

# IS THIS OUR LAST CHANCE FOR PEACE?

By JOSEPH and STEWART ALSOP

These are the grim facts the free world faces: A Russian "devastation" stockpile of atom bombs, a Red Air Force larger than ours, and 6,000,000 Russians under arms by 1955. Is there anything we can do to avert this menace? Yes, say these experts—provided we act now.

**I**N the training courses of the intelligence services, the first lesson is to distinguish between "capabilities" and "intentions." As words of art, capabilities are what the other fellow can do to you, and intentions are what he means to do to you. Mistakes about either are easy and frequently costly. It is idiotic to get into a fight with a perfectly good friend, just because he is flexing his biceps. It is even worse to be knocked out cold by an enemy, just because you have paid more attention to the smile on his face than to the knuckle-duster in his pocket.

Democracies incorrigibly incline toward the latter error. Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain all but destroyed Britain by it. We ourselves importantly promoted the loss of China by our break-neck postwar demobilization. And we invited the Korean aggression by the Truman-Louis Johnson disarmament policy of 1949-50.

It is well to remember these incidents of the past, now that America is again engaged in a fateful calculation of capabilities and intentions. On the one hand, the Kremlin's new rivalries at home and new peacefulness abroad fill the headlines, and are raising high hopes for an end of the cold war. On the other hand, the Soviet Union's growing military power is causing the darkest apprehensions among the few who trouble to follow the true trend of the world power balance.

Which are to guide our policy, the apprehensions or the hopes?

The present report solely concerns Soviet capabilities, and it will have only this to say about Soviet intentions: If we are again deceived, the penalty will not be paid in such distant countries as China and Korea. One way or another, the penalty will be paid here in the United States.

This is predictable, in turn, because the American strategic situation is now being transformed in a way that very few Americans even dimly understand. We are in the midst of an unnoticed revolution, all too closely resembling the change that overtook

Britain when the Germans passed the British in military-industrial strength and the invention of modern aircraft opened the British Isles to attack across the Channel.

It took more than eight decades, from the accession of Bismarck to the outbreak of war in 1939, for Britain to let slip her ancient position as the invulnerable arbiter of Europe. In our case, the challenge is perhaps more difficult to meet; since the change has gone very far indeed in the eight short years since 1945. The causes are:

*The invention of absolute weapons;*

*The emergence of the Soviet empire as a military-industrial giant power;*

*And the development of weapons systems which can reach from continent to continent, reducing our protecting ocean moats almost to the status of the Strait of Dover.*

Thus far, these revolutionary developments have never really been taken into account in American policy making. For instance, we have built heavily on our atomic monopoly. Yet, as will be shown, the breaking of that monopoly by the Soviet Union was not even allowed for in the whopping defense budgets of the last two Truman years.

When asked to explain this curious neglect, such leading postwar policy makers as Charles E. Bohlen and George F. Kennan used to reply that coping with the change in the American situation was too heavy and too painful a task. Something might still turn up, they used to say, to alter the whole trend. When asked just what might turn up, they would then answer in effect that Stalin's toes might turn up.

Stalin waited a long while to die. We can no longer hope that it will be eight years, or ten years, or fifteen years before the final phase, when this country will come within direct and easy range of Soviet power. We must now expect this to happen in two or three or at the most four years, unless positive counteraction is taken. Such is the real problem. It is made all the worse by the general unawareness that the problem exists. For those, then,

who do not absolutely trust the Kremlin's peacefulness, it may be well to have a look at this problem's main aspects.

*The invention of absolute weapons* is the most obvious symbol of the strategic revolution of our time. Only eight years ago, when President Roosevelt died, the American atomic bomb had not been tested. Four years ago, when President Truman launched his disarmament policy, our atomic monopoly was still unbroken—it lasted until the explosion of the first "people's democratic" atomic bomb in September, 1949. When President Eisenhower was inaugurated, American official estimates credited the Kremlin with about 200 atomic bombs. In only two more years the Kremlin is expected to have about 400 atomic bombs. And after that will come the era of the "people's democratic" hydrogen bomb.

