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~~TOP SECRET SUEDE - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

18 March 1952

COPY

TO: AFSA-02D

FROM: AFSA-23D3

VIA: AFSA-23D, AFSA-23

SUBJECT: Plain Text Exploitation in the Chinese Military Problem

Since the activation of the Chinese Communist problem at AFSA in mid 1949, a large body of information has been produced on Chinese Communist Military forces. From the standpoint of both quality and amount, virtually all of this information has been derived from an analysis of plain text messages. In the period 15 June 1949 to 5 March 1952, almost 80 per cent of all military identifications were provided by plain text traffic -- largely by personal messages on the Commercial Network.

Chinese Communist Military Identifications
(15 June 1949 - 5 March 1952)

<u>Source</u>	<u>Number of Identifications</u>	<u>Per cent of Total</u>
Commercial Net Plain Text Traffic	3251	78%
Enciphered Traffic	935	22%
Total	4186	

GROUND FORCES:

Although [redacted] traffic currently provide identification of tactical units in Korea, virtually all identifications of Chinese Communist Ground Force tactical units in China proper (Field Armies, Army Groups, Armies and Divisions) are derived exclusively from plain text: 1/

<u>Echelon</u>	<u>Maximum Number of Units</u>	<u>Number and Percentage Identified from Plain Text</u>		<u>Number and Percentage Identified from Plain Text and Cipher</u>	
Field Armies	4	4	(100%)	4	(100%)
Army Groups	22	14	(64%)	14	(64%)
Armies	70	41	(59%)	46	(65%)
Divisions	210	57	(27%)	85	(40%)

1/ Order of Battle - Chinese Communist Ground Forces, 4 December 1951.

[redacted]

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Significantly, the great bulk of COMINT on [] units above division level is available only from plain text traffic. Plain text military identifications have provided intelligence of particular interest:

- (a) First identifications of the movement of [] units from South China toward Manchuria, reported in July 1950. 2/
- (b) Further indications of movement and identification of units in Manchuria. 3/

The above reports were issued prior to the Chinese Communist large-scale intervention in the Korean War.

- (c) First indications that elements of the First and Second Field Armies were enroute to Korea, pre-dating front-line identifications by as much as six weeks. 4/
- (d) Recent disclosure of the shift of the 16th Army or its elements to Manchuria from Southwest China. 5/
- (e) Increase in the level of military unit identifications in South China by solution, through plain text traffic, of military unit cover-designations. 6/

In brief, identifications of Chinese Communist military units provided by plain text traffic furnish most of the COMINT information on the disposition and movement of the Chinese Communist Ground Forces in China Proper and Manchuria, most of the COMINT information on military district organization in China, the organization of various military headquarters echelons, the locations and activities of military schools; and most of the COMINT information on military supply matters.

AIR

The foundation of all U.S. estimates of Air Order of Battle in China and Manchuria rests wholly on AFSA plain text reports. Solution of the

- 2/ Movement of Fourth Field Army Units, 17 July 1950, []
- 3/ Movement of Fourth Field Army Units, No. 2, 1 September 1950, []
No. 15; Movement of 50 Army Troops, 13 November 1950, []
- 4/ Movements of First Field Army Elements, 5 February 1951, []
Movement and Current Disposition of Second Field Army Elements, 7 March 1951, []
- 5/ [] 16th Army in Manchuria - Korea Theatre, 14 February 1952, []
- 6/ Code-Numbering System Used by [] 48th Army, 25 September 1951, []
[] Code-Numbering System of Armies in South China, 10 October 1951, []

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system of cover-numbers used by tactical air units made clear the regiment - division relationship and was essential to subsequent interpretation which included enciphered air traffic. 7/

First COMINT identifications of the Fourth Air Regiment, the 27th Air Regiment, the 3rd, 5th and 18th Air Divisions came from plain text traffic.

First reference to air training schools appeared in plain text in August, 1950 and formed the basis for solution of the Flight School cover-designation system and identification of schools. 8/

With current [redacted] plain text provides important supplementary information on air units in China and general support to the intelligence effort.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NAVAL

Except for limited information available from a small amount of Naval traffic passed [redacted] virtually all COMINT information on the [redacted] is derived from plain text messages passed on the Commercial Network. This includes information on command organization.

INSEPARABILITY OF PLAIN TEXT AND ENCIPHERED TRAFFIC PROCESSING

While plain text traffic provides extensive COMINT information on Chinese Communist military units and organizations -- in many cases most or all of that information -- under no circumstances can the processing and analysis of plain text link activity [redacted] To do so would damage not only the technical COMINT effort but seriously inhibit the production of intelligence from intercepted communications.

Processing of Far East targets is based on the recognition that crypt-analysis, traffic analysis and linguistic exploitation are mutually dependent and that the purpose of each, together, is to provide the maximum contribution possible to the reporting or intelligence operation.

Information derived from the day-to-day processing of plain text by analysts has enabled those analysts to accomplish and hasten solution of enciphered traffic.


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
EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Milton Zaslow.
AFSA-2303


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
FIELD ARMIES IDENTIFIED




ARMY GROUPS IDENTIFIED



ARMIES IDENTIFIED



DIVISIONS IDENTIFIED



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Friedman Files,
Folder: A 19-2/15 Brownell Committee