

SECRET

REF ID: A67248

RESTRICTED

DATE 19 July '46

TO	FROM	TO	FROM
<del>✓</del> Chief, ASA..... (10)	_____	_____	Ch, Security Div..... (80)
_____ Executive O..... (11)	_____	_____	P & O Staff..... (81)
✓ Dir Comm Res..... (14)	_____	_____	Ch, Materiel Br.... (82)
_____ Ch, Hist Unit..... (13)	_____	_____	Ch, Methods Br.... (83)
_____ Control O..... (15)	_____	_____	Ch, Protective Br... (84)
<del>✓</del> Asst Chief (Staff)..... (20)	✓	_____	Ch, Maint Br..... (85)
_____ Ch, Pers Sec..... (21)	_____	_____	Ch, Res & Dev Div .(70)
_____ Ch, Org & Tng Sec .(22)	_____	_____	Tech Staff..... (71)
_____ Ch, Plans & Oper... (23)	_____	_____	Ch, Ciph & Ciph Br. (72)
_____ Ch, Materiel Sec.... (24)	_____	_____	Ch, Int Equip Br... (73)
_____ Ch, Fiscal Sec..... (25)	_____	_____	Ch, Elec & Elec Br. (74)
_____ Adjutant, ASA..... (26)	_____	_____	Ch, Lab Serv Br .. (75)
_____ Ch, Sec Cont Sec... (27)	_____	_____	Ch, C'logic Br.... (76)
_____ Asst Chief (Oper).... (60)	_____	_____	Ch, Pers & Tng Br.. (61)
_____ Ch, Intel Div..... (90)	_____	_____	Ch, Supply Br..... (62)
_____ Ch, Lab Br..... (91)	_____	_____	Co, Arlington Hall... (40)
_____ Ch, Machine Br.... (92)	_____	_____	2d Sig Serv Bn.... (50)
_____ Ch, Crypt Br..... (93)	_____	_____	_____
_____ Ch, Int Cont Br.... (94)	_____	_____	_____
_____ Ch, I & D Br..... (95)	_____	_____	_____


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| <input type="checkbox"/> As Discussed                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Information & File            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> As Requested                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Recommendation                |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Concurrence or Comments | <input type="checkbox"/> Signature if approved         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Information & Forwarding           | <input type="checkbox"/> Your action by                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Information & Return               | <input type="checkbox"/> Info upon which to base reply |

1. Until recent months ASA has had on the staff of the Division of Cryptography, Dept of State, an officer assigned as a working member of that Division and also as our liaison officer to that Div. (Majr Woake, Capt. Lesher). Since Lesher left we have not filled that "vacancy" —

- if it exists REF ID: A67248
2. I think it might be to Army's advantage to continue such a relationship as has existed in the past - if we can spare the man. Otherwise, only Navy is in the picture and some day we might find ourselves at a serious disadvantage, lacking the contact.
  3. Rec thought I be given to this. Maybe we should begin by asking Capt. Parke if he needs anybody from here - or would like to have somebody, either on a full or part-time basis, to fill the job he's doing.

F.

There is correspondence in the files on this if you wish to see it. Gen. C - decided not to refill and got out of it.



Thank :

This appears to me to be a closed issue so far as Staff is concerned & they have made some good points. They have overemphasized the point about com security & underemphasized that about possible value in the C. intell field. But on the whole, I don't think will want to argue with them - unless you have some weighty shots.

J.