The problem of how many enemy bombs would "devastate" America has recently been studied by a high-level Government-research group, Project East River. "Devastation" was precisely defined as the extent of atomic destruction that would force an American surrender. Possible combinations of bomb damage were carefully analyzed, for their effects on industrial plant, industrial working force, transport, communications, electric power, and so forth.

In this coolly scientific manner, an exact estimate was made of a potentially decisive enemy stockpile. It can now be stated on indisputable authority that Project East River's decisive stockpile contained approximately 400 bombs, or the same stockpile that the Kremlin will control by the end of the year 1955.

On the import of this development, there is testimony from a witness who may not be lightly disregarded. No other Western leader has studied the world power balance more closely than Winston Churchill. None has placed a higher value on the chief assets on our side of that balance—American industrial productivity, America's still enormous atomic lead and American strategic airpower. Yet in July, 1950, Churchill

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## IS THIS OUR LAST CHANCE FOR PEACE?

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solemnly told the House of Commons: "There could be no more certain way of bringing about the destruction of civilization than that we should drift on helplessly until the Soviets are fully equipped with atomic bombs."

You may not accept Churchill's somber conclusion, as these reporters do not. Yet you cannot dodge the plain facts. In the pre-atomic era, no enemy could knock out America, because this continent was too remote, too vast, too self-contained. This happy security has been ours for so long that we have blandly continued taking it for granted while it has been visibly crumbling away. The old security will be altogether lost when the Kremlin controls enough atomic bombs to "devastate" America.

So much is easy to understand, once the fact sinks home—which our leaders have sedulously sought to conceal—that the Kremlin really will have this quantity of atomic bombs before very long. What is far less easy to understand is the second element in the revolution of our time. This is the astonishing rate of growth of Soviet power.

The emergence of the Soviet empire as a military-industrial giant power has

also been muffled by official concealments. But there is another and even more important reason why this phenomenon is so little understood. By a cruel paradox, the very features of the Soviet system which we take as signs of poverty and weakness and lack of know-how are the secret sources of Soviet strength.

Think for a moment. What are these signs of supposed Soviet weakness? They are simply the innumerable signs that the peoples of the Soviet empire live in misery, at any rate by American standards. But if the collective farms are not electrified and the Moscow housewives have few pots and pans, then there are more kilowatts of electricity to produce aluminum and there is more aluminum to build airframes. If Russian machinists have no cars and tramp to work in bast shoes, then there is more shoe leather for the armed forces and there is more manufacturing capacity for military vehicles and there are more petroleum products to fuel the war machine.

In other words, the misery of the Soviet people provides the surplus and the strength of the Soviet state. The surplus is vast, for it is the product of the largest empire in history, which now has great industrial as well as agricultural productivity. And since power, and not a better life for the people, is the state's sole aim, this vast surplus of

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## Caught... with our stamps down!

*It was one of those frizzling fry-eggs-on-the-sidewalks Fridays. At ten o'clock the Old Man phoned and said that he wouldn't be in. "You take over, Henry," he says. Ha!*

The afternoon was just one foul-up after another. A batch of invoices had to be done over, wrong discounts. A Big Customer wires from Boston about his Urgent order—which turned up in the Baltimore freight depot. The bank has a tizzy, dealer's check bounced. The office air conditioning went floey. Fooley!

And at 4:40 p.m., DST, there is wild wail from Mrs. Duchy, the Old Man's secretary. Our stamp box is bare. Daffy, the new girl, had forgotten to buy stamps.

Some crisis! Everybody is scheduled to get away early on the weekend.

So who hotfoots through the sun baked streets? And stands in line with all the parcel mailers in the stifling postoffice? And tries to keep the stamp sheets from gumming on the way back? And sticks stamps on every last blasted envelope? Don't answer!

Monday bright and early, I phone the Pitney-Bowes place, and tell them, "You send up one of those baby postage meters, and I'll see that it stays here."

And the Old Man didn't even argue.

There's no argument about it! With the DM, the smallest office can have metered mail—and get rid of old fashioned stamps.

