



A PCS Trip to Korea . . .

Submitted by Headquarters, 501st Comm Recon Group

At a Tokyo Air Base, you board a plane for Korea. Your destination is the 501st Communications Reconnaissance Group in Seoul. As you ascend, the landscape of Japan opens broadly beneath you, measured by the steady drone of the engines.

Snow capped mountains loom and then the startling blend of land into a patched quilt of color, and finally the blue sea moves under you and the coast of Japan fades back into a swirl of clouds.

Your first glimpse of Korea reveals "mountains covered with mountains." When there are no mountains, hills fill the vacancy.

Tile and grasstopped houses assimilate together in clusters of villages along mountain sides and in the level areas. White roads weave and curve around the mounds of earth. Time presents a repetition of these scenes until someone quietly says, "We're circling for a landing." The capitol of Korea appears in the near distance. Wheels touch the ground; you set foot on Korea.

It is February, and the air hits your unprotected face with a dampish cold. Mingling around the Kimpo Airfield gate are groups of American soldiers. Many are bundled in heavy winter clothing, having

taken the long motor jaunt from the front.

A phone call brings a jeep from the 501st motor pool; you pile your gear in the back, and take your first trip through Seoul. You feel the jarring effect of hole-potted streets; the jeep dances under you.

Finally you insure the presence of all your molars, and watch with curiosity the strange-appearing assortment of people and native clothing. Korean natives, ROK, British, French, Canadian, Turkish, and American soldiers present an impression of united effort. Army vehicles pass in an unrelenting stream, bearing markings of all branches of the service. Business houses look more like antiquated shacks. Ancient, wood-slabbed trolley cars rumble past, packed with commuters in sardine-canned tradition.

The jeep turns at a traffic circle and follows the robot armed gestures of a Korean policewoman. You enter a narrow side-street, and watch signs indicating British, ROK, and American unit headquarters along the route. Finally the jeep turns and passes through a stone gateway and you have reached your destination. WELCOME TO KOREA...CHO SUN AE SUE HOWAN YONG PAT OAT SUM NEE DA HWAN...VELCOM ZU KOREA..... BIENVENUE QUI KOREA.

June 1952

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The War in the Ether:

THE TANNENBERG STORY

~~(Confidential)~~

Heavy, gloomy, the towers of the Tannenberg Monument once towered against the sky of East Prussia. Grand and powerful stood behind them in those days the spirit of General Hindenburg, a symbol, as it were, of a force which must necessarily wreck anything that endeavors to attack it. The Battle of Tannenberg had become, since 1914, a symbol for the German people. Much has been written and spoken about this battle, but only little about that which was actually decisive for the course of this mighty action. Tannenberg - a symbol! Even for the one who knows! For it was at the same time a symbol of the ease with which small causes can unloose great effects, of the rapidity with which a great success can be achieved, if by accident the human inadequacy of wholly secondary and insignificant persons on the other side opens the way. Tannenberg - a symbol of mighty superiority and at the same time a symbol of fateful chance.

The Battle of Tannenberg was the first one in the history of man in which the interception of enemy radio traffic played a decisive role. This is all the more remarkable since the intercept service used by the Germans at that time was not yet systematically organized, and the intercepted radiograms represented many times the results of chance occurrences.

Several years after World War I a series of books was published which, among other subjects, dealt also with the Battle of Tannenberg. The main ones were: Hindenburg's "Aus Meinem Leben," Ludendorff's "Erinnerungen," General Danilov's "Russland in Weltkrieg," and the German Archives publication "Der Weltkrieg 1914-18." In the three last-named publications the question of intercepting the radiograms of the Russian Army before and during the battle is discussed; but nowhere is it discussed ful-

ly. In the German Archives publication the intercepted radiograms of the Russians are touched upon briefly; but there are many sentences attempting to prove that all the Russian radiograms intercepted at that time had no influence whatever on the outcome of the battle.

What are the real facts in the case?

