



On 1 June, Colonel John C. Arrowsmith assumed command of the Army Security Agency, relieving Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke, who left for assignment in the Far East. Colonel Arrowsmith served in this Agency as Comptroller and Deputy in turn before being assigned as Chief. He has had a long career in the Corps of Engineers and served in the China-Burma-India Theater and the European Theater during World War II.

He assumed command of the 45th Engineer Regiment on 1 April 1942 at Camp Blanding, Florida, and on 8 May was promoted to the grade of Colonel; he departed with this unit on 28 May for CBI. From October 1942, until late in 1943 he was engaged in the Ledo Road Project.

On 10 December 1942 Base Section No. 3, SOS, US AF, CBI, was activated and Colonel Arrowsmith was designated as its first Commanding Officer.

On 25 June 1943 he was made a Brigadier General and was named Commanding General of the Base Section and the Ledo Road Project.

In January 1944 he joined XXI Corps, as Corps Engineer, and went to ETO with the unit. In this assignment he saw combat service in the Rhineland Campaign and the Campaign of Central Europe.

Colonel Arrowsmith was also District Engineer of the Berlin District and assisted in rebuilding facilities for U. S. troops in Berlin.

Returning from Europe in December 1947, he was assigned to Fort Belvoir as Director of Research and Development and Commanding Officer of the Research and Development Laboratory.

On 1 August 1949 he was assigned to duty with the Army Security Agency.

He has attended Command and Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Engineer School, and the Army Industrial College. His decorations include the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Croix de Guerre with Palm. He is author of articles on sunken ships and Industrial Mobilization.

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# Fooling The Enemy

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

THE FIRST OF A SERIES ON TACTICAL DECEPTION  
DURING WORLD WAR II

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## NAVY COMMUNICATIONS DECEPTION OF JAPAN

One of the most interesting and significant instances of use of communications deception in World War II was that of the Third Fleet's attack on northern Japan in July, 1945. During this month the Third Fleet under Admiral Halsey was to begin a series of operations against the mainland of Japan, designed to destroy enemy naval and air forces, shipping, shipyards, coastal industrial centers, and empire transportation facilities. The Japanese Air Forces, particularly the growing number of suicide planes which had exacted such a heavy toll of our naval supporting forces in the Okinawa campaign, constituted a real threat to the Fleet operations which were to supplement the increasing B-29 sorties against industrial targets.

The initial offensive of the Third Fleet was a carrier based air strike against the Tokyo area on 10 July. Radio silence and the usual high-speed run to the launching point for the strike was planned for this phase; the Fleet's approach to be screened by submarines under instructions to destroy without warning any enemy picket located. The second offensive was to be a carrier-based strike against Northern Hokkaido on 13 July. In order to cause the Japanese to misinterpret the intention of striking this second objective and to divert the enemy's plane strength to the south, tactical deception was planned. The mission of the planned deception operation would be to simulate radio transmissions of the Third Fleet supposedly in fictional movement from the Tokyo area, after the Tokyo attack, on 10 and 11 July, toward a southern position where strikes could be launched against Kyushu, and thereafter a withdrawal of the Fleet to the Southeast. Attempts were to be made to deceive enemy communication analysts by submarine radio transmission south of Kyushu which were generally interpreted by enemy radio traffic analysts as one of the fleet "cue" immediately preceding a carrier strike. To complete the deception, a heavy strike would be made on Kyushu by carrier-type planes actually based on Okinawa. Meanwhile, the Third Fleet would in fact be enroute for the assault on Northern Honshu and Southern Hokkaido.

A deception plan of this scope requires expert coordination and timing, in order that the information to form to the planned deception story. Complete coordination, effected by a central command organization within which there is a staff cognizance of the plans and their implementation, is absolutely necessary as well as accurate radio (keyed) and voice deception. In the TUSCON OPERATION, this coordination required timing arrangements for ship-shore radio key and also for press releases, official communiques, and correspondent's stories, in order not to compromise completion of the deception.

### Background Preparation

For Radio and Voice deception, adequate and timely preparation by well-trained personnel is essential. There must be particular emphasis on complete, advance analysis of all pertinent radio circuits and "typing" of radio operators so that there will be no abnormal disruption of the desired pattern of traffic. The first radio transmission of a deception unit normally should be from the approximate position of the unit to be simulated, or at a distance from the position which is roughly consistent with the elapsed time and normal speed of advance. Arrangements with the units to be simulated must be made and directives must insure against radio indications of the actual "home base" of those units.

In preparation for this particular deception operation, it was requested that the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area arrange for the carrier-type plane strike on Kyushu from the Okinawa base, and for the submarine radio transmissions off Kyushu. This request was granted and the necessary directives were issued. Also, especially trained communication security unit personnel were supplied to assist in planning and implementing the radio key and voice phases of the operation.