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8 December 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. PARK ARMSTRONG JR., DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. In accordance with telephone conversation, I send you herewith (Inclosure 1) a copy of a teletype message dated 29 November 1954 from our Colonel Lansing, who is the NSA Liaison Officer at the Pentagon.

2. The official documents published on the hearings pertaining to the various Pearl Harbor investigations do not include solved Japanese messages beyond December 1941. So far as I am aware, the text of the Tojo message referred to in Inclosure 1 has never been published. This does not mean that references to the Tojo message or even the text itself may not appear in some history written since the close of World War II and now in the public domain.

3. However, there has been at least one disclosure or "leak" on the Tojo message--on one of Drew Pearson's broadcasts seven years ago, as evidenced by Inclosure 2.

4. We will delay giving any answer to JID until we hear from you.

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN
Special Assistant

2 Incls:
a/s

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THE Forrestal DIARIES

on the way over [to the Potsdam Conference] by people who accompany the President—Bohlen among others—who reflect the view that we cannot afford to hold out any clarification of terms to Japan which could be construed as a desire to get the Japanese war over with before Russia has an opportunity to enter.

This last was something of a new note. Up to that time the anxiety had all been lest Russia should fail to enter, leaving us "committed and frozen," as Admiral Leahy had put it at a White House meeting, "to the concept of unconditional surrender, maintenance of which might prove extremely costly to us." The idea that it would probably be far harder to keep the Russians out of the Pacific war than to bring them in had been broached by Harriman in May,⁵ but was not yet widely accepted. Already, however, the first hints were coming that the Japanese collapse might be more imminent than had been supposed.

13 July 1945

Japanese Peace Feeler

The first real evidence of a Japanese desire to get out of the war came today through intercepted messages from Togo, Foreign Minister, to Sato, Jap Ambassador in Moscow, instructing the latter to see Molotov if possible before his departure for the Big Three meeting [the Potsdam Conference], and if not then, immediately afterward, to lay before him the Emperor's strong desire to secure a termination of the war. This he said arose not only out of the Emperor's interest in the welfare of his own subjects but out of his interest toward mankind in general. He was anxious, he said, to see cessation of bloodshed on both sides. Togo said to convey to the Russians the fact that they wanted to remain at peace with Russia, that the Japanese did not desire permanent annexation of any of the territories they had conquered in Manchuria. Togo said further that the unconditional surrender terms of the Allies was about the only thing in the way of termination of the war and he said that if this were insisted upon, of course the Japanese would have to continue the fight.

Sato's response . . . was to protest that the proposals were

See p. 77.

quite unrealistic; looked at objectively it was clear that there was no chance now of dividing Russia from the other Allies, that the agreement on Poland, on Chapultepec and the Conference at San Francisco showed that England, Russia and the United States were determined to act in concert. Togo's response was that, regardless of Sato's views, he still desired him to carry out his instructions.

It was a difficult and delicate situation. We were already on the eve of the Potsdam Conference, which convened on July 17, just four days later. The American ability to read the Japanese codes, which had played a decisive part in several critical passages of the war, was now revealing the inmost struggles of Japanese policy as it faced inevitable defeat. How best to deal with this situation, which involved Soviet and American aims as well as the confusions of the Japanese and the possibility that if pressed too hard they would still choose to go down in a suicidal defense, was not an easy question.

15 July 1945

Japanese Peace Feeler

Messages today on Japanese-Russian conversations. Togo, Foreign Minister, insisted that Sato present to Molotov the request of the Emperor himself. Sato's replies insistently pointed out the lack of reality in Togo's apparent belief that there is a chance of persuading Russia to take independent action on the Eastern war. He stated very bluntly and without any coating how fantastic is the hope that Russia would be impressed by Japanese willingness to give up territory which she had already lost. . . . Throughout Sato's message ran a note of cold and realistic evaluation of Japan's position; and he said that the situation was rapidly passing beyond the point of Japan's and Russia's cooperating in the security of Asia but [that the question was] rather whether there would be any Manchukuo or even Japan itself left as entities. The gist of his final message was that it was clear that Japan was thoroughly and completely defeated and that the only course open was quick and definite action recognizing such fact. . . .

It is significant that these conversations began before there

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THE FORRESTAL PAPERS

could have been much effect from the thousand-plane raids of the Third Fleet and several days before the naval bombardment of Kamaishi.