With the DM, you print postage as you need it, for any kind of mail, directly on the envelope (or on special tape for parcel post). With the meter stamp, you can print your own small advertisement, if you like. There's a moistener for sealing envelopes.


The postoffice sets the meter for as much postage as you want to buy. Postage in a meter is safe from loss, damage, theft—and automatically accounted for, shows on visible registers. Metered mail, already postmarked, can get away faster in the postoffice.

Anybody can learn to use a postage meter. It's a great time saver—and postage saver.

There's a postage meter, electric or hand operated, for every office, large or small. Ask the nearest PB office to show you. Or send the coupon.



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## YOU BE THE JUDGE

By WILLIAM DONALDSON

ON all installment sales, Schultz's jewelry store added a flat 10 per cent "finance charge" regardless of the number of payments or length of time allowed for them. Suddenly the Government demanded that the jeweler pay its 20 per cent luxury tax on the "finance charge" as well as the stipulated price. It said the flat charge was actually a part of the price. Instead of paying, however, the jeweler took the question to court.

"The price is the amount charged for the article itself," he argued. "The extra ten per cent simply reimburses me for the increased work and expense of handling installment payments over a period of time. Therefore it really isn't a part of the price."

"If the extra ten per cent were a true finance charge, we would go along with that argument," Government counsel replied. "But it isn't. Schultz tacks it on to the cash price no matter how many installments he has to handle. Surely it is more trouble to collect twenty-four installments than six. Yet he charges ten per cent regardless. So his charge is arbitrary and actually a part of the price, and should be subject to the tax."

If you were the judge, would you make the jeweler pay the tax?

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

The jeweler had to pay. "It is obvious," the court said, "that in fixing the amount a customer is to pay on a credit sale a merchant cannot arbitrarily name any amount that he chooses as a 'finance charge'.

or 'carrying charge' and thereby exclude it from the tax base. This would open unlimited opportunities for evasion of the tax."

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the state is always invested and re-invested to increase the state's crude military strength.

It is often asked, "How does anyone know the Soviets are producing so many atomic bombs, or tanks, or airplanes, or whatever?" The answer is partly secret, although much can be learned by careful analysis of published data. At any rate the test of events has shown that the estimates are reliable. Or rather this test has shown that Western intelligence estimates of Soviet military-industrial accomplishments always tend to err on the side of optimism, because of failure to realize that the people's misery is the state's strength.

For example, the year 1952 was officially supposed to be the earliest date for the explosion of the people's democratic atomic bomb. The Joint Chiefs of Staff used to ridicule this date that was given in their own planning papers. As late as September, 1949, so sound an expert as Dr. Vannevar Bush actually had in print a "more realistic" prediction that the Soviets would not be able to build their first bomb before 1964. Doctor Bush had to revise his book in proof, and the Joint Chiefs had to revise their thinking rather thoroughly, when the Soviet atomic explosion occurred that September of 1949.

Again, until Korea, our own difficulties with jet engines led to a confident official assumption that Soviet jet-engine output must be very low in quantity and very poor in quality. Then a MIG-15 engine was captured in Korea. It was found to incorporate brilliant improvements, in engineering to give strength and in design to give thrust, which we had lacked the know-how to devise.

There is an authentic account, told by an eyewitness who later defected, of how the Soviet tank designers took their troubles to Stalin in the mid-1930's. They told him the familiar story of all tank designers, that superior speed, armor and fire power could not be combined in a single tank. Stalin, in effect, replied, "Give me all three or you go to Siberia." The result of this ruthlessness was the famous Soviet T-34, far and away the best medium tank of the last war, which we did not really equal until 1950.

The postwar steel figures show how such methods pay off for the Kremlin. In 1945, Soviet steel production was hardly more than 12,000,000 tons per year. In 1948, war damage had been repaired; expansion had begun, and the Soviet steel base was about 20,000,000 tons. This year Russian steel capacity has reached 39,000,000 tons, while the Soviet empire as a whole now has a steel base of no less than 49,000,000 tons. In two more years the Soviet imperial steel base is expected to be close to 60,000,000 tons, or more than the combined steel capacities of Western Europe and the British Isles.

