

MEMO ROUTING SLIP

NECESSARY FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS,
CIRCUMSTANCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

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|---|--|----------|------------------|
| 1 | NAME OR TITLE <i>General Canine</i> | INITIALS | CIRCULATE |
| | ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION | DATE | COORDINATION |
| 2 | | | FILE |
| | | | INFORMATION |
| 3 | <i>Pat. attached</i> | | NECESSARY ACTION |
| | | | NOTE AND RETURN |
| 4 | <i>Pat. attached</i> | | SEE ME |
| | | | SIGNATURE |

REMARKS

Your comments at staff mtg this morning in re COMSEC leads me to send this to you as a matter of info. Will keep you advised as to what I learn. Have a feeling that some of the drying up of our COMINT sources may be attributable to this kind of leakage.

FROM NAME OR TITLE

Fredman

DATE

21 Aug 51

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

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TELEPHONE

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

14 August 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, AFSA

SUBJECT: Security of AFSA COMINT Communications

- References:
- (a) Memo from AFSA-OOB to AFSA-OOA, 14 April 1950, on same subject, with Comment No. 1, AFSA-OOA to AFSA-O4, 3 May 1950; and Comment No. 2, AFSA-O4 to AFSA-OOA.
 - (b) Memo from AFSA-O4 to AFSA-O2, Thru: AFSA-OOA and AFSA-OOB, 23 May 1950, on same subject, with Comment No. 2, AFSA-O2 to AFSA-O4, 2 June 1950, and Comment No. 3 from AFSA-OOB to AFSA-O4, Thru: AFSA-OOA, 7 June 1950.
 - (c) Memo from Technical Director, AFSA-O2 to AFSA-OOB, subject: Cryptosecurity of AFSA Communications, 17 April 1951.
 - (d) Memo from AFSA-OOB to AFSA-O2, 20 April 1951, commenting on reference (c).
 - (e) Memo from AFSA-OOX to AFSA-OOB, 26 April 1951, and from AFSA-13 to AFSA-OOB, 14 May 1951, commenting on reference (c).
 - (f) Summary Report on Security of AFSA Communications, 25 April 1951, prepared in AFSA-41.

1. The references are cited not only because of their direct bearing on the subject but also because the number of them indicates that the subject has been one of some concern for some time.

2. So far as I am aware, and so far as can be seen from the references, very few constructive steps have been taken thus far to correct a situation which appears to be quite dangerous to the security of our COMINT sources. Even if minor violations of COMSEC that are discovered in the usual surveillance exercised by AFSA-41 are corrected on a continuing basis, unless the basic problems involved in improvement are studied and answers obtained to them, our COMSEC situation will probably continue to be defective. To have this sort of a situation exist at the fountain head of COMSEC within and for all the Armed Forces seems to me to call for prompt attention and action, since the example set by AFSA would hardly be a salutary one for the Services.

3. Information and comments from AFSA-O4 on this subject would be helpful.

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN
AFSA-OOT

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