

~~TOP SECRET~~CSDIC(Main)/Y 25Copy No:- 9

FIRST DETAILED INTERROGATION OF FIVE
GERMAN WT OPERATORS.

NY-3
NS

PW 1.

Name: DOBBERSTEIN Albert
Rank: CSM (Oberfunkmeister)
Unit: 5 Coy 289 GR
FP No: _____
Captured: 16 Dec 44 BAGNACAVALLIO
Secret No: M44/2082
Interrogated: CSDIC(Main)CMF, 26 Dec 44

PW 2.

GEESE Wolfgang
WT/Sjt (Funkmeister)
HQ 3 Bn 96 Arty Regt
56492A
Deserted at UDINE about 15 Nov 44
Captured in FAENZA 16 Dec 44
M44/2084
CSDIC(Main)CMF, 28 Dec 44

PW 3.

Name: HINTERLEITHNER Heinz
Rank: Cpl
Unit: HQ 1 Bn 200 GR
FP No: 58277A
Captured: 15 Dec 44 CELLA
Secret No: M44/2079
Interrogated: CSDIC(Main)CMF, 28 Dec 44

PW 4.

BISCHOFF Walter
Pte(Gefr)
HQ 3 Bn 361 GR(mot)
59518A
15 Dec 44 SW of FAENZA
M44/2044
CSDIC(Main)CMF 27 Dec 44

PW 5.

Name: TROEGER Werner
Rank: Pte(Gefr)
Unit: HQ 1 Bn(att RHQ) 741 Rifle Regt
FP No: _____
Captured: 11 Dec 44 VILLANOVA
Secret No: M44/2043
Interrogated: CSDIC(Main)CMF, 27 Dec 44

Subject of report: - Allotment of callsigns and frequencies:
Unit sigs equipment and organisation:
Army Sigs Ordnance Depot BERLIN-SCHOENEHEBERG:
Numbering of RASTERSCHLUESSEL:
Personalities.

1. PREAMBLE

PW 1. : A 27 yr old regular from BERLIN. Called up to 3 Sigs Bn in 1938 and with this unit in POLAND and FRANCE. Later with 475 Sigs Bn attached to IV Armd Corps, in General's WT Sec, and at BERLIN-SCHOENEHEBERG Army Sigs Ordnance Depot. From Apr to Oct 44 with 3 Coy 508 Sigs Regt, then transferred to the infantry. No attempt to be secure, but his knowledge of technical matters is small.

Reliability : Fair

PW 2. : A 29 yr old radio mechanic from ERFURT. Anti-Nazi deserter. Has been in Army since 1937, mostly as technician in smoke units. Received six months WT training at GLATZ Army Sigs School in Feb 42, posted to 3 Bn 96 Arty Regt as WT Sjt in Feb 44. Also had the function of Signals Master (Funkleiter) and had access to sigs docs (Unterlagen).

Reliability : Fair

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- PW 3. : A 37 yr old schoolmaster from AUSTRIA, called up in 1938, and always served with Sigs units. In Jul 43 posted to 476 Armd Sigs Bn, attached to LXXVI Armd Corps, and in Jan 44 posted to Sigs Pl of 200 GR (mot), as NCO i/c WT stn.
Reliability : Fair
- PW 4. : A 19 yrold commercial clerk from MUIENSTER. Called up to the GAF in Jan 44. To GAF Sigs School at HALLE in Jun, where he had nearly two months WT training, then continued training at 29 Inf Sigs Depot and Tng Bn at ERFURT. At beg Oct 44 he was posted to HQ 3 Bn 361 GR (mot) where he was WT operator. A Nazi product, but answered questions, though he had little infm to give.
Reliability : Poor
- PW.5. : A 22 yr old signwriter from DRESDEN. Called up to Arty Sigs in Feb 41, and served with 19 Arty Regt in RUSSIA. After further sigs training in 1943 he was posted to 114 Div HQ as WT operator in May 43, and since then served as WT operator with various units of the Div in CROATIA and ITALY. Was NCO i/c WT stn in last unit, 741 Rifle Regt. Not very bright, and suspicious, though he answered most questions asked.
Reliability Poor