Forrestal's reference here was to the naval operations, beginning on July 10, in which Japan's communications, industries, coastal installations and the remnants of her fleet were hit with air bombing and naval artillery, delivered, in the words of the official report, by "the greatest mass of sea power ever assembled."

These conversations also took place nearly a month before the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

On the 24th Forrestal dictated further notes on these Japanese messages:

24 July 1945

Japanese Peace Feeler

... Finally, on the first of July, Sato sent a long message outlining what he conceived to be Japan's position, which was in brief that she was now entirely alone and friendless and could look for succor from no one. . . . He strongly advised accepting any terms, including unconditional surrender, on the basis that this was the only way of preserving the entity of the Emperor and the state itself. . . .

The response to his message was that the Cabinet in council had weighed all the considerations which he had raised and that their final judgment and decision was that the war must be fought with all the vigor and bitterness of which the nation was capable so long as the only alternative was the unconditional surrender.

Three days later Forrestal was in Paris on his way—uninvited—to the Potsdam Conference. These intercepted telegrams can only have convinced him that he and Crew were right in their belief that a willingness to preserve the Emperor would open the way to a Japanese surrender which in most other respects would be in effect "unconditional." Carelessly enough, Forrestal did not enter in his diary the text of the draft statement which he had been directed at the State War Navy meeting on June 26 to have prepared; even more carelessly, in his extensive notes on the

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35—M O N O—GGG

BEGINNING OF INSERT ON GALLEY 132 AAA

No. 89ba

84C 7363/7-1245 . Telegram

The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State, July 12, 1945~~SECRET~~

BUCHAREST, July 12, 1945—1 p. m.

URGENT

[Received July 13--4 a. m.]

465. In connection with negotiations relative creation Soviet-Rumanian petroleum company (reference my telegram 456 of July 8¹) I have just received from a reliable source copy of letter dated

¹ Document No. 85aa.

July 3 addressed to Prime Minister Groza by General Susaikov as Deputy President of AIC [ACC] which in English translation reads as follows:

"This is to bring to your knowledge that the shares of the Rumanian petroleum societies which belonged to the Germans, enumerated in the annexed table, pass into the patrimony of the Soviet Union as partial compensation for damages caused to USSR by Germany.

"In view of this please take the necessary measures on behalf of Rumanian Govt to turn over the rights to the above mentioned shares to Government of the USSR which has charged the association 'CCR Petrol' to take over these shares".

Following is annexed list of companies followed by the value of shares: Hunas Peranta—14,900,000; Explora—59,100,000; IRDP—145,500,000; Columbia—325,000,000; Concordia—755,800,000; Meotica Romano—21,300,000; Petrol Block—285,500,000; Sardep—23,300,000; Sarpetrol—3,490,000; Ranspetrol—4,500,000; Continental—100,000,000;

It was previously reported that during discussions Criticov informed Tatarescu it has been agreed upon at Yalta that USSR should have undisputed disposition over shares of all German interests in Rumanian petroleum companies including "Concordia and Columbia" but, it will be noted, no mention is made of this in Susaikov's letter.

It is believed Department will desire repeat text this telegram to Moscow.

MELBOURNE

END OF INSERT ON GALLEY 132 AAA

BEGINNING OF INSERT ON GALLEY 140 AAA

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs: ~~TOP SECRET~~ **REF ID: A6642** The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato), July 12, 1945¹

¹ Reprinted from International Military Tribunal for the Far East, "Record of Proceedings" (mimeographed), pp. 23,590-23,592. This message was intercepted and decoded by United States authorities and its contents were known to Forrester on July 13. See Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrester Diaries* (New York, 1951), p. 74; cf. pp. 75-76. It seems probable that a report concerning this document and document No. 91y (and perhaps other messages between Togo and Sato) was contained in the paper on Japanese peace feelers which reached Blumson at the Berlin Conference on July 16. See document No. 402a, footnote 3.

[Translation]

[Telegram No. 893] With reference to my telegram No. 891, et al.

* Not printed.

