

10 TIMES-HERALD
Washington, D. C.
TUESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1950

U. S. Intelligence Shakeup Urged By Byrd, Bridges

By WALTER TROHAN

Drastic shakeup of the Nation's intelligence service was asked yesterday by two senators who criticized the failure of the United States to be prepared for the Communist attack in Korea.

Sen Byrd (D) of Virginia declared that events of the last few weeks have demonstrated need for overhauling of intelligence agencies. He was supported by Sen. Bridges (R) of New Hampshire. Both are members of the Senate armed services committee, which handles the military budget.

Reorganize For War

"The whole intelligence setup ought to be reorganized on a war basis," Byrd said. "I am particularly disturbed because military leaders here thought that the North Koreans had committed most of their troops to the fighting zone and now we find that more reserves are being poured into the battle."

Bridges said the best available information shows the United States was caught napping by the attack. He wants the Senate committee to investigate the intelligence setup with a view to recommending revision of its entire structure.

Chief Is Questioned

"I hope that intelligence from other parts of the world is better and has been better evaluated than that which we got in Korea," Bridges said.

Shortly after the Korean attack, the Senate committee briefly questioned Adm. Hillenkoetter, director of the central intelligence agency, on the nature of information being reported here.

Hillenkoetter said CIA had reports on massing of North Korean troops at the 38th parallel for more than a year before the invasion. He said CIA made no attempt to evaluate these reports, but merely passed them on to other government departments.

Washington Failures Blamed For Korea Intelligence Fiasco

Information on Communist Moves Ignored by Strategic Planners Here

By WALTER SIMMONS

U. S. HDQ. IN KOREA, Aug. 7 (CTPS)—The failure of American intelligence at the start of the Korean war was partly local and partly due to a lack of Washington co-ordination.

These points are notable:

1. Intelligence in Korea failed to predict the enemy's June 25 D-day

2. Technical intelligence in Washington failed to give the military advisers in Korea a true picture of the Russian T-34 tanks used so successfully in the first month of the war.

Had Accurate Dope

3. American officers in Korea had accurate information on the North Korean military build-up at all times. But intelligence was fooled by the numerous false invasion alarms.

The South Korean army was alerted twice in May and once in June by such false alarms. The Americans had grown so accustomed to them that they scoffed when President Rhee and Premier Mo warned an attack was imminent.

Such alerts—now recognized as inspired from North Korea—date back to 1947. American intelligence knew and reported these facts on the enemy's capabilities:

1. The North Korean army included more than 100,000 men. Of these, 2,000 tankers were trained in Russia. There was at least one regiment of tanks and between 50 and 100 planes.

2. The build-up of army strength began in January with new draft levies supplementing five Russian-trained divisions.

Defenses Set Up

3. A zone three miles deep was cleared north of the 38th parallel during the spring. The Americans were not sure whether this was standard iron curtain technique or to prevent military news from seeping through.

4. The North Korean army was disposed along the border in three defense lines capable of stopping any South Korean attack.

The intelligence picture during June was clouded by Russian-inspired political maneuvers. These included sudden permission for a United Nations representative to visit the north; the dispatching of three North Koreans to the south, and the offer to exchange Cho Man Sik, a famous political leader held prisoner in the north, for several Communists held by the south.

None of these maneuvers was successful. But they produced maximum confusion and misled

intelligence experts. Two days before the invasion, American advisers who had checked the latest estimates were told flatly there would be no invasion for a considerable time.

Veterans Brought In

The intelligence experts noted that from 30,000 to 60,000 Korean veterans had been shipped from Manchuria and Siberia to swell the enemy ranks. Two divisions of Red Koreans had fought on the German front during the war.

The failure of Washington to emphasize the danger of the Russian tanks led to fatal complacency. Almost no information on their armor and armament was available in Seoul when the war broke, although it was in files. The American advisers did not believe the bazookas and 47 MM. anti-tank guns with which the South Korean army was supplied were capable of stopping these tanks. This disbelief continued until the inadequately equipped GIs learned it the hard way.

Times-Herald, Wash., D.C.
August 8, 1950