

10 January '52

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USCIB

SUBJECT: Measures for the Increased Security of COMINT

REFERENCE: USCIB 13/195

1. There is submitted herewith the report on this subject from the USCIB Security Committee prepared in compliance with the terms of reference provided by USCIB at its Special Meeting on 3 August 1951 and in consideration of problems of COMINT dissemination and collaboration which have arisen recently vis-a-vis NATO and the UK.

2. Copies of this report have been forwarded separately to the USCIB Coordinator for consideration by the US Delegation to the forthcoming ERUSA Conference.



ROBERT F. PACKARD  
Chairman, USCIB Security Committee

Enclosure

Staff Study, 10 Jan. '52  
with Encls 1 & 2

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-22-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

10 January 1952

REPORT BY THE SECURITY COMMITTEE OF USCIB

ON

MEASURES FOR THE INCREASED SECURITY OF COMINT

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider whether any changes should be made in the BRUSA COMINT regulations and practices in order to improve COMINT security and to increase the efficiency of the exploitation of COMINT sources.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. There follows a brief chronology of the development of this problem in USCIB:

- a. In December 1950 the Coordinator submitted a study on this subject to USCIB (13/134). This study was referred to the Security Committee.
- b. On 7 March 1951 the Security Committee submitted its first report on this subject (13/152) which dealt largely with matters of physical security, personnel, codification of security regulations and the establishment of a full-time USCIB security officer. This report was returned to the Security Committee for further study.
- c. On 30 March 1951 the Security Committee submitted its second report on this subject (13/163) which presented a proposal intended to simplify COMINT security practice through the reduction of the number of categories of COMINT material and the dissemination of certain products without existing COMINT controls. It was hoped that this new approach might have the effect of increasing the security of high grade COMINT products as well as improving the utilization of low-grade COMINT products. This report was returned to the Security Committee to document the application of this proposal.

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- d. On 11 July 1951 the Security Committee submitted its third report on this subject (13/195) which discussed those existing principles of COMINT security which should be changed and additional principles which should be adopted in order to apply in practice the general idea which had been presented in the preceding report. This report also included a proposed re-draft of Appendix B to the BRUSA Agreement. Certain aspects of this report were not accepted by the Board, and the report was returned to the Security Committee for further study in the light of specific terms of reference provided by the Chairman of the Board. (See the extract from the Minutes of the 67th Special Meeting of USCIB on 3 August 1951 which are attached hereto as Enclosure 1).

3. The Security Committee has reviewed its report of 11 July (13/195) in the light of these terms of reference and in the light of certain additional problems vis-a-vis the UK and NATO which have developed since that report was prepared in July, i.e. (a) the need to increase the use of tactical military communications in Korea; (b) the possibility that it may be necessary to provide BRUSA COMINT products to third party recipients in NATO; (c) proposals that a NATO COMINT service be established; (d) requirements for global collaboration in time of war; and (e) relationships with third parties. This report is directed primarily toward those aspects of COMINT security which affect the BRUSA Security Regulations and which should be discussed at the forthcoming BRUSA Conference. There is forwarded herewith as Enclosure 2 a re-draft of Appendix B of the BRUSA Agreement which incorporates those changes in the combined security regulations which the Security Committee now considers desirable.

4. The Security Committee considers that the general principles outlined in its report of 11 July (13/195) are valid and should be adopted by the Security Committee but has changed or withdrawn certain of the specific proposals contained in that report. These are:

- a. The proposed changes in the basic categories of COMINT. The definitions of these categories have now been changed with a view toward a more appropriate distribution of the various COMINT products among them.
- b. The proposal that these categories be further sub-divided into a number of classes of COMINT. It is felt now that there must be allowances for various classes of material within categories, but that the previous proposal was unduly complicated in that it required a considerable number of these classes at the outset.

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- c. The proposal that unenciphered tactical military traffic be excluded from COMINT. It is now felt that this type of material should be handled as COMINT, but under a separate set of controls which will allow for maximum use.
  - d. The proposal that there be a separate category of COMINT exclusively for plain-text material. It is now felt that this proposal would neither enhance security nor effectively increase the utilization of plain-text.
  - e. The proposal that COMINT codewords not be classified. It is now felt that codewords should be classified with the exception of an unclassified designator to be used in connection with "low-level" COMINT products.
  - f. The proposal that certain COMINT products might be disseminated regularly on an undisguised basis to unindocctrinated recipients. It is now felt that the increased utilization of certain COMINT products which might result if this proposal were adopted is outweighed by the security risks involved.
5. The basis changes to the ERUSA Security Regulations which are now considered desirable may be summarized briefly as follows:
- a. Material derived from press and propaganda broadcasts should be removed from under COMINT controls. (See paragraph 3 of the re-draft of Appendix B which is attached as Enclosure 2.)
  - b. There should be established four categories of COMINT (A, B, C and D) with allowance for the possible subdivision of each category into separate classes. (See paragraph 4 of the re-draft of Appendix B which is attached as Enclosure 2.)
- (1) At the outset these four categories would include the following:
- (a) Category A (Special Intelligence) -- that material now handled as "Special Intelligence".
  - (b) Category B (Traffic Intelligence) -- that material now handled as "Traffic Intelligence".
  - (c) Category C (Weather Intelligence) -- that weather material now handled as "Special Weather Intelligence" or "Traffic Intelligence".