Many people—Aneurin Bevan and Treasury Secretary George Humphrey to name just two—are comfortably convinced that America's 117,500,000 tons of steel capacity still gives the West a safe superiority. But here, again, the misery of the people enters in. What you use steel for can matter much more than how much steel you have.

Even in 1945, with the West Russian steel plants still in ruins, Soviet war industry is authoritatively credited with turning out 120,000 pieces of artillery of all calibers, 110,000 mortars, 450,000 machine guns, 30,000 tanks and a vast panoply of other weapons. It is another American illusion that the

Russians fought the last war with American arms; Lend-Lease mainly aided the Kremlin not with arms, but with transport equipment and raw materials. Since the war, the production of arms, the strengthening of the armed forces, the steady buildup of a powerful military supporting structure have been the highest objects of the Kremlin's policy.

As we ourselves saw in the war period, a high level of military spending need not halt and may even stimulate an upward surge of national income and productivity. As the steel figures indicate, Soviet national income has risen rapidly and continuously throughout the postwar years. The best British and American authorities put the rate of rise at between 9 and 10 per cent per annum, compounded. The main result has been a continuously increasing Soviet military effort.

The people, the consumers, have of course been thrown some sops, in the form of more and cheaper food, goods and services. When the starting point is almost absolute misery—as those who have been in internment camps will recognize—small improvements give a vital sense of increasing well-being. And while the secret police still enjoy their privileges and wield their machine guns, the people's misery is not likely to make trouble—it will only go on providing surpluses—for the Kremlin.

Then, too, the historic weak spots in the Russian economy have been buttressed by lavish investments, in everything from aluminum production—to be expanded no less than 2.5 times by 1955—to Soviet technical and scientific education—already producing an annual crop of physicists, chemists, engineers and other militarily valuable specialists—decidedly larger than our crop in America. In particular, the Trans-Siberian Railway has been fully double-tracked and otherwise greatly improved. Two more trans-Asiatic lines are well along toward their completion date in 1955. Important new truck production has been built up, in step with the mechanization of the Red Army. And there will be fuel for these new trucks and for the Red Air Force,

since Soviet petroleum output has now been brought up to 60,000,000 tons per year by restoring the Baku wells and opening new oil fields beyond the Urals.


Those who still rely on poor transport or deficient petroleum to hamstring the Kremlin are like the British and American experts who said Hitler could make war for only eight months because of the German oil shortage.

And while these problems have been so energetically tackled, the lion's share of Soviet national income has always been and is still being invested for the same purposes covered in our own Pentagon and Atomic Energy Commission budgets. In the years 1949-50, at least 30 per cent of Soviet national income was absorbed by the military effort, direct and indirect. Since 1950, this share has been a full 40 per cent. By contrast, American postwar defense and atomic spending has dropped as low as 6 per cent of national income, and is now running at about 16 per cent.

What do these figures mean in reality? You cannot get at the truth by studying the Soviet budget, since the Kremlin rigs all prices in favor of the armed services. But go back to the steel base and you can work it out for yourself. In effect, American defense spending now amounts to 16 per cent of a national income proportional to 117,500,000 tons of steel. Soviet military spending currently amounts to 40 per cent of an empire-wide income proportional to 49,000,000 tons of steel. Sixteen per cent of 117.5 is less than 40 per cent of 49. If we merely wished to equal the Soviet investment of manpower and materials, we should have to increase our defense appropriations to around \$60,000,000,000 this year.

But here the rule of the people's misery plays its last trick on us. An enormous share of every American defense dollar goes to pay and maintain our uniformed personnel. We use more than 60,000 men to form and support a division in the field. The Soviet divisional slice is hardly more than 24,000 men. The Kremlin not only invests more materials and manpower than we do, the Kremlin's investment also earns up

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to twice the return of finished military power. So if we wished to equal the Soviet fighting force in being, we should have to increase our defense budget to something like \$120,000,000,000 this year.

