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Conference on Indoctrination

c/s

SEC

7 November 52

1. Attached is a verbatim account of a conference conducted by SEC concerning the necessity for review of indoctrination procedures and for a revision of USCIB #5. This conference was held prior to the announcement concerning our changed status; hence, some of it will have no bearing any longer. However, there is material here which should be considered by Captain Goodwin and Colonel Campbell. I have, therefore, sent a copy of this correspondence to them.

2. The conference was called to consider:

a. The need for two types of indoctrination in AFSA.

- (1) A security briefing (initial indoctrination) and oath -- liability to Public Law 513, oath of security, etc.
- (2) COMINT indoctrination and oath for selected individuals -- in accordance with the oath prescribed by USCIB #5.

b. The need for a revision of USCIB #5:

- (1) To include AFSA in its proper position as a member Agency of USCIB (such inclusion would give DIR more clearly delineated authority on clearance and indoctrination matters).
- (2) To spell out a definition of COMINT indoctrination that is definitely required by "CONSUMERS" and by certain "PRODUCER" personnel as opposed to the "security briefing" or "initial indoctrination" initially required for the majority of our compartmented "PRODUCER" personnel.
- (3) To ascribe to the DIR the authority not only to determine the "need-to-know", but to also determine whether a "security briefing" (initial indoctrination) or an indoctrination for COMINT is required (this distinction is important because, at the moment, each Service concerned retains the right to authorize indoctrination of its personnel).
- (4) To spell out the requirements that USCIB be notified annually of the number of personnel cleared and indoctrinated for COMINT (what portion of the personnel of a "PRODUCER" Agency needs or is expected to have such indoctrination).

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SUBJECT

Conference on Indoctrination

TO C/S FROM SEC DATE 7 November 52 Comment No. 1 contd.

3. In the summary, the verbatim account herewith gives the following information:

a. OPNS indicates a requirement that all OPNS personnel be indoctrinated for COMINT.

b. R/D indicates in their opinion that very few of our people need indoctrination in the sense of knowledge that we apply "certain methods for the solution in the specific foreign systems" or "that certain results are derived therefrom".

c. P/P believes we confuse "need-to-know" with "indoctrination". That indoctrination is an elementary instruction that is later expanded on a "need-to-know" basis. (This does not agree with G-2's interpretation but does agree with our current procedures).

d. C/SEC states the opinion that there should be no variation in the "level of clearance" of our people, but that very few people in C/SEC have any contact or gain any knowledge of COMINT.

e. LCG implies no need for COMINT indoctrination except on top level in that Division.

f. COMM believes that 95% of its Division should receive full COMINT indoctrination.

g. COMP concurs that a revision of USCEB #5 is required (as do all who were present at this meeting).

h. With the exception of the Commandant, it is doubtful if any of the AFSA School Staff and faculty need full indoctrination. There are portions of the AG and PERS, (very small groups) that need this indoctrination.

4. It is recommended that as a part of our current change in status, these matters be included in the study of Captain Goodwin's committee.

LESLIE H. WIMAN
Colonel, Artillery

Incl:

Transcript of SEC Meeting - 15 Oct

cc: COMP LOG
COMM CONS
P/P [] Capt. Goodwin & AG
C/SEC R/D
OPNS

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Mr. Friedman

AFSA/15 Oct. 1952

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TRANSCRIPT OF SECURITY CONTROL DIVISION MEETING

Date: 15 October 1952

Time: 1300 - 1420

Place: Room 19232

Present:

Representing

Col. L. H. Wyman	SEC, Chairman
Capt. J. S. Harper	OPNS
Col. J. E. Condron	OPNS
Dr. S. Kullback	R/D
Lt. Col. G. S. Stevenson	R/D
Mr. H. L. Clark	C/SEC
Mr. Paul Neff	COMP
Lt. F. T. Johnson	AG
Lt. Col. R. H. Horton	P/P
Maj. R. P. Goolsby	P/P
Lt. Col. J. W. Powers	COMM
Lt. Col. R. Hume	SEC
Maj. W. W. Wilson	SEC
Capt. J. H. Fortune, jr.	PERS
Lt. Col. M. A. Marshall	LOG
Lt. Col. S. L. Patterson	SCH
Maj. D. K. Corcoran	SCH

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COL. WYMAN: The arrangements for the Conference Room limit us to one hour's time. Therefore, we will start the conference now without waiting for Capt. Harper and I will try to be as brief as possible. This conference was precipitated as a result of certain contacts I have had with G-2, Army, in matters of obtaining clearances for COMINT for certain of their people to have access to AFSA spaces and information. I find that G-2 has a higher selection standard than USCIB 5, our guide, requires. Whereas as USCIB 5 states "should be" and authorizes waivers of certain standards because of operational need, G-2 uses the word "must" and permits no waivers. There are five of these standards. They involve matters pertaining to foreign relatives, membership in subversive organizations, character, loyalty and discretion, etc. Since all of these are "musts" for G-2, when we ask them for clearance for special intelligence on a particular individual we have a hard time. G-2 will not indoctrinate unless the standards are met and the complete investigation has been completed.

Originally when AFSA was formed it was established that all positions in AFSA were sensitive positions and that for assignment to or employment in any of its positions a complete COMINT clearance (clearance and indoctrination) was required.

There has been a great deal of confusion as to what constitutes basic clearance requirements. For our purposes we have held that SR 380-160-10 of the Army is to all intents and purposes the same requirement as that prescribed by USCIB 5. For the Navy this regulation is RIP 45(B) and for the Air Force, Registered Air Force Control Document No. 2-6521. The Air Force terms this a cryptographic clearance. The Army represented by ASA, as opposed to G-2, does the same thing but refers to it, plus indoctrination, as a cryptologic clearance. The Navy's clearance in terms of the Secretary of Defense Directive of 5 June 1952 is the same requirement. G-2, Army, places their requirement at a higher selective and investigative level.

