

*cc
Sum
12/10/44*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Madrid (SPAIN)
To : Tokyo (SUMMER - Vice-Chief, General-Staff)
8 December 1944
JAS

510 . (Parts 1-5 complete)

I believe that the Leyte operations are so important that they may decide the outcome of the Greater East Asia War. Therefore, I hope you will excuse me if, regardless of my inability to cast any light on the current military situation, I offer my humble opinions on the subject.

1. I think the Americans show by these operations that they are not pursuing any diplomatic courses, but are resolved to decide the war by force of arms, to make this the basis of their policy and to continue fighting stubbornly, no matter what losses they suffer, until they have won the war.

2. It is the peculiar characteristic of the strategy of the American Army, that it is based on great material strength. We cannot overlook the scale of American operations, always carried out with absolutely superior military strength, nor the grandeur of their conceptions, the resolute and daring ideas of their command. The home-country is untouched by the horrors of war and is vast and powerful. The U.S. has suffered some losses but not enough to have received a mortal wound. It is only when the Americans (? have been made to see the terrific costs of operations ?) that defeatism will spread amongst them.

PART 3:

There are two things in the current Leyte situation which I find incomprehensible: The first, how it

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WAR DEPARTMENT

D-8484
Page 1

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is that our navy, after inflicting such tremendous losses on the enemy, should then, to all purposes, have disappeared from view, while enemy-task forces keep on appearing in the Philippine waters, and the enemy continues to organize great transport convoys and to supply his troops; the second, how it is that our air strength, which could so easily be concentrated and supplied, has not gained that air superiority in the Philippines which would give us mastery of the seas.

In opposing enemy operations which are on a great scale, we too, must make our preparations and our plans on a great scale. Against the enemy's tenacity we must pit equal tenacity with equal disregard of losses.

The enemy is now carrying out continual air-raids against Japan proper, but I judge these raids to be containing operations connected with the Philippines operations.

In my opinion it is absolutely necessary that we concentrate all our air strength in the Philippines, and immediately wipe out the enemy's landing forces with superior strength, and thus decide the Greater East Asia War at this time.

Inter 8 Dec 44 (1)
Rec'd 8 Dec 44
Trans 10 Dec 44 (9387-t)

Japanese

D-8484
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WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

6619

From: Berlin (Oshima)
 To: Tokyo
 11 October 1944
 JAA

#1135

Message #322 sent from the Embassy in France to Your Excellency.

At the time when we evacuated our office at Vichy the condition of public order was extremely bad, and I was very apprehensive that some untoward situation might arise in that place or its vicinity. Because of air raids and the activities of the Maquis I considered it both from the standpoint of preservation and safety to be very difficult to convey such an important machine as the HINOKI from Vichy to Belfort, a distance of 500 kilometers (it took four days to make the trip). Therefore, we decided to destroy the machine.

As for its destruction I entrusted the matter to the two men who are in charge of it and two other members of my staff, and they completed the destruction between 10 p.m. on the 19th of August and 2 a.m. on the following day. As for the place and operation by which the destruction was carried out, on the basis of your instructions given in your circular telegram #2330^a in 1941, we first removed the covers from the body of the machine and the rectifier, then we took the cryptographic unit and the printing unit apart by removing the screws. We then detached the connecting unit and dismounted it into its smallest components, after which we knocked it to pieces with a hammer. We were particularly careful to destroy the cryptographic unit completely. The inflammable parts

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Page 1

WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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such as the electric wires, plug board, and ebonite rods we burned up with a mixture of gasoline and fuel oil. Among the various parts that we took apart and destroyed we took the frames of the cryptographic unit and the printing unit, the frame of the rectifier and the typewriters (a) and (b) and before dawn on the 20th threw them away and scattered them about in various places from three to five kilometers northwest of Vichy (these were places that we had selected beforehand when we considered that such an occasion might arise). As for the other small parts we threw them in the river along the road between Vichy and Dijon during the 20th and 21st of August as we went along.

a - CI-2645.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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Rec'd 12 Oct 44

CI-2655

WAR DEPARTMENT
~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~

From: London (GHLRK)
To: Tokyo (Winter) (Head, General Affairs Section)
13 August 1940
JAS

139 Five-part message

(Part 1)

Answer to your wire #521^a.