2. ALLOTMENT OF CALLSIGNS AND FREQUENCIES

(Sources PW 2,3,4 and 5. 3 Bn 86 Arty Regt, 1 Bn 200 GR(mot), 3 Bn 361 GR(mot), 1 Bn(att RHQ) 741 Rifle Regt)

All PW state that since about 10 Nov 44 callsigns changed daily at 0300 hrs and frequencies every three days at 0300 hrs. Nearly all seem to be agreed that allotment of callsigns and frequencies depends on the CSO at Corps, and that he allots them through Div HQ down to bns. However none except PW 2 appeared to know much about what happens higher than Div level.

a) 96 Arty Regt (PW 2)

Disuse of Army Callsign Book "E"

PW stated that about Sep 44 an order was received by the Regtl Sigs Officer laying down that the use of Army Callsign Book "E" was to cease w.e.f. 1 Nov 44, as it had been compromised(bloggestellt). The system of allotting callsigns after that date was to be as follows -

Bn sigs tps were themselves to work out a callsign table (RUFZEICHENVERTEILER), part of the callsign plan (RUEZEICHENPLAN), still on the basis of tables in the Army Callsign Book "E", for a month ahead, and submit it to RHQ sigs, from where it would be passed to Div Sigs Bn. From there it would go to the CSO. After examination and any necessary alteration all tables would be returned to bns by the same channels in time for use by the first of the month. In practice this system did not dispense altogether with the use of Army Callsign Book "E", but allotment of callsigns according to basic numbers was to be discontinued.

PW himself had to prepare a table for 3 Bn links and submit it to RHQ by 15 Sep; it was, following the new order, to come into effect on 1 Nov. In fact this was not done, but PW heard that it was to come into force on 1 Dec. (Meantime the unit left for HUNGARY on 15 Nov). PW's opinion is that this new system is merely a provisional one, and that an entirely new system of allotment will be adopted in due course.

b) 200 GR (mot) -(PW 3)

Army Callsign Book "E" was still in use in 90 PG Div; it was handled down to Div level only. Div Sigs Officer issued regts with callsigns and frequencies in monthly lists; Regtl Sigs were supposed to extract contents affecting their own stations and pass on the rest to OC Bn Sigs Dets by DR every three or four days. Each WT stn was given at least two callsigns for each 24 hour period, and operators were encouraged to use them ad lib and change from

one to the other as often as possible to avoid detection and identification. In practice lists of callsigns and frequencies were not sent to bns every three or four days, but lists were issued for a whole month; when 1 Bn Sigs Det office was stormed by New Zealand troops on 15 Dec 44 near CELLA the complete monthly lists were captured.

FW also stated that as conditions in ITALY were so difficult, once a "good" frequency had been established stns continued to communicate on it beyond the period of 72 hrs laid down in orders.

When the unit was in action operators' Christian names were used instead of callsigns. In the last action in which FW took part (14/15 Dec) "callsigns" used were HEINZ (FW), RUDOLF and PETER.

c) 3 Bn 361 GR (mot) - (PW 4)

FW stated that in his Bn callsigns were not issued to WT stns for periods longer than two or three days. A minimum of two callsigns was allotted to each stn. Each stn was also allotted at least two frequencies in addition to alternative and spare frequencies (AUSWEICH and VERFUEGUNGSWELLEN).

d) RHQ 741 Rifle Regt - (PW 5)

Army Callsign Book "E" was still used in the unit. Callsigns were received by bns every three days, and were sent down by officer only.