I have stated to the Director and have written in our Security Manual that our clearance standards are the minimum directed by USCIB 5, that indoctrination will be administered on a "need to know" basis, and the Director shall exercise his right to waive certain selection

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standards in accordance with operational need. My problem is mainly concerned with indoctrination, the Director's authority to determine "need to know", and the type of indoctrination which is meant by USCIB 5 in its requirement that they be notified annually of all persons "cleared for COMINT". USCIB 5 states that for each of the member agencies and departments the head of the Service concerned shall determine the "need to know" for its personnel, that personnel in the Department of Defense outside the member agencies and departments shall have their "need to know" determined by the Secretary of Defense, that all contractual people, technical consultants, etc., employed by a Service shall have their "need to know" determined by the head of that Service, and that for all others who must have access to COMINT only USCIB can determine the "need to know".

AFSA was formed after USCIB 5 was written. We contend that only the Director can determine the "need to know" of persons associated with or employed by AFSA. Because of this we have problems. We feel that the cryptographic clearance, as noted above, is required but that for many people coming into AFSA, indoctrination in the sense of USCIB 5 is not required. We are required many times to establish the clearance status of so and so in order that he may interview somebody in "R&D", for example, with no necessity for discussing COMINT and with no necessity for access to AFSA information. On the other hand, we often need to provide access for someone in G-2 in a space where complete indoctrination is not necessary but where a certain amount is.

In this case because we are a COMINT Agency we have asked G-2 for clearance for special intelligence. They retain the right to indoctrinate and insist on giving full indoctrination--far more information than we consider necessary. It is a problem to us both in record keeping and in placing clearance requirements on the Services. Because of the difference in selection and clearance of G-2, as opposed to ASA, G-2 is a bit alarmed at the number of Army personnel who are submitted as being cleared for COMINT.

I feel that a rewrite of USCIB 5 is necessary. Where the Director has authority delegated to him for the clearance

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and indoctrination of his own civilian employees, he does not have it for military personnel and contractor personnel who are associated with his Agency via the Services. We have no question about the Services' authority to clear people. We do question anyone's authority to determine the "need to know" of cleared people sent for assignment to AFSA or employed on a contractual basis. Again if we were to apply G-2's high standards, we would not have sufficient employees or assignees to carry out our operation.

Perhaps the matter is one of terminology. We cannot feel that USCIB is interested in the number of employees we have per se. We do feel that they are interested in the number who have been indoctrinated for COMINT. In other words, we have two levels of indoctrination--one an initial security indoctrination or briefing, followed by such further indoctrination as may be required by the "need to know" with the complete indoctrination being that termed by USCIB as cleared for COMINT. Where the break is between this ultimate indoctrination and what goes before I frankly do not know. I estimated with the Director the other day that perhaps 1,500 AFSA personnel could be considered indoctrinated in this latter fashion. One of the reasons for this conference today is to find out from you people how many of your personnel might be considered indoctrinated to this high level.

In the last two paragraphs of USCIB 5 it states that all those individuals who are involved in the various parts of the production of COMINT need not be cleared in accordance with the same standards as those who handle the product; that they need not be indoctrinated but that those who have a complete knowledge of our business must be recorded and reported. Should we have two definite indoctrinations? I do not mean two standards of clearance because clearance merely establishes eligibility for indoctrination. Should we try to maintain in my Division a list of those individuals who have been indoctrinated "all the way", as opposed to those who have received only partial indoctrination?

Capt. Harper entered the meeting at 1:15. Col. Wyman apologized for not holding up the meeting and briefly discussed the foregoing for his information. Col. Wyman continued.

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COL. WYMAN: The oath our people sign upon indoctrination is not exactly the COMINT oath prescribed by USCIB 5. We do not include that portion which states that personnel leaving the COMINT Activity engage not to reveal the source of COMINT, although this particular point might be considered covered under their Public Law 513 responsibility. Perhaps we should have an oath, separate and distinct for use in the indoctrination and debriefing of personnel who have knowledge of the whole COMINT Activity. A great many people in COMSEC are in no way connected with COMINT; our card punch operators, for example, and certain low-level employees are not connected with any but their particular part of the COMINT Activity; the Staff of the AFSA School have no knowledge; and many others. They have no "need to know" of the final product, how it is handled, where it goes, or what it is for.

I would like to come up with recommendations as to whether we can do something about establishing the position of AFSA in USCIB, the Director's authority, and a clear delineation of the meaning of indoctrination. Now that you, Capt. Harper, are here, I would like to mention a revision in the Agreement which states that only those people who handle Category I COMINT matters require indoctrination for COMINT in the spirit of USCIB 5. I would like to hear comments in order from 02, 03, 04, 12, and other Staff Divisions as to how they feel about their own people.

CAPT. HARPER: It is much better from our standpoint where we are all together in the same office to have everybody indoctrinated. We are not opposed to change because we have thought of it many times, but it gives us freedom to transfer people around or to pick them up to do special work which we would not have otherwise.

COL. WYMAN: I would like to bring up this point with regard to CIA. In the COMINT portion of CIA they have their own security officer who accepts nobody for assignment without evaluating the investigative material himself. He accepts for assignment only those people concerning whom there is no doubt in his mind. My point in this matter is that we

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report so many people cleared for COMINT each year. We have 7,000 civilian employees and we report them to USCIB as being cleared and indoctrinated for COMINT. I do not believe this is a true statement. I do not believe all of these people can be considered as indoctrinated in the manner contemplated by USCIB 5. Even in your own office I do not think it is necessary. For example, the other day we were asked to give some instruction in the use of secret ink to certain G-2 personnel. As far as we are concerned, all these persons need have in regard to AFSA is a cryptographic clearance with minimum indoctrination concerning the area in which they are to work. However, to get clearance for special intelligence, according to G-2's requirements, they must be indoctrinated "all the way". Also they must meet the complete selection standard G-2 has set up. We do not consider this complete indoctrination necessary.