AND / OR CARRIER SHEET HQ ASA

MUST REMAIN WITH ATTACHED PAPERS

NUMBER EACH MEMO OR REPLY IN LEFT BORDER, PLACE NAME, RANK AND TELEPHONE NUMBER BOTTOM OF EACH ACTION. DRAW LINE UNDER EACH ACTION

ENTER FILE CLASSIFICATION ADJUTANT \_\_\_\_\_

A. H. P.  
11

TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECT
			Proposal for More Complete Liaison Between the Army, Navy, and State Department
1.	SS-14	SS-23	21 May 46
			<p>1. Reference attached memorandum, same subject, better inter-Departmental liaison is always desirable. However, the following comments are made regarding the proposed methods of achievement.</p> <p>2. The Army and the Navy admittedly have an interest in the security of State Department communications, and the Cryptographic Security Board should take measures to insure such security. In this connection, liaison between the three departments should be continuous. It is felt, however, that each department should provide for proper security of its own communications. Present concept dictates that it is not the duty of any one department to furnish all the personnel to provide such security. The placing of Military, or Naval Attaches as cryptographic security officers at the various embassies would make the Army and Navy responsible for functions properly the responsibility of the State Department. This is not considered within the Army Security Agency's scope of responsibility and is not particularly desirable. If, at present, the State Department has poor security and no facilities for adequately training cryptographic security personnel, it may be advisable that they be permitted to enroll personnel in the appropriate Army or Navy schools for such training. This would insure that the State Department had sufficient personnel of its own without making excessive demands on the limited personnel of either or both of the other departments concerned.</p> <p>3. With regard to the proposed clearance of Military Attaches for the purpose of obtaining "cribs" to assist in cryptanalysis, the following is to be considered:</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">a. The present method of requesting the Military Attaches to pick up such items as telephone books, directories, magazines, newspapers, etc., provides collateral information from readily accessible sources.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">b. To obtain further information, it would be necessary to "clear" Military and Naval Attaches and make available to them material of the highest classification; and to train some fifty additional officers, as well as their replacements, rather extensively in cryptographic and cryptanalytic operations, before assigning them to their duties. Such clearance and assignment involve:</p> <p style="margin-left: 80px;">(1) Giving highly classified information to personnel located in foreign countries for a special assignment which would require a very small portion of their time. In addition, it is believed that the amount of material so obtained may very well be negligible in comparison with what is available from other sources.</p>

5-11-46  
1-14-3-15-1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23-24-25-26-27-28-29-30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44-45-46-47-48-49-50-51-52-53-54-55-56-57-58-59-60-61-62-63-64-65-66-67-68-69-70-71-72-73-74-75-76-77-78-79-80-81-82-83-84-85-86-87-88-89-90-91-92-93-94-95-96-97-98-99-100

TO FROM DATE SUBJECT Proposal for More Complete Liaison Between the Army, Navy, and State Department

(2) Exposing to compromise by an over-zealous person signal intelligence which may have been achieved with great difficulty. This problem of clearance of attaches is of particular concern to the Director of Intelligence at this time.

c. To fulfill the ultimate objective, personnel are required who are highly trained in espionage activity. There are already available other organizations with this specialized training who accomplish this type of work successfully without the precise knowledge of what agency needs the material and why it is needed.

d. Much of the "crib" material that the Attaches would obtain may be available at the State Department here, or can be picked up in CHAIR ROCK operations.

e. The method of obtaining material we desire and require to fulfill our mission, without revealing the purpose for which the information is obtained, is the best means of acquiring the maximum of such material without risking a compromise of operational activities.

4. It is concluded that:

a. The Army Security Agency should not be made responsible for State Department communication security since it infringes on a basic responsibility of that Department.

b. Attaches should not be charged with obtaining what they know to be signal intelligence "cribs" because:

(1) Of the extensive training responsibility which would be assumed by this Agency.

(2) Of the security considerations regarding their clearance.

(3) They can continue to obtain all routine collateral information which is desired by this Agency.

(4) "Cribs" obtainable only by surreptitious means can be and should be handled through other channels involving fewer security considerations.

5. The proposal on either point is not favorably considered at this time.

GEORGE A. BICHER  
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Deputy Chief, Army Security Agency  
Ext 498

1 Incl  
Ltr dtd 21 Feb 46, same subj,  
to Director of Comm Research