together to avert complete collapse before winter sets in." If he could gain time "and secure the winter months to refurbish his combat resources, the enemy will have the capability of prolonging the war to costly lengths." As to the seven Panzer and three Para divisions undergoing reconstruction, there were in immediate reserve in the West, and could be used in conjunction with terrain for local counterattacks to contain Allied forces "or for a general counteroffensive."