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USCIB: 4/87


20

17 August 1953

~~SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject: COMINT Clearance Standards and Procedures.

1. The enclosed Draft Directive is forwarded for consideration at the request of Chairman of the Security Committee.
2. The Executive Secretary considers the enclosure an acceptable interim measure from his viewpoint.
3. The Security Committee is to be complimented on the thorough and expeditious manner in which it has handled this complex problem.



RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure

Memorandum from Chairman SECCOM
dtd 17 Aug 53, subject as above.

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~~SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:VIA: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

Subject: COMINT Clearance Standards and Procedures.

Reference: USCIB 4/85.

1. At its Fifth Meeting on 17 July 1953, USCIBEC agreed to refer to the Security Committee for further study and revision a proposed redraft of USCIB Directive No. 5 (USCIB 4/65).

2. USCIBSECCOM has addressed itself to the problem with a view to drafting an up-to-date directive which would serve as an interim policy pending eventual preparation of a comprehensive COMINT Security Policy.

3. Accordingly, the enclosed redraft of USCIB Directive No. 5 is forwarded for consideration. The redraft has the unanimous agreement of all members of SECCOM except for the last sentence of paragraph 4c. The Air Force member could not concur with the requirement for a full field or background investigation subsequent to the indoctrination of personnel cleared in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph.

FOR THE USCIB SECURITY COMMITTEE:



P. J. KARL
LCDR, USN
Chairman

Enclosure

Proposed USCIB Directive #5
dtd 17 Aug 53.

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~~SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~PROPOSED UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARDDIRECTIVE NO. 5USCIB STANDARDS AND PROCEDUREFOR CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR COMINT

1. Communication Intelligence (COMINT) is the name given to all processes involved in, and intelligence information and technical material resulting from, the interception and study (a) of foreign communications passed by wire, radio, and other electro magnetic means (except press, propaganda, and public broadcasts) and (b) of selected foreign communications sent by non-electro magnetic means.
2. The elements of the procedure for clearing a person for COMINT are, consecutively:
 - a. Determination of the "need to know".
 - b. Investigation, and evaluation in terms of USCIB clearance standards.
 - c. Approval for indoctrination.
 - d. Indoctrination (and debriefing).
3. DETERMINATION OF THE "NEED TO KNOW".
 - a. The "need to know" exists only when a knowledge of COMINT is essential to a person for the performance of his official duties. The number of persons cleared for COMINT will be held to the essential minimum.

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- b. The responsibility for determining the "need to know" of persons in the performance of duties under the direct cognizance and supervision of a USCIB member department or agency rests with that USCIB member department or agency, which shall act in full coordination with any other member department or agency concerned with such determination.
- c. The responsibility for determining the "need to know" of civilians under contract and employees and representatives of commercial firms and civilian research institutions which are to engage in research, or the design, development, or manufacture of equipment, pertinent to COMINT production rests with the USCIB member department or agency directing the project, which shall act in full coordination with any other member departments or agencies concerned with the project.
- d. The "need to know" of all other individuals will be determined by USCIB, unless otherwise directed by the Special Committee for COMINT of the National Security Council.
- e. The "need to know" of boards, committees, councils and other activities of like nature under the exclusive cognizance of a USCIB member department or agency rests with the USCIB member department or agency concerned. The "need to know" of any other board, committee, council or activity will be determined by USCIB, unless otherwise directed by the Special Committee for COMINT of the National Security Council.

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- f. No person will be deemed to have a "need to know" solely by virtue of performance of duties on a board, committee, council, or other like activity unless such board, committee, council or activity shall be determined to have a "need to know" as a whole by competent authority as set forth herein. When the "need to know" has been determined for a board, committee, council or other activity prior to designation of the members, such board, committee, council or other activity should, insofar as practicable, be composed of members already indoctrinated for COMINT.
4. USCIB INVESTIGATION AND CLEARANCE STANDARDS.
- a. USCIB standards for clearance of a person for COMINT are as follows:
- (1) The person shall be of excellent character and discretion, and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States. Exceptions to this requirement may be made only as agreed by USCIB. A record of waivers granted will be maintained by the Executive Secretary, USCIB.
 - (2) The person should be a native-born U. S. citizen. The members of his immediate family should be U. S. citizens.
 - (3) No member of the person's immediate family and no person to whom he may reasonably be supposed to be bound by ties of affection, kinship, or obligation should be of dubious loyalty to the United States.