CAPT. HARPER: I don't think that is a good example. I agree in some respects with G-2. We have a lot of visitors who have to come in here. Secret ink is not COMINT, nor is our need for certain types of supplies COMINT, so everybody coming in doesn't have to be indoctrinated for the same category that you are talking about. I am talking about the employees, the people who work for and are assigned to O2. They are all cleared. We wouldn't have them in the place if they weren't qualified and indoctrinated from the security standpoint.

COL. WYMAN: Clearance is quite different from indoctrination. I mentioned the secret ink matter only because these individuals must come into Mr. Feeney's spaces and must have access to his laboratory. Their very presence in Feeney's shop gives them access to a certain amount of information.

CAPT. HARPER: It shouldn't be accessible. Feeney can certainly take care of that.

COL. WYMAN: They can't help but see and hear things in the laboratory with so much going on.

CAPT. HARPER: All he has to do is cover it up.

COL. WYMAN: Will not it stop his operation?

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CAPT. HARPER: I can arrange those things.

COL. CONDRON: Actually such occurrences are rather remote.

CAPT. HARPER: They get all the painters in there.

COL. WYMAN: Yes, but the supervisors are forewarned?

CAPT. HARPER: They have to be forewarned. If visitors come in with an ordinary visitor's badge on they shouldn't be allowed to walk around.

COL. WYMAN: Perhaps the secret ink is a bad example. What I am trying to say is that these individuals do not need indoctrination beyond their "need to know".

CAPT. HARPER: It isn't in accordance with the "need to know" that they be told all about the organization.

COL. WYMAN: That is right, but in this case G-2 insists. I can give you a better example.

CAPT. HARPER: Let's get back to a practical example and not theoretical things. We have been talking about AFSA employees. Our laborers don't need to be told all about the Activity. They need to have such indoctrination or clearance or whatever you call it, to take an oath not to tell what they overhear through the walls or open doors, or see on the blackboards in going around, etc. It is not permitted for them to tell. There is no reason why they should be told how many intercept stations we have, or about the organization, and a lot of other things.

COL. WYMAN: But there is a difference in the various levels of people we employ. For example, what about our custodial personnel? There is a certain group of them, about 40, whom we want to have access to come into our shops to repair power lines, fix boilers, replace lights, and eight of these need to have access to go back and forth through security areas simply in the process of cleaning out the toilets on the second and third floors. We need them cleared in order that they can do their work without escort. We have tried our best to get ASA to provide clearances. ASA's

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stand is, "We will not clear them because they have no 'need to know' and we determine the 'need to know'." We could not agree with them more except that the mere access to the spaces where they are to conduct their work imposes a "need to know" through their proximity to classified work. We want clearance only to establish eligibility to let us indoctrinate sufficiently to safeguard our information. This type of indoctrination is what we refer to as an initial security indoctrination and it amounts to hardly more than a security briefing. It is not a COMINT indoctrination.

CAPT. HARPER: We see them walking around without escorts.

COL. WYMAN: Yes, in the hallways but not across the secure areas between wings. Originally all positions in AFSA were designated as sensitive positions, not because their work was highly classified but because mere proximity to the work of the Agency gave personnel access to information which was highly sensitive. In other words, proximity to classified information creates a "need to know" and granting such proximity to uncleared people or perhaps unindoctrinated people promotes the possibility of security violations.

CAPT. HARPER: I don't think it does.

COL. WYMAN: You are referring to the secret ink personnel?

CAPT. HARPER: I don't agree with you on that unless you expect those people to come over for a course of instruction.

COL. WYMAN: It is a course of instruction and lasts for two or three months.

CAPT. HARPER: I thought it was just one visit. They should be cleared.

COL. WYMAN: I am glad you say that. Our problem is that we do not feel we need to require G-2's high selection standard for them and yet G-2 will not indoctrinate unless that high standard is maintained.

CAPT. HARPER: Tell G-2 to send them over and we will indoctrinate them.

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COL. WYMAN: We can't indoctrinate them under the USCIB 5 prohibition.

MR. NEFF: What is the date of USCIB 5?

COL. WYMAN: In 1949 before AFSA was formed.

CAPT. HARPER: My reaction is that people coming into AFSA have to meet our clearance standards and be indoctrinated to the extent that is necessary.

COL. WYMAN: To accomplish that I believe USCIB 5 needs to be rewritten. However, to finish our discussion at this time may I take it that you do not concur that there is need for a top-bracket group of people being indoctrinated for COMINT in the sense of the Category I requirement under the proposed revision of the Agreement?

CAPT. HARPER: For our own employees, no. I don't think so. That is something which is rather an unwieldy procedure from the standpoint of the Operations Office. Security has always got to give away to some extent to the necessity for operations. You can carry it to the point of absurdity where we get the most security by not having any papers around, where we get ideal security if we don't send any messages.

COL. WYMAN: Another example of our problem is securing clearances for people to work on the new site project. Certain people must come into AFSA to see what types of machines we use and to settle certain construction requirements. The Anderson-Nichols Company has some people cleared sufficiently. However, it takes time to secure clearances for special intelligence when the Army cites the high standards that they do. We are acting out of order, but in order to get the work in progress, we grant interim clearance on the same basis we grant interim clearances to our own people (NAC and Polygraph) while waiting for the final clearance to come in from the Army. Actually the Director has no authority to do this.

CAPT. HARPER: All they need is a contractor's clearance.

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COL. WYMAN: Contractor's clearance, yes, but accomplished by the same standards as we require of anybody else for the particular type of contract involved.

DR. KULLBACK: There are two considerations here, that of clearance and of indoctrination. So far as indoctrination is concerned, that is essentially what statements shall be made to a cleared individual with respect to the disclosure of COMINT. By communications intelligence you mean either certain methods for the solution of specific foreign systems or the results derived therefrom. Very few people will need to be indoctrinated in that sense.