At 1400 hours 23 August 1914 the new head of the German Eighth Army, General Von Hindenburg, and his Chief of Staff, Major General Ludendorff, arrived in Marienburg and assumed immediate command. The Eighth Army, which was to defend East Prussia, was composed on that day of an Eastern Group (I Reserve Corps, XVII Army Corps, and First Cavalry Division) on the Nordenburg-Insterburg Line, and a Western Group (mostly the XX Army Corps) in the region of Tannenberg. The I Army Corps was being transported by railroad from the Eastern Group via Marienburg to the Western Group.

The Eastern Group was facing the Russian First Army (General Rennenkampf) consisting of the XX, III, IV, and II Army Corps as well as five and one-fourth cavalry divisions; the Western Group was facing the Russian Second Army (General Samsonov), consisting of the VI, XIII, XV, XXIII, and I Army Corps, as well as three cavalry divisions. The two Russian Armies formed an Army Group under General Shilinski.

The Germans had the following radio communications: two heavy radio stations in the Army Staff Headquarters; one heavy and two light stations in the First Cavalry Division, making a total of five mobile radio stations for the entire Army. In addition there was one radio station each

in the garrisons of Königsberg, Graudenz, and Thorn.

**Translated from original German materials by
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The outfitting of the Russian Army Group with radio equipment, and its distribution cannot be accurately given; it seems, however, that most of the staff headquarters down to the corps staffs were outfitted with radio stations. At the outbreak of the war there was one radio company each in I, II, IX, and XV Army Corps in European Russia, as well as in the Caucasian Corps. As can be seen from the above, I and XV Corps belonged to the Russian Second Army, and III Corps to the Russian First Army. Each of the companies which had been organized in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war had at its disposal at least six radio stations.

General Shilinski's objective was - according to directives of 13 August - to make a decisive attack in which the First Army was to surround the German left wing (the Eastern Group) and prevent its retreat to Koenigsberg, while the Second Army was to advance into East Prussia south of Koenigsberg in order to cut off the enemy's retreat to the Vistula and attack him in the rear.

The German Army Staff Headquarters obtained information on this objective of the Russians through an order which was found on a Russian officer who had fallen in the battles around Gawaiten on 20 August. This order contained an extract from the above-mentioned directive of General Shilinski.

Almost simultaneously with the arrival of this order in the German Army Staff Headquarters, a Russian radiogram was intercepted which mentioned this attack and contained attacking orders for the Russian IV Army Corps (which was attached to the First Army). This telegram was, therefore, a confirmation of the order found on the fallen Russian officer.

Hindenburg now knew that for the present *Rennekampf* was no menace. Therefore, in the course of the day he was able to decide to decrease still further the number of troops which were facing the Russian First Army and to withdraw the entire XVII Army Corps in the direction of the south.

Hindenburg now went over to the I Army Corps. On his way down there, when he was passing Loebau, another intercepted radiogram of no less importance was handed to

him. This time the organization and destination of the Russian Second Army were completely revealed. This radiogram, also in plain text, was dated 0600 hours 25 August and contained an order of General Samsonov to the Russian XIII Army Corps. To be sure, this radiogram was somewhat garbled.

The intercepted contents were as follows:

"After battling along the front of the XV Army Corps the enemy corps retreated on 24 August in the direction of Osterode. According to information.... the land defense brigade by Gilgenburg The First Army pursues the enemy further, who retreats to Koenigsberg-Rastenurg. On 25 August the Second Army proceeds to the Allenstein-Osterode Line; the main strength of the Army Corps occupies: XIII Corps the Gimmendorf-Kurken Line; XV Corps Nadrau-Paulsgut; XXIII Corps Michalken-Gr. Gardiene. Boundaries between the Army Corps on advance march: Between XIII and XV the Maschaken-Schwedrich Line; between XV and XXIII, the Neidenburg-Wittingwalde Line. Then I Corps to remain in District 5, to protect Army's left flank... The VI Army Corps advances to the region Bischofsburg-Rothfless, to protect the right flank. To protect station Rastenurg the 4th Cav. Div., subordinate to VI Army Corps, will remain in Sensburg to observe region between the Rastenurg-Bartenstein Line and Seeburg-Heilsberg-Line. The 6th and 15th Cav. Div....staff quarters 2 Army in Ostrolenka."

When General Von Hindenburg arrived at 1300 hours on 25 August at the General Command Staff of the I Army Corps, he was thus also completely informed on the mission of the Russian Second Army for that day. It was decided to begin the German attack on the following day. On the same day at 2030 hours the orders for the army to attack on 26 August were released in Riesenurg.