Such are the techniques, then, which enable the Kremlin to maintain a peacetime power that we could hardly put into the field in wartime—175 Red Army divisions, more than 60 divisions in the European satellites, 3,500,000 men in the Chinese communist armies, a Red Air Force of 20,000 planes, a Chinese Air Force that may have passed 2000 planes, a Red Navy that is larger than the British Navy, and so on. Such are the methods by which the Kremlin is now driving toward its ominous goals for 1955, unaltered since Stalin's death, of a Red Air Force at least half again larger than our own, and a staggering total of 6,000,000 men under arms in Russia alone.

In truth, the grim trick of building the strength of the state on the misery of the people now amounts to a Soviet secret weapon which is doing more to tilt the world power balance decisively against us than the mere growth of the Kremlin's atomic stock. While our total productivity is still much greater than Soviet productivity, we have already been surpassed in the military-industrial effort. And the misery of the Soviet peoples is still creating state surpluses. The surpluses are still being invested to build more strength. And no one can foretell where this process may end.

This does not mean the Kremlin planners do not have their troubles. Indeed some experts think they are already running head on into the most intractable problems of any system founded on the people's misery—not enough food for the growing industrial-labor force and expanding armed services, owing to a brutalized agriculture; and shortage of labor, owing to poor man-hour productivity, which is causing the Kremlin to import huge slave gangs from the inexhaustible manpower pool of China. But these troubles of the Kremlin planners are a mighty poor consolation when we look at the continuing growth curve of Soviet strength. More particularly they are a poor consolation when we consider the special aspect of the Soviet growth process which is the third element in the great strategic revolution of our time.

*The development of weapons systems which can reach from continent to continent* is thought by most of us to be another American monopoly. We are confident—perhaps too confident—of the power of our own Strategic Air Force. But we are unable to imagine that any other air force can ever strike across our ocean moats.

Not so the Kremlin, whose military thinking and order of priorities are plainly suggested by two simple facts. As is well known, Lavrenti Beria, who now stands second in the Kremlin hierarchy, was made the overlord of the Soviet atomic program as soon as the last war ended. As is hardly known at all, Georgi Malenkov, Stalin's chief heir, was simultaneously made the overlord of Soviet aircraft and guided-missile development and production, of the Soviet air defense system and of the Soviet strategic air arm. To Malenkov was given the job of preventing the absolute weapons from being delivered to Russian targets, and of gaining the power to deliver those weapons to targets overseas.

Official secrecy, American as well as Soviet, cloaks all but a few significant

details of Malenkov's achievement. But these are quite enough to give distasteful food for thought.

The first interception of an American reconnaissance aircraft on the Soviet air borders occurred off Siberia, as long ago as 1949. Since then, interceptions have been frequent; and as everyone will recall, some American planes actually have been shot down. By now the Soviet air defenses are rated as both dense and elaborate, being built around an extensive radar net and a special home-defense force of between 3500 and 4000 MIG-15's.

Since the MIG-15 is a day fighter depending on guidance from ground radar, the existing Soviet air defenses are still thought to be too weak for a united attack by our B-50's, B-47's and B-36's, flying in from all quarters. But our twenty-odd groups of medium-range B-50's and B-47's are dependent on allied bases overseas, which are bound to grow less and less dependable as the shadow of crude Soviet power darkly lengthens. Our seven long-range groups of B-36's, which are the backbone of our Strategic Air Command, are already rated as obsolescent, with no early replacements in sight. And the B-36's will be altogether obsolete when and if the MIG-15's are replaced with a night and all-weather fighter carrying its own built-in radar tracking equipment.

This gives sharp interest to an incident of last summer. A Navy patrol plane was intercepted in thick cloud cover over the Black Sea and tracked, still through solid soup, all the way across Turkey to Cyprus. The conclusion was obvious, that this could have been done only by an all-weather fighter with built-in tracking radar. But the Air Force did not wish to draw the obvious conclusion. There was a typical interservice intelligence hassle. The hassle ended in a typical interservice intelligence compromise—an agreement that the Soviets do not now have an all-weather fighter, but will have one soon.

