

Suspense

15 May

J.O. Jara
203. Red

15 Apr. - O'Gara;
g-v to do nothing -
cait without indicating
down on others. I told him about very
recent Winchell leak.

MEMO ROUTING SLIP

FOR USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS,
CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1	NAME OR TITLE <i>Mr. O'Hara</i>	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION <i>Room 1400 B Bldg</i>	DATE	COORDINATION
2	<i>AHS</i>	<i>1</i>	FILE
			INFORMATION
3			NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE

REMARKS

I have not been able to find what you're seeking but this does not mean that some disclosure(s) weren't made. It would take an exhaustive search to exclude the possibility. Does your library maintain any kind of files that might help - especially the ones

FROM NAME OR TITLE

J. Friedman

DATE

19 7 52

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

TELEPHONE

dealing with the investigation
 made at that time or
 soon after the voyage. I
 know how investigation was
 made & maybe the
 newspapers & periodicals
 of that period might
 contain some references.
 Some I can't be
 more specific I used to
 maintain a file of research
 has been kept up when I first
 collected in that sort of
 work.

J

MEMO ROUTING SLIP

NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS,
CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1	NAME OR TITLE <i>Adm. Wenger</i>	INITIALS <i>AW</i>	CIRCULATE
	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION <i>V/DIR</i>	DATE <i>16 FEB 1953</i>	COORDINATION
2	<i>Mr. Friedman</i>		FILE
			INFORMATION
3			NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE

REMARKS

Mr. O'Gara brought this to me. Article by Hanson Baldwin contains serious violations of COMINT security. I have been asked to indicate whether the Comint situation relative to Battle of the Bulge has ever been disclosed before. Am investigating. Please (over) return this copy.

FROM NAME OR TITLE <i>Friedman</i>	DATE <i>9 Feb 53</i>
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	TELEPHONE

Am sending ~~this~~ to you at once
so you can be prepared for an
approach from BLO - I
imagine he will be instructed
to do so.

J.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CANOE

53-28/S/ASST

Copy 386

5 MAR 1953

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. O'GARA, Technical Consultant, SRB, G-2,
Room 1400 "B" Building, AHS

SUBJECT: Hanson Baldwin Article in February 1953 Issue of USA
Combat Forces Journal

1. I am inclosing a copy of a report from NSA-94 on the subject.
I have but two or three comments thereon:

a. I concur in the conclusions of the report.

b. With reference to par. II 1 (e), I think it a bit far-fetched to deduce an implication that we "possibly mounted a successful effort against Russian communications," merely from the statement by Baldwin that "the deficiencies of much of this 'high level stuff'--which gave for instance the strategic situation on the Russian front ...".

c. With reference to par. II 4, the letter from General Marshall to Governor Dewey (25 September 1944), which was given wide publicity when General Marshall was forced to release it, and which was published in the Report of the Joint Congressional Investigation of the Attack on Pearl Harbor, contains statements which certainly reveal very significant information regarding U.S. successes against Germany in the COMINT field during World War II. I append hereto a copy of that letter and have side-lined portions of interest in this connection.

2. I have not been successful in finding in any public record anything which discloses the COMINT information revealed in the subject article, at least as regards the Battle of the Bulge. But this does not mean that there has been no disclosure other than that contained in the subject article. Only a very exhaustive search would bring positive or negative indications.

3. a. The following is quoted from page VII of the Foreword to Dark December: the full account of the Battle of the Bulge, by Robert E. Merriman /Ziff-David Publishing Company, 1947/:

"Out of it all came five long, detailed volumes describing the Battle of the Bulge. From my notes, through access to these volumes which are available in the War Department, from other unclassified documents now available, and from papers which I had collected during this work, the factual basis of this story is gathered."

b. Although the above-quoted extract appears to indicate that the five-volume history of the Battle of the Bulge in the files of the War Department contains only unclassified information, it may be worthwhile to scan these volumes to make sure that there are no

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5 MAR 1953

references, even thinly veiled ones, to the part played in that Battle by COMINT, or rather the lack of it.

4. Another article on the Battle of the Bulge, also by Hanson Baldwin, which appeared in the New York Sunday Times Magazine, 15 December 1946, has also been examined but I find no references to COMINT therein.

5. In my opinion, in security breaches of this nature, some of the burden of proof of non-violation should be placed upon the suspected violator. In other words, it might be advisable and warranted to ask the person at whom the finger is pointed in instances of this kind to produce previously published material or references, in order to absolve himself of responsibility for the initial security breach involved.

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN
Special Assistant

2 Incls:

1. Photostat copy of
NSA-94 rpt, TS Codeword.
2. Copy of Dewey-Marshall ltr, TS.

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~

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REF ID: A66479

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Memorandum for: Mr. William Friedman, Technical Director, National Security Agency

From : NSA-924 (Thru Channels) 92/PH 90/RK

Subject : Report on Information of Possible Compromise of United States COMINT Activity

This report, submitted for your consideration, represents the findings of one senior analyst who spent four days searching open sources & in consultations. It is patently impossible to search every available open source in this period of time, and to that extent this report is incomplete. However, the opinions of those individuals who were connected with the United States effort against the World War II Germans, all of who could not recollect any previously published account of U.S. successes against the Germans, should be of value in assessing this possible compromise.