On the evening of 23 August General Von Hindenburg's operational plan was essentially complete. The entire Eighth Army was to be concentrated for the attack on the Russian Second Army. The XX Army Corps was already organized, primarily only for defense purposes. The I Army Corps - being transported by railroad - was to be stationed to the right of the XX Corps, to

attack the left flank of the enemy, and then the rear. The principal part of the XVII Corps and the I Reserve Corps (until then in the Eastern Group) were to march in a southerly direction and attack the right flank of the Russian Second Army. The two last-named corps were at that time still at a distance of about three days' march. Only the cavalry division and a small portion of the infantry of the XVII Corps were to remain behind to face the Russian Niemen Army.

How far this plan was capable of being carried out depended, on the one hand, on General Rennenkampf's tactics when he discovered the departure of the two German Army Corps and, on the other hand, on the ability of the XX Corps to maintain its position until the concentration of the Eighth Army.

On 23 August the battle began along the front of the German XX Army Corps, where the Russians started to attack. The Germans at first maintained their positions, but - to reserve their strength until actual crisis - retreated somewhat on the 24th. On this day several radiograms were intercepted, which, among other things, gave information on the line of march and the mission of the Russian XIII Army. This Corps was to circle around the left flank of the German XX Corps and appear in the rear of the Corps' 37th Infantry Division.

The Germans succeeded in avoiding this encirclement without too great losses on their side.

On 25 August they continued with the concentration of the Eighth Army troops. On this day General Von Hindenburg intended to leave for the front early in the morning, meet the head of the I Army Corps, General Von Francois, in Montawa, to acquaint him with the existing situation.

Before his departure from Marienburg a radiogram was handed to him which had been intercepted in the night of August 24-25. This radiogram, which was not enciphered, but had been sent in plain text, contained (which until then had never happened) a complete operational order of General Rennenkampf to the IV Army Corps. From this intercepted radiogram General Von Hindenburg obtained information on the future aims of the Russian First Army,

which up till then had been completely unknown to him. Among other things, the radiogram stated that the First Army would not reach the Gerdauen-Altenburg-Wehlau line until 26 August with the southern flank (IV Corps) at Gerdauen. Also the marching goal for the 25th was given, which was to be several miles east of the above-mentioned line.

One must admit that it was a piece of unusually good fortune for the Germans that both these radiograms were intercepted on the morning of 25 August, that is, at a time when critical decisions had to be made. It seems the more remarkable that these two radiograms were the only ones of sufficient length, and whose contents really were of a deciding factor, which were sent in plain text by the Russians, and intercepted by the German radio stations from the beginning of the war until the middle of September, 1914.

On 26 and 27 August the I and XX Army Corps prepared to attack the left flank of the Russian Second Army. The German divisions which had advanced the farthest toward the right (the 5th Land Defense Brigade and the 2nd Infantry Division) met with stiff opposition, and for a while the situation was critical. On the forenoon of the 27th, Russian radiograms were intercepted which disclosed that the Russians were expecting reinforcements or perhaps had already received them, among others, the Third Guard Division from Warsaw (which was attached to the XXIII Army Corps). This information contributed to the fact that General Von Francois (I Army Corps) no longer deemed it possible to proceed eastward to Neidenburg in order to sever the enemy's connections in the rear, but decided to turn the attack in a southerly and southeasterly direction.

The left wing of the XX Army Corps, which on 26 August had not been drawn into the battle to any great extent, was attacked by the Russians early in the morning of the 27th. The attack gradually spread out more and more toward the north and finally reached the German Third Reserve Division, which was on the left of the XX Army Corps. A Russian radiogram which was intercepted by the Germans now gave information on the attack mission of the opposing Russian XV Army Corps and re-

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Vint Hill Housing

Nearly all the landscaping has been completed for the eight-unit row houses for NCO's at VHFS.

Five of these buildings, completed in 1950, lie adjacent to the newly constructed officers quarters. Each has a spacious cement terrace off of the front door. The entire unit has a cement basement and each apartment has an individual gas-fired forced warm air furnace. There are six; rooms; three bedrooms, a kitchen and a combination living and dining room. The floors are all hardwood and each kitchen has a pleasant forced ventilation. The units have 1080 square feet of living space.

