

Mark:

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SPSIS-1A (26 June 1945) 1st Ind

Signal Security Agency, Washington 25, D. C., 27 June 1945

TO: Commanding Officer
Signal Security Agency

1. The Chief of the Intelligence Division does not concur in the recommendation for the appointment of an individual as coordinator of the Japanese Army Problem. His views are that the Japanese Army Coordinating Committee adequately performs this function now, and that it would be unnecessary to supplement their decisions by establishing this new office, even though this appointment would not necessarily mean an additional individual, but would be naming an existing executive to act in this capacity.

2. Furthermore, the Chief of the Intelligence Division believes that this coordinator should not properly report to him because of the fact that other branches outside of the Intelligence Division are represented on the Japanese Army Coordinating Committee.

3. In Recommendations 3, 4 and 5, the Chief of the Intelligence Division concurs.

/s/ James H. Frier, Jr.
JAMES H. FRIER, JR.
Major, Signal Corps
Control Officer

SPSIS-1 (26 June 1945) 2d Ind

Signal Security Agency, Washington 25, D. C., 2 July 1945

TO: Chief, Intelligence Division
Signal Security Agency

1. The recommendation made in the basic study that a coordinator of the Japanese Army Problem be appointed requires most careful consideration. While the existing JAC Committee has been very effective in coordinating certain aspects of the problem, there is evidence to indicate that a full-time coordinator working under your direction would serve a useful purpose in handling matters which a committee cannot by

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SPSIS-1 (2 July 1945)

its very nature properly deal with.

2. Your detailed comments on the recommendations contained in the basic study are requested.

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/s/ W. Preston Corderman
W. PRESTON CORDERMAN
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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SPSIS-9 (26 June 1945)

3d Ind

Signal Security Agency, Washington 25, D. C., 28 July 1945

TO: Commanding General, Signal Security Agency

1. The recommendations submitted as a result of the Control Study of the Japanese Army problem can generally be separated into two groups, - those dealing with the appointment of a Japanese Army Coordinator, and all other recommendations. I do not concur in the appointment of a Japanese Army Coordinator as described in the study and will discuss this matter in further detail later. The other recommendations are believed quite sound. They will be discussed in detail first.

2. Recommendation 3 has in fact been in effect since the undersigned was placed in charge of the Intelligence Division. No research tasks involving the expenditure of funds or the allocation of a sizeable group of personnel have been undertaken without the knowledge and approval of the Chief, Intelligence Division. Research is such an integral part of cryptanalysis and traffic analysis that to impose any broad curbs would destroy initiative. No curb is therefore applied except where funds or reassignment of a sizeable group of people is involved. It is recommended that this policy continue in effect.

3. The present administrative organization of the Intelligence Division has now been in effect eleven months. I concur in Recommendation 4 that no changes are indicated at the present time.

4. Steps will be taken to comply with Recommendation 5. The value of work measurement studies in assessing the relative value of employees is appreciated. More work can be accomplished with fewer people if all meet a minimum standard of production. Work measurement should permit the prompt weeding out of those misassigned or unfit employees who are dragging production levels down. I concur in the opinion of the Control Officer that with few exceptions work measurement standards can be determined for the routine operations of the Intelligence Division and action toward that end will be

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SPSIS-9 (28 July 1945)

taken.

5. The remaining recommendations, 1, 2 and 6, are all concerned with the appointment of a Japanese Army Coordinator. Since the inauguration of the Japanese Army Coordinating Committee, 9 October 1944, the Chief of the Intelligence Division, as Chairman of the Committee, has performed the functions of a "Japanese Army Coordinator". The need, therefore, for the appointment of an additional officer, with possibly a staff of assistants, to assist the Chief, Intelligence Division in performing this function depends on whether (1) there is a pronounced lack of coordination in the existing operational structure, or (2) the Chief, Intelligence Division is unable to perform this function without further aid.

6. With regard to the first of the above premises, I definitely do not agree that there is a pronounced lack of coordination in our present operational structure. The work of the Control Committee during their study of the operating sections was most helpful in bringing to the attention of section chiefs several minor cases of work duplication or waste which were corrected on the spot. A resurvey of operations in the same manner on an annual basis would be well worth the time as each such survey would result in many improvements being adopted. The existence of major cases of work duplication or waste which, however, is improbable if not impossible due, if for no other reason, to the fact that most of our operating sections are understaffed, are continually struggling with mounting backlogs, and are forced by necessity to restrict their operations to the bare essentials, having no time for "luxury" projects or other embellishments in which would be found most of the uncoordinated and duplicated activities.

7. It is desirable at this point to examine into the extent to which we should go to eliminate every instance of duplication within our operation. The problem of producing intelligence from Japanese Army communications is strictly a war-time project. It is a project in which speed is the primary consideration, - more important even than efficiency in which speed is only one of many factors combining to measure the ratio of output to input. If the Japanese Army project were being conducted for profit at a commercial enterprise, or if it were a long term government activity in which economy is a major factor, we should expend every possible effort to eliminate all of the unnecessary. But since speed is primary, and speed always entails waste to some degree, we must permit certain duplication of files, the use in the production line of more copies than are absolutely necessary, independent approaches to problems from more than one side, and many other inefficient practices the elimination of which might adversely affect our objective of producing the largest quantity of intelligence in the shortest possible time. It is my studied opinion that we should not exert strenuous efforts to eliminate all traces of inefficiency but should be constantly on the alert to cut out or modify any procedure which delays the production of intelligence.

8. With regard to the second premise of paragraph 5, that the Chief

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SPSIS-9 (25 July 1945)

Intelligence Division is unable to perform his function of coordinating Japanese Army procedures without additional aid, the undersigned is perhaps not competent to render an opinion. The following two facts, however, can be offered.

a. It is estimated that from 65% to 70% of the time of the Chief, Intelligence Division is devoted to problems arising out of Japanese Army operations. A large part of this time is spent by the Chief, Intelligence Division in contacting personally not only Branch Chiefs and others of the Intelligence Division but similar personnel in the Operating Services Division and representatives of AIS. This amount of time should suffice to coordinate properly any major operational problems that arise. Direct contact between all the branches concerned is continuously in effect. The appointment of a Japanese Army Coordinator would not materially reduce the amount of time which the Chief, Intelligence Division should devote to the Japanese Army problem.

b. The Japanese Army Coordinating Committee through the medium of its weekly meetings serves to air thoroughly all problems confronting each of the branches in performing its own share of the work. Since the committee is made up of responsible executives, direct action can be and is taken on problems affecting more than one branch. No more effective way of dealing with such problems is known.

9. It is recommended that paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 under RECOMMENDATIONS in the inclosed report be approved, and that paragraphs 1, 2 and 6 be not favorably considered.

HAROLD G. HAYES
Colonel, Signal Corps
Chief, Intelligence Division