3. UNIT SIGS EQUIPMENT

a) With 71 Smoke Regt (till Feb 44) - (PW 2)

At Bn and troop level "b", "f", and "k" pack'sets were used, and later "g" sets. 5 watt and 30 watt transmitters (at Bn HQ) were also used.

b) With 96 Arty Regt (till 15 Nov 44) -, (PW 2)

Pack'sets "b", "f" and "g" were used in bn and troop, and bn HQs had each one 5 watt transmitter.

c) 200 GR (mot) (till 15 Dec 44) - (PW 3)

Regtl Sigs Fl had "g" sets and a 30 watt transmitter. Bn HQ sigs dets were equipped only with "g" sets.

d) 3 Bn 361 (mot) (till 15 Dec 44) - (PW 4)

The Bn had four "g" sets, one at Bn HQ and one each with 9, 10 and 11 Coys. 12 Coy had no set.

e) 114 Div Sigs Bn (till 11 Dec 44) - (PW 5)

2 (WT) Coy was equipped with five WT vans each with one 80 watt transmitter. There were also two "b" sets for receiving and transmitting.

f) 1 Bn 741 Rifle Regt (till 11 Dec 44) - (PW 5)

The Bn was equipped with "d" sets.

4. IDENTIFICATIONS

a) 508 Army Sigs Regt - (PW 1)

FW's infm dates to Oct 44. At that time there were six coys in the Regt: 2 Coy was the only WT Coy, the rest were telephone coys or telephone construction coys.

2 Bn, with 3 and 6 Coys, was renamed 1 Bn in Jun 44. FW, who was in 3 Coy, could provide no other infm of Sigs interest.

b) Army Sigs Ordnance Depot (HEERESZUEGAMT (NACHRICHTEN) BERLIN-SCHOENEHEG
(PW-1)

PW was employed at this depot from Feb 43 till Apr 44. His appointment was that of "Lager Funkmeister"(Stores Wt Sjt); his function was actually that of examination of non-technical equipment and despatch of sigs equipment.

i) Location

This Sigs Depot has been independent since about 1935, when it ceased to be part of the Army Ordnance depot at SPANDAU. Until early 44 most of its departments (BEZIRKE) were in the Depot grounds at 81 NAUMANNSTRASSE; after that date, as a result of the bombings of BERLIN, the Depot was decentralised and various departments, or sections of them, were evacuated to WEST PRUSSIA, STETTIN, the HANZ, and other places in the outlying districts of BERLIN. No further details available.

ii) Organisation

The Depot was commanded by a Major, with a Captain i/c A and Q. It was divided into several main groups (ABTEILUNGEN), of which PW could only remember one, ABTEILUNG G(GERAET), the Equipment Group. This was divided into ten departments, numbered 1 - 10, with several sub-divisions such as 3A, etc. PW remembered the following departments:

<u>Department (BEZIRK)</u>	<u>Dealing with:</u>
1	Despatch (VERSAND)
2	Wireless (FUNK)
3	Telephone(FERNSPRECH)
3a	Carrier-frequency sets (WEITSPRECH)
4	? ?
5	? ?
6	Instructions (VORSCHRIFTEN)
7	? ?
8	? ?
8a	MT (KRAFTFAHR)
9	? ?
10	Propaganda (PROPSGANDAGERAET) apparatus

iii) Equipment

PW had on him a list of equipment he had once despatched from the Depot (he had made notes on the back of a photograph). He was unable to supply details on the equipment, except that the Depot used to supply this type of apparatus to the POST OFFICE and the SS ORD DEPOT at ORANIENBURG and also to Sigs Units maintaining comms in the rear areas on the Eastern Front.

The list read:

1 Kiste Vorratstelle fuer ein B Amt	1 case spare parts for a B exchange
1 " " " " A "	1 " " " " A "
2 Maschinenestelle WT 34	2 frames for (machines) WT 34
50 Nebenstellenumschalter fuer WT 34	50 commutators for secondary stns WT 34
Netzgeraete fuer Traegerfrequenz A(Zusatz)	?transformers for carrier- frequency sets A (attachment)
Wandverteiler " " "	distributors for carrier-freq"
Hauptgestelle fuer MTC	main frames for MTC (sets)

This equipment was issued for field stns set up by the PO SS and Army Sigs, which maintained three types of exchanges, A, B and C AEMTER.

Each carrier-frequency set had the type and number stencilled on a plate. The size of the number indicated the type of exchange for which the set was intended; the highest number indicated a C Exchange, the lowest an A Exchange. The following numbers were listed against the equipment noted by PW:

- ..for a B Exchange 1729
- ..for an A Exchange 357

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The frames for machines WT 34 had the numbers 930671 and 930052 respectively.