COL. WYMAN: Under USCIB 5 my impression is that clearance for COMINT and the report rendered to USCIB concerning the number of people so cleared should include only those people who have access to the whole operation and that that number must be kept to a minimum. That is what is causing the confusion in my mind. I want to know how many people in R&D know all about the production of COMINT, what is done with it, and where it goes.

CAPT. HARPER: Nobody. I don't think there would be anybody in O2 who could fulfill that definition, who knows all about where it goes.

COL. WYMAN: We might say 1,500 people in AFSA altogether?

DR. KULLBACK: I don't think anybody in O3 knows that. I have never concerned myself with it.

CAPT. HARPER: The number of people in O3 who would have to know enough about it to require full indoctrination would be very few.

DR. KULLBACK: In studying the techniques and reading the systems very few people concern themselves with where the ultimate message goes when they translate it, what amount of intelligence it contains, who gets it, or what they do with it. They are not concerned with that.

COL. HORTON: I am not sure but that we are confusing the indoctrination with the determination of the "need to know".

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The indoctrination covers certain general security precautions and the administration of the oaths prescribed in USCIB 5. The determination of the "need to know" of the various grades of COMINT takes place continuously as time goes on. Within Capt. Harper's shop, as all of us know, he may get one particular man and put him on a T/A problem of a particular type. He is put on there for that particular assignment. He is not given the complete overall picture necessarily of COMINT.

COL. WYMAN: In AFSA, he is not.

COL. HORTON: Capt. Harper might take him off this particular assignment and put him on another more classified one.

COL. WYMAN: That is progressive indoctrination.

COL. HORTON: No, that is not indoctrination. That is, the determination of the "need to know" and the security precautions relating thereto; the indoctrination, as such, takes place at the time that you have him assigned and give him that security oath.

CAPT. HARPER: I would say less than three people would fit your (Col. Wyman's) definition. They are the Director, Admiral Wenger, and myself. Only those three would fit an interpretation as strict as that. They may not know everything. There is a lot going on that I don't know about. There are other things that I know and that two or three other people know about which neither the Director nor Admiral Wenger know. They know about them, but don't know the details. I think most of those things will work themselves out on the "need to know" basis in which we are all pretty well trained.

COL. WYMAN: What worries me is the confusion you have and the misunderstanding with the supporting Services. Our Army personnel are furnished by ASA. ASA themselves are in agreement with us and send us cleared people in accordance with SR 380-160-10. If there is some point in the case which needs a waiver they inform us what it is and if we accept the waiver, we get the man; if we don't, we don't. As far as they are concerned when they send us a soldier or an officer as cleared it is up to us to conduct the indoctrination. They simply place the man's name on the

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special intelligence list and notify G-2. Because of their high standards G-2 is somewhat alarmed at the large number of Army personnel that ASA reports to them as certified for COMINT. From our own standpoint I believe G-2 is correct and I do not believe all these people are indoctrinated for COMINT in the spirit of USCIB 5.

DR. KULLBACK: There is a difference in the point of view. G-2 thinks in terms of indoctrination or clearance for COMINT in terms of the receiver of the product, the consumer, and those who may take action on these things. In AFSA they go through appropriate clearance procedures and are put to work on the various phases of the producing activity. They don't have to know everything. They are not concerned with the product itself.

CAPT. HARPER: The people who know as much of the end-product in O2 as those in G-2 are comparatively few. There may be three or four dozen. I think the consumers get the whole works. We don't. We don't like them to have the whole works.

COL. WYMAN: What our authority is in dealing with the three Services ought to be clarified for us. As it is, we are constantly in difficulties over Service requirements. For example, none of our Army civilian personnel are certified to TAG; should we certify them to TAG as cleared for special intelligence, G-2 might be expected to complain.

MR. NEFF: The military get certified for COMINT.

COL. WYMAN: That is cryptographic certification.

MR. NEFF: That is different. They are not certified for COMINT. Cryptographic certification is only one step toward certification for COMINT. You have to indoctrinate them for certification for COMINT for a cryptologic clearance.

COL. WYMAN: ASA's stand is that when they send military personnel to us they know we will indoctrinate them and they certify our people to the Army as indoctrinated for COMINT. We have never certified our civilians to anybody. We are the only office of record. The only time we furnish information to anyone is when we notify USCIB each year that we have approximately so many employees cleared for COMINT.

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COL. HORTON: We must continue to report the indoctrinees. It doesn't make an iota of difference. If a man is indoctrinated and has signed the oath, whether or not he ever sees or ever hears about a piece of COMINT or cryptographic equipment, he must be reported to the Board.

COL. WYMAN: Do you mean the GS-2 Card Punch Operators?

COL. HORTON: If he has been indoctrinated and has taken the oath, he must be included in the total.

CAPT. HARPER: I may be confused by your definition of indoctrination. I have thought of it as this. They read the appropriate laws and instructions and take the oath not to reveal anything they may know. From the security standpoint that finishes it.

COL. WYMAN: As far as we are concerned, we call that a security indoctrination. ASA calls that a security briefing. The indoctrination is done in accordance with the "need to know".

CAPT. HARPER: Perhaps we should get the terms straightened out before we talk with them.

COL. WYMAN: I want to get something from us that we all and they will agree to.

CAPT. HARPER: When we say "indoctrination", in our sense that means a security briefing. I don't want every punch operator to know the whole business.

COL. WYMAN: They are not indoctrinated then.

CAPT. HARPER: In the strict sense of the word, I agree with you. We will have to go to Webster on it.

COL. WYMAN: I would like to hear from O4 on this thing.

