

## MEMO ROUTING SLIP

REF ID: A57050

FOR USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS,  
CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1 NAME OR TITLE	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DATE	COORDINATION
2		FILE
		INFORMATION
3		NECESSARY ACTION
		NOTE AND RETURN
4		SEE ME
		SIGNATURE
REMARKS		
<p>3 Jan</p> <p>Capt M - Pse look this over I will have a talk.</p> <p>I think capt. Goodwin's answer is good. He is getting closer, sooner, to the real issue than anticipated. I think it obvious that, between the lines, capt. Goodwin has cited a need as fundamental as, and similar to, the basic intent of your D/F. 13 Jan</p>		
FROM NAME OR TITLE	DATE	
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	TELEPHONE	

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-16-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 95

Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 Apr 48, and AFHQ Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used.

16-48487-4 GPO

TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTN (4)

<b>MEMO ROUTING SLIP</b>		REF ID: A57050	
NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS			
1	NAME OR TITLE <i>Mr. Friedman</i>	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DATE	COORDINATION
2			FILE
			INFORMATION
3			NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE
REMARKS <i>Take a look at these comments, I have some definite ideas on the problem which I would like to discuss with you</i>			
FROM NAME OR TITLE		DATE <i>28 DEC 1954</i>	
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION <i>e/s</i>		TELEPHONE	

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : C/S <sup>A</sup>  
DCTS

FROM : IG

DATE: 14 December 54

SUBJECT: Comments on Mr. Friedman's memo of 3 Nov. 54 on "Compromises of COMINT Due to Ineffective COMSEC".

1. You ask if I have any comments on this either as a result of my trip or otherwise. As a result of my trip I can say categorically, in answer to Friedman's 6f(1), that the IGs of the Services, including those of the cryptologic agencies, have no effect on COMINT operations except impedance. There are two reasons for this:

- a. They know nothing about the operational and technical end, and hence concentrate their whole attention on Service directives as distinguished from NSA directives. Their principal interests are the mess, cleanliness, utilization of the library, the accuracy of supply accounting, the Troop Information Program, all that. This, not COMINT operational effectiveness, is what the CO and his people get marked and promoted on.
- b. They operate under the existing Service philosophy of the IG as an official whose responsibility totally ends when he has found deviations from the letter of the rules, enforced "rectification", and clamped down on the deviators. (Typical example: one station had slightly altered a receiver, under NSA-62 guidance, to make it function better with certain of our special R/P equipment. A Service IG made them change it back. Don't ask me how he knew. He probably made the CO fill out a questionnaire including something like the following. "List any equipments in your command in which non-standard alterations have been made". And the CO foolishly did so.)

In answer to Friedman's 6f(2), let us, by all means, for reasons above and others which follow below, refrain rigidly and forever from taking any such steps. Some further thoughts follow.

2. I see in Friedman's memo. such phrases as "An OIG of COMSEC functions--" (referring to some officer attached to a COMINT unit), "--to assure that COMSEC people are consciously aware--" (again referring to people in a COMINT outfit), "In regard to inspections of COMSEC activities--" (by context obviously referring to checks of compliance with COMSEC rules within COMINT activities). I wonder whether we are not a little confused, all the way up and down the line?

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There are OICs of COMSEC activities in NSA-40; there is a COMSEC activity at Vint Hill, another at Kelly AFB; there are various COMSEC activities run by the Services, which monitor our own communications and advise the commanders they serve accordingly; every one of the Services' crypto-repair facilities performs COMSEC functions. But nowhere else in the Services are there any COMSEC functions, or COMSEC activities, or OICs thereof; there are only communications activities, part of whose duty is to use properly the devices and rules of COMSEC as one of the tools with which they communicate. A crypto-center boss isn't the OIC of a "COMSEC activity" any more than a destroyer navigator is an ephemerist, or a cruiser gunnery officer the chief of an ordnance outfit. I implied above that "we" might be confused, and I said "we" advisedly, not meaning Friedman as an individual. Our confusion, I believe, is apparent in the place that we give NSA-40 in the crypto-security of COMINT communications. I suggest that the crypto security of COMINT communications is, under the Director, Enderlin's business, and the business of the COs of the various stations, assisted by their communicators; and that 40 should have exactly the same place in this that he has in the communications of CINCPAC with his ships, CG 7th Army with his tanks, and SAC with his B47s, that is, a provider of means and an expert advisor (and one that Enderlin is lucky to have so convenient, but who is, nevertheless, in the business on call by Enderlin, not otherwise).

3. Now getting back to the IG philosophy, who should inspect to see whether a certain NSA Branch is keeping its WD80 cards up to date? Why the Division Chief, the Office Chief, the appropriate Deputy Director, and the Director, all assisted by PERS, of course! Who should inspect the Branch's supply records? The same line officials, assisted by NSA-17. Who its security? The same, with Reynolds's boys as the experts this time. Who should inspect a station's training in and compliance with COMSEC rules? The same people who should inspect its communications; viz, the CO, his CO, his CO, and maybe DIRNSA, each and every one assisted by his expert on the subject, his Communicator. What place has the IG in this? A good question, deserving a paragraph of its own.

4. A primary duty of Command is inspection, and Staff is Command's resource for the purpose; in fact I may say that inspection, determining the extent to which plans and policies and orders are being executed, is Staff's "other" big job, the first being, of course, to formulate the plans, policies, and orders. Certainly it follows that each element of Staff should inspect the details in which it is the expert, and the Staff is actually so charged in all of the manuals, industrial as well as military. What, then, is left for an entity whose stated duty is inspection and nothing but inspection? There are only two things to be inspected - - orders and performance. Since performance is already taken care of, the only thing left for an exclusive inspecting entity to inspect is orders; this means that the IG's real duty

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is to inspect Staff, to inspect plans and policies, to inspect the quality of direction from the top. He is a device for self-inspection. This has been lost sight of in the Services, the evolution of the present Service IG being, I suppose, something like this:

- a. "The Chief, PERS, is 'responsible' for the administration of personnel." (This is probably to be found either in the organization manual or in the unwritten, unconscious premises of every command on earth. And it is not true, and cannot, by the nature of Staff, ever be true.)
- b. (With the premise of a., above). "An official cannot effectively inspect that for which he is responsible. One cannot be trusted to inspect himself." (If you will change this to read "for which he is immediately responsible" I might buy it, with reservations; but not hooked up to that false premise.)
- c. "Ergo the Chief, PERS, cannot inspect the administration of personnel". (Then, since one of his primary jobs is inspection, what does he inspect - - the preservation of archives?)
- d. "Therefore we have to have something called an Inspector to inspect with." (And once we have him, everything bearing the label "inspection" gets automatically shunted to him, the way I once saw a despatch about a new air-compressor routed to the Station's "Air Officer".)

The IG in the Services has thus become the only Staff man who inspects, or, at best, the man under whom the other Staff people go through a sort of formalized, periodical walk-through of what should be fully half of their own jobs.

5. I will, of course, if ordered, cease inspecting orders and undertake the inspection of performance. But in that case I shall request that I be provided with the following additional force:

- a. Half of the NSA Staff.
- b. About ten carefully selected high-graders from PROD.
- c. Ditto from COMSEC.
- d. Ditto from COM.

  
E. S. L. GOODWIN  
Captain, U. S. Navy

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