5. NUMBERING OF RASTERSCHLÜSSEL

PW stated that the RASTERSCHLÜSSEL issued to 200 GR (mot) for Dec 44 was referred to as 0051 or 0048 or 0014.

6. PERSONALITIES

a) 508 Army Sigs Regt (Oct 44 - PW 1)

Lt ALBRECHT	OC 6 Coy, vice Capt FLEISCHHACKER
Capt FLEISCHHACKER	Former OC 6 Coy, now with Gen Staff somewhere in ITALY.
2/Lt GOHLA	Coy Officer in Regt
Capt Dr HAPPACH	OC 3 Coy (previously listed as Lt)
2/Lt KAMPF	Coy officer, probably in 3 Coy.
Major KIRCHNER	No longer with regt. Now NaFue with an SS unit last reported in FINLAND.
2/Lt ROOS	Accidentally killed while playing around with a pistol (under the influence of drink)
Lt SERELIN	Posted away from unit sometime in autumn. Now with DV-SCHLESIEF (Divisions Vermittlung), a military trunk telephone exchange for direct comms in and with the Reich.
Capt THIER	OC 5 Coy.

b) 114 Sigs Bn (till 11 Dec 44 - PW 5)

Capt DEFFREGGER	OC 114 Sigs Bn
Lt MIES	OC 2 (WT) Coy in Sigs Bn.
2/Lt LEFFLOW	On det from Sigs Bn to 661 Arty Regt
2/Lt MANGELSDORF	" " " " " " an Inf Regt in Div
CSM(ObWm) ZAPP	Signalmaster (Funkleiter) at 2(WT) Coy 114 Sigs Bn

c) 96 Arty Regt (till 15 Nov 44 - PW 2)

2/Lt KASTL	OC HQ Tp in 3 Bn (also Sigs officer)
Capt KOCH	Sigs officer at RHQ. In Nov relinquished his appointment and did NOO work. Reported captured by Allies nr VERGARETTO.
2/Lt DIENST	Sigs officer at RHQ, vice Capt KOCH.

d) 200 Gren Regt (mot) (till 15 Dec 44 - PW 3)

Col BEHR, Baron von	Formerly OC Sigs Bn at ROMMEL's HQ (PW 1 also knew him there.) Is a Sigs officer, from the BALTIC STATES, speaks Russian fluently. Very keen on correct sigs work and security, changes Sigs officers "very often".
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Sjt (Fw) FASTEROCK

i/o Sigs det at HQ 1 Bn

2/Lt RECKLEBEN

OC WF Pl att RHQ. Belongs to 2 Coy 190 Sigs Bn

e) 3 Bn 361 Gren Regt(mot) (till 15 Dec 44 - PW 4)

Sjt(Fw) PAS

? i/o Sigs det at HQ 3 Bn

f) Army Sigs Ordnance Depot, BERLIN-SCHOENBERG (till Apr 44 - PW 1)

Capt LENK Erik

i/o A and Q. From STUTTGART

Antmann HAGEL

In Equipment Department

Inspektor SEIFFERT

" " "

g) 475 Sigs Bn (IV Armd Corps) (Jan 43 - PW 1)

Lt MEHSEL

In Bn. A high frequency technician. Formerly liaised between LORENZ AG and the army.

A. G. B.

C.S.D. I.C., (Main)
C.M.F.
3 Dec 45.

Hilary M. M...
for (R. P. F. EDWARDS)
Lt-Col.
Comdt., CSDIC(Main) CMF.

Answer:

REF ID: A65380
I started on Russian about it? Up till then there had been no cryptographic success. Then I went to SWINEMUNDE with the task of learning Russian and Polish, and breaking the systems of both those countries. After 1½ years I went back to BERLIN, to the Russian section. The Russians were using three systems in the BALTIC, the main system, one 4-figure and one 5-figure system. In the beginning, decyphering of the main system was successful; in this cypher the Russians reported in advance to all units the intended moves of ships and a/c which were to take place the following day. It was an unrecyphered system, a code whose groups were triplicated (3-fach belegt).