MR. CLARK: There is the same confusion in my mind that there is in some of the other peoples' minds. Let me give you an example and ask questions on it. From time to time, on the basis of what is considered by AFSA-02 as a "need for me to know", I have received certain codeword material. During

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the past years I have raised this question. I have never, to the best of my knowledge, unless it is in the regular oath that I took when I entered this place and retook recently, been specifically indoctrinated for COMINT in the same way that I have been specifically indoctrinated for COSMIC. Yet I get the material which comes to me through Top Secret handling and it comes to me for my information. Am I supposed to have that?

COL. WYMAN: In the Security Manual that we are publishing now we say that our concept of clearance does not constitute knowledge of classified material. It simply constitutes eligibility for access to classified information.

CAPT. HARPER: In accordance with the "need to know".

MR. CLARK: Then in O2 I am eligible and have the "need to know"?

COL. WYMAN: You are.

MR. CLARK: Who determines that I have the "need to know" it? That is what Frank Rowlett determined. Therefore, I could have it. It has always struck me as being funny. It seems to me that I should sign something which would be applicable to special intelligence to protect it forevermore.

COL. WYMAN: From what appears in the Security Manual you will see that the matter of clearance and indoctrination is a sore subject. I have stated AFSA's position as I see it, the position that currently exists. I am bumping into these things with the Services all the time and I want to get agreement among us. To my mind it is up to the Director to determine what indoctrination his people get. We do not want to indoctrinate all people "all the way".

CAPT. HARPER: That would be failure on our part to maintain security.

COL. WYMAN: We feel that USCIB 5 must be rewritten.

MR. CLARK: I have another comment about O4. As for the clearance standards which are required for our people, I think it is perfectly desirable that all the personnel in AFSA be subjected to the same criteria and have the same kind of investigation performed on them, that we have a common set of rules and regulations for determining a person's eligibility to be cleared.

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COL. WYMAN: To the best of my knowledge and belief this is the situation. The Navy, in their investigation, waives certain things that we don't waive. We accept their people and we know normally why waivers have been granted. If Navy personnel are separated from AFSA and want to be hired as civilians, we don't take them unless they meet our requirements. We rarely see their records. The Air Force clearances are based on similar regulations to those of the Army.

MR. CLARK: Are you aware that under USCIB 5 this year the Secretary of Defense has promulgated for all three Services a joint policy for cryptographic clearance?

COL. WYMAN: That is right.

MR. CLARK: We now have a common agreement on standard criteria on investigations?

COL. WYMAN: We hope we do. We want to get agreement on how that should be done. None of the Services use the term "cryptologic" except the Army. That really amounts to cryptographic as designated in the June 5 revised SecDef memorandum. Our basis for indoctrination is that.

MR. CLARK: My second point is similar to Dr. Kullback's. As far as the majority of people in O4 are concerned, they have no contact with the actual products of COMINT nor with the source from which that information comes. In general, they are aware that O2 is engaged in COMINT activities. The details they need not know and do not know. There are some exceptions. The people in 41, doing analysis and evaluation, work rather closely with O2 and have a certain knowledge of that part of the work. The majority of the people in O4 do not have contact with COMINT or gain any knowledge of COMINT.

COL. WYMAN: How many people in your Division require complete indoctrination?

COL. MARSHALL (LOG): As you brought out, the people at the warehouse know very little of what goes on except what

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they find out from the supplies they are handling. At the same time in dealing with supplies they might have occasion to enter some of the areas that might be classified higher than the warehouse.

COL. POWERS (COMM): I don't know personally. Quite a large per cent of codeword material comes through our place. Ninety-five per cent of our people will see it. That is the way they get the information. At some time or other they will see the resulting product when it goes out.

MR. NEFF: I have something to say. I think this is a rather complex problem for us this afternoon. I think it would be better to have you come around and talk with us personally and give us a copy of the proposed paper that we could study for a while. I have had considerable experience and have some ideas of my own on all of the subjects you have raised. I was active at one time in both the preparation and review of the criteria that USCIB has prepared. I practically wrote personally the Army clearance regulation. We certainly can't solve here any of the points you raised this afternoon. They are much bigger. I think we are going to have to take them one by one.

COL. WYMAN: Chapter 3 of the Security Manual explains very clearly, I think, just about what we have arrived at this afternoon. I foresee a blast from the Services, but I feel it is what we ought to stick to. I would like your support on this thing, if you agree. If you don't, I want to know where you disagree. The Manual will be around shortly. We have coordinated it completely with I2. It represents much of what we have said this afternoon. I believe that it is entirely in line with the spirit of USCIB but I anticipate trouble when it hits the Services.

CAPT. HARPER: You better get it around as soon as you can.

COL. WYMAN: It will be out very soon and you will have it as an AFSA document.

CAPT. HARPER: I imagine that as an official AFSA document I am sure to agree with it if it is along the lines we have been talking about. However, I want to be sure that I agree with it before it is published.

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COL. WYMAN: However, we have tried for two and a half years to get something down on paper. A great amount of time would be involved in coordinating it through every Office and Staff Division. Your own chapter on COMINT is going in exactly as you prepared it. On the personnel security procedures we have coordinated those thoroughly with Col. Horton's office. Mr. Douglas and Mr. Murphy went over it with a fine-toothed comb. It will make clarification of the USCIB 5 paper necessary.

MR. NEFF: Only a directive from higher authority can clarify it and improve upon it in due course. At the present time you are stuck with it and have to operate under it accordingly.

COL. WYMAN: The Director is completely in accord with the idea that he should be the only one to determine the "need to know" for people within AFSA. Yet USCIB 5 states that only Service and member people can determine that "need to know".

MR. NEFF: I don't interpret the USCIB statement that way at all.

COL. WYMAN: It is stated in the second paragraph.