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

- (d) Category D (low-level intelligence) -- tactical plain-text voice traffic, the results of DF on nets carrying this traffic, and such other combat plain-language communications as may be agreed subsequently between USGIB and LSIB. (See 13/214 of 7 November '51 which was approved by USGIB at its November Meeting.)



- c. Specific provision that COMINT products may be assigned to the various categories on the basis of either source or content. (See paragraph 4 of the re-draft of Appendix B which is attached as Enclosure 2.)
- d. Specific provision that indoctrination for COMINT should apply only to the particular categories or classes of COMINT to which the individual will require access on the basis of his "need-to-know". (See paragraph 8p of the re-draft of Appendix B which is attached as Enclosure 2.)
- e. Specific provision that standards for security investigation may differ as between categories A and B on the one hand and categories D and/or C on the other. (See paragraphs 8a and 8q of the re-draft of Appendix B which is attached as Enclosure 2.)
- f. Precise delineation of the conditions under which the various categories of COMINT are to be disseminated, particularly as regards emergency situations and "disguised" dissemination. (See paragraphs 17 through 20 of the re-draft of Appendix B which is attached as Enclosure 2.)
- (1) The practices to be applied to categories A, B, and C are substantially the same as those now in force for special intelligence, traffic intelligence and weather intelligence.
- (2) The practices proposed for category D envisage

a considerable number of recipients and provide for broad dissemination of this type of material to un-cleared recipients when suitably disguised.

(3) There is to be no dissemination of any category of COMINT on an undisguised basis to un-cleared recipients except under specific emergency conditions which are described within the security regulations.

- e. Specific provision that the US and UK will exchange statements of their investigative clearance standards for COMINT. (See paragraph 8 of the re-draft of Appendix B which is attached as Enclosure 2.)
- h. Provision for the use of an unclassified designator in connection with Category D (low-level) COMINT. (See paragraph 15 of the re-draft of Appendix B which is attached as Enclosure 2.) Codewords to be used in connection with the other categories of COMINT are to be classified and to be known only by individuals indoctrinated for those categories.
- i. Specific provision for the classification of materials in the various categories, i.e: Categories A, B, C and D to be classified TOP SECRET (codeword), SECRET (codeword), SECRET (codeword) and CONFIDENTIAL (unclassified designator) respectively. (See paragraph 16 of the re-draft of Appendix B which is attached as Enclosure 2.)

6. With regard to the specific terms of reference under which this report has been prepared (see Enclosure 1) it is felt that:

- a. The number of persons eligible to handle the higher categories of COMINT can be somewhat reduced, and that a means will exist to preclude the admission to the higher categories of the large number of persons who may become involved in handling low-level intelligence.
- b. The provision of an additional category for low-level intelligence to be handled on a less rigid basis will increase both the production and utilization of this type of material.
- c. The need to broaden the usefulness of plain-text is met insofar as possible without sacrificing security through the medium of the additional category of low-level intelligence and the specific provisions for disguised dissemination.

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- d. In establishing four separate categories of COMINT, it is not felt that the production and use of COMINT will be further complicated, but rather will be simplified and rendered more secure.
- e. The assignment of the various types of COMINT products to each of the four categories can be accomplished through the preparation of clear-cut lists of those cryptographic systems, communications systems and type of subject matter which are to be handled in the various categories.
- f. It is felt that the adoption of these new principles and procedures is not only feasible but necessary. This has already been demonstrated, for example, in the use of tactical military traffic in Korea. These principles should provide a clear-cut basis for meeting the complex requirements for dissemination of COMINT. They are sufficiently flexible to provide for those changes of emphasis among COMINT activities which have developed in recent years and may be further accentuated in the near future. They provide further for the necessary utilization of COMINT under emergency conditions.