W/T messages connected with this network could also be traced in the second 4-figure cypher. This was a recyphering system. The system itself was not entirely decypherable, as the material was insufficient; we only received a little of it with heavy W/T interference. We also received material from the BLACK SEA, which presented the same picture although the keys (Schluessel) were somewhat different. By comparing both lots of material, after my return to BERLIN, it was possible to decypher it completely. Then, in BERLIN, when events were precipitated, I worked for some time on Italian cyphers, and occasionally on French and Spanish ones. Sometimes a whole country's material was left untouched. Then I resumed work on RUSSIA, which was still using a 5-figure key, which was not a subtractor, however, but an adder. The break was successful. There were difficulties, owing to the size of the basic code book, which contained 50,000 groups; it was hatted, and changed after some time. We discovered a formula according to which the code groups were built up, and identified thereby names of ships, equivalents of numbers and punctuation marks. The key (Schlüssel) changed daily.

Pow 05

We could only work on the system when 80 to 100 messages came in per day. The basic book changed twice, but we always got into it again, although not nearly as far as with the English one. While we were reading the 4-figure system well, the 5-figure gave us very good results during the RUSSO-FINISH war, although work was suspended for a short time by order. During this war the Russians introduced a double recyphering system. Later, we worked together with FINLAND. We had one break into the double recyphering adder system, but it led to no practical results. We then limited our attention to the 4-figure system, which went well until '39. I myself was head of the Russian section, but almost all my personnel was taken away from me; only a few remained and coping with the tasks involved difficulties of personnel, and between '39 and '40 I had to help with cyphers of other countries. Owing to lack of staff I only remained in touch with difficulty.

Autumn 1940: What does the cypher look like, and can we break it at all, using large numbers of personnel? At all events we kept our heads above water, but with some difficulty. At the beginning of the war the question was whether we should manage to break it or not. Plenty of staff was supplied. On 23/4 - I believe - at the time of the attack on JUGOSLAVIA, the system changed; previously a substitution system; it became an adder.

When the war with RUSSIA started, we could read a high percentage of it. The construction of the adder was peculiar, and consisted of repetitions. The suspicion arose that the adder must be based on a clear word-text. We received confirmation from FINLAND that it was a book, obtainable commercially, in which each letter was replaced by a figure and these rows of figures added to the code-groups. The indicators only gave the page and line of the book. The indicator itself was buried (verborgen) in the text and recyphered by the addition of another number. We had this book in our drawer. One of our employees, living in the same house as the military attache, who had to leave suddenly and left a number of books behind, which were to be handed over to book-salvage, helped himself to the Russian books. We learned the title of the book, and searched everywhere until he ((our employee)) remembered that the book "History of the Communist Party" was among them. We should have managed in any case, but the book facilitated the work. We were in a position to read about 100% of the material. The only difficulty was the code but it had been broken so far that we could read it and follow exactly the movements and minefields of the Russians in the BALTIC. This was until the Russians were locked in around LENINGRAD. After this the W/T traffic dropped off. Later on there were only lesser cyphers for patrol vessels, which were handed over to the Finns in the autumn, because FINLAND had better reception. The Finns kept us currently informed and we turned our attentions to the BLACK SEA and had very great success. A characteristic feature was the great number of systems, which frequently changed. Then there were cyphers from the WHITE SEA, which at first were worked on in FINLAND. Later on we ourselves broke a few minor cyphers. We later had a small group working in KIRKENES. We worked on problems connected with major systems and had a research station

of our own for the BLACK SEA in MAMAIA. The actual work was done at the out-stations. We ourselves did not make any progress with the major systems as it was not worth while working on them along with the British ones.

Question: Will you include in the list a few names from the Russian Section?

Answer: Yes.
Orr. TRANOW

Question: How did liaison with the Finns function, actually?

Answer: Collaboration with FINLAND was effected by direct exchange between TALLINN and FINLAND. Only the bigger things came to us through the mediation of our IO at OKW.

Kapt. z. S,
KUPFER

Question: With whom did you work?

Answer: We were never in FINLAND ourselves.

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