CAPT. HARPER: I was a member of USCICC which was a sub-board of USCIB and which worked up this originally before it was revised as a USCIB paper back in about 1947 or 1948. We determined the "need to know" for the Services for the real consumers. It was not the people who worked in CSAW or in the producing Bureaus but it was for the consumers. It was an effort to prevent the Chief of ASA from saying, "Well now, Mr. Jones of the Navy doesn't 'need to know' this." CIA or the State Department couldn't say that Mr. Jones doesn't "need to know". The Navy Department is the one who says that Mr. Jones has the "need to know". It has nothing to do with the producer.

COL. WYMAN: Yet the Air Force insists on my interpretation.

CAPT. HARPER: You will find in here then that the Navy is responsible for clearance and indoctrination of Mr. Jones. We had a big row with them over indoctrination of the Press. We warned them that they weren't clearable in our eyes. As I recall, we decided to take turns and say "No". Of course,

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at that time there was no AFSA. Now AFSA is in the peculiar position of being an independent body. G-2 of the Army can't give the Director orders, etc.

COL. WYMAN: It should be resolved.

CAPT. HARPER: Unfortunately it has grown up that our employees are Army employees. It was only intended originally when AFSA was formed that the Army would be the Executive Agent. Administratively that was the intent. Through Civil Service requirements and laws they became Army employees. Gradually, it has grown up that they are full Army employees just the same as anybody working for the Quartermaster's Depot.

COL. WYMAN: The Navy says, "We alone will indoctrinate our people." We (AFSA) accept their clearance but we do not accept their indoctrination and repeat it in accordance with the "need to know". The Air Force sometimes sends us people who are cleared and indoctrinated; however, when they arrive cleared only we must request authority to indoctrinate from Brooks Field. In both cases we proceed to indoctrinate in accordance with the "need to know".

CAPT. HARPER: You mean you can't even give the Air Force man a security briefing?

COL. WYMAN: If that is termed "indoctrination", that authority is delegated to General Lynn.

MR. NEFF: There is something wrong there.

CAPT. HARPER: Very definitely.

MR. CLARK: It sounds like USCIB 5 needs going over.

CAPT. HARPER: I don't think it stems from USCIB 5.

COL. HUME: They delegate the authority only to Gen. Lynn or to his position to indoctrinate.

CAPT. HARPER: That is in accordance with the 2010 series which indicates that the personnel from the Services should be cleared and indoctrinated when we get them.

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COL. WYMAN: In calling this meeting to a close I would like to restate my position. The definition of "indoctrination" as such is something which has needed to be reviewed, as far as I am concerned, for AFSA's purposes in its relations with the Services; also USCIB 5 needs to include the Armed Forces Security Agency and its people and spell out the authority of the Director.

CAPT. HARPER: I think you are right. May I suggest that for our purposes we drop the term "indoctrination" for what we do? I would rather agree that it is not an indoctrination. It is a security briefing.

COL. WYMAN: The Security Manual will state that we have two types of indoctrination. One, a security indoctrination. We definitely state what it is. Once the man has cryptographic clearance and an initial security indoctrination he is considered by AFSA to be acceptable; from then on he receives progressive indoctrination for classified information to which he must have access to do his work in accordance with his "need to know".

CAPT. HARPER: We get into trouble when we start talking in different languages from the Services or CIA. For that reason I suggest we don't call this an "indoctrination".

COL. WYMAN: That will be the first change in the Manual.

COL. CONDRON: The Air Force gets a glossary of terms which are coordinated with the various Agencies and Services so that we all know what the other fellow is talking about.

COL. WYMAN: We are including a glossary of terms.

I thank you all for your attention. I hope you don't feel the time has been wasted.

Col. Hume said to Col. Wyman that Admiral Wenger's need for the Conference Room no longer existed and we could continue, if necessary.

COL. HUME: Do you not want to bring up again the point of top-grade indoctrination?

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MR. NEFF: That is where your terminology comes in. I am pretty certain that I remember a report by name in which what you are talking about is what Dr. Kullback calls "consumer's indoctrination". That was not intended for the processing people.

COL. WYMAN: Then all our people would not have to be indoctrinated.

MR. NEFF: They are not intended to be.

CAPT. HARPER: I want full clearance and indoctrination within O2 to take care of the "need to know" business. They are told enough to go about their work. Then when they move to another activity they are told that. They won't be told to forget what they have learned in the first place. We are glad to have them retain that knowledge. As an employee goes up step by step to GS-15, he learns more and more. Certainly a person should not know everything because he is a GS-15.

MAJ. CORCORAN: When G-2 gives indoctrination to personnel, do they give it like it is done down at the School? What do they do, go ahead and tell them about operations?

COL. WYMAN: About operations completely and codeword material.

MAJ. CORCORAN: We tell them in essence that this is a Security Agency and to keep their mouths shut.

COL. HUME: In G-2, their indoctrination is threefold and is comparable to COMSEC indoctrination, to COMINT indoctrination, and to administrative security indoctrination. The latter is our initial security indoctrination.

MAJ. CORCORAN: Ours says it a lot more simply. They are given a brief indoctrination. If they need to know more later on, as Capt. Harper said, they are told what they will need to know for that particular project. That is what we give them down there.

COL. WYMAN: ASA considers your indoctrination simply as a security briefing. To them, it is not an indoctrination in the sense that we use it progressively later on.

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CAPT. HARPER: That is why I think this is a better term for 16 to use and for the 05 School. When they come to 02, 03, 04, 12, or 17, they have to have full security briefing. Indoctrination in their particular work will be given by their supervisors who know how much they have the "need to know".

COL. WYMAN: The security briefing is the initial security indoctrination.

MR. CLARK: May I raise this question? This Secretary of Defense Directive of 5 June, is that specifically for cryptographic clearance?

COL. WYMAN: Yes. The standard for cryptographic clearance put down there are practically identical with the basic USCIB standards. It is the same thing as SR 380-160-10 and the Service similar regulations.

MR. NEFF: The Army Regulations are written deliberately that way?