1. I have as yet no evidence as to whether or not the British have already solved Japanese codes. However, according to a reliable source, "both England and Germany have succeeded in solving the codes of almost all the major nations in the world, and the British Secret Intelligence Bureau employs Koreans and Chinese." An American Aide [HOSAKAWA] stated, "The English can solve any code, no matter how good, within a week, so you will have to communicate secret material by messenger only." Consequently I have become cautious [in sending messages], fearing that my wires may be solved and read.

(Part 2)

2. In peace-time England, the Army, Navy, and Air Force each had an agency for cryptanalytic and other intel-

Japanese

C - 1166

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
WAR DEPARTMENT

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ligence activities. (In the War Ministry is was a section in the Intelligence Department.) It is almost certain that when the war started a joint Secret Intelligence Bureau (called "The Black Chamber") was set up, which is carrying on cryptanalytic work with the aid of a great number of expert Specialists collected for the purpose. However, we do not know who controls this Bureau, how it is organized or anything of that sort.

(Part 3)

GIST^b

3. Mentions that he has heard that the British are also intercepting written communications, have special switchboards for listening in on telephone conversations, and even have means for listening to conversations in private rooms.

(Part 4)

4. Because of all these facts, all of us are being very careful, both in the handling of code materials and in our personal speech and behavior. An aide personally tears up and burns the papers on which incoming and outgoing code messages have been written. Hereafter please see

Japanese

C - 1166

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
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to it that messages from Japan do not contain an encoded text almost identical with a public announcement or a DOMEI wire, and that code text having to do with local firms is carefully composed.

(Part 5)

5. According to a statement by a --LU-- official, Germany has lately gone ahead of Britain and the United States in cryptanalysis, and has directly under the Propaganda Ministry (?intelligence?) and code schools (?in which the subject is studied systematically?) and which serve both for research and training.

a - Not available.

b - Text incomplete in Part 3.

Inter --N-- (?) Japanese
 Rec'd --M--
 Trans 1601 26 Nov 45 (9387-1)

C - 1166

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~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~
 WAR DEPARTMENT

Gen. G. Army

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Training course
of fortification &
engineer's school*

From: Berlin (GMBRK)
To: Tokyo (Summer) (Vice Chief, General Staff)
24 August 1944
JAS

Ø59 Part 1*

To the Vice Chief of General Staff and to the Chief of Ordnance Administration Headquarters:

Gist of Colonel ITO's field report on the short course of the fortifications and engineers school:

I. Training and other matters:

1. A good part of the school management visits the actual battlefields, and is assigned to actual participation in the construction of fortifications.

2. Using a very small number of instructors, they give a short course (about 3 weeks) in the construction of field fortifications to 60 officers at a time, men brought in from every area. (A good many of them are company officers with the advantage of preliminary training and men with engineering background in construction, civil-engineering, etc.)

all 2-12 same #
* - ~~Parts 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12 same number; Parts 2, 5, 7, 8 in process; Part 11 not readable.~~

Inter 26 Aug 44 (2) Japanese D - 6666
Rec'd 26 Aug 44
Trans 1559 18 Oct 44 (3020-1)

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Berlin (GMBRK)
To: Tokyo (SUMMER (Vice-chief, Gen. Staff))
25 August 1944
JAS

59 Part 2*

3. The substance of the training course is varied to meet new developments in the situation. In the short course, emphasis is placed on field fortifications, and on ground fortifications in particular. They teach the outline of organization of fortifications and the essentials of construction of the various kinds of armored works. They are taught the necessary practical matters for their duties as supervisors of fortification-engineer units.

4. Officers who have taken this short course are sent principally to the Eastern Front.

* - Parts 1, 3-12 same number.

Inter 26 Aug 44 (2,92)
Rec'd 26 Aug 44
Trans 0912 5 Dec 44 (9390-g)

Japanese

D-6666

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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*TODT Org
Attached to Fort
Eng. Hqtrs - supplies
labor for construction of
fortified positions*

2 Units
From: Berlin (GMBRK)
To: Tokyo (SUMNER (Vice Chief, Gen Staff))
25 August 1944
JAS

#059 (Part 3*)

The TODT Organization, which is attached to the Fortifications Engineering Headquarters supplies labor [mostly foreign] for the construction of fortified positions. Germans drafted through labor societies are used to direct the construction work.

(Part 2). The German Army's present Fortification Organization capacity.