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- (4) No member of the person's immediate family and no person to whom he may reasonably be supposed to be bound by ties of affection, kinship, or obligation should be a resident of a foreign country having basic or critical national interests opposed to those of the U. S.
- (5) Exceptions to any of the foregoing requirements, except the first, may be made by the USCIB member of a member department or agency but only in case of compelling need after every reasonable assurance has been obtained that, in the circumstances, the security risk involved is negligible.
- b. To permit evaluation on the basis of the foregoing requirements each person to be cleared for COMINT shall, prior to clearance, be required to furnish a signed Personal History Statement or other documentation containing information essentially similar to that called for in the sample form attached hereto as Annex 1, and shall be subjected to a thorough investigation which shall include at least the following:
- (1) Check of the date and place of birth of the individual.
 - (2) Check of the national files of the FBI and of such other investigative agencies as may be pertinent to the investigation.

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- (3) Local agency checks in areas where the individual has resided to consist as a minimum in every case of a check of the files of the local police, local credit agencies, the headquarters of the appropriate major subordinate command of the Department of Defense (if necessary), and such other agencies as may be pertinent.
 - (4) Check of records of the person's military service, if any.
 - (5) Verification of information provided concerning education and affiliations.
 - (6) Interviews with at least three character references, and a check made with former employers.
 - (7) Interviews with at least two additional character references found through the preceding steps in the investigation.
- c. Officers of the Armed Forces and of the Foreign Service of the United States with more than 10 years' continuous active commissioned service and civil officials appointed by the President and approved by the Senate need not necessarily be subjected to the complete formal investigation as outlined above in paragraph 4b. Before the indoctrination of such persons, however, all pertinent records readily available in the Washington area will be scrutinized with a view to determining whether any questionable traits

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have been noted during his entire period of commissioned service. A full field or background investigation will be initiated as soon as practicable.

- d. In each case the responsibility for initiating and conducting the required investigation and for making the evaluation based on the foregoing standards for clearance rests with the authority which has determined the "need to know".

However, where the Secretary of Defense or USCIB has determined the "need to know", this responsibility may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense to a member department or agency under his cognizance, or will be delegated by USCIB to an appropriate member department or agency, in each specific instance.

- e. In emergency, or when there is other compelling need to clear a person for COMINT prior to completion of the full prescribed investigation, and the responsible authority has determined upon such advance clearance (paragraph 5c, hereinafter), such investigative checks as are immediately possible shall be made at once, and the full investigation and final evaluation shall be completed at the earliest practicable moment. Interim clearances granted on this basis must be held to a minimum.

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5. APPROVAL FOR INDOCTRINATION.

- a. The responsibility for approving the indoctrination of a person for COMINT rests with the authority which has determined his "need to know". When determination of the "need to know" has involved coordination with other departments, similar coordination shall precede the decision to approve indoctrination.
- b. In a case where the responsibility for approving indoctrination rests with the Secretary of Defense or with USCIB, the organization which has been charged with making the required investigation and evaluation (paragraph 4d, above) shall furnish to the approving authority the following:
 - (1) A certification that the person under consideration meets all USCIB clearance standards (or a statement to the contrary, with particulars).
 - (2) Any reports of the investigation and documents pertinent thereto which the Secretary of Defense or USCIB may require in the specific instance.
- c. In an emergency, or when there is other compelling need, in the national interest, to indoctrinate a person for COMINT prior to completion of the full prescribed investigation, the authority which has determined the "need to know" may approve such prior indoctrination. Indoctrinations granted on this basis must be held to a minimum.

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6. INDOCTRINATION AND DEBRIEFING.

- a. Indoctrination is defined as instruction as to the nature of COMINT and the security regulations and practices which govern the handling of COMINT material and COMINT activities.
- b. Each person who is to be indoctrinated for COMINT shall:
 - (1) be thoroughly and carefully instructed in the general nature of COMINT and the general principles of COMINT protection, or
 - (2) completely familiarize himself with the specific regulations which govern the dissemination and safeguarding of that COMINT to which he is being granted access.
 - (3) shall be required to subscribe to an oath of secrecy.

The oath to be administered upon the indoctrination of a person for COMINT shall be essentially similar to that of the sample form attached as Annex 2.

- c. REINDOCTRINATION. It is noted that each member department and agency is responsible to assess the need for, and conduct, such reindoctrinations as are considered necessary or desirable.

