

10 July 1945

SUBJECT: Present Organization for Research on Ultra Material for Intelligence Concerning Security of Our Own Communications.

TO: General Corderman

1. In the past few days discussions have been hold between myself and various members of Signal Security Agency concerned with the carrying out of the directive contained in the attached memorandum and your recent verbal directive in connection with our evaluation of Ultra material from the point of view of discovering weaknesses in our own cryptographic systems and procedures and bringing about corrections therein. Careful consideration has been given to the matter of improving our present set-up and operations in this field.

2. a. It is found that the Communications Security Branch is quite competent to evaluate material having a bearing upon our cryptographic systems and requiring a good knowledge of the techniques of cryptanalysis. However, Communications Security Branch and Protective Security Branch are not in a good position to evaluate information contained in Ultra having a bearing upon ^{traffic} analysis and requiring a good knowledge of traffic analysis techniques. Without such knowledge it is difficult to add together isolated bits of information which might tell what the Japanese are able to do

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along these lines.

b. The present files of Ultra material in the Communications Security Branch are not particularly well suited for research along traffic analysis lines. Moreover, there appears reason to believe that we may be overlooking a good deal of material of potential value in connection with traffic analysis, because without a knowledge of traffic analysis techniques the scanners and translators in B-I cannot be expected to be able to recognize scattered or isolated bits of information as being of potential value, so that it may be that messages which would be of value are "deadheaded."

c. No satisfactory arrangements have been made to collect, analyze and synthesize all the data ^{pertaining to traffic analysis} and to arrive at sound conclusions by means of well-integrated studies by a group devoting more or less full-time attention thereto.

3. The files built up by Major Spitzer of MIS for evaluation of Ultra material connected with security of our communications are more complete and better arranged for the purpose than are the files in the Communications Security Branch. Because it would be a big job, it seems to me inadvisable for us to try to duplicate Major Spitzer's files. All of us at Signal Security Agency who are concerned with this operation believe that if Major Spitzer's files were transferred to Arlington Hall Station and made available to a working group under my general supervision, much more

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adequate facilities for research would be provided and better integrated studies would result therefrom.

4. a. It is therefore proposed that Major Spitzer's files be transferred to this station and that the individual he now has on that job continue to be on the MIS payroll and to work on making up the files just as at present. These files would then be available to representatives from the following units:

- (1) Military Intelligence Service (Major Spitzer)
- (2) Protective Security Branch, Security Division
- (3) Communications Security Branch (including Captain Maass, Liaison Officer between Security and Intelligence Divisions)
- (4) Traffic Analysis and Control Branch, Intelligence Division.
- (5) Other branches of the Intelligence Division having an interest.
- (6) Director of Communications Research

b. At least one person from each of the first four of the above-named units would be assigned on a full- or nearly full-time basis to work with these files and new material added thereto. It is further proposed that once a week there be a meeting of all concerned to discuss the facts developed by the working group and to establish or outline such reports or research projects as might be required. Major Spitzer and any of his associates who are concerned would be invited to

participate in these weekly meetings. They would bring to the meetings such information available at MIS as has a bearing on the matters under discussion, as for example, the determination of the accuracy of the information reported by the Japanese with respect to order of battle, disposition, subordination, and operation of Allied troops.

5. In brief, while being guided by your directive that the Signal Security Agency itself ought to evaluate Ultra information having a bearing upon the security of our own communications regardless of what MIS does along these lines, I feel that the establishment of a working group with participation by representatives of MIS in the working group would be more practical and conducive of better results than if we tried to do it all alone. The availability of Major Spitzer's files to such a working group, if the files were at Arlington Hall Station, would be a big factor in the improvement in the results desired.

6. If the foregoing meets with your approval, it is requested that the matter be taken up with MIS for an expression of opinion as to the feasibility of the proposal contained in paragraph 4_a above.

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2. a. It is found that the Communications Security Branch is quite competent to evaluate material having a bearing upon our cryptographic systems and requiring a good knowledge of the techniques of cryptanalysis. However, Communications Security Branch and Protective Security Branch are not in a good position to evaluate information contained in Ultra having a bearing upon ^{traffic} analysis and requiring a good knowledge of traffic analysis techniques. Without such knowledge it is difficult to add together isolated bits of information which might tell what the Japanese are able to do

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Security Associate Director for Policy and Records

On 20130910 by mm

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b. The present files of Ultra material in the Communications Security Branch are not particularly well suited for research along traffic analysis lines. Moreover, there appears reason to believe that we may be overlooking a good deal of material of potential value in connection with traffic analysis, ^{and deception,} because without a knowledge of traffic analysis ^{and deception} techniques the scanners and translators in B-I cannot be expected to be able to recognize scattered or isolated bits of information as being of potential value, so that it may be that messages which would be of value are "deadheaded."

c. No satisfactory arrangements have been made to collect, analyze and synthesize all the data ^{pertaining to Traffic Analysis} and to arrive at sound conclusions by means of well-integrated studies by a group devoting more or less full-time attention thereto.

3. The files built up by Major Spitzer of MIS for evaluation of Ultra material connected with ^{traffic analysis and decryption} ~~security of our communications~~ are more complete and better arranged for the purpose than are the files in the Communications Security Branch. Because it would be a big job, it seems to me inadvisable for us to try to duplicate Major Spitzer's files. All of us at Signal Security Agency who are concerned with this operation believe that if Major Spitzer's files were transferred to Arlington Hall Station and made available to a working group under my general supervision, much more

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b. At least one person from each of the first four of the above-named units would be ^{made available} ~~assigned~~ on a full/ or nearly full-time basis to work with these files and new material added thereto. It is further proposed that once a week there be a meeting of all concerned to discuss the facts developed by the working group and to establish or outline such reports or research projects as might be required. Major Spitzer and any of his associates who are concerned would be invited to

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