Even if you accept this Alice-in-Wonderland logic, the trend is still plain. The American Strategic Air Command, our main deterrent of Soviet aggression, is already losing some of its deterrent value. Unless strong steps are taken to match the buildup of the Soviet air defenses with continuing improvement of American long-range striking power, the deterrent may become dangerously ineffectual.

Even more significantly, the Soviet strategic air arm began regular reconnaissance of our own air borders sometime last summer. Regular recon missions have been flown from the Kamchatkan and Soviet Arctic bases, over Alaska, Northern Canada and Greenland—because of our big Thule base there. None of these missions has been intercepted. Almost none has been radar-spotted. Indeed we should hardly know that Malenkov's strategic bombers were testing our continental approaches, if the high-flying Soviet planes did not leave their vapor trails behind them.

This Soviet impunity, which contrasts so strikingly with our own experiences on the Soviet air approaches, is hardly surprising. Our overpublicized radar fence is nowhere near the continental approaches, being much too close in to give long warning, and full of holes to boot. As for our defending fighter force, it theoretically comprises twenty-nine groups, or about 2200 planes in all. But some of the groups do not exist. Almost all the planes are at least obsolescent. Some



are even useless radial-engined fighters left over from the last war. Current all-weather-fighter production is shockingly low.

Meanwhile, as may be inferred from the Soviet air reconnaissance of this continent, Malenkov's strategic air arm has been gaining strength. At present it is still built around 1000 TU-4's, the improved copy of a captured B-29 which is comparable to our B-50. Like most of our own strategic aircraft, the TU-4 lacks intercontinental two-way range. The Soviets also lack the chain of advance bases on allied soil which substantially improve our capability.

Yet Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg himself has repeatedly warned us that the TU-4's may well be used for one-way sacrifice missions. Or the TU-4's may be saved, and far cheaper yet far deadlier planes may be sacrificed, if Malenkov exploits the curious aerodynamic possibility of the TU-4's carrying small jet bombers under their wings, in a

certain "technological break-throughs." Lincoln's other findings, which are the very opposite of hopeful, may be briefly summarized as follows:

First, the existing and presently planned American air-defense system is hopelessly weak. If it achieves 10 per cent of interception of an attacking force, it will be doing wonders.

Second, the Soviets will have both the atomic bombs and the long-range air power to deliver a massive intercontinental attack within about two years.

Third, therefore, this country will be nakedly exposed to air-atomic "devastation" by the Kremlin within two years, unless immediate counter-measures are taken.

We may hope the Lincoln time schedule is pessimistic. Certain respectable authorities argue that the time of total danger will not come for three or four years. But this is the only honest qualification. It is frivolous to dismiss the Lincoln findings with the phrase, "The offense is the best defense," especially when our own offensive power is weakening. It is downright shocking to mock Project Lincoln for advocating an "air Maginot Line," especially when our own military plans concede to the Kremlin the inestimable privilege of striking the first blow, which may itself prove decisive. These current Pentagon clichés are mere frightened evasions of the hard and central fact, that only the greatest and most urgent American efforts can now prevent this country from coming within easy, direct range of Soviet air-atomic power. If and when that day comes, the grand strategic revolution of our time will be tragically complete.

Nor can we be certain that day will not come, even if we now lay out five or six billion dollars a year for new and better air defenses. There is still the next phase to think about—the phase of long-range guided missiles. The atmospheric missile, ram-jet-powered and flying in the high supersonic speeds, will be all but impossible to intercept. There is no known way to intercept the ballistic missile—the two-stage rocket like a huge, doubled-up V-2, flying at near planetary speeds outside the earth's atmosphere, which is thought to be the end of this particular road of weapons development.

An American industrialist with direct responsibility has recently given the considered opinion that this country could have a ballistic missile within five years, by a special effort on the pattern of the Manhattan District Project. In practice, he added, "God knows when it will be," since these huge and terrible birds are immensely costly, and our long-range-missile projects are now lumped in with twenty-four other projects for missiles of short and medium range, with a total annual appropriation of about \$1,000,000,000. Meanwhile, the Soviets are believed to have been making an all-out effort to develop an intercontinental missile ever since the end of the last war.