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- d. DEBRIEFING is defined as the process of reminding persons no longer authorized to have knowledge of COMINT or to receive COMINT end products that they are still bound by all security regulations pertaining thereto. When a person's "need to know" has ceased to exist he shall be debarred from further knowledge of COMINT and shall be required to subscribe to a final oath of secrecy. The oath to be administered upon the debriefing of a person who has been indoctrinated for COMINT shall be essentially similar to that of the sample form attached as Annex 3.
- e. ACCIDENTAL REVELATION OF COMINT INFORMATION. Whenever COMINT information or COMINT end products are accidentally revealed to non-indoctrinated persons, immediate action shall be taken by the cognizant member department or agency to instruct such persons as to the general nature of COMINT and to impress upon them their obligation, under U. S. Code 18, Section 798, to maintain absolute silence regarding the revelation.
- f. The responsibility for indoctrinating and debriefing a person and for administering the oaths of secrecy rests with the authority which has determined the individual's "need to know". When the Secretary of Defense or USCIB has determined the "need to know", this responsibility may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense to a member

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department or agency under his cognizance or by USCIB to an appropriate member department or agency in each specific instance.

- g. Each USCIB member organization shall maintain current records of personnel indoctrinated by it for COMINT, pursuant to its own determination of "need to know", and shall keep the Executive Secretary, USCIB, informed, on a quarterly basis, of the total numbers of such personnel. The Executive Secretary, USCIB, will maintain a list of persons cleared for COMINT pursuant to the determination of the "need to know" by USCIB.
- h. Each USCIB member organization will keep the Executive Secretary, USCIB, advised of the names of any individuals not under its exclusive cognizance who have been indoctrinated or debriefed by it for any reason, setting forth at the same time the date and authority under which such action was taken.
- i. Member departments and agencies of USCIB which receive, use or disseminate COMINT final products will maintain a written set of regulations for the handling and dissemination thereof, in accordance with the policies of USCIB. Each member department and agency will place on file with the Executive Secretary, USCIB, a current copy of such regulations, together with such changes as may be made thereto from time to time.

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7. PERIODIC REINVESTIGATIONS.

Persons cleared for COMINT and retaining that status permanently or over a long period of time shall be subjected to such periodic reinvestigations as are considered necessary by the USCIB member concerned. Such reopened investigations shall be conducted by the investigative services available to that member agency. The minimum requirement for a reopened investigation shall consist of a National Agency Check and a review of an up to date Personal History Statement or other similar documentation at not to exceed five year intervals.

8. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING INDOCTRINATION AND DEBRIEFING.

a. In order to assist in administrative control of duty assignments, the following procedures will be observed:

- (1) When an individual of one USCIB member department or agency is supplied to another member department or agency for a permanent duty assignment involving knowledge of COMINT, the receiving activity will be responsible for the required indoctrination and debriefing. The necessary investigation and evaluation prior to indoctrination may be made in coordination with the parent activity.
- (2) The receiving activity will furnish a copy of the executed indoctrination and debriefing oaths to the parent activity immediately after their execution.

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- (3) The indoctrination and debriefing of an individual supplied to another member department or agency for a temporary duty assignment involving knowledge of COMINT will be a responsibility of the parent activity.
- (4) When an individual is debriefed and returned to his parent activity for further assignment, the activity to which he was attached shall make suitable recommendations to the parent activity in regard to limitations on assignment to duties of a hazardous nature.

9. EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL IN NON-INDOCTRINATED STATUS

- a. It is desirable that all persons to be employed in the COMINT field, directly or on a contractual basis, by a USCIB member department or agency be investigated, evaluated, and indoctrinated in accordance with the standards set forth in paragraphs 4 and 6 of this Directive. However, such persons as need not and positively will not have knowledge of, or access to, either (1) COMINT codeword information, documents and technical materials, or (2) activities which involve or produce directly such information, documents and technical material may, at the discretion of the USCIB member of the department or agency concerned, be investigated and instructed according to the standards and procedures normally applied by that member department or agency for persons requiring access to the level of classified information involved.

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- b. The application of the exception described in paragraph 9a above shall be held to the necessary minimum. Persons employed and granted access to classified non-codeword information in the COMINT field in accordance with paragraph 9a above shall not be considered as indoctrinated for COMINT. The numbers of such persons, however, shall be reported to the Executive Secretary, USCIB, on a quarterly basis.

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