Two new 2-story buildings to house offi-

cers and their families were completed at VHFS last November and were immediately occupied. There are many conveniences offered in these structures which have fireproof asbestos cement shingles. An L shaped utility room services two apartments. It has a washing machine and laundry tubs. The combination living and dining room is large in size, approximately 20 feet by 11 feet, and two 11 feet by 14 feet. The modern kitchen is 7½ feet by 14 feet, and has ample closet room and cabinets. The first floor is of asphalt tile and upstairs is found hardwood. The exterior approaches are of cement and parking area is found in the rear.

Large picture windows, which have small panes encased in steel, allow the rays of a pleasant Virginia sun to brighten the household. Each unit houses eight families.



AHS Troops, WACs March

A battalion of troops and a company of Wacs from Arlington Hall Station were among more than 10,000 marchers who paraded down 25 blocks of the Nation's Capital as part of the third annual celebration of Armed Forces Day, May 17.

Some 50,000 spectators, including Commander-in-Chief, Harry S. Truman, turned out for the 4-mile long parade.

Arlington Hall's troops marched second in the formation, following Ft. Myer's Third Infantry "Old Guard". They were headed by Battalion Commander, Maj Harry F. Clarens, and his aides, Capt Donald H. Harter, Capt Terry W. Eakin, and Lt Thomas W. Reeves.

The AHS Wacs marched as a part of a Wac Battalion composed of military women from the Hall, Ft. Myer, Ft. Belvoir and Walter Reed.

AHS PERSONNEL

Capt Richard H. Davis Jr., AHS Adjutant since 10 Nov, 1949, has been reassigned with an overseas unit. A native of Alabama, he enlisted in the Army in 1940, and has been awarded the Combat Infantry Badge, the Bronze Star with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Purple Heart and overseas and good conduct ribbons.

Cpl R. A. Needham, a Military Policeman, was chosen AHS's second Soldier-of-the-Month by a board of officers.

Capt Uriah H. Hunter, AHS Chaplain, has been reassigned to overseas duty.

Economy Program

In keeping with the drive to promote the cost consciousness economy program at AHS, signs were recently posted on various pieces of equipment in all sections of the post to make both military and civilian personnel cognizant of the taxpayers expense involved in the purchase and replacement of all types of equipment. Typical instances: folding chairs were tagged at \$2.49; large desks with typing compartment, \$81.06; typewriters, \$127.60 to

\$221.00. The program clearly pointed out the need for cost consciousness throughout both AHS and ASA.

War in the Ether

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vealed its intention to encircle the German left wing. Other radiograms disclosed that the Russian XIII Army Corps intended to support this attack toward the right of the XV Army Corps, and to proceed toward the rear of the German Third Reserve Division.

While these encounters were progressing, the German XVII Army Corps and the German First Reserve Corps made forced marches toward the battlefield. On 26 August they fought with the Russian VI Army Corps at Gross-Boessau, which then retreated southward. Simultaneously, a Russian radiogram was intercepted from which the German Eighth Army Staff Headquarters assumed that the Russian II Army Corps, which was at Rennenkampf's left wing, had been proceeding northward from Mauer Lake and was now supposed to march in a southerly direction, in order to lend Samsonov a hand.

That the Russian II Army Corps was proceeding northward from Mauer Lake was known already beforehand from reports of the Loetzen Garrison, but that it was supposed to advance in order to support the Second Army was news. The German First Cavalry Division, which was stationed in the region of Schippenbeil, now received orders to halt the advance march of the enemy corps along the Rastenburg-Korschen Line.

The German Army's order for 28 August was signed by Hindenburg on the evening of 27 August. Later in the evening information was received that Russian troops from the south had arrived in Allenstein. There was thus the possibility that the Russian troops from the south had arrived in Allenstein. There was thus the possibility that the Russian XIII Corps was striving to reach the north in order to join the approaching II Corps. The Army order which had just been signed was now immediately replaced by a new one which, among other things, ordered the XVII Corps and the I Reserve Corps to Allenstein.