Some experts therefore forecast a Soviet ballistic missile by 1957 or 1958. Others think this forecast is unduly pessimistic. Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a long and anxious emergency meeting, not long ago, for the curious reason that a meteor fell in the Southwest Pacific. The place of fall was a significant distance from the supposed Soviet center of guided-missile development. A missile of this range could hit any American target from launching sites on Soviet soil. The meteor had been mistaken for a missile. Evidently,



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
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
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## ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ PORTRAIT OF A HANDY MAN

By Elias Lieberman

He helps repair the easy chair  
• We just bought on deposit;  
He fixes locks and bells and  
clocks,  
He paints the kitchen closet;  
He waxes floors, sandpapers  
doors  
And mends defective wiring;  
No job is barred. He works so  
hard  
That he has me perspiring.  
Our house complains from roof to  
ground  
When Al forgets to come around!

sort of reversed piggyback. Or the range of the TU-4's can be greatly extended by air refueling, an expedient we ourselves heavily rely on. Or, finally, the TU-4's that are now coming off the production line can be turned into avionic guided missiles—pilotless aircraft with full long-range guidance.

There are excellent reasons to suspect that the Soviets may be using current TU-4 output in precisely this way, which is definitely known to be feasible. TU-4's transformed into avionic guided missiles will have no range problem. In addition, there are good reasons to think that the Soviets may be building a new bomber of the size and range of our B-36, with turbo-jet engines to give improved performance.

The meaning of all these depressing but fragmentary facts cannot be accurately assessed by laymen. But all the known facts have long been under study by the most impressive scientific task force that has ever been assembled in this country for such a purpose. This is Project Lincoln, sponsored by the Air Force and directed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. For two years Lincoln has absorbed nearly half of MIT's very great technical and scientific resources, as well as employing a horde of the most eminent special consultants. Last fall Lincoln made its preliminary report. THE SATURDAY EVENING POST has already given the public the hopeful Lincoln finding, that a truly effective American air-defense system can now be built, although at great cost, by taking advantage of




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
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
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the Joint Chiefs do not think the pessimists are absolutely touched in the head.

It is already very late to try to cope with the remorseless strategic revolution in the midst of which we live. But it is not too late, if all the incredible resources of American ingenuity and American productivity are mobilized for this purpose. We still have freedom of choice. In order to choose wisely, we must first face the facts set forth above, which have not been faced. And when we have squarely faced the unpleasant facts, we must then seek honest answers to some hard questions.

Suppose, first of all, that the Kremlin "will never willingly make war on the United States," as so many people believe. The Kremlin's intentions really may not be directly aggressive. But what will be the situation if the Kremlin merely has the capability of "devastating" this country by air-atomic attack?

Was not British policy paralyzed by the far milder specter of Hitler's *Luftwaffe*, until a cornered and enfeebled Britain had to fight a war of despair? What will happen to American policy, when it is known that America can be destroyed by an order from the Kremlin? Shall we then respond to the challenge, if there is another aggression like Korea? Or if we do not respond to the challenge, what of the resulting crumbling of the Western alliance, the inevitable game of devil take the hindmost throughout the whole free world? How shall we feel as super-Munich is succeeded by super-Munich, while we rage at our own impotence and wonder when our turn will come? Will it be a consolation then, that the Kremlin has not "made war on the United States"?

So far, the hard questions answer themselves. But suppose we make the enormous efforts that are needed to achieve a truly mutual "peace of mutual terror" in Sir Winston Churchill's phrase. What will be the situation then?

Will it be tolerable, for example, when the two giant powers both possess intercontinental guided missiles with atomic or hydrogen warheads? When both halves of the world exist in a state of permanent, twenty-four-hour alert? When in both Washington and Moscow hands are always hovering above a push button that may destroy civilization, and a mistake about a meteor may cause the button to be pushed? Can a free society adjust itself to such conditions?