Having received no report on your interview with Molotov, I feel like our marching out troops without sufficient reconnaissance, but it is considered proper to convey to the Soviet Union, prior to the commencement of the Three-Power Conference, the Imperial wish to end the war. I hope that you will make explanation to the following effect directly to Molotov:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, being solicitous over the increasing calamity and damage of the war to the belligerent countries, desires that the war should promptly be brought to an end. Nevertheless, so long as Britain and the United States adhere to the demand for Japan's unconditional surrender in the Greater East Asia War, there is no other way for Japan but to fight through the war at all hazards for the honor and existence of the country. It is much against our will to shed more blood of belligerent nations for that reason. His Majesty hopes to restore peace as soon as possible for the sake of the happiness of mankind.

The above Imperial wishes are rooted, not only in His Majesty's benevolence to his subjects, but in his hearty desire for the happiness of mankind, and he intends to dispatch Prince Konoye Fumimaro as special envoy to the Soviet Union, bearing his personal letter. You are directed, therefore, to convey this to Molotov, and promptly obtain from the Soviet Government admission into that country for the special envoy and his suite. (The list of members of the special envoy's suite will be cabled later.) Further, though it is not possible for the special envoy to reach Moscow before the Russian authorities leave there for the Three-Power Conference, arrangements must be made so that the special envoy may meet them as soon as they return to Moscow. It is desired, therefore, that the special envoy and his suite make the trip by plane. You will request the Soviet Government to send an airplane for them as far as Manchouli or Tsitsihar.²

² Togo informed Sato in a further telegram of July 13 that the Soviet Ambassador in Japan had been informed of the "Imperial wish to end the war" and had "promised to telegraph promptly about the matter to his Government."

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36—M O N O—GGG

No. 91x

The Imperial Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, July 13, 1941

(Translation)

[Telegram No. 1387] Reference to my telegram No. 1383²

¹ Reprinted from *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 10. (For the English text, see *Proceedings of the Joint Fact-Finding Commission*, pp. 23-29, 215-216. Cf. document No. 51x, footnote 1.)

² Not printed.

Although I promptly asked Molotov for an interview, he replied to the effect that, as circumstances would by no possibility admit of a meeting, I should discuss the matter with Lozovsky. Thereupon, I met Lozovsky at 5 P. M. on the 13th, and presented His Majesty's wishes, contained in your telegram No. 893,³ translated into Russian,

³ Document No. 91x.

together with my confidential letter addressed to Molotov, asking Lozovsky to transmit them, after perusal, to Molotov without delay. The letter referred to the Imperial wish to dispatch Prince Konoye, mentioned in your telegram, and asked that the Soviet Government give assent to the visit of the Prince and kindly afford conveniences to the Japanese Government by placing an aeroplane at its service.

I explained, on that occasion, that the special envoy Japan is now intending to send, being dispatched in accordance with His Majesty's wishes, is quite different in character from those projected envoys in the past who were successively submitted to Molotov, and expressed our desire that the Soviet Government should fully understand this point. I added that the Japanese Government, being anxious to obtain the consent, in principle at least, of the Soviet Government in this matter, hoped to receive the reply before the departure of Molotov, and to make arrangements so that the special envoy [could] meet the Soviet authorities as soon as they returned from Berlin.

As Lozovsky asked to whom the message of the Emperor was directed, I answered that, though the message was not addressed to any special person for the reason that it conveyed the Imperial wishes, we hoped that it would be transmitted to Kalinin, the head of the Soviet Government, Stalin, Chairman of the Board of People's Commissars, and Molotov. Lozovsky stated that he understood the reasons why the Japanese Government was in such haste and wished to urge the reply of the Soviet Government in compliance with Japan's desire, but that it was practically impossible to make a reply prior to the departure of Molotov as a part of the Russian delegation was expected to leave that very evening. I thereupon expressed my desire that, inasmuch as the preparations had to be made for the dispatch of the special envoy and his suite, the reply be given on consultation with Berlin by telephone or other means if it was impossible to reply before Molotov's departure. Lozovsky answered me that he intended to arrange it as I desired, and promised to bring to Molotov immediately the documents I carried.

I hasten to make report as above.⁴

⁴ Sato informed Telegram No. 1387 on July 19 that Lozovsky had informed him on July 18 that the Imperial wishes and the message of the Emperor of Japan were "not" and contains no concrete proposal" and that the Soviet Government was "not" able to give any definite reply as to either the message of the Emperor or the question of the Special Envoy Prince Konoye. No definite reply was given in Sato's telegram of July 19 was available to the United States in Berlin.