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COPY 3

THE COLMAR COMPROMISE

ARMY SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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ARMY SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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GAS22 314.7

1352

SUBJECT: Historical Study.

TC: Director
Armed Forces Security Agency
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: AFSA-14

Attached study prepared in the Historical Section, G2,
Army Security Agency and entitled The Colmar Compromise is
forwarded for reference and file.

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

John M. Wilson

1 Incl.
Cy #3 of The
Colmar Compromise.

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GAS 2 314.7

APR 3 1952

SUBJECT: Historical Study.

TO: Director
Armed Forces Security Agency
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: AFSA-1⁴

Attached study prepared in the Historical Section, G-1,
Army Security Agency and entitled The Colmar Compromise is
forwarded for reference and file.

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

1 Incl.
Cy #3 of The
Colmar Compromise.

JOHN D. WELLS
CAPTAIN AG
ASST ADJ GEN

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This Document contains the following TOP SECRET Pages.

Text material - 47 pages

Chronological Summary - 2 pages

Tab 2 - 7 pages

Tab 3 - 5 pages



ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE COLMAR COMPROMISE

Prepared under the Direction of the

Chief, ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

April 1952

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HISTORICAL NOTE

This historical study, dealing with the Colmar Compromise in France in 1918, outlines the emergency measures which must be taken when the compromise of major systems occurs, and indicates the enormous amount of work involved in replacing these systems. Further, it reveals the large numbers of personnel involved in such a compromise from enlisted men to theater commanders, and emphasizes the grave situations in which all concerned find themselves. Hence, it provides important orientation for personnel in communication security duties. The incident itself was insignificant because there was no actual compromise.

The study was written to be Chapter XVI in the manuscript history of Converter M-134-C (ASAM-1, or SIGARM), a technical survey. Because of dissimilarity and special interest, the compromise study is given separate distribution.

15 April 1952

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THE GOLMAN CYBEROM SE

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Chronological Summary

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THE COLMAR COMPROMISE

A. General

In spite of the carefully worked out measures concerning the physical security of the M-134-C (SIGABA), and the high degree of cryptographic security established for it, a very serious compromise of Army and Combined Cryptographic Systems and materials occurred at a Division Headquarters in Europe late in World War II.

Headquarters, Communications Zone, ETO, (Paris, France), dispatched an Urgent-Secret message on Tuesday, 6 February 1945 at 2340Z, to all strategic commands in Europe, informing their signal officers to suspend certain systems due to a possible compromise. The War Department received an info copy of this message No. WX-95403, and by 0149, 7 February, Arlington Hall¹ officials had read the following communication:

Suspend use immediately of editions 18 and 19 of systems 2201, 2222 and 2242, editions 10 and 11 of CCEP 0125 and 0126 and edition 2 of system 514.

Grave possibility of compromise all mentioned exists, all Commanders to be informed of possibility of enciphered traffic via radio in above systems being read by enemy. Reserve systems now being distributed.

Use only secure landline, courier, or reserve systems where available until security restored. Note 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17 not affected as well as CCEP 0101, 0102 and 0131 by above. Inform all subordinate units concerned.

1. Info copy to SPWIC - Code letters for Arlington Hall Station

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The following day (8 Feb 45) two messages from Comzone, EW, sent on the 7th were received at Arlington Hall.

No. TX 95681, 1802Z

Use of msg 0122 A-15 suspended immediately due suspected compromise. Ascertain from subordinate holders under your jurisdiction and inform this headquarters earliest possible to put edition A-16 into effect.

No. TX 95749, 1900Z

Bring into effect immediately COMOP 0131-14 for intra-service U. S. Army use only as temporary measure. Distribution now being made in Army Ground Forces for issue to divisions. Ground Force divisions will commence use as soon as document available. Ground Force divisions will hold COMOP 0131 until normal system and security restored.

A fourth message, No. TX 96041² had been received at the War Department and subsequently by AHS on 8 February, which still gave no definite information nor details concerning the compromise. It was not until 10 February at 2300, when the officer in charge of the War Department Code Center called Colonel Clinton B. Alsopp, Chief, Security Division, AHS, to tell him that an extremely important message, No. 96921³ concerning the compromise had just been received, did AHS officials become cognizant of the fact that the SIGABA itself and rotor baskets, MICVI and SIGA WQ were lost. The message read as follows:

Parked truck belonging to two eight infantry division containing following documents stolen in Colmar France: SIGABA,

2. Outgoing message No. TX 96041, 8 Feb 45, from Hq. Comzone 1945Z, back message signed Eisenhower, read as follows: Now suspected compromised SIG FSC-3 emergency distribution in progress in an effort to make 12 February date for edition 4 possible. Notify all holders concerned.
3. Outgoing Secret message No. TX 96921, 10 Feb 45, 1907Z, from Hq. Comzone, European Theater of Operations, USA, Paris, France.

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The following day (8 Feb 45) two messages from Comzone, ETO, sent on the 7th were received at Arlington Hall.

No. BX 95681, 1802Z SECRT

Use of TOR 0122 A-15 suspended immediately due suspected compromise. Ascertain from subordinate holders under your jurisdiction and inform this headquarters earliest possible to put edition A-16 into effect.

No. BX 95749, 1900Z SECRT

Bring into effect immediately OGP 0131-44 for intra-service U. S. Army use only as temporary measure. Distribution now being made in Army Ground Forces for issue to divisions. Ground Force divisions will commence use as soon as document available. Ground Force divisions will hold OGP 0131 until normal system and security restored.

A fourth message, No. BX 96041² had been received at the War Department and subsequently by AHS on 8 February, which still gave no definite information nor details concerning the compromise. It was not until 10 February at 2000, when the officer in charge of the War Department Code Center called Colonel Clinton H. Allsopp, Chief, Security Division, AHS, to tell him that an extremely important message, No. 96921³ concerning the compromise had just been received, did AHS officials become cognizant of the fact that the SIGABA itself and rotor baskets, SIGIVI and SIGA HUG were lost. The message read as follows:

Parked truck belonging to two eight infantry division containing following documents stolen in Colmar France: SIGABA,

2. Outgoing message No. BX 96041, 8 Feb 45, from Hq. Comzone 1945Z, took message signed Eisenhower, read as follows: Now suspected compromised SIG ESC-3 emergency distribution in progress in an effort to make 12 February date for edition 4 possible. Notify all holders concerned.
3. Outgoing Secret message No. BX 96921, 10 Feb 45, 1907Z, from Hq. Comzone, European Theater of Operations, USA, Paris, France.

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