MR. CLARK: We know of the investigations that are to be carried out, that the criteria to be met by the personnel are identical for clearing an individual for either COMINT or COMSEC?

MR. CLARK: I can cite an instance where a Service interpreted the criteria differently. The Air Force has a school at Scott Air Force Base where they have cryptographic operations. The Army has one at Camp Gordon. A lot of the Service personnel within them have interim cryptographic clearance. Never to my knowledge has an individual accepted on an interim clearance by the Signal Corps failed to pass a full clearance. About one out of every one hundred at Scott Air Force Base would fail to pass the final test and they follow exactly the same rules.

COL. WYMAN: That is possible.

MR. CLARK: There are bound to be differences in interpretation. The one of the Services which is more strict to begin with is bound to be more strict than the other finally. We wouldn't get the same end result out of the two situations.

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MR. NEFF: I claim regardless that you have to have one hundred per cent or the whole thing falls down. You say, for example, that the Air Force insists on determining whether an Air Force officer is cleared or not. All you do is to review it. I claim there is a weakness in that the other Agencies review the clearance of people that are sent to them.

COL. WYMAN: We do not review all clearances as a matter of courtesy but we do require Personal History Statements from all of them. These we review and if they indicate the necessity for reviewing the record, we do.

MR. NEFF: You assume that the Services saw that PHS, too?

COL. WYMAN: It is possible that they have waived certain items. This must be taken into consideration. Perhaps we do not want to waive the same item.

MR. NEFF: If one activity says that the person is cleared, the second activity accepts the statement?

COL. WYMAN: Not always. For example, ASA has a stamp which they put in an upper corner of a PHS sent to us for review. That stamp means that there is something in the man's case which needs waiving. If we want the man, we say "Yes" in the blank provided. If we do not, we say "No". If our answer is "No", ASA moves the individual concerned. We do not have this arrangement with the other two Services.

COL. CONDRON: The 5 June agreement is in operation now?

MR. CLARK: It is subject to interpretation.

MR. NEFF: That doesn't preclude, because of the intelligence aspects, that other things will govern. For the ASA:Processing Activity, the same investigative standards and the same evaluation of investigative reports will apply whether or not they are going to be working at ASA on the cryptographic or the intelligence end. That is a joint thing on the cryptographic end. The area of contention is where you have the different Services giving different interpretations on the intelligence end.

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MAJ. CORCORAN: Is the clearance given in the Air Force for assignment to AFSS equivalent to ASA's or is it like G-2's?

COL. WYMAN: It is probably much the same as ours here. You signed an oath temporarily, there, when you were brought into this business?

MAJ. CORCORAN: When I came in from the Air Force?

COL. WYMAN: Here, we had to wait for authority to indoctrinate you.

MAJ. CORCORAN: We wondered how you indoctrinate.

COL. WYMAN: That is what we often wonder with regard to the Air Force and Navy, how much indoctrination has been given by the Service before a man arrives here.

MR. CLARK: When an officer is sent to you for assignment to AFSA and the Service indicates that the individual has been cleared, is that clearance accepted without re-investigation?

COL. WYMAN: Yes, if there has not been a break of 18 months. We have to follow rules on that.

MR. CLARK: Personnel supposedly are cleared in accordance with Service standards.

COL. WYMAN: We are to review them and certify them.

MR. CLARK: We don't put them down in the Training School?

COL. WYMAN: If we know about their clearance, we don't put them in the Training School.

The purpose of this meeting has been met. We all feel that there is a need for a review of USCIB 5. Second, you, Capt. Harper, believe that the indoctrination as we are now conducting it is in the best interests of your operations and within the requirements of USCIB as now written. Third, we all feel that the term "indoctrination" is perhaps misused, and that we should term our initial security indoctrination as a "security briefing" instead. We all understand that a military person cleared will possibly have some similar briefing when he comes in the Service but that further indoctrination should be developed within the Agency.

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MR. CLARK: Along that line of thinking would you then report regularly only those people that you determined to have been fully indoctrinated?

COL. WYMAN: Not necessarily.

MR. NEFF: There has to be a need to get fully indoctrinated if they work in AFSA.

CAPT. HARPER: They want the names of people employed here?

COL. WYMAN: No, we simply send them the number, we don't send the names to anybody.

CAPT. HARPER: We were supposed to send the corrections every year to the FBI. ASA did. We wanted to do that, The FBI didn't search their files in those days. They said that they couldn't do that but if anything came up, for instance, Ziswoski out in Chicago turned out to be a member of a front organization, they would look at the list and see if the name Ziswoski was on the list. If it was, they would so inform us. They couldn't take the listing and go through the entire file on every name. I never heard of the effects of it. We did do it. We might have some individual talks on these subjects.

COL. WYMAN: My purpose in having you all here was to determine how many people in each Staff Division and Office would come under that top-level indoctrination. You state that as far as you, Capt. Harper, are concerned, there would be only three or four.

CAPT. HARPER: Take 12, for example. Youngsters from 12 come around all the time asking for information from this person or that person who makes up the papers. They don't come to me. If I weren't sure that every one was fully cleared and security indoctrinated, I would have to issue an order that nobody wearing a 12 badge, with certain exceptions, would be allowed in the operating spaces. The same thing would be true of 16.

MR. NEFF: I think it was not intended that any individual in any cryptographic agency receive this formal indoctrination.

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CAPT. HARPER: G-2's indoctrination is based on that. I can see reasons for G-2, ONI, CIA, ID, and the Air Force Intelligence Consumers getting fuller indoctrination than the vast majority of our people do. They get the same kind of indoctrination as the people in 25 get. I can understand that reason. I think that is an internal matter.

MR. NEFT: Exactly. That should be the extent of the security briefing as we are now calling it.

CAPT. HARPER: I meant more than that. I meant more than a security briefing. I meant the knowledge of what this means, on how it is arrived at in order that they can evaluate it properly as intelligence information.