CONCLUSIONS

- 7. It is concluded that the principles delineated in the Security Committee report of 11 July (13/195), as amended and described in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, are valid and should be adopted.
- 8. Because of the close relationships of these principles to the specific problems to be discussed at the forthcoming BRUSA Conference, the proposed re-draft of Appendix B should be considered carefully by the US Delegation in preparing its terms of reference for the Conference.
- 9. The specific assignment of various types of COMINT products to each of the four categories should be established by the USCIB Coordinator and GCRQ and agreed between USCIB and LSIB.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 10. It is recommended that:
  - a. The conclusions above be adopted by USCIB
  - b. The US Delegation to the forthcoming BRUSA Conference negotiate these changes to the BRUSA Security Regulations.

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18 December 1951

BASIC REFERENCES REGARDING THE SURVEY OFMEASURES TO INCREASE THE SECURITY OFCOMINTP A R T I

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|----|--------------|--------|--|---|
| 1. | 22 Dec. '50  | 13/134 | Staff Study by the Coordinator on "Measures for the Increased Security of COMINT".         | Referred to SECCOM.   |
| 2. | 7 March '51  | 13/152 | First SECCOM Report to USCIB on "Measures for the Increased Security of COMINT".           | Referred to SECCOM for further study.   |
| 3. | 30 March '51 | 13/163 | Second SECCOM Report to USCIB on "Measures for the Increased Security of COMINT".          | Returned to SECCOM for amplification.   |
| 4. | 11 July '51  | 13/195 | Third SECCOM Report to USCIB on "Measures for the Increased Security of COMINT".           | Returned to SECCOM for further study.   |
| 5. | 3 August '51 |        | Terms of reference for SECCOM's reconsideration of 13/195.                                 | Forwarded herewith as Enclosure 2.  |
| 6. | 11 Sept. '51 | 14/151 | SECCOM Report to USCIB on "Dissemination of COMINT to Foreign Nationals in NATO Commands". | USCIB acceptance still pending; report referred to the delegation for the forthcoming conference. |

Enclosure 1

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| 7.  | 17 Oct. '51 | SC B-30/35 | Memo from the Secretariat concerning "Procedure for the use of Codewords".   | Contained instructions from USCIB that SECCOM should consider, as a part of this survey, the multiple use of codewords. =    |
| 8.  | 7 Nov. '51  | 13/214     | SECCOM Recommendation to USCIB concerning a "Proposed change to the BRUSA Agreement affecting the security of COMINT". | Proposed change in paragraph 33a, Appendix B of the BRUSA Agreement with regard to tactical plain-test voice communications. |
| 9.  | 18 Dec. '51 |            | AFSS Proposal of 27 July concerning an "Additional Consideration for Proposed Category 'C' COMINT".                    | Forwarded herewith as Enclosure 3.   |
| 10. | 18 Dec. '51 |            | AFSS Proposal of 4 December concerning "USCIB 13/195 and Related Discussion".  | Forwarded herewith as Enclosure 4.   |

P A R T II

11. (See entry No. 1 above).  
 12. (See entry No. 2 above).  
 13. (See entry No. 5 above).

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| 14. | 21 Oct. '51 | SC B-30/36 | Undated Report by AFSA-12 to DIRAFSA concerning USCIB Directive No. 7.  | Referred to SECCOM by the Coordinator for consideration as a part of this survey. |
| 15. | 11 Dec. '51 | SC B-9/4   | SECCOM Recommendation to USCIB regarding the "Application of the Security Designator 'SECURITY INFORMATION'". | USCIB acceptance still pending.   |
| 16. | 18 Dec. '51 |            | AFSS Proposal of 27 July concerning the "Necessity for a Standard USCIB Identification Badge."                | Forwarded herewith as Enclosure 5.  |

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EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE 67th (SPECIAL) MEETING OF USCIB

3 August 1951

"The CHAIRMAN pointed out to Mr. Packard the following general principles which he thought should be used as guidance in the writing of a revised Security Committee report:

- "a. Increase the security of COMINT by reducing the number of persons who handle material in the highest category.
- "b. Explore the possibility of increasing the production of COMINT by relaxing, to some extent, the clearance standards for personnel who handle material in the lower categories.
- "c. If possible, without sacrificing security, broaden the usefulness of plain-text COMINT by allowing more latitude in its dissemination.
- "d. Determine the necessity for the adoption of more than two or three categories.
- "e. To insure the proper categorization of individual messages, and to minimize the loss of valuable information, devise, if possible, a standard template to be used by personnel charged with the responsibility of sorting COMINT material into categories.
- "f. Determine the feasibility\* of adopting new principles to increase the security of COMINT."