I. The Problem:

In the February, 1953 issue of the United States Army Combat Forces Journal, an article, "Battlefield Intelligence", written by Hanson N. Baldwin, makes reference to United States Communications Intelligence activities. (Inclosure #1 contains pertinent extracts) Research was undertaken to determine if these references represent a security breach, and if so, the extent of the security breach.

II. Facts Bearing on the Problem:

1. On the basis of information contained in the article, it is thought that a foreign intelligence analyst could deduce that:

- (a) A "low-level" (tactical COMINT), and a "high-level" (Magic) effort was mounted by the United States against German communications.
- (b) The "low-level" effort was a responsibility of lower echelons; the "Magic" effort a responsibility of higher echelons.
- (c) Success was obtained by the United States in both fields.
- (d) Higher echelons closely guarded the flow of "Magic" to lower echelons.
- (e) The United States possibly mounted a successful effort against Russian Communications, or German communications on the Russian front, or a combination of both.

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

2. This information, combined with information about "Magic" contained in the Proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Investigation, should enable a foreign analyst to determine the general level and character of the United States cryptanalytic effort against the Germans in 1944-45.

3. If the intelligence analyst of a foreign government had access to captured German cryptographic machines, devices, and interrogations of German personnel, he should be able to deduce more exactly the nature of U.S. successes with high-grade German cryptographic systems.

4. A search of open sources such as newspapers, magazines, books, and World War II histories, thus far does not reveal any significant information regarding United States successes against Germany in the COMINT field during World War II.

5. Qualified individuals intimately acquainted with United States COMINT activity, particularly the effort against the Germans, were consulted regarding Mr. Baldwin's article. These individuals, Mr. Oliver Kirby, NSA-72, Dr. Carl P. Klitzke, NSA-71B2, and Dr. Roy Johnson, NSA-71B1, were of the opinion that the article represented a considerable compromise of United States COMINT activity which ranged from "moderate" to "substantial" in importance.

6. Dr. Roy Johnson, NSA-71B1, stated that to the best of his ability to recollect, the term "Magic" was applied to reports issued from Washington and not in the European Theater of Operations. Such reports may have contained high grade German material. Mr. Baldwin's use of the term "Magic", could therefore stem from information revealed in the Proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Investigation.

III. Conclusions:

1. Mr. Hanson N. Baldwin's article "Battlefield Intelligence" contains authentic references about United States COMINT activity against the Germans which constitute a breach of security.

2. The importance of this breach is substantial when the information in his article is studied in conjunction with previously published information about United States Communication Intelligence activities and successes and this must be assumed to be the case.

Incl: 1

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Inclosure #1

UNITED STATES ARMY

COMBAT FORCES

JOURNAL

February 1953

THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE AS A CASE HISTORY

.....

Radio deception for some units was practiced extensively, and the Sixth Panzer Army -- the key unit upon which the success of the offensive depended -- observed complete radio silence for at least three weeks before the start of the operation. (page 33).

Perhaps most important of the "straws in the wind" was the interception and decoding of a German message (by the 12th Army Group G2) about two weeks before the attack, which ordered certain Luftwaffe units to reconnoiter the Meuse River bridges. (page 35).

.....

Another and more basic failure was the inadequacy of collection; we just did not get all the facts that were available. There was a variety of reasons for this.

In General Sibert's words "we may have put too much reliance on certain technical types of intelligence, such as signal intelligence . . . and we had too little faith in the benefits of aggressive and unremitting patrolling by Combat troops. We had no substitute, either, for aerial reconnaissance when the weather was bad; and when we came up to the Siegfried Line, our agents had great difficulty in getting through, particularly in the winter".

Dependence upon "Magic", or signal intercepts, was major, particularly at higher echelons; when the Germans maintained radio silence, our sources of information were about halved. (page 40).

.....

Higher echelon G2s, privy to a flow of information from "Magic", British Intelligence, OSS, and others, often incorporated so much in their reports that front-line combat units received a plethora of data, much of it of little use to them; the lower-level G2 had great difficulty in separating the chaff from the wheat.

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Inclosure #1

- 2 -

The deficiencies of much of this "high level stuff" -- which gave for instance the strategic situation on the Russian front, and described the psychology of the Rhinelanders -- is best illustrated in the official words of Major Philipsborn (Summary of Intelligence, 27 May 1945):

"While it is perhaps an exaggeration, nevertheless there is a certain amount of truth in the statement that while we knew to a nicety where bridges, fords and brothels were located in towns all around us, we rarely, if ever... knew where the enemy's anti-tank gun was sited."

(pages 40-41).

REF ID: A66479

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