DR. KULLBACK: Also the circumstances under which they could use it operationally, what they have to know.

COL. WYMAN: In our Manual, you will find reference to this type (consumer) of people. There are certain badges that they get.

CAPT. HARPER: When they show the proper badge, we assume they are fully cleared.

MR. CLARK: I have one point in connection with the re-investigation. I don't know how many people here have been through this experience which I had about six months ago. I found the Agency had re-investigated me. They called me over without any knowledge on my part to sign all the various and sundry oaths. It was my experience and that of several other people that the general wording of these oaths is no longer directly applicable to personnel who are being re-investigated but is fundamentally applicable to personnel being indoctrinated for the first time.

COL. WYMAN: It should be more or less a reminder. We investigate every three years and only to the extent that your former clearance doesn't meet the current requirements.

MR. CLARK: The actual wording that I had to sign wasn't applicable to me. It didn't make any sense. It wasn't true. I had to sign them because 16 said that I had to sign them.

COL. WYMAN: We can change that.

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MR. CLARK: I read about a dozen things.

COL. WYMAN: That is a general reminder. It is not too good and is being revised.

MR. CLARK: I raise the point for the sake of looking into it.

CAPT. HARPER: I don't believe the statute of limitations has anything to do with it any more.

COL. HUME: The second oath, the renewal oath, is only a matter of record. Each individual on the street is obligated to the laws of the United States whether he signed an oath or not.

COL. WYMAN: Public Law 513 would take care of that.

MR. NEFF: We probably don't need the oath.

CAPT. HARPER: I think it is a good thing to have. That is all it ever did do even before PL 513.

LT. JOHNSON: Suppose a person refused to take the oath?

CAPT. HARPER: Suppose he was a Queker?

LT. JOHNSON: We had one case last year.

COL. WYMAN: The gentleman was a Jehovah's Witness and we asked him to "affirm".

MR. CLARK: Capt. Harper, in the Navy you had an oath which I signed and which I may no longer live up to. When I worked for the Navy in 1935 and 1936 and was released to go back to the Army I signed certain oaths never under any circumstances to reveal the Navy's success to the Army. Now this being a joint organization, I can no longer say I won't do that.

CAPT. HARPER: Your oath still applies. You can tell the Army man what it was and he can tell the Navy man.

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COL. WYMAN: I appreciate your coming over here. I hoped I would hear more from Dr. Kullback. I believe you, Dr. Kullback, have a lot of difficulty in your shop in deciding when to do what in the way of indoctrination or how much to do.

DR. KULLBACK: The difficulty is in the question of interpreting indoctrination rather than security requirements. The people should be cleared. They don't have "need to know" the COMINT activities. The contractors haven't any "need to know".

CAPT. HARPER: In general you have to trust that they won't go and tell what they have seen or heard. Many times these people (contractors) are not cleared. They walk through the halls under escort to see the Director, the Chief of 17, or the Contracting Officer. That is all right. Those people aren't going to sit down and tell them all of their business.

COL. WYMAN: Many times they come in too without any check by Security at all. We are trying to get that under control.

COL. HUME: There should be a stronger recommendation from the requesting Office or Division concerning an incoming visitor, contractual or not. The Office itself should require even stronger standards than we do and all visitors who come in under this category should meet those standards. Some visitors of this nature come into AFSA so fast that there is no time to determine their qualifications for access to classified matter. There should be some statement coming from the Division or Office concerned; they should not just throw the question up in the air and leave it for Security to decide. They should tell us exactly what those people are to do, why they are here, to what degree they should be cleared, and in what capacity they are going to be entered in our operational spaces.

DR. KULLBACK: Either they are brought in or they are not brought in. Before any classified information is made available to anybody you can rest assured the people concerned know about it because they are well aware of the implications of Public Law 513.

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CAPT. HARPER: There was one instance when I was over there when somebody wasn't cleared. The contracting officer stated that he was. It was not true in fact.

DR. KULLBACK: By the same token if we get information from the contracting officer that an individual is cleared, we act on the assumption that that is a valid statement.

COL. HUME: It should also state to what degree. A few little facts like that would help us tremendously.

CAPT. HARPER: The contractors are cleared only for Confidential information.

DR. KULLBACK: One other possibility would be to provide a public reception room which is not within the confines of AFSA into which these people could be brought so that you could talk with them.

CAPT. HARPER: Get the contracting officer to tell you. You should not depend on an individual in O3 to tell you when somebody is cleared when he visits here.

COL. WYMAN: Only Security should check clearance status; Office Chiefs should tell us when visitors are coming and what clearance, if any, is required.

DR. KULLBACK: Generally the people who visit us are the people with whom we are doing business. They have been cleared. Many times somebody comes to the Pentagon looking for business. Somebody in the Signal Corps says, "Why don't you go and try AFSA? They do research." Then the first thing you know you have somebody knocking at the gate. A few business people will approach you, people who are connected with atomic energy and with Government offices security-wise.

COL. HUME: There has to be a check. Just as Capt. Harper said that he can't take a man's word for it, neither can the Security Control Division.

CAPT. HARPER: In the case which Dr. Kullback points out, of somebody coming here because he was sent out to see Dr. Kullback or Mr. Dingley about business, I never worried

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about those in the slightest. I think that Dr. Kullback and Mr. Dingley are capable of looking out for AFSA's security concerns. They don't know who the people are in the first place. Maybe they are cleared for some other business.

COL. WYMAN: You can talk about a lot of business without ever getting into classified matters or into what the Agency does or anything of the sort.

DR. KULLBACK: If we had some sort of public reception room, it would help.

COL. WYMAN: We will try to get that.

CAPT. HARPER: I don't know whether you get so much of it now. In 1951 we had two or three a day looking for business.

At this time it was felt that enough discussion had been held. Col. Wyman asked to see Col. Condron and Capt. Harper after the meeting adjourned.