\*(Should be "necessity")

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Enclosure 2

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27 July 1951

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MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, USCIB Security Committee PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

SUBJECT: Additional Consideration for Proposed Category "C" COMINT

1. In further discussion of the necessity and feasibility of the proposed Categories of COMINT AFSS has submitted a draft paper to you which relates to Category "D" material. In connection with Category "C" material it is suggested that the following possibilities be considered.

2. At the present time it is understood that AFSA-2/6 discards



3. The value of this material to the U.S. would certainly appear to warrant serious consideration by USCIB. This information would be profitable in the field of propaganda and psychological warfare. It is believed that if this material were available to the Voice of America for example, programs could be presented which would unerringly indicate the breakdown in Soviet economy as well as areas of dissatisfaction and unrest, and even official police restriction. Inclusion of this material in the Voice of America programs would quite possibly spread consternation among the Soviet police agencies of MGB/NVD, and at the same time would appeal to the great mass of Soviet people who would find the Voice of America making specific reference to their personal problems.

4. It is therefore recommended that SECCOM consider the possibilities of this use of Category "C" COMINT material and request AFSA to prepare a study of the extent of the information of this type which is at present discarded without processing.

/s/ Thomas A. Miller  
THOMAS A. MILLER  
USAFSS MEMBER,  
Security Committee

Enclosure 3

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE

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WASHINGTON 25, D.C.~~TOP SECRET~~DRAFT~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Lynn

Subject: USCIB 13/195 and Related Discussion

1. For almost a year the USCIB Security Committee has been considering a number of proposals intended to increase the security of communications intelligence. At present a special Ad Hoc group of the Security Committee is considering proposals to categorize COMINT and in effect liberalize its dissemination by the creation of special categories or types of COMINT. It is felt that any approach along these lines does not in itself increase security but rather decreases security by increasing the dissemination.

2. It is recommended that consideration be given to an alternate proposal along the following lines:

Code words should be used to designate and protect three distinct types of material:

a. Disseminated communications intelligence, that is, intelligence derived from cryptanalysis, traffic analysis, or plain text exploitation. Such materials to be designated by a code word and classified top secret or secret according to the specific item of information contained and disseminated in strict accordance with the need to know only to specially cleared and indoctrinated intelligence consumers via authorized couriers or specially designated crypto systems. In no case would such finished intelligence contain sufficient identifying details to unquestionably reveal the specific foreign

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transmission or cryptographic system from which it is derived. Three chief types of materials exist, to each of which the need to know will determine the dissemination of the end produce: Type A, communications intelligence derived from top level cryptanalysis and traffic analysis to be classified top secret and designated by the dissemination code word; Type B, communications intelligence derived from lower level cryptanalysis and traffic analysis to be classified top secret or secret as appropriate and designated by the dissemination code word; and Type C, communications intelligence derived from plain-text exploitation and classified as top secret or secret as appropriate and designated by the dissemination code word.

b. Processing communications intelligence. Such materials to be designated by the processing code word and classified top secret, secret as appropriate. Various processing areas will exist, area A high level cryptanalysis and traffic analysis; area B lower level crypt and T/A; area C plain-text exploitation; Area D plain-language voice materials; etc. All such materials used in the production of COMINT will be closely held within designated major processing centers or field processing centers and messages relating to such materials will be transmitted only by authorized courier or in cryptographic systems held by such processing centers. Within each processing center strict compartmentalization will be the rule and dissemination between areas will be strictly determined by the need to know.

c. Planning, policy and administrative matters dealing with communications intelligence will be designated by a separate code word and classified top secret, secret, or confidential as appropriate.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

d. Communications security information, specifically material dealing with the communications security of the United States which reveals cryptanalytic or traffic analysis techniques whose revelation to unindoctrinated persons would pose a potential danger to the security of the communications involved and correlate evidence of foreign exploitation of U.S. communications through a foreign communications intelligence process will be designated by a code word and classified top secret, secret or confidential as appropriate. Such information would be released strictly on a need to know and only to authorized and indoctrinated communications security recipients. Information on foreign jamming of U.S. military communications derived from communications intelligence and not reading the specific communications intelligence processing involved will be considered to fall within the category to be disseminated by the communications security code word and to be classified as top secret, secret, or confidential.

e. Subsidiary designations; subsidiary dissemination or processing code words may be designated as required to delineate separate and self contained fields of COMINT each to be designated by a separate code word and classified top secret, secret, or confidential as appropriate. Among the fields which may require such delineation for dissemination purposes are:

1. Special weather intelligence.
2. Communications intelligence derived from plain text exploitation.
3. Special intelligence produced by a communications intelligence activity over which the BRUSA agencies have no control and for whose produce the BRUSA processing agencies can not guarantee authenticity.
4. Field COMINT of the type at present designated WHEEL.