These questions may seem to answer themselves, like the others. But reflect for a moment on the alternatives to the "peace of mutual terror." One alternative is the still-faint possibility, that grows fainter with each further tilt of the world power balance, that somehow, sometime, something or other will halt the revolution of our time. Relying on this alternative out-Micawbers Mr. Micawber. Another alternative is surrender. Needless to say, this alternative is not to be considered. The third alternative is that which was hinted at by Churchill in the same remarkable House of Commons speech about the Soviet atomic bomb that has been quoted already. He then said:

"In three or four years the Soviets will have a sufficient supply of these bombs to cause a major catastrophe at any time they so decide. . . . I think it very much better that we should make a resolute effort to come to a settlement with them by peaceful means, but on the basis of strength and not of weakness, on the basis of success and not of

fatuous incapacity of resistance to aggression. We should endeavor to come to a settlement with them before they become possessed of this devastating power. . . ."

And in another speech made a little earlier in 1950, the great old man spoke out even more clearly:

"Moralists may find it a melancholy thought that peace can find no nobler foundations than mutual terror. But for my part, I shall be content if these foundations are solid, because they will give us the extra time and the new breathing space for the supreme effort which has to be made for a world settlement. . . . But if there is a breathing space, if there is more time, it would be a grave mistake to suppose that this interlude will last forever, or even last more than a few years. . . ."


"Man in this moment of his history has emerged in greater supremacy over the forces of nature than has ever been dreamed of before. . . . There lies before him, if he wishes, a golden age of peace and progress. He has only to conquer his last and worst enemy, himself. With vision, faith and courage, it may still be in our power to win a crowning victory for all."

Read these words of Churchill closely. They are no mere call for

negotiation at any cost. They are a call to take risks, perhaps very great risks, to make negotiation succeed. Then against the words of Churchill, lay the words of Stalin which are still the leitmotiv of Soviet policy, although the dead dictator spoke them when he was a mere youth, arguing communist tactics in the abortive Russian revolution of 1905. Said Stalin: "What do we need in order to win? First, arms; second, arms; third, arms and arms again!" Stalin's question and answer darkly underline Churchill's noble plea and warning.

To these add the splendid vision of a true world settlement, that President Eisenhower so movingly offered in his first full-dress speech on foreign policy. Then you have the full commentary on the third alternative—the fearfully risky, painful and dangerous but perhaps fruitful, perhaps necessary effort to get a settlement—if need be, to force through a settlement—while there is still time to do so. This is the moment, while the new Soviet regime is still rendered malleable by internal rivalry, and while we are still able to negotiate without the fatuous incapacity that Churchill warned against. If this opportunity slips by, there may not be another.

THE END



## The Role I Liked Best . . .

By MAUREEN O'SULLIVAN

I'll never forget my first day of rehearsal for the role of Henrietta in *The Barretts of Wimpole Street*. I bounced onto the set with all my youth showing, but without having memorized a single one of my lines. If a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, I was dynamite that day.

To make my embarrassment complete, the two stars of the picture, Norma Shearer and Charles Laughton, were letter-perfect in their lines. I wonder now that I wasn't quietly dropped from the picture.

However, from this bad beginning came a good ending. As the picture progressed, I not only learned my lines but also learned to love my part. I liked Henrietta's spirit and her reactions. I liked the Victorian settings and costumes. And, of course, it was wonderful to be in a picture with Norma Shearer and Charles Laughton.

Both were exceptionally nice to me. Each afternoon, in those more relaxed days of movie making, we'd stop work and have egg-nogs in Norma Shearer's dressing room. Afterward, Norma and I usually were in a giggling mood, and once the chop whiskers Charles Laughton wore for the picture seemed irresistibly funny to us. Charles was very cross with us that afternoon, but he soon forgave us.

We worked hard on the picture, but we still found time for fun. Once, when no one could get Flush, the dog in the picture, into proper position, director Sidney Franklin turned to me. "You've handled plenty of animals in the Tarzan pictures," he said. "Can you fix Flush?"

I couldn't coax Flush into position, so I upheld the honor of Tarzan by picking him up bodily and putting him in the right spot.