1. Up to now --2G-- there has been no sign of sufficiently strong positions on the Eastern Front.

* - Part 10 same number 7-8 same #
Parts 1-2, 4-9, 11-12 not yet readable. 3, 9, 10 + 12 same as 4 + 6
Inter 26 Aug 44 (2)
Rec'd 26 Aug 44

Trans 1127 13 Sept 44 (9387-o) Japanese D-6666

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WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Berlin (GMBRK)
To: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff)
25 August 1944
JAS

#059 Part 4*.

Consequently, the positions do not consist of many zones, but of about one zone only. This is caused by the great distances of the many fronts and the (?shortage?) of materials to construct such positions, as well as the labor and the means of transporting it.

2. The width of the position occupied by a division depends on the terrain. Of course, it is not always the same in every case, but this usually amounts to 15 to 20 kilometers, and at times to 40 kilometers.

3. Outline of the organization of the position.
The position installations are very fundamental,^a

* - Parts 3, 6, 9, 10, and 12 same number; parts 1, 2, 5, ^{same #} 7, and 8) in process; part 11 not readable.

a - Continued in next part.

Inter 26 Aug 44 (2) Japanese
Rec'd 26 Aug 44
Trans 11 Oct 44 (9390-y)

D-6666

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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From: Berlin (GMBRK)
To: Tokyo (SUMMER (Vice-Chief, Gen. Staff))
25 August 1944
JAS

59 Part 5*

. . . they merely construct between the most advantageous line on the battlefield (this is called the "main line of combat") and a line 200 to 300 meters to its rear, two liaison trenches running parallel^a to the lines, and some more liaison trenches which run perpendicular^b to the main line, thus joining together the above two liaison lines. They construct also some short liaison trenches which shoot off from the above ones. Tank traps consist of positions covered by artillery set up on a line two to three kilometers to the rear of the main line of combat.

- * - Parts 1-4 and 6-12 same number.
- a - YOKO HOKO.
- b - TATE HOKO.

Inter 26 Aug 44 (2)
Rec'd 26 Aug 44
Trans 0912 5 Dec 44 (9390-g)

Japanese

D-6666

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

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From: Berlin (GMBRK)
To: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff)
25 August 1944
JAS

#059 Part 6*.

2. Between the main combat line and the artillery support positions are the so-called lines of defense. In this interval are placed all sorts of light and heavy infantry weapons. The artillery troops are usually located to the rear of the positions on the artillery (?line?).

3. The positions described in 1 are organized for invincible defense by reinforcing them in time, materials, and labor, and by having all units from squads to battalions construct obstacles in their respective areas to afford a truly desperate defense.

* - Parts 3,4,9,10 and 12 same number; parts 1,2,5, ^{same #} (7 and 8) in process; part 11 not readable.

Inter 26 Aug 44 (2) Japanese
Rec'd 26 Aug 44
Trans 11 Oct 44 (9390-y)

D-6666

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Berlin (GMBRK)
 To: Tokyo (Summer) (Vice Chief, General Staff)
 25 August 1944
 JAS

Ø59 Parts 7 and 8*

III. Battle experiences bearing on the construction of fortifications:

1. Choice of position:

Since positions on the forward slopes are very often prematurely destroyed by concentrated fire on the occasion of any large-scale enemy offensive, they recommend the selection of positions on the rearward slopes. When positions on the rearward slopes are thus used, the losses inflicted by the enemy tend to be slighter, and the disadvantage of not being close to the main fighting line is overcome in the following ways:

One can enhance an already adequate fire-power by guiding it through observation, etc. carried out either from commanding heights to the rear or from

(Part 8)

the flank or, again, from individual positions set on the forward slopes.

2. Anti-tank measures:

(1). When one builds the tank-traps out in front of the main fighting lines, the disadvantages entailed in their use as positions for assault against the enemy are greater than the advantage gained by stopping the tanks with them.

Japanese

D - 6666

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Page 1

WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT~~TOP SECRET~~

It is better to build the tank-traps within the main zone of fortifications (and preferably in double lines) than out in front of the main fighting lines.

* - Parts 1,2,5 in process; Part 11 not readable;
Parts 3,4,6, 9,10, 12 same number.

Inter 26 Aug 44 (2) Japanese
Rec'd 26 Aug 44
Trans 1445 19 Oct 44 (3020-1)

D - 6666

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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2 Units

From: Berlin (GMBRK)
 To: Tokyo (SUMMER (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff)
 25 August 1944
 JAS

#59 Part 9*

2. Technique of liquidating enemy tanks in a given area.

Mines will be laid to cover as much as possible every section of the area. In addition to this the tank traps mentioned earlier will also be employed to arrest tank activity.

3. In addition to setting up tank obstacles, anti-tank guns must be placed to fire as much as possible on every part of the field. Moreover, in choosing the gun positions, it is necessary to use the terrain so that the guns will not be run over by the tanks.

4. Since the enemy has infantry troops following the tanks, these troops must be repulsed by machine-guns located near the anti-tank guns.

* - Parts 3 and 10 same number; parts 1,2,4-8, 11 and 12 not yet readable.

Inter 26 Aug 44 (2) Japanese
 Rec'd 26 Aug 44
 Trans 1553 18 Sep 44 (9390-H)

D-6666

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Tactics, Mit
 T technique of liquidating
 every tank is and of every
 anti-tank guns*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 Units
From: Berlin (GMPK)
To: Tokyo (SUMMER (Vice Chief, General Staff))
25 August 1944
JAS

#059 (Part 10*)

These anti-aircraft gun and machine gun positions are constructed and equipped so as to serve as nests of resistance.

3. Provisions for defence against bombing:

(1) Since fortifications on the Atlantic Coast were destroyed by heavy artillery carpets (TEPPICH), in the future permanent fortifications will have to be protected with armor and casemates.

(2) The dug outs and gun shelters on the Atlantic Coast were able to withstand both the carpets and naval gun fire.

* - Part 3 same number
Parts 1-2, 4-9, 11-12 not yet readable.

Inter 26 Aug 44 (2)
Rec'd 26 Aug 44
Trans 1127 13 Sept 44 (9387-o)

Japanese

D-6666

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

*Coastal defenses
vicinity of Atlantic
Coast defenses
need for
rest*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Berlin (GMBRK)
To: Tokyo (SUMMER (Vice-Chief, Gen. Staff))
25 August 1944
JAS

59 Part 11*

Gun shelters in the future will be simple in construction, but a greater number of them will be built. The thickness of reinforced-concrete shelters is 150 centimeters, which makes them impossible to (?destroy?).

(3) RINGUSHUFENDO^a (independent combat trenches for one or two men, attached to bunkers) are excellent for combat purposes (Atlantic coast fortifications and battle fields in the east).

4. Measures against attacks from the rear.

* - Parts 1-10 and 12 same number.
a - German word, probably RINGSTELLE.

Inter 26 Aug 44 (2,4,92)
Rec'd 26 Aug 44
Trans 0912 5 Dec 44 (9,90-g)

Japanese

D-6666

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

TEPPIC
 H. J. a. H. 124
 Copies of actual documents
 furnished. Coast defense

2 Units

From: Berlin (GEMERK)
 To: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff)
 25 August 1944
 JAS

#059 (Part 12*)..

1. Since the enemy usually swings around and attacks from the rear, it is necessary to organize key position resistance nests which can be defended on all 4 sides. (Atlantic Coast fortifications)

2. The above has proved effective through experience on the Eastern battle line. Therefore, in the chain defense system, too, they are constructing their internal organization on the key position resistance nests system. (See part 2).

* - Parts 3, 9 and 10 same number; parts 1,2,4-8, 11 not readable.

Inter 26 Aug 44 (2) Japanese
 Rec'd 26 Aug 44
 Trans 1427 23 Sep 44 (9603-f)

D-6666

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RK-3943

-- de 7160

11 SEPT 44 2327

-- Tsu 36

On 496 52

11 SEPT 2220

Nika MANILA TO RABAU (M)

"I" Code Message #524, parts 1-4 complete.

In a certain area, there was considerable delay in the disposal of cryptographic materials after communications using them had been stopped. It was only after purchasing tobacco from some natives and discovering that pages from the Army Address Codebook #3 had been used as wrappings for this tobacco that we realized the cryptographic materials had been compromised. This incident which occurred in the Southern Area leads us to believe that the material has fallen into enemy hands.

The numerous occurrences of compromise are deplorable, especially in view of the pressing war situation.

In the near future numerous types of new materials will be issued, the distribution of which will entail considerable difficulty. For this reason, we insist that there be no deviation from the regulations governing the distribution and transport of these materials, in order that the security of the Army's codes be preserved and allotments arrive safely.

Communication codebooks and discriminant additive books as well as conversion squares, etc. have easily distinguishable characteristics which make special care in handling imperative.

This is an order.

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

RK-3943

~~TOP SECRET~~

Message addressed to:

All offices under our direct control

OKA (TSUKASA, NAMPÖGUN YASEN TETSUDÖ

SHIREIBU, NAMPÖGUN BÖEKI KYÜSUIBU,

NAMPÖGUN [?KÖKÜ?] KYÖIKUTAI)

MORI (HIKARI)

HAYASHI

AKATSUKI

SAMBÖ HOMBU

W.D. LI 472 327 411 322
F11 903 4930 3782 1503
F11 743 1225 7028 4310
F11 289 0351 2604 8997

Trans 13 Oct 44

(8061,1026, 1181-f)

RK-3943

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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F 38712-A

Q28 238 8131 0073 3887

- de 10280	10 Jul 44	1852	95
Tsu 28	On 299	52	9 Jul 44 2320

ATE: --E--

Manila to Menado

"I" Staff #1 Message #876, Part 1

Because there are many careless points in the handling of --LG-- secret documents, they get lost (stolen). The frequent occurrences (of this) are indeed very regrettable. Recently we got a spy report^a that the enemy is planning to steal orders and important documents on all fronts, so ---

a - CHOHŌ.

Trans 11 Nov 44 (7300-m)

F 38712-A

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT

24.

W. K. Si
~~TOP SECRET~~

--- de 6440

29 JUL 44 1425

95

-- T 1628

0 238 59

F 29 JUL 1400

M TO M (M)

TRANS.# 1026

IKIOI SEN Staff Message #154, parts 1 and 2

Beginning 1 August, please use temporarily (until the arrival of the main body of the GUN SHIREIBU) the KAGAYAKI SHUDAN Codebook when communicating with our SENTO SHIREIJO.

Further, from the point of view of the present war situation concerning the BIAK and NOEMFOOR detachments, there is an excess of rigmarole and waste of time connected with the compilation and distribution of cryptographic materials. In addition, we are afraid that communication will become impossible, since the materials may not be ready on time. Under these circumstances, please (?communicate with?) the S.A. HOMEN BUTAI.

End message

*Instruction
Please*

W.S.# W6 985 5331 2132 8568
W6 454 3574 0481 5465

C.I. Comment This is the original of the "rigamarole and waste of time" reference. ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

7552

From: Washington (Afghan Minister) (Afghan Legation)
 To: Kabul (Foreign Office)
 15 August 1944
 AFA

#23/23

In continuation of my dispatch #584^a. For some time now the Legation has been without a servant. All my efforts in various cities through employment agencies, personal Afghan and Indian acquaintances, and other agencies - and even also in Canada - have been utterly fruitless. The State Department unofficially has also made many attempts to help me. Moreover, every servant demands a wage of twenty-five dollars.

This situation is unbearable and has driven me to desperation. Two days ago I had to open the door myself for the Iranian Minister. Then, since there was no one to open the door for the man who came to read the electric meter, I had to excuse myself from His Excellency to go open the door for him.

--U-- therefore either send me at once a capable servant, or grant me immediately the salary I have proposed, or send a Minister who is able to endure this state of affairs, since, with all due respect, I have neither the qualifications of a doorman nor those of a sweeper.

a - Not available.

Inter 15 Aug 44 (59)
 Rec'd 17 Aug 44
 Trans 20 Aug 44 (5040-B)

Afghan

#136160

~~TOP SECRET~~*requested*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~COPY~~

~~GLINT~~

[Redacted] 7 Oct 47

From:
To :

9 Sep 47
51

At the beginning of one of your telegrams there is a five-letter group MDGSC. What significance has this?

Cipher Office.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
EO 3.3(h)(2)

TI
TR
TT

M

4 Oct 47 1722Z

3636

SS
GR 17

[Redacted]

[Redacted] 7 Oct 47

From:
To :

13 Sep 47

67

Your telegram received^a.

The five-letter group MDGSC at the beginning of the message has absolutely no significance. It was added solely to mislead anyone here studying cryptanalysis into thinking that it was the name of a codebook.

a -

[Redacted]

TI
TR
TT

M

4 Oct 47 1722Z

3636

SS
GR 25

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~COPY